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Abstract 
In both the German Romantic and the Māori traditions, Sein/Being may be 
described as both finite and endless, and is not a separate phenomenon from 
things in the world but instead one that gives rise to them, providing them with 
Geheimnis/mystery. Forgetting about Being is an issue for the Māori self now as 
much as for the West, however, and it is moreover implicit in various modes of 
colonisation that things in the world should be approached as if they are 
geheimnislos/lacking mystery. To acknowledge Being in all its mystery is to bring 
to the fore, once again, the notion that the activity of Being is not separate from 
the consciousness of the self, or from other things in the world. 
 
The frühromantische/early German Romantic poet and philosopher, Friedrich von 
Hardenberg (Novalis), had written in the late 18th century on the threat that 
Geheimnislosigkeit/the lack of mystery posed for the integrity of things in the 
world. His works are central to this thesis: I approach them with an ontological 
focus and use them as Stoßsätze/sentences that challenge and push, to examine 
how Māori, individually and collectively, are encouraged to forget Being and 
mystery in their everyday interactions with the philosophies of Western 
institutions. I then engage with the dominant usages of the terms ‘whakapapa’, 
‘ako’, ‘whenua’, and ‘mātauranga’, to show that they are characterised by an 
overriding lack of mystery. Finally I use some of Novalis’ fragments to 
romanticise/revitalise those terms and the things to which they refer, in 
conjunction with some other Māori terms, thereby reclaiming aspects of their 
mystery in modern philosophical discourses. I also offer some romanticised early 
German Romantic terms from their positioning alongside Māori ones.  
 
This thesis is innovative methodically and substantively, highlighting two main 
themes: the collaborative approach of referring to a seemingly disparate 
philosophical source to explain colonising influences on Māori metaphysics, 
ontology and epistemology, and the possibility for some substantive critique and 
resolution to those influences. The form of Symphilosophie/[unified philosophy] 
that is referred to here is both collaborative and productive. Novalis’ theories and 
fragments assist method and substance. My thesis brings to the fore the value of 
his sources when they are brought into dialogue with Māori philosophy to 
illuminate the issue of Geheimnis to things in the world. 
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Style notes 
The reader should keep in mind the following aspects of style: 
Technical formatting approach 
As much early German Romantic text is not available in English, or because I 
wished to place greater emphasis on aspects of Geheimnis/mystery than some 
translations offered, I have provided some translations into English myself. Some 
Māori text has also not been translated. Where I have translated German or Māori 
quotes myself, I give the German or Māori first in quotation marks, follow this 
with its reference in APA in text style, and then follow it with a solidus (/), and 
then my translation enclosed in square parentheses. In cases where the translation 
is not mine but another author’s, it is enclosed in quotation marks and then 
followed by its reference, as with the German version. However, where a German 
or Māori term is already very well known amongst those speakers, or has already 
been translated by several sources, I have provided the common definition 
without square parentheses. 
 
The APA rule is that quotes that exceed the 40-word limit be indented beneath the 
paragraph. I have generally followed this rule but, because the quotes often 
combine both German and English and hence their combined word count, I have 
sometimes kept the quotes within the paragraph, particularly when the flow of the 
paragraph is retained by running the quotes on straight from the text. 
 
To draw the reader’s attention to a use of a term that is key, or to highlight a term 
that is significant or idiosyncratic in a discrete piece of text, instead of using 
double quotation marks (which is the norm for APA referencing) I use single 
quotation marks to avoid confusion with direct quotations. Generally I do not use 
quotation marks again for the term thereafter, but will sometimes include them to 
make it clearer that it is the term itself that is being discussed. I also use single 
quotation marks with translations when there is some text between the German or 
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Māori term and the English translation. Italics are reserved for smaller works or 
for emphasis, double quotation marks for larger works when not used for direct 
quotations. 
 
The table of contents shows headings of font size 16 and above. 
Linguistic approach 
To highlight the crucial importance and dignity of one of this thesis’ key terms, I 
have capitalised ‘being’ – therefore ‘Being’. This is to emphasise its importance 
as distinct from things in the world. The phrase ‘things in the world’ refers to 
ideas, feelings and concepts as well as physical matter. 
 
For the non-German reader: German is a highly inflected language, and the form 
of nouns and adjectives can change depending on their context. I make the 
following notes about the incorporation of German terms and text into English: 
 
- Where I have run German quotations immediately on within English text, I 
amend them at the start as if they were situated within German text overall. 
They are therefore declined, where appropriate, so that they fit with the 
English text, as if the immediately preceding English text were in fact 
German. 
- There are some German terms that I use throughout. Where appropriate, I 
have declined these to fit with German linguistic conventions.  
- At page 230, in a heading in chapter five, I use a German adjective 
(‘geheimnislos’) after the dative preposition ‘with’, in relation to the Māori 
term ‘whakapapa’/genealogy. Without either a definite or indefinite article, 
the German rule is that the adjective be declined in a particular way, to 
reflect the gender of the noun (in this case, ‘whakapapa’). German has three 
genders – neuter, masculine and feminine. I chose to decline ‘geheimnislos’ 
so that the activity of ‘whakapapa’ in relation to women is acknowledged – 
hence ‘geheimnisloser whakapapa’. This seems not only appropriate given 
the glaringly obvious fact that women are linked with whakapapa, but also 
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because of the deep metaphysical, and then etymological, associations that 
the term ‘whakapapa’ has with the phenomenon ‘Papatūānuku’/Earth 
Mother/Being. I also declined the adjective so that it reflects both masculine 
and neuter elements– ‘geheimnislosem whakapapa’ – to reflect the equally 
clear connection that men have with whakapapa.  
 
As a noun carrying with it the expression of the neuter gender, ‘whakapapa’ 
could be seen as simultaneously independent of gender.  
 
At the time that Novalis was writing, it was common to use a slightly different 
spelling for some of the terms I frequently refer to. These are ‘Sein’ (which he 
spelt ‘Seyn’), Dasein (‘Daseyn’), and Geheimnis (‘Geheimniß’). Where I am 
quoting him directly, and other writers of his era, I retain that original spelling; 
otherwise, I opt for the more contemporary spelling of those terms. 
 
Not all Māori terms are macronised because often the sources they were quoted 
from did not use macrons. In accordance with The University of Waikato policy I 
have macronised Māori terms in all other instances, but I note that there is a risk 
of the language being standardised (and hence disciplined) at the expense of 
policy, as if speakers would only traditionally pronounce a term in one specific 
way. My contentious assertion here is beyond the scope of this thesis but its focus 
would itself be an interesting aspect of Geheimnislosigkeit. 
 
Subtextual approach 
My overall aim in chapters five, six and seven is to provide a response to the 
German Romantic philosopher and poet Novalis’ Stoßsätze/sentences that push. 
This response draws both on Māori theoretical writings and my own active 
process of thinking. The focus of these descriptions is on the ontology of things in 
the world, and therefore the mystery they either possess or lack for the Māori self. 
In a worldview in which the tendency is to encourage discussion about things as if 
they lack mystery, or as if there is no prior phenomenon that allows for their 
 xii 
emergence or concealment, references to their ontology can be subsumed by what 
are considered to be more fruitful, or valid, discourses. 
 
The reader will observe that in these chapters I have frequently provided a 
considerable volume of information through the use of footnotes. They contain 
those valid discourses that tend to arrange the things being discussed as if they are 
to be interrogated thereafter in terms of their already apparent nature. In other 
words, these discussions order things according to what Heidegger (1993), 
throughout his Sein und Zeit, terms their “ontisch”/ontical character. This ordered 
approach to those things does not reflect on them as if there is that prior, pre-
arranging phenomenon: Indeed, such a reflection is not its concern. A significant 
amount of information and discussion can be generated in that manner. Novalis 
himself did not have a single term to describe this penchant that dominant 
discourses have for the discussion of things in terms of their clarified properties, 
but in one of his works – Die Lehrlinge zu Sais – he gave a cursory nod to that 
seemingly matter-of-fact, empirical mode of description when he stated that “[d]er 
Wind ist eine Luftbewegung” (1960e, p. 100)/“[t]he wind is a movement of air” 
(1988, p. 87). Thus the wind may indeed be talked about in terms of its overt, 
already-established characteristics. In a Māori context, a similar approach would 
restrict ‘hau’/wind, as an event of physics, to its evident and sensible 
characteristics. Immediately, however, Novalis follows this up with a strict, 
qualifying question: “[A]ber ist er dem einsamen, sehnsuchtsvollen Herzen nicht 
mehr, wenn er vorübersaust, von geliebten Gegenden herweht[?]”/“[B]ut is it not 
more to the lonely, yearning heart when it comes murmuring, blowing from places 
beloved[?]” (my own emphasis). The disclaimer he gives here indicates the 
unnamed places that the wind originates from. Those places are mysterious but 
are incorporated with that acknowledged, felt fact of the wind as an entity that 
behaves in accordance with established laws. Novalis’ preference there is to place 
a fact about a thing in the world cautiously alongside a description of its 
mysterious origin. In Māori, to follow Novalis’ approach, the ontological nature 
of ‘hau’ could be considered in its unfathomable depth, in its association with its 
sense of a tempest that gales through things in the world, allowing them to dwell, 
or, as the tohunga/[specialist] Tikao told Beattie (1990), with “a wind or breath 
coming out of their [a person’s] inner being” (p. 76). ‘Hau’ is hence always 
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‘wind’ that appears to be governed by certain laws and displays certain 
tendencies, but this is always secondary to its mysterious, unknowable character.  
 
This approach of Novalis’ is not an uncommon one in his Die Lehrlinge zu Sais. 
Here, Novalis finds it necessary to include the more ordered descriptions in the 
substantive part of his text. Generally he manages this in a considered way, but 
always on the way to a more mysterious discussion. Like Novalis, I therefore 
include some of those sorts of discourses in the text of the thesis where some 
context, particularly historical, is necessary. The reasons for this are evident, but 
in particular they offer a fuller explanation of the reasons for an ontological hiatus 
that I describe in chapter five. To that extent, historical facts are necessary to 
clarify to the reader what actually happened to bring about that forgetting of 
Being, and hence mystery. 
 
At other parts of those chapters, I judge that it is necessary to place these sorts of 
ontical descriptions into footnotes. One of the roles in my footnotes in these 
chapters is to provide a subtext to the main discussion. The subtext consists of 
social, political, historical and traditional fragments related to Māori scholarship 
that, I argue, show my ontological argument in various forms of practice or 
manifestation, but which are not aimed at discussing Being, and would interrupt 
the flow of that argument if they were incorporated into the primary text. To be 
sure, these fragments comprise an important portion of the argument, because 
they show that the realm of Being is not disconnected from everyday living, as I 
go on to argue throughout the thesis. Yet I argue for the primacy of that 
ontological realm, and so the greater portion of space is claimed for that 
discussion. 
 
On one level the subtextual footnote may be seen merely as support for my 
argument. It is true that this device does indeed support it, but the broader 
intention is that it should provide a glimpse into the social manifestation of Being. 
My other, quite closely related and rather more conventional use of footnotes is 
drawn on simply to give additional information for the reader on a related point in 
the text. 
  
 1 
Chapter One: Introduction:‘Geheimnis’/ 
mystery/“Tērā te auahi”  
This thesis explores the Geheimnis/mystery of things in the world for the Māori 
self, primarily informed and challenged through the writings of the Early German 
Romantic poet and philosopher Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis) as well as 
through various Māori strands of scholarship. First, I shall outline the problem of 
‘Geheimnislosigkeit’/[lack of mystery] that threatens a respect for things in the 
world as geheimnisvoll/[replete with mystery]. I propose that, in both explicit and 
tacit ways, strands of Māori scholarship and thought argue for the Geheimnis of 
things in the world. Novalis’ writings (and those of other German speaking 
philosophers) provide specific ontological prompts for me to consider both an 
attribution of Geheimnis to things in the world through the lens of that Māori-
related reflection, and the converse - the forgetting of the Geheimnis of those 
things. In discussing Geheimnislosigkeit and Geheimnis, I aim to do as Novalis 
had done: I shall constantly disrupt the idea that things in the world are self-
evident and completely knowable, as if their Geheimnis were stripped from them. 
Alongside that discussion I inquire into the notion of Being/the Absolute and its 
relationship with Geheimnis. 
 
As this work considers a theory of mystery (and its lack) and Being, I refer 
primarily to Novalis’ writings that highlight the ontological. Of particular 
significance here are his Fichte-Studien (which emphasises both the 
epistemological and ontological aspects of existence), “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen 
und Figuren” from Heinrich von Ofterdingen, Die Lehrlinge zu Sais, and some of 
Hymnen an die Nacht. In these works, a strong argument for the recognition of 
Being and mystery is discernible. Other works of his that I refer to are not 
recognised as especially ontologically focused, but I have detected that there is 
nevertheless an equally strong, if somewhat more silent, attention to Being in 
those works. These works include Das Allgemeine Brouillon, which is Novalis’ 
incomplete poeticising of the sciences, and Die Christenheit oder Europa, a 
fictionalised history of ideas set in an ontological context which argues against the 
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socio-political and philosophical tendencies of modernity that endanger a 
commons-oriented, spiritual outlook on human beings, society and the divine. In 
all these, in one form or another, Novalis describes how Being is commonly 
obstructed, and how it can be reclaimed. As a Māori writer who is concerned with 
both those processes, I approach Novalis’ writings in all cases so that his 
arguments for ontology, and hence Geheimnis, are brought to the surface. 
  
Embedded within this thesis is the continuous presence of my own identity as 
Māori (from the Tūhourangi and Ngāti Whanaunga iwi/tribes). My engagement 
with mystery, with my disturbance of certainty that is held out as a priority to 
various processes of colonisation in relation to Māori, and with my own 
connection to the wider world, begins in the following lament that is often sung 
by my people of Tūhourangi. Even in my recitation of this lament, I introduce 
traditions external to Māori to help delve into its Geheimnis, and to critique the 
given Geheimnislosigkeit of its translation (and therefore its conception even in 
Māori). 
 
The Māori writer in the realm of mystery: “Tērā te 
Auahi” 
Tera te auahi ka patua i Tarawera kai raro iti iho  
Yonder is the volcanic haze that destroyed (those) at Tarawera, and just below  
 
Ko Ngati Taoi i moe ra i te whenua, haere ra e te iwi  
Lie Ngati Taoi entombed by ash and scoria, farewell to you all  
 
Ki te po-uriuri ki te po tangotango ki te iwi ki te po  
(Farewell) to the realm of death, to the darkness, where reside your ancestors  
 
Arohirohi ana taku nei titiro ki te puke i te Kumete  
I feel giddy as I look toward the hill Te Kumete  
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Kai raro iti iho ko te tini a te kura, i a Tuhourangi  
For just below are buried the myriad of precious ones of Tuhourangi  
 
Whakapukepuke ai nga ngaru o Tarawera, ko te rite i aku kamo  
The waves of Tarawera were tumultuous, likewise my eyes are a-flood with tears  
 
Ka whati mai te ngaru, ka oho ra te marino, ko te rite i te iwi  
The wave of volcanic debris broke, causing disharmony, likewise the people were 
in shock 
  
E hora noa mai ra te rae ki Moura, haere ra e te iwi  
(Ash and mud) are spread across the promontory at Moura, goodbye my people 
  
Ki wiwi ki wawa, ki raro ki te reinga – ko wai au ka kite?  
Who knows where you have gone, to the north to Te Reinga – will I ever see you 
again?  
 
Kai kinikini ai te mamae i taku kiri, ki te iwi ka wehe  
Pain pinches my body, for the people who were killed  
 
Whakarehurehu ana taku nei titiro ki Whakapoukorero  
The mountain Whakapoukorero fades from my sight  
 
Kai raro iti iho ko Ngati Rangitihi, toku hoa moenga  
Just below were Ngati Rangitihi, my companions and relations  
 
Na Ngatoroirangi i taki mai te mana o te atua ka hau kai te whenua  
T’was Ngatoroirangi who called upon the mana of his god (to imprison Tamahoi), 
whose fame spread throughout the land  
 
Hurahia (e) nga tohunga, ka maranga kai runga, ka ru ko te whenua  
(Later) priests uncovered and awoke the denizen who caused the quake 
  
 
 4 
Te riri o te atua i whiua ki te tangata, i whiua ki te whenua  
It was thus the anger of the god who destroyed the people, and the land 
  
E hora noa mai ra i te pouriuri, i te po tangotango  
(The people) lie scattered in the world of darkness, in the world of the dead 
  
Waiho nei te aroha, waiho nei te mamae, ka kai kino i taku kiri  
Leaving anguish and pain, to gnaw unceasingly within 
 
I maringi a wai te roimata i aku kamo, ki te iwi ka wehe  
And the tears drop copiously from my eyes, for those who have departed this life. 
(Office of Treaty Settlements, 2008, pp. 353-354) 
 
I begin my thesis with this lament for various reasons. Firstly, Māori writers may 
wish to acknowledge those who have gone before them but still remain in one 
form or another. Secondly, they frequently embark on an academic text with an 
introduction outlining their position, regardless of the discipline(s) in which they 
are working. This sort of preface acts as a signal to the audience that they are 
entitled to discuss elements of Māori existence. They may alert the reader by 
stating that they are Māori – and therefore have a degree of experience and 
expertise in the area of Māori Studies - or they may choose to allude to the fact by 
reciting a piece of text that originates from their tribal area. In this chapter and the 
next I discuss my position as a Māori researcher/writer, with a greater focus on 
the impact of the outside world on that position. I partially aim to clarify my own 
social membership with one of my tribal groups and to signal to the reader my 
personal capacity to deal with those disciplines that I listed earlier and that 
provide points of discussion in my thesis.  
 
The lament also gives rise to an irony concerning the very method of this thesis. 
The irony consists in the situation that the Māori writer is forced to deal with the 
term ‘Māori’ as they write about aspects of Māori existence. Although full 
attention to this problem is beyond the scope of the thesis, and although it is a 
dilemma that would appear to be more sensibly dealt with in the method chapter, I 
propose it is helpful to address it from the outset, as my approach to it will assist 
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the reader as they continue reading the thesis. The problem lies in the following: It 
could be stated that the lament relates to facets of Tūhourangi experience, and that 
I am therefore defined wholly by that experience. On extension, I would be unable 
to use the term ‘Māori’ because it is a general term (and indeed one that did not 
exist pre-colonially to refer to any group of people). My response is that I am also 
affected on a continual basis by the discourse of ‘Māori’ as a colonising notion. 
This effect is largely historical and political, but it also impacts on the very 
identity of the self. My use of the term ‘Māori’ throughout the thesis, then, 
acknowledges the need to talk from the position that this general label offers, to 
provide responses that a collective experience of colonisation gives rise to. 
Pihama (2001) acknowledges the difficulty and comments that “[t]he term 
‘Māori’ is viewed by some as problematic…. The term Māori has … been 
challenged by many Māori people” (p. 1), but she adds that the term can be used 
politically. I agree with both her reservations with, and confidence in, the term, 
and argue that it can be used to reflect the reality of a colonised people who would 
formerly have referred to themselves in other ways. 
 
However, throughout the thesis I also use the term cautiously, particularly where 
it might generalise. If the term generalises then it threatens to homogenise Māori 
people, as Pihama also identifies. Writing about a possible concept of Being and 
Geheimnis for Māori in this manner is especially fraught because it assumes that 
there is a solid, unchanging entity that is undifferentiated. It may become 
authoritative when it is preceded by the adjective ‘Māori’. Again, an irony arises, 
for I suspect that talk of ‘metaphysics’ and ‘Being’ is especially vulnerable to this 
form of discipline, whereas we may talk of ‘the Māori reader’ and ‘Māori people’ 
with relatively more freedom. This susceptibility that arises from representations 
of ‘metaphysics’ and ‘Being’ leads to my resistance to prescribing the nature of 
Being to one experience. The irony at this point is that in the act of asserting a 
Māori notion of Being, I threaten to be prescriptive.  
 
The problems that I have posed here could be fleshed out in another thesis 
altogether but are important to allude to. I also need to make some decisions about 
them. The reader should note that what I discuss in the thesis are actually aspects 
of ontology, Geheimnis, and Geheimnislosigkeit that I propose could be of use to 
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Māori, and I draw on particular writers’ observations and theories that, of course, 
give their perspective on aspects of Māori philosophy. In other words my 
propositions about Being are in fact my limited expressions of what ontology 
might be held out to be, informed by both Novalis’ writings and those from the 
Māori tradition, but I draw back from definitively asserting a Māori ontology. 
Instead, I offer that my approach to the interplay between Novalis’ thought and 
elements of Māori scholarship, to theorise about Being and mystery for Maori, 
could be of interest to the Māori reader.  
 
“Tērā te Auahi” and the mystery of Heidegger’s 
‘legein’/gathering disciplines  
As I engage with the ontological context of mystery, I draw on other cultural 
sources to clarify the mystery of my position as a Tūhourangi researcher. This 
engagement is similar in nature to what Heidegger means when he describes the 
Greek verb legein in terms of its depiction of ‘gathering’, which accords with his 
proposition that, when thinking “besinnlich”/[meditatively], “wir uns auf solches 
einlassen, was in sich dem ersten Anschein nach gar nicht zusammengeht” (2000, 
p. 526)/“we engage ourselves with what at first sight does not go together at all” 
(1966, p. 53), instead of solely using reasoning to produce a conventional 
outcome. Here I am concerned with bringing together a seemingly unrelated 
group of disciplines - German Studies, Māori Studies, philosophy, some law and 
education - without diminishing their distinctive integrity. ‘Thinking’ for this 
thesis is to draw on various strands of thought whilst acknowledging their 
distinctiveness in relation to each other. The lament describes the trauma that the 
Tūhourangi people experienced from the eruption of their mountain, Tarawera: 
This much may be obvious to the reader. But other elements reveal themselves 
too: mystery; life (as opposed, or in addition, to the death that is evident in the 
lament); other finite phenomena (mountains and hills) to name a few. The 
interpretation that I offer here signals my intention to draw on hitherto unrelated 
academic disciplines, whereby the lament requires that I not just stay within the 
usual gloss defaulted to in the English translation but that I step outside of it and 
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think about everything as if it is impinged on by other less obvious elements. This 
constant critique/affirmation process at every step also dictates the method of my 
research, as I discuss in the following chapter.  
 
Again thinking of Heidegger’s interpretation of the verb legein: In ‘gathering’, the 
calling together of elements with a view to revealing an outcome is an aim of this 
thesis. The eruption that the lament refers to took place in 1886, and at this time 
the Tūhourangi were seasoned business people, especially in tourism. Indeed it is 
sometimes said that the reason for the eruption was that Tūhourangi had ventured 
too far from their traditional practices and opened themselves up to rampant 
capitalism. Meanwhile, the composer of the lament names a god (Tamahoi) who 
is decidedly pre-European in his or her origins. Historically and discursively this 
juxtaposition is important because, despite the continued oppression of Māori 
beliefs at the time this lament was composed, the lament calls to itself a number 
of elements, physical and other, to discuss an event, in much the same way that 
legein envisages. Factors of colonial resistance despite colonisation are gathered 
together, alongside purely traditional belief. Legein in a Māori sense would have 
to account for not only the aggregation of traditional events and discourse but 
colonised ones as well. 
 
In turn, these elements are themselves unfathomable. In holistic Māori belief they 
connect to every other thing in the world, both perceptible and those, as “Tērā te 
Auahi” recounts, “in the world of darkness”. They bring with them all those 
elements with which they are connected, continuously and throughout what is 
now dominantly perceived as ‘time’. To this extent there is a degree of the 
unknown inherent to every word in the lament. Although they can be denotatively 
understood, the words themselves necessarily call forth and gather all elements in 
the world. While we may be focusing on one element of the lament, such as one 
word or concept, there is a much more mysterious interplay between all elements 
that cannot be identified. Some of these elements are not even specified in the 
lament, but I go on to argue that a sense of Geheimnis has innate to it a marked 
respect for the lack of presence of an object. It is here that one becomes aware of 
the fundamental mystery of things in the world and their interplay beyond one’s 
perception. 
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The dominant interpretation of the lament lends one to think that the terms and the 
things they signify are certain, and indeed there is a degree of determinacy to 
them. We may be fundamentally certain that an eruption did indeed occur from a 
mountain that is indeed named Tarawera. Yet even such terms, as certain as they 
appear, are surrounded by an aura of mystery. Science, that exemplar and 
advocate of certainty, still intersects with mystery on a regular basis, mainly at the 
theoretical level: Dawkins, an atheist and scientist, argues for what seems to be a 
mysterious effect of the gene phenotype on the environment as well as other 
organisms: 
 
Causal influence [of gene on phenotype] radiates out from the 
replicator, but its power does not decay with distance…. Through a 
variety of physical and chemical media it radiates out beyond the 
individual body to touch objects in the world outside, inanimate 
artefacts and even other living organisms. (1982, pp. 237-238) 
 
In the lament, darkness or “pō tangotango” is scientifically definable, yet within 
the Māori term itself an infinitude of phenomena, which may not be determinable, 
is pulled into the lament. The term ‘dark’ has been coined as the adjectival portion 
of the phrase “dark matter” to describe “the dominant component of the physical 
Universe” for which “there is no persuasive theoretical explanation” (Cahn, 2007, 
p. 2551). I propose some Māori would agree that the adjective ‘dark’ is more than 
the absence of light; it is also engaged with the active presence of invisibility. Pō 
tangotango, equated with ‘dark’ in the lament, takes on an active role of 
movement, as it is in the constant process of ‘taking’ – ‘tangotango’. 
 
The beginning of a discussion of Geheimnis 
I return to the idea that Geheimnis is derived from ‘Being’ in chapter three, but we 
can note at this stage that, even in terms that are scientifically defined, there is an 
equally mysterious and ontologically uncertain aspect. Moreover, it is not just 
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terms that call forth a holistic mysteriousness. Here one may draw on the various 
aspects of mystery that exist between humanity and nature. The works of Rudolf 
Otto, an early pioneer of reclaiming and analysing the mysterious and holy in 
ancient and modern philosophy, were influenced by his studies in theology and 
aimed to specifically identify types of mystery that were at work. He notes that 
‘holy’ has taken on specifically religious overtones that coincide with “vollendet 
gut” (1997, p. 5)/“completely good” (1958, p. 5) but initially carried with it a 
“deutlichen Überschuß” (1997, p. 5)/“clear overplus of meaning” (1958, p. 5). His 
modes of revelation that herald the mysterious include ‘Mysterium tremendum’, 
which itself is broken down into the elements of “awefulness”, 
“overpoweringness”, and “energy”. The first of these is not characterised solely 
by the devastating but also the gentle. In the lament we can clearly see the 
destructive event but alongside some aspects that are treasured – the “precious 
ones of Tūhourangi”. In the second, the ‘majestas’, as a word containing still 
“eine leise letzte Spur des Numinosen” (Otto, 1997, p. 22)/“a last faint trace of the 
numinous” (Otto, 1958, p. 19), we get a sense of not just grandeur and 
overpowering but submergence – of being, as Otto phrases it, “Erde-, Asche- und 
Nichts-Seins” (1997, p. 23)/“‘dust and ashes’ and nothingness” (1958, p. 20), or, 
as the lament would have it, ash and scoria. There is a sense of being “entombed”, 
as the lament notes. The energetic form of mystery refers to that which “[ist] 
rastlos und restlos” (1997, p. 28)/“knows not stint nor stay” (1958, p. 24): The 
entire lament is punctuated with the acknowledgement of this aspect of the 
mysterious. It is the mysteriously active that gave rise to the eruption through the 
god Tamahoi. 
 
What emerges from Otto’s analysis is a discussion of the well-worn, rational-
based ideas of the world against various modes of mystery. He does not discount 
those rationalistic explanations but outlines how there were originally additional, 
more sublime attachments to various things in the world, leading to a kind of 
delight that resides in both solemnity and longing. While ‘fascination’ may seem 
like an overly detached description, in the past it was linked directly to the 
emotional state. “Whakarehurehu” does not just mean the fading from sight that is 
given in the text; it also incidentally carries with it the meaning of a premonition. 
As such, the eruption and all the elements called forth in the lament recur in a 
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longing for the future, in particular to see what will be the emotional reserve of 
the survivors.  
 
Otto’s discussion draws our attention to the problem of mystery, with its corrosion 
by rationalism, and its capacity to be both benevolent and destructive. His implicit 
warning that one should not be satisfied with the current usage of a term is set 
against a backdrop of mystery. Ultimately it is the overall presence of mystery 
that renders a thing in the world unknowable in a complete sense. The noun 
‘mystery’, which is the given equivalent of ‘Geheimnis’, does not do justice to its 
German counterpart. Again it is Heidegger who, with his emphasis on 
etymological semantics, provides us with some assistance by arguing against 
equating Geheimnis with inert mystery. Geheimnis is comprised partly of the 
word ‘Heim’, which equates with ‘home’ or place of origin (Massie, 2007). It is 
this home or point of origin that is concealed but still holds sway throughout 
humanity’s engagement with the world. Geheimnis is active in its concealment of 
itself, and it is from this mystery that one originates and unfolds in the world. 
However, given mystery’s self-concealment, Heidegger warns against trying to 
unveil the “light of truth that shines behind the veil of deceptive appearances” 
(Massie, 2007, p. 43) and instead supports the openness to the revelations that this 
concealment itself holds. For Otto and Heidegger, Geheimnis, or mystery, is 
therefore not an inert ‘thing’ but an active presence in the world. 
  
Novalis’ and Māori elements of thought 
The reader will have already concluded that I am referring to another cultural 
tradition alongside my own cultural reading. Some 12000 miles from New 
Zealand, and nearly one hundred years before the eruption that gave rise to the 
lament I have cited, an Early German Romantic1 poet and philosopher had 
acknowledged that there was a ubiquitous activity that was characteristic of 
mystery. For him, this Geheimnis was a constantly impinging activity, not a 
detached entity. He also argued that some things would likely come into sight of 
                                                
1 From this point on I use the term ‘Romantics’ to refer to the Early German Romantics. 
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the onlooker while others would hide, but that arrangement could change 
instantaneously. Interestingly, this poet and philosopher, Friedrich von 
Hardenberg (Novalis), penned a significant set of poems that also lamented death. 
In this case grieving for the loss of his fiancé, one of these poems titled Hymnen 
an die Nacht rhapsodically disturbs the reader from a solid, self-evident 
interpretation of his text, with components swerving into the view of the reader 
and then moving out, as Novalis intended. Novalis had tried to convey to the 
reader that something much greater than the reader’s own cognitive control was at 
play here, something which allowed a limited understanding to grasp the poems to 
begin with. This unknowable, primordial agent, he maintained, should prevent 
one from speaking about the world as if it were ‘geheimnislos’/[lacking mystery]: 
 
Abwärts wend ich mich zu der heiligen, unaussprechlichen, 
geheimnisvollen Nacht. Fernab liegt die Welt - in eine tiefe Gruft 
versenkt - wüst und einsam ist ihre Stelle. In den Saiten der Brust 
weht tiefe Wehmut. In Tautropfen will ich hinuntersinken und mit der 
Asche mich vermischen. - Fernen der Erinnerung, Wünsche der 
Jugend, der Kindheit Träume, des ganzen langen Lebens kurze 
Freuden und vergebliche Hoffnungen kommen in grauen Kleidern, 
wie Abendnebel nach der Sonne Untergang. In andern Räumen 
schlugen die lustigen Gezelte das Licht auf. Sollte es nie zu seinen 
Kindern wiederkommen, die mit der Unschuld Glauben seiner harren.  
(1960i, p. 131)  
 
Away I turn to the holy, the unspeakable, the secretive Night. Down 
over there, far, lies the world – sunken in a deep vault – its place 
wasted and lonely. In the heart’s strings, deep sadness blows. In 
dewdrops I’ll sink and mix with the ashes. - Memory’s distances, 
youth’s wishes, childhood’s dreams, the short joys of a whole long life 
and hopeless hopes come grey-clad, like evening mist after the sun 
has set. In other places Light’s pitched happy tents. Should It never 
come back to Its children, who are waiting for it with simple faith? 
(1988, p. 11) 
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There is a warning waiting to be expressed here that starts to argue more directly 
for a sense of mystery to be retained even as one is encountering the thing in the 
world as geheimnislos. Novalis, as Heidegger would much later, expressed some 
of his philosophy in caveat form. Similarly Max Weber (1919) would state that, 
under a regime of rationalism and intellectualisation, the inevitable result is 
“Entzauberung” (p. 9)/[disenchantment], in which there would be no room for 
“prinzipiell … geheimnisvollen unberechenbaren Mächte” (p. 9)/[principally … 
mysterious, incalculable forces]. What becomes apparent with these writers is that 
one may not write wistfully from a point of traditional romanticism by, say, 
reciting past tradition as if that were enough: One must also account at the same 
time for a critical form of expression. 
 
The outcome of gathering these different strains of thought and writing together is 
an uncertain one, but it is motivated by a desire to add to what Habermas (1968), 
throughout his Erkenntnis und Interesse, calls “persönliches 
Erkenntnisinteresse”/personal cognitive interests, which for him has both a critical 
and emancipatory aspect and one that retains the dignity of the ‘Erkannten’, the 
thing being thought about. In this thesis I intend to highlight Geheimnis alongside 
a necessary critique of Geheimnislosigkeit so that both the European and Māori 
reader may get a feel for a greater dimension to things in the world. 
 
My Erkenntnisinteresse/motivation to inquire into 
the theme of Geheimnis 
The lament “Tērā te Auahi” both sets down my position as a Māori writer and 
begins to alert the reader to the generally complex nature of Geheimnis. 
Specifically I aim to inquire into the following aspects of the issue of Geheimnis 
for the Māori self and, to a lesser extent, for the scholar of the 
‘Frühromantik’/Early German Romantic tradition: 
 
1. What is the creativity of thought that Novalis provides for a Māori 
consideration of Geheimnis/Geheimnislosigkeit of things in the world? 
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2. More specifically, how might a dialogue between the German speaking 
tradition and Māori academic tradition help us contemplate a 
contemporary and ontological approach to the mystery of objects that 
we talk of, including the Māori terms for these? 
 
Other questions arise within those two main ones above: 
 
1. What are some of the wider ideas and notions of Geheimnis that emerge 
from a discussion of Geheimnis in a colonised Māori context? How can 
ideas and notions of Geheimnis, of the ontological mystery and 
mysterious interrelationship of things, be conceived of in academic 
philosophical contexts? How can they be conceptualised and described, 
without Geheimnislosigkeit resulting? 
  
2. What are the consequences of not considering the mysterious and 
holistic ideas for modern society and modern academia? That is, what 
happens when one approaches things in the world as if they were 
geheimnislos? I pay particular attention to the consequences for the 
Māori self, but also note that there are consequences for non-Māori 
traditions, such as the German speaking ones on which I draw. 
 
3. How can a dialogue between those early discourses about the 
mysterious and the loss of the mysterious that arose in German 
Romanticism, in particular from Novalis’ works, help contemporary 
philosophers to reconstruct and better understand their contemporary 
situation, which is often characterised by the exclusion of the 
mysterious and Being from social discourses? 
 
There are specific factors that have led me to want to inquire into the issue. They 
involve: the largely untraversed nature of philosophical colonisation that Māori 
have experienced; the lack of correspondence between utterances that are grandly 
spiritual on the one hand, and everyday, particularly institutional, activities on the 
other; the teachings of an aunt; and my somewhat unusual wish to place 
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seemingly disparate cultural philosophies in conversation with each other, in an 
expression of ‘Symphilosophie’/[collaborative philosophy]. 
The philosophical problem of Geheimnislosigkeit 
For quite some time I have been aware that Māori would have been colonised 
philosophically as well as by loss of land, language and wellbeing. Indeed the 
discipline of philosophy itself appears to have been colonised, according to 
Millán-Zaibert (2007) who cites Rorty: “Logical positivists such as [Carnap] 
trained students to brush past romance and to spot nonsense. Philosophy in the 
English-speaking world became ‘analytic’ – antimetaphysical, unromantic, highly 
professional, and a cultural backwater” (p. 26). This admittedly harsh rebuke of 
Millán-Zaibert’s is tempered later when she states that “philosophy as a cultural 
backwater would still be preferable to philosophy as a sea of relativism” (p. 27). If 
the type of philosophy that she reproaches is the acceptable one, though, then it 
will more than likely be the one that was given over to Māori in order to make 
sense of the world. The huge amount of literature stating that Māori had a non-
analytical, emotional/spiritual/mental/physical-at-once relationship with 
everything (Durie, 1994; Marsden, 2003; Pere, 1982; Royal, 2009b) would be 
influenced by the analytical presentation of objects in the world to produce some 
very unusual combinations, which are not traditional, may nevertheless still be 
sourced in Māori philosophy, but will need to be analysed and critiqued. My 
discussion of “Tērā te Auahi” has revealed that the given translation needs to be 
called into question, and the belief that analytical, rational and empirical 
philosophy and traditions need to be the assumed ones for Māori now is itself one 
that has emerged through colonisation: As Marsden (1985) warns in a step further 
on from Millán-Zaibert, “abstract rational thought and empirical methods cannot 
grasp the concrete act of existing [for Māori] which is fragmentary, paradoxical 
and incomplete” (p. 163). Marsden’s use of the word ‘abstract’ raises interesting 
issues for the Māori writer who is delving into a colonised, neo-traditional 
approach to the world. I would argue that the traditional view of the relationship 
between self and object was neither solely concrete nor abstract: It was both at the 
same time. In a colonised age, though, it may be necessary to think about these 
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relationships theoretically, without the overly rational and empirical approaches 
that Marsden suggests one avoids. 
 
Novalis and the resistance of the Frühromantiker 
Novalis himself was acutely aware of the effects of philosophical colonisation, 
even if their full impact had yet to be felt. A scientist, explorer, poet and 
philosopher - all achieved before he died at the age of 29 - he belonged to the 
prominent Early German Romantic movement. Alongside the rationalistic attitude 
toward nature during the eighteenth century, there was a parallel artistic and 
philosophical tradition in the West that saw the imposition of an overly correct 
view of the world as detrimental to its traditional life-styles, or more generally to 
more holistic forms of thinking and living. Having witnessed the stark contrast 
evidenced by the change from ‘myth’ to a scientific worldview2, proponents of the 
stance that ‘myth’ and ‘knowledge’ were on an equal footing, such as Novalis, 
questioned the loss of a belief in the holistic nature of language alongside the de-
mythologisation of history and nature. In the Early German Romantic movement 
the critique of instrumental language became the mainstay of the critique of 
modernity, with particular concern directed to the linguistic ordering of nature, of 
traditional human societal and economic order, through modernist forms of 
speech. This critique was sustained through time, with the Romantics’ distinctive 
use of poetry reflected on and taken up into the 20th century3. 
 
In stark contrast to the preferred modern view of things in the world as explicable, 
Novalis drew on a number of terms to describe their inexplicability. In his Die 
Christenheit oder Europa, for instance, he uses what would normally be an 
adjective – ‘geheimnisvoll’/[state or quality of being replete with mystery] – and 
capitalises it to render it a noun at the same time. This unrestrictive approach to 
grammar is a tool of his, and in this case it has the effect of turning what would 
                                                
2 The dramatic move from a holistic perception of the world to a scientific one was the 
result of a malaise that was named in different ways by the German Romantics. Beiser 
(2003) lists them as follows: alienation (Entfremdung), estrangement (Entäusserung), 
division (Entzweiung), separation (Trennung), and reflection (Reflexion) (p. 31). 
 
3 Stefan George and Karl Wolfskehl are two writers who have developed their reception 
of the ideas of the Romantics in the twentieth century.  
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normally refer to the static properties of a thing into a thing that is simultaneously 
active and conceptually incomprehensible. He also uses the term against its 
opposite sense: 
 
[M]an reformirte das Erziehungswesen, man suchte der alten Religion 
einen neuen vernünftigen, gemeinern Sinn zu geben, indem man alles 
Wunderbare und Geheimnisvolle sorgfältig von ihr abwusch. (1960d, 
p. 516)  
 
[The system of learning has been reformed, humanity has tried to give 
the old religion a new, rational, baser sense. At the same time, 
humanity has painstakingly expunged itself of wonder and mystery.] 
  
Even in his use of the word ‘das Geheimnisvolle’ here, he manages to draw the 
reader’s attention to the need for a synchronised mode of thinking, in which I am 
not just describing a traditional Māori approach to mystery but also a consequence 
of not accounting for mystery. It is here that another motivating feature of my 
thesis emerges. 
 
Discordance between traditional utterance and usage 
A predicate of many rationalist and analytic methods of philosophy is a belief that 
a grounding proposition can be found, or that it should be strived for. Then it 
needs to be expressed in clear or systematic terms (Levy, 2003; Solomon, 2003). 
Such lucid certainty the Romantics take issue with. As we shall see in more detail 
in chapter three, Novalis disdained the idea that the individual self was the 
grounding aspect of awareness and philosophical certainty. Here, alongside 
Geheimnis and its negatives, Novalis refers also to ‘Being’, as well as ‘the 
Absolute’. The variety of words he utilises demonstrates that what is being 
discussed is largely unknowable and should not be isolated by one name. For 
Novalis and other Romantics, the Absolute, or Being, although related to the self, 
is prior to it and turns everything into the mysterious. Innate to an apparently 
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straightforward act such as an utterance there is an ontological given, influenced 
by both speaker (who is him- or herself influenced by Being) and the Absolute. 
Friedrich Schelling, a contemporary of Novalis’, noted that talking about the 
Absolute is thoroughly different from talking about the world of appearances. 
Echoing Novalis’ and Schelling’s view, Grant (2006) therefore stated that “[t]he 
philosophical exposition of the unconditioned, or Absolute, is not like the analysis 
of a concept or state of affairs, rather, the exposition of the Absolute occurs within 
the Absolute, as the medium of its own exposition” (p. 1).  
 
 
The disjuncture for Māori 
The extent to which we can have certainty about things as they still retain their 
mystery is an issue that arises for me as a Māori writer because on the one hand 
one commonly sees utterances printed such as “[e]verything has a mauri, 
including people, fish, animals” (Barlow, 1991, p. 83) and yet one will witness a 
discordance between such an utterance and the everyday practices and literature 
of Western institutions, such as law, medicine and education. These institutions 
would often commission research reports seeking to address the ‘Māori problem’ 
that existed between Māori communities and those particular institutions’ 
everyday workings. The reports might have a substantial portion set aside 
detailing what are taken to be Māori core values and beliefs (often overly 
traditional, not contemporary, in their voice), but would then revert to an 
empirical voice throughout the rest of that same report. It was as if the front piece 
of the research felt the need to get the more intangible, ‘spiritual’ and 
metaphysical aspects of Māori existence out of the way before moving on to more 
realistic, pragmatic solutions. Māori philosophy in these cases is attractive as a 
mythical proposition but holds very little credibility as a complete philosophical 
explanation in its own right. 
 
In order to elucidate what is at issue here, we must think about these slip-ups in a 
cultural context. Despite appearances, they are not entirely innocent. In a Māori 
sense they may have very real consequences, but the nature and extent of those 
consequences have not yet been fathomed. Treacherously, the remainder of those 
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commissioned works would still invoke Māori terminology to refer to concrete 
Māori entities – one currently prolific example is ‘whānau’, which appears to be 
attached liberally and discursively cited – but, because of those terms’ new 
context and setting within empirical and objectifying language, they would now 
mean no more than their Western counterparts. Whānau in these texts threatens to 
mean no more or less than its given, ‘family’. Yet these terms were still held out 
as if they retained their original, authentic meaning. This aspect of language, its 
movement over into colonising agendas and realms, as if both the original and the 
colonising have an almost instinctive correspondence with each other, is one that 
remained unarticulated by me for many years, even though I saw it in action in the 
Waitangi Tribunal, where I represented Māori claimants as a lawyer. Here I 
noticed that Māori claimants were allowed to describe their traditional and 
ontological views of the world but unless these were packaged with epistemic and 
linguistic certainty, ultimately it would be the ‘technical’ evidence that would be 
most compelling for the Tribunal. Even though I had not recognised it then, those 
utterances were being constrained to fit the certainty that empirical, rational 
knowledge offered. Here it is as well to consider Schelling’s negative description 
of discussions about Being – namely, the idea that a particular sort of exposition, 
one that talks about an already apparently evident thing in the world (such as a 
concept or state of affairs), is posed as adequate for discussing all things in the 
world. Or as the phenomenologist Martin Heidegger (1993) argued, when he 
highlighted the tendency of modern Western humanity to avoid thinking about 
Being in the ways that the ancient Greeks had: “was als Verborgenes das antike 
Philosophieren in die Unruhe trieb und in ihr erhielt, zu einer sonnenklaren 
Selbstverständlichkeit geworden, so zwar, daß, wer darnach auch noch fragt, einer 
methodischen Verfehlung bezichtigt wird” (p. 2)/“that which the philosophers 
found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a 
clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is 
charged with an error of method” (1967, p. 21). This plainly evident attribution of 
characteristics to things in the world that both Heidegger and Schelling (and, as 
we shall see, Novalis) warn of probably also affects Māori. 
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The teachings of an aunt 
My observations about these discordances, or of a philosophical and political 
denial of Geheimnis, have for some time been accompanied by a nebulous sense 
that things are not right. Largely this disquiet was cultivated in me by an aunt of 
mine, who was a wonderful inciter of mysterium tremendum! Titari Hill, or Aunty 
Betty as we called her, was an amazing ‘kuia’/older woman of Ngāti Tūwharetoa 
who lived her life for her iwi. A staunch Catholic, she was also highly aware of 
Being. We very rarely spoke Māori with each other, although we both could have 
if we had chosen to. I was 15 when I started having a lot to do with her. She was a 
philosopher in her own way and also highly political: She was quite opposed, for 
instance, to the wholesale commodification of kumarahou/Pomaderris4, because 
she had memories of her grandmother collecting rongoa/traditional remedies from 
the forests and using them to treat various maladies. In the main, though, our 
discussions had very little to do with ‘ngā rā o mua’/[the days of old]; they were 
much more to do with the posing of questions to explore what lies beneath the 
surface. This was an active process that required a bringing together of old ways 
of thinking with current colonised settings. Some of these conversations were 
punctuated with great tracts of silence. What I learnt from her was the need to 
theorise the workings of other things – good or bad – beneath what appeared to be 
obvious. Implicitly I was advised to retain some tentativeness in my approach to 
things in the world. 
 
My aunt’s teachings, which did not seem to be self-conscious attempts on her part 
to ‘teach’ me, were characterised by times of theorising and creativity. This is also 
a vital facet of Novalis’ method, which is to ‘romanticise’, and which is described 
in a pedagogical context in his Die Lehrlinge zu Sais. Here neither my aunt nor 
Novalis intend that one stay focused on the past. In many ways, then, this thesis is 
a commitment to her to carry on that task. She passed away some years ago now, 
but would have been amused and unsurprised, I imagine, to hear that I had 
decided to refer to a German Romantic poet and philosopher from the late 1700s 
to discuss issues that we Māori are facing here in New Zealand today. 
                                                
4 Kumarahou is highly valued by Māori for its blood cleansing and antiseptic properties. 
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The desire to engage with Symphilosophie 
My motivation as a Māori writer, to specifically refer to a German philosopher to 
clarify and articulate philosophies that relate to Being and Geheimnis, arises for a 
number of reasons. First, I am familiar with German-speaking cultural traditions, 
and I can read and speak German, and although I had left the language behind me 
for quite some time I still find referring to other linguistic sources a fascinating 
exercise. This alone does not explain my approach, though. Easily the most 
frequent question in respect of my thesis is: “Why are you looking at a German 
philosopher for your topic?” This question frequently implies that we already 
have the answers among our own Māori resources, academy and community, and 
that any forays into Western disciplines in particular are not only puzzling but 
also unnecessary and even potentially dangerous. That there may already be 
resources to undertake similar critiques in our own communities could indeed be 
true, and I am not setting out to either prove or dispute that assertion, but my 
motivation comes from trying to bring a fresh perspective to the fraught topic of 
colonisation. However, I do note that there appears to be a hiatus in discussions 
about colonisation amongst Māori. Possible explorations into that murky area are 
overshadowed by debates in specific, solid sites where improvement is needed, 
such as Māori achievement in education 5 , te reo Māori/Māori language 
proficiency, greater Māori access to resources, and so on. I speculate that it is as if 
the colonisation of one’s philosophies is too hard and unpleasant to talk about 
directly, or as if it has been conceived of as neatly dealt with in its root and scope. 
 
Many Māori are not averse to invoking Western theorists to highlight a political 
dilemma, though. The 1990s saw an upsurge of Māori who referred to Foucault 
and Gramsci, for instance, but these theorists were drawn on to explain political 
oppression, not to theorise different Māori ways of perceiving and describing 
metaphysical phenomena, such as the relation of the self to things in the world. 
They were also not referred to in order to discuss intra-cultural colonising 
                                                
5 Oliver (1998) notes that there is a general tendency to avoid philosophical discussions 
about education, and that those solid sites are focused on. 
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practices. It has been especially important for Māori to identify the subtler, covert 
machinations of State power to examine oppression, but exactly how these less 
obvious practices affect views that Māori have of the world remains an 
underrepresented concern. Although it is not necessary to refer to Western writers 
to discuss indigenous metaphysics or self-colonising practices, the self-affirming 
nature of current views of language, often replicated by Māori themselves, means 
that some sort of outside help is desirable. The more obvious reaction is to default 
to other indigenous writers, and certainly this is a highly feasible option, given the 
apparent, common experiences shared by indigenous peoples. Collective 
indigenous forums, such as the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, allow for the exchange of ideas and for dialogue amongst indigenous 
peoples, thus providing opportunities for discussion on more conceptual topics. 
Even in these forums, indigenous peoples are still aware of their differences and 
avoid taking on the broad ‘indigenous’ name, together with its shared experiences, 
as a cultural reality. 
 
The place of Western philosophers in Māori metaphysics 
It is crucial, though, to understand that Western theorists can be useful in 
contributing to the process of theorising around colonisation. By identifying those 
sites of colonisation, they can encourage debate of a different type than that which 
indigenous peoples commonly engage in. These theorists do not have as their 
target audience indigenous peoples, they cannot describe the indigenous 
experience – and nor do they aim to - but their contribution is more tangential 
because it raises concerns that may not arise within indigenous forums. Many of 
these concerns are precisely so useful because they are starkly different to those 
that usually emerge from indigenous writings. Some examples may be proposed 
here: Heidegger, arguing that “[d]ie Zugangs- und Auslegungsart muß vielmehr 
dergestalt gewählt sein, daß dieses Seiende sich an ihm selbst von ihm selbst her 
zeigen kann” (1993, p. 16)/“[w]e must rather choose such a way of access and 
such a kind of interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself and from 
itself” (1967, p. 37), may attract Māori to a non-instrumentalist approach to a 
thing in the world. Foucault’s (1995) analysis of the Panopticon – that it “gains in 
efficiency and in the ability to penetrate into men's behaviour” (p. 204) - could 
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assist Māori by challenging them to assess whether colonisation has affected them 
to the extent that they engage in disciplining behaviours amongst themselves. We 
can see here the embryonic beginnings, derived from those galvanic Western 
sources, for various Māori discussions that are relevant for their contexts.   
 
I argue that Māori could, if they wanted, apply the philosophies of the Romantics 
in a similar vein. Undoubtedly more surprising than any lack of Māori 
engagement with the Romantics, though, is the general silence of Romantic 
philosophies in concrete and current areas of concern in the West. Bowie (1997) 
suggests that the German Romantics have still to be fully incorporated within 
“contemporary analytical philosophy” (p. 299). The exact degree to which 
Romantic and Goethean thought has left a legacy for modern German 
environmentalism is hotly debated (Ball, 2003). In both cases there is a call for 
German Romanticism to be made relevant and current, an appeal which was 
reiterated at the recent “Die Aktualität der Romantik”/[The Actuality of the 
Romantics] symposium of February 2011, at Monash University, Melbourne. It 
became apparent at the symposium that the Romantics needed to not only be 
discursively sketched in their isolated theories – this has already been in train for 
some time - but also applied to new territory. It was acknowledged that 
Romanticism was supposed to be a living, relevant set of theories that were yet to 
be more fruitfully applied in the social and political spheres, or even be made a 
‘Lebenkunstwerk’/[living work of art], and it was highlighted that the Romantics 
offer numerous possibilities for the application of their philosophies to equally 
numerous but unrelated areas. One of these areas, postcolonialism, when viewed 
through the lens of Romanticism, has the potential to open onto an inquiry into the 
‘Binnenkolonisation’/[inner colonisation] of European societies and philosophical 
thought. The Romantics posit that, philosophically, developed European thinkers 
did not always view things in the world in predominantly rationalistic and 
empiricist ways. 
The need for research into the self-colonisation of Europe 
Novalis and, for instance, philosophical and religious thinkers in central Europe 
(such as Paracelsus and Jacob Böhme) had not always viewed things in the world 
in rationalistic ways, signalling that the deeper, more metaphysical implications of 
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colonisation within Europe remain to be further explored. Both the deep 
metaphysical colonisation that confronts Europe, and even its automatic 
avoidance of that problem, are not frequently traversed areas of concern. That 
Europe has suffered philosophical colonisation through the imposition of 
dominant ideas could be daunting for those who have always considered – and 
indeed lauded – Europe as the coloniser, and as somehow invulnerable to the 
corrosion of its long-held traditional beliefs, especially to a deterioration that 
occurs outside of its control. Yet, to be sure, there has been trenchant critique 
along certain lines. The deep-seated hubris that appears to characterise Europe’s 
belief in its own inviolability is one that Heidegger’s method of Destruktion, for 
example, takes to task when he questions the elevation of reason, and the 
consequent neglect of an inquiry into Being, through Platonic metaphysics 
(Colebrook, 2006; Richardson, 2003), and then through a preference for the 
highly visible (Wolcher, 2008). Heidegger notes, though, that the ancient Greeks 
did not avoid the issue of Being. Novalis, as we shall see, had earlier witnessed 
the philosophical overthrow of a spiritual Europe by objectifying and 
instrumentalising practices. Capra (1982) highlights that before the 15th century 
Europe lived organically. Dorothy Brantz (Forum, 2009), talking specifically of 
Germany’s relationship with nature, indicates that there is now a reluctance on the 
part of German society to fully embrace the idea of nature as opposed to 
‘landscape’ – a symptom of an historical and philosophical divergence from 
viewing the outer world as something not necessarily breachable by human 
interference. In that written “Forum” in which she expresses these concerns, other 
critics, who recognise only too readily the loss of an earlier relationship with 
things in the world, join her in similar critiques.  
Where rationalism meets Māori 
The conception of colonisation at issue here makes it necessary for the West to 
consider its largely unacknowledged, ironic domination over itself. Whilst some 
considerable intellectual graft has been brought to bear on the problem, the critical 
authors above call for more extensive inquiry. As a vulnerable entity, the 
coloniser’s tendency to rid both the self and the other of mystery remains to be 
explored in more depth. My own reference to the Romantics does not primarily 
aim at exposing this soft underbelly of Europe but instead seeks to highlight to the 
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reader, either Māori or non-Māori, that no particular culture is immune to that 
tendency. In other words, Māori are not somehow exempt from the possibility that 
they, too, might deprive things in the world of their mystery. The flaw of 
rationalism and philosophical materialism, according to the Romantics, is that, as 
it explains things in the world, so there is now nothing mysterious about it. For 
Māori this can inculcate itself subtly through Māori terminology, with such terms 
as ‘rangahau’/research, intertwining themselves heavily with Western traditions. 
In these contested spaces Māori are called to “define the term correctly” (L. 
Smith, 2000, p. 5). Yet, in thinking ‘correctly’ there may be an element of 
mystery: The appearance of the thing that is being thought of, the appearance of 
the perceiver in relation to that thing, the surrounding and distant things in 
relation to that thing and the perceiver, are all mysterious, and are given their 
mystery because of the primordial ‘force’ that Weber (1919) spoke of. Being, the 
Absolute, and perhaps ‘the thing in itself’: All may supply our reference points for 
thinking, but they may also disrupt the apparent certainty evolving from that 
thinking, and so even then one’s certainty is precarious. 
 
The fresh approach that other schools of thought bring about – including Western 
ones – is a timely one. Recently the Waitangi Tribunal (2010) released a report 
into the state of the Māori language. The Tribunal had previously released another 
report into the reo/language in 1986, but this current document is part of a wider 
claim concerning Māori cultural and intellectual property. The Māori language – 
or more precisely its decline - constitutes a significant element of the claim and is 
described in the report as “approaching a crisis point” (p. x) in various ways 
throughout. On its heels, other sources echo this same grave sentiment ("Change 
needed to avert crisis for te reo Māori," 2010; TVNZ, 2010). Clearly something is 
not working; however, the root of the problem may lie not in whether enough 
money is plugged into the issue, or whether language is compulsory in schools, or 
whether there needs to be a tuakana/teina relationship between learner and 
teacher. It may instead lie, to a large extent, in different views of the 
interrelationship between language, self, and things in the world.  
 
It is here that I see the Romantics as being especially valuable, because I argue we 
need to rethink our currently static views on things in the world, including 
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language. The Romantics promoted this constant reformulating of ideas and 
creativity, especially when an apparent impasse had been arrived at. The type of 
thinking here is meant to be abstract because it is not meant to dwell on solid, 
definable objects. We would not only conceive of language, for instance, in its 
usual sense; we would also have to think about the natural world, its possible 
effect on the speaker, the speaker’s effect on the natural world and the objects in 
it, the place of emotion in speech (and whenever I mention speech here I am 
describing everyday speech, not just ceremonial). The Romantics are drawn on 
here to challenge almost unassailable ideas about things in the world: that terms 
for them are an apparently self-evident tool for communication (preferably a 
precise one); that they are therefore totally created by human beings; and that the 
natural world only has an impact on a speaker insofar as the speaker is aware of 
that impact through their senses. 
 
Even though this thinking that the Romantics encourage may indeed be described 
as ‘abstract’ in the strictly philosophical sense of the word, Novalis, for one, 
wants such thought to be useful. Underlying such assumptions about the nature of 
things in the world is an overall drive for theory to be concretely helpful. I 
speculate that the Romantics would prefer that an exchange take place in a 
dialectical exchange of discussion or ‘poesy’ rather than in a discursive form. 
Novalis (1960b) states that “[a]lles soll aus uns heraus und sichtbar werden – 
unsre Seele soll repraesentabel werden” (p. 252)/“[e]verything should be drawn 
out of us and rendered visible – our soul ought to become representable” (Wood, 
2007, p. 11)6. Philosophy is not just a mental activity but needs to be translated 
into practice in a social and aesthetic sense. Consequently, Novalis’ ideas are 
meant to have implications for practical life. The empirical mode of revealing 
things in the world is just a step towards a greater mysterious encounter with 
those things, and this encounter is an everyday one. This thesis may also augment 
German scholarship on the area, as I provide a reading of Novalis’ emphasis on 
mystery through a relational indigenous lens whilst acknowledging that the 
                                                
6 In the broader context of Novalis’ philosophies, ‘visibility’ does not equate with 
‘clarity’, or with the exposure of a thing to the Panopticism that Foucault warns against. 
‘Made manifest’ may be a better translation of ‘sichtbar’, because although things are 
brought out into the domain of perception, they still retain their hidden aspects. 
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creativity of the individual ‘Ich’/I is important. I refer to this again in the final 
substantive chapter of the thesis.  
 
Of course, other philosophers and poets besides the members of the Romantics 
may be referred to in order to illuminate aspects of Māori philosophy. I chose 
Novalis because he impressed me as articulating ontological and metaphysical 
philosophies that share similarities with those of some Māori. However, the 
general method that brings philosophical traditions into dialogue to see what 
academic and social benefits will emerge may be employed in other situations as 
well.  
 
The substantive structure of this thesis 
The thesis consists of an introduction, a chapter on terms and method, five 
substantive chapters, and a conclusion. The reader may unofficially approach the 
five substantive chapters as comprising three parts – the philosophising towards a 
Māori notion of Being, the focus on Geheimnislosigkeit, and the romanticising 
(and hence rendering mysterious) of key Māori terms – even though these parts 
are not explicitly stated elsewhere in the thesis. To begin with my method chapter 
(chapter two): It discusses in quite some depth the terminology that I refer to and 
the process I am using to inquire into the questions laid out above. Novalis 
inspired the method I am using which can at this stage be briefly thought of as 
involving ‘sentences that challenge or push’, which Novalis calls ‘Stoßsätze’. My 
aim is to use these sentences of his to push me to think about (he calls this 
‘Nachdenken’) a possible Māori response to Geheimnis and Geheimnislosigkeit. 
This chapter is indeed long, but while this Stoßsatz method is relatively 
straightforward, I intend to discuss the method in its fullest context of Geheimnis. 
I also set the scene in this chapter for a view of the ‘geheimnisvolle’/[replete with 
mystery] self in relationship to other things in the world, particularly to thinking 
and writing. It is just as much related to the actual content of the thesis as to the 
method.  
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In chapter three, “Philosophising about aspects of Being and mystery for Māori”, 
I theorise about a notion of Being that may be relevant for Māori, and the 
immediate relationship that Being has with Geheimnis, through my own process 
of thinking and by drawing on Māori scholarship. To arrive at that point I firstly 
consider Novalis’ process of making those sorts of assertions. Novalis reacted to a 
contemporary philosopher’s (Fichte’s) theories about the place of the self in 
relation to other things in the world. He called this process 
‘Fichtisierung’/Fichtesising, and it is important to note that his reaction to Fichte 
included both admiration and opposition. From that point he then felt he could 
make some pronouncements of his own about the place of the self as a thing in the 
world in respect of other things. In that chapter I discuss the position of another 
Māori theorist that I similarly react to: I have chosen Te Maire Tau’s assertions 
about the place of the Māori self in relation to the world as a method of theorising 
about a Māori notion of Being and Geheimnis. The point of this chapter is to 
highlight the issue that simply making affirmations about Being and Geheimnis is 
not sufficient; one should also simultaneously engage in a process of 
philosophical critique. My resulting affirmations about Being and Geheimnis are 
therefore joined with an element of Geheimnislosigkeit - their opposite. I refer 
back to Novalis’ own assertions about Being that evolved from his method, in 
order to further supplement my own assertions about Being, and allude to some 
processes of thinking that my aunt encouraged me to engage with. This process I 
undertake understands ‘Geheimnis’ not so much as an object of thought but, 
among other things, as an infinitely critical approximation to thinking, as a 
continuous activity, about what Novalis envisages is a creatively unfolding Being. 
 
The next three chapters deal with the forgetting of Being and mystery, a 
forgetfulness that is encouraged by various instruments of Geheimnislosigkeit. 
The first of these - chapter four - considers in some detail Novalis’ poem “Wenn 
nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren”, from his novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen, 
through which Novalis lays out some of the general signposts of 
Geheimnislosigkeit. The aim of this chapter is to provide Stoßsätze to discuss 
chapters five and six.  Chapter five draws on the impetus given by chapter four to 
discuss the factors that have encouraged Māori to forget Being and to think about 
things in the world as geheimnislos. Chapter six also draws on chapter four but 
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examines how things in the world are sometimes made to be complicit in the 
process of Geheimnislosigkeit through dominant definitions of Māori terms, 
particularly in Western institutional settings such as law, medicine and education. 
The terms I have chosen to examine here are ‘whakapapa’/genealogy, 
‘ako’/teach/learn, ‘mātauranga’/knowledge, and ‘whenua’/land7. Central to this 
critique is an investigation into the nature of the philosophical self, in an 
individual but relational sense, as the self relates to things in the world. 
 
The final substantive chapter, chapter seven, is aimed at suggesting some 
resolutions to the Geheimnislosigkeit that threatens things in the world for Māori. 
It refers back to the terms that I argued in chapter six had become tools for 
viewing things in the world with certainty, and now I romanticise them, drawing 
on their denotative definitions as well as their first assumptions, with a view to 
representing them so that they reflect the Absolute. In chapter eight I identify 
some issues that arose throughout the thesis, and conclude by noting that there is 
considerable need for further research into this area. 
  
                                                
7 The reader will see in chapter six that I challenge those dominant definitions that I have 
provided here for convenience. 
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Chapter Two: The mystery of Stoßsätze/ 
[sentences that challenge and push], and of 
thinking: Terms and method 
In the introduction chapter I brought to the reader’s attention the notion of 
Geheimnis and its opposite, Geheimnislosigkeit. That chapter was designed to 
raise these phenomena as nascent issues in my thesis. I expressly referred the 
reader to a lament that is sung by my iwi – “Tērā te Auahi” – and showed that the 
elements within that lament are mysterious, intrinsically and also because of their 
link with each other. Additionally, my position as a writer is somewhat 
mysterious because of my innate, ontological association with the elements of that 
lament.  
 
In this chapter I bring to the fore Novalis’ works more explicitly, and continue 
with the complexities presented by Geheimnis and Geheimnislosigkeit, but now 
consider them in the context of the theorising self. To theorise for the rest of the 
thesis, and indeed to theorise about my position as thinker and writer in this 
chapter, I refer to Novalis’ process of Romantisieren with particular emphasis on 
his Stoßsatz method. This is my method chapter, but in that method I also start to 
consider a substantive problem that will continue throughout the thesis: How do 
things in the world impact on the self? In the context of the method specifically I 
can expand on that broader question in the following way: How do things in the 
world impact on the self as the self thinks and writes, and therefore how is 
thinking and writing in that sense an activity underpinned by Geheimnis? Thus, 
while this chapter does set out the method for the reader, it also continues in 
greater depth than chapter one the theme of mystery itself – now in relation to the 
thinking self. This constant thought given to things in the world as one undertakes 
what appears to be such an avowedly straightforward exercise as writing starts to 
alert the reader to the complexity of Geheimnis, as one is also forced to constantly 
consider it alongside its opposite - Geheimnislosigkeit.  
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In the German Romantic and phenomenological traditions, common reference is 
made to the terms ‘Sein’/‘Seyn’, ‘das Absolute’, ‘das Unbedingte’, and ‘Gott’. 
Occasionally, as the primordial activity underpinning all those terms organises all 
manifestations of nature, Novalis may also use the term ‘Natur’ as a holistic 
expression of the Absolute. The Romantics tend to use the terms Seyn/das 
Absolute/das Unbedingte interchangeably – more so Seyn/das Absolute – 
suggesting that they contain many more similarities than differences, although 
when using them they do wish to highlight different aspects to the term. As I am 
introducing the Māori labels for Being alongside those terms, I shall lay out for 
the reader the ontological similarities of each Romantic term alongside the Māori 
term korekore/thoroughgoing negativity/Being. The activities and manifestations 
that these terms refer to give rise to things in the world, including the self, and 
imbue them with unknowable, imperceptible elements. An analysis of these terms 
is therefore essential to any discussion about Geheimnis. 
 
Kore/korekore: Das Absolute, Sein, das Unbedingte 
Das Absolute/the absolute 
According to German Romantic philosophy, things in the world, including human 
self-awareness and perception, are transformable by human beings but only 
because of human dependence on, and relationship with, the Absolute. Consider 
the relationship between finite things in the world and the Absolute in the 
primordial sense in Novalis’ (1960g) following fragment:  
 
(Lebendige Kraft - abs[olute] Kraft - relative Kraft – wircksame 
Kraft.) 
Durch Gewalt wird der Körper aus seinen Verhältnissen gedrängt – 
bis zu seinem lebendigen, freyen Zustand. Auch das Leben ist aber 
wieder – sensibles Leben, specifisches Leben - abs[olutes] Leben – 
Lebendiges Leben. 
Der Ausdruck abs[olut] ist relativ wieder.  
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abs[olut ] abs[olut]oder abs[olut]2 ist das Höchste und Letzte. (p. 52)  
 
(Living force – absolute force – relative force – effective force). 
By means of control the body is forced out of its relations – into a free 
living state. Life in turn is also – physical life, specific life – absolute 
life – living life. 
The expression ‘absolute’ is in turn relative. Absolute absolute or 
absolute2 is the highest and the ultimate. (Wood, 2007, p. 195) 
 
Novalis emphasises the dual nature of the Absolute – its finitude and infinitude – 
in this fragment. He calls the expression ‘absolute’ “relative”. It is qualifiedly 
linked to the noun ‘life’, and is posed as finite in that way. His point is that, by 
grouping it amongst ‘physical’, ‘specific’, ‘living’, it is no more or less in its 
qualification than those other adjectives because it is amongst the world of things. 
 
Novalis then doubles the term for effect, but before we delve into his reasons for 
this approach, let us turn to a similar, and helpful, description from the Māori 
theologian and philosopher Maori Marsden. Marsden, a prolific writer on Māori 
philosophies around Being, uses various terms to refer to the infinite, including Io, 
Papatūānuku, kore and korekore. His works are highly innovative, as he reflects 
on the metaphysical significance of each traditional term within a contemporary 
ethics of nature, and theorises on their current importance, not just on their 
traditional use. Moreover, in his The woven universe: Selected writings of Rev. 
Māori Marsden (Marsden, 2003), he addresses the mismatch between the 
metaphysical concepts behind these terms and the approach offered by science, 
thereby questioning whether Māori and dominant Western philosophies can, or 
even should, be reconciled. In many ways, Marsden’s knowledge is an 
indispensable aspect of parts of this thesis, especially as he places concepts 
alongside what he posits to be their antitheses. 
 
For Marsden (2003) the radical and necessary alternative to staying with the 
evident form of ‘kore’/negativity or voidness is to acknowledge its antithesis. The 
term is apparently the opposite of Novalis’ “absolute” in the above fragment, 
because in its singular ‘kore’ form, as a term indicating negativity, it refers to a 
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void. It is not yet a thing. Marsden then posits that the term korekore that succeeds 
kore, being the result of the doubling of the term kore, is so thoroughly negative 
or void that it takes on aspects of its opposite. It hence becomes positive, or 
“potential Being” (Marsden, 2003, p. 20), and assumes elements of the finite. 
Marsden believes that the potential Being can be likened to growth within the 
womb, or of a plant. The finite is not yet fully formed but is on its way. It is 
nevertheless a thing. The effect is to point to a paradox within the double term 
that is established to attempt to reflect that there is a dual, even oppositional, 
character within the term.  
 
Das Absolute/korekore, both finite and infinite  
Marsden is helpful as I interpret Novalis because he highlights the effect of 
doubling the term. Although the respective terms kore and absolute in their 
singular form point to diametrically opposite states, both conclude in the same 
place. There is a possible precedent in that discussion for an interpretation of 
Novalis’ term “[a]bsolute absolute”, which he comes to towards the end of that 
fragment. Recall that Novalis’ grouping of ‘absolute’ with other finite phenomena 
highlights that the absolute is similarly finite8. Its later doubling in the fragment, 
                                                
8 Heidegger’s somewhat confusing maxim that “[d]as Nichts nichtet” (1998, p. 39)/the 
nothing noths, offers some help with an alternative interpretation of the active nature of 
kore, and its immediate impact on the awareness of the self. His maxim is perplexing 
partly because he encourages the thinker to evade negativity in their thinking whilst 
contemplating the “nihilating power of the void” (Dorrien, 1997, p. 158). This nihilating 
in fact “shelters ‘the best’ of Being” (Warminski, 1987, p. 63). Being is to be thought of 
not as an entity that is not a thing, yet that, as a non-entity, it noths. Thus it is a “certain 
occurrence (Ereignis) that is given to be thought” (Vallega, 2001, p. 51). As negativity it 
is simultaneously to be thought of as that which has to it positive and negative elements, 
yet ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are terms to be rejected. 
It would be unusual to say ‘ka kore te kore’; indeed, in its grammatical peculiarity the 
statement roughly equates with that of Heidegger’s. However, kore can be a verb, and in 
the context of Heidegger’s assertion it also means ‘the nothing noths’. This Māori 
linguistic rendering – ka kore te kore - likewise construes that Being is nihilating that 
which is not a thing. This nihilation means that one is dealing with both negative and 
positive but that these term should at the same time be rejected because they threaten to 
reify that which is (and that is therefore such and such) and that which is a blank nothing. 
So in nihilating, there is simultaneously (‘einst’) a concealment of Being, and an 
appearance that is given to humanity to think about. I argue that this revelation is ‘te pō’, 
which is taken usually by most Māori metaphysicians to mean ‘the dark’ in the next stage 
of creation after te kore, but which may also be taken to mean concomitant ‘distress’, as 
in ‘pō-uri’.  
Thus: Ka kore te kore is the sheltering (nihilation) of kore and at the same time the 
revelation of te pō (distress). 
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though, suggests an uptake not just of the opposite as an object of human thought 
(“relative”) but as an ontological opposite. In being doubled, the term ‘absolute’ 
has become so thoroughly finite that the infinite is immediately emphasised. As 
much as korekore, “absolute absolute”, as Novalis puts it, is intrinsically both 
finite matter and mystery. We shall see in much greater depth that Novalis wanted 
Western humanity to recognise that the finite things before them are part of a 
much greater, organising activity, and to move away from viewing them as if they 
are total and as if they are independent of other things9. On the other hand, he also 
encourages his readers to resist losing themselves within a morass of 
indeterminacy. The “absolute absolute” appears to be a mystical paradox but in 
the “[l]ebendiges Leben” the contradictions of finite and infinite, and of immanent 
and transcendent, seem to be resolved. His Das Allgemeine Brouillon, from which 
was sourced the above fragment, evidences the presence of both mystery and 
banality at the same time, as well as showing that one may proceed towards either 
mystery or banality through the process of romanticising, which takes scientific 
principles and expresses them in seemingly contradictory and mysterious ways. 
Nevertheless, the continuation of certain empirical and rationalistic aspects of 
things and activities is still to be acknowledged in that process. 
                                                                                                                                 
In being pōuri, from te pō, one is similarly grappling with a thing but also its 
simultaneous loss. It has hence receded but its background has been brought into our 
awareness, and this ‘background’ cannot be defined. It is through this recession of the 
thing of concern that one is radically disengaged “from the whole space-time-matter 
world of das Seiende[/the entity]” (Nieli, 1987, p. 25). Heidegger had argued that it was a 
feeling of ‘Angst’ or dread that brought this sudden, yet rare, awareness of the 
disengagement about. 
The linguistic aspect of this phrase is utilised by Heidegger (and may be executed for 
similar effect in Māori) to emphasise the following: 
 -­‐ that there is a continuous active aspect to kore; -­‐ that an unusual linguistic experiment is sometimes necessary to activate thinking 
about this activity; -­‐ that there is a need to get ‘beyond’ the finite object to obtain a sense of that 
which is both finite and infinite, or positive and negative; -­‐ that, in Māori linguistic convention, the dark (te pō) is a reference to a form of 
distress, and, when experienced, takes one beyond the confines of the finite 
world, as Heidegger had noted was the outcome of ‘dread’.  
 
9 Novalis refers throughout his works to the activity of a thing in the world, including the 
activity of a thing’s properties because of the Absolute. In Fichte-Studien, for instance, he 
places activity in the “Entgegengesetzte” (1960j, p. 237)/“opposed thing” (Kneller, 2003, 
p. 136). It is the thing that is opposed to the thing being focused on that holds the activity 
of the thing. In respect of korekore, it is kore that contains activity, and vice versa. 
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All this appears to be relatively straightforward as long as it accords with 
progressive and linear strains of thought, by which this leads to that. Yet could the 
original singular terms already contain within them elements of their double, even 
though the double form apparently follows the singular? My question suggests the 
possibility that those singular terms defy sequential time and simple binary logic 
and causality. Novalis tackles the temptation to think of the unlimited as deriving 
from the limited in his Fichte-Studien when he addresses the apparent causal link 
that suggests the move from feeling to reflection: 
 
Im Bewußtseyn muß es scheinen, als gienge es vom Beschränkten zum 
Unbeschränkten, weil das Bewußtseyn von sich, als dem 
Beschränkten ausgehn muß – und dies geschieht durchs Gefühl- 
ohnerachtet das Gefühl, abstract genommen, ein Schreiten des 
Unbeschränkten zum Beschränkten ist. (1960j, p. 114)    
 
In consciousness it must appear as if it went from the limited to the 
unlimited, because consciousness must proceed from itself as limited 
– and this happens through feeling – without consideration of the fact 
that feeling, regarded abstractly, is a progression from unlimited to 
limited. (Kneller, 2003, p. 13)  
 
His attention to the apparent move from one state (limited) to another (unlimited) 
is what is striking in this passage. More specific to this fragment, we could 
maintain that our depiction of the movement from finite to infinite – from 
absolute to absolute absolute – comes about because of the limitations on our 
consciousness. Because of this progressive interpretation we are caught in a linear 
stasis. But Novalis goes on to name the Absolute even in that same fragment: 
 
Sobald das Absolute, wie ich das Ursprünglich Idealreale oder 
realideale nennen will, als Accidens, oder halb erscheint, so muß es 
verkehrt erscheinen – das Unbeschränkte wird beschränkt et vice 
versa. (1960j, p. 114)  
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As soon as the absolute, as I want to call the original ideal-real or real-
ideal, appears as accident or halfway, then it must appear inverted – 
the unlimited becomes limited and vice versa. (Kneller, 2003, p. 13) 
 
Implications for notions of time 
For Novalis the major issue now becomes how to avoid the consequences of 
thinking that either the limited leads to unlimited or vice versa. These 
consequences more than likely entail a continued limitation on the potential of the 
self, through the restriction of the activities of the Absolute by consciousness. In 
terms of the Absolute, Novalis is clear that it contains already the apparently 
successive infinity of absolute absolute. The Absolute in singular form is 
therefore already both finite and infinite. The complexity of the notion of time for 
Māori is also implicit linguistically, as particles such as ‘e … ana’, ‘ka’, ‘kei te’, 
and ‘kua’ that are normally used in conjunction with a verb are not time specific. 
The proper noun ‘Papatūānuku’ conceives of ‘Papa’: Marsden (2003) insists that 
“the earth is not simply Papa (rock foundation) but Papa-tua-nuku (rock 
foundation beyond expanse, the infinite)” (p. 22), but the name already shows 
manifestations of that finite manifestation, rock foundation10.  The interrelational 
causality also shows itself, again, in the phrase ‘i ngā rā o mua’ which refers both 
to days gone before as well as those ahead. The preferred belief of both 
Romantics and Māori, I argue, is for a “Gegenwart [die schwebt] – gleich einem 
Gefäße, das einen aufnehmenden und abführenden Gang hat” (Novalis, 1960b, p. 
449)/“present [that] floats – like a vessel that has an ascending and descending 
course” (Wood, 2007, p. 167), where movements forwards and backwards occur 
simultaneously. Kore and Absolute thereby evade total solidification as much as 
their doubled forms and warn against a complete detachment from things in the 
world. With this interpretation, humanity is encouraged to remember the 
importance of their finite manifestations as disclosures of the Absolute. 
 
                                                
10 I diverge from some areas of Marsden’s belief, especially his tendency to stress the 
termination of metaphysical events at certain stages. It may appear to humanity’s 
perception that there are set stages to metaphysics, but I argue later that the event 
continues, despite that perception. 
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‘Sein’/Being 
Seyn or Being is also a dual, simultaneous action that can be discussed 
phenomenologically. Korekore is comparable here, too. To start with Being: 
Phenomenologically it is linked with both activity and finite thing. It therefore 
contains within it the ability to act, but also present in it are things in the world. 
As an ontological indication it “is characterized by the dynamic of ‘becoming’; by 
its manifestation in ‘appearances’; and by the sense of authentic representation 
denoted by the ‘ideal’” (Pratt, 2002, p. 94). As an “ideal”, one strives after 
depicting it authentically. In these ways the word ‘Being’ already contains within 
it both the ability to organise itself as well as the things that it autonomously 
solidifies into. It is both product and activity. Korekore might be a ‘thing’ 
according to its positive attributes, but because of its creation from kore it 
contains within it strains of negativity, or ‘nothingness’ that appear not to be 
related to things. One is reminded here that ‘kore’ can be placed after the particle 
‘kua’, suggesting that in its negativity it is less concerned with positive things; 
that is, it is concerned entirely with activity, not finite manifestation. Yet in 
forming korekore, kore even on its own already contains within it strains of 
positivity. Like Seyn/Being, both kore and korekore are things in the world as 
well as sheer activity at the same time.  
 
There are hence some plausible correspondences between Seyn/Being and 
korekore, and the Absolute and korekore. In the case of the Absolute, Being, the 
infinite (das Unendliche) and the unconditioned, Stone (2011) sums up the 
relationship between the German terms and the Romantics’ reason for using a 
variety of terms for the same phenomenon: 
 
The absolute is ‘the infinite’ (das Unendliche) because it is not a finite 
thing but the non-finite whole encompassing all finite things. The 
absolute is ‘being’ because all finite things contain negation in that 
they differ from and so are-not one another, whereas the absolute 
encompasses everything so that there is nothing outside it for it to not-
be: it entirely is. The absolute is ‘the unconditioned’ (das Unbedingte) 
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because, as the whole, there is nothing outside it to causally condition 
it. (p. 502)  
 
These similarities all highlight the terms’ reference to the same phenomenon. I 
note here, though, that there may be some difficulties with the English or German 
terms when discussing a Māori affirmation of korekore, especially with the term 
Being. ‘To be’ does not exist linguistically as an outright verb in Māori. A 
discussion of the implications of a linguistic ‘Being’, including its potentially 
negative connotations of its import into Māori, is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but would be a worthy topic of research. Translations certainly (and, I suspect, 
unwittingly) impose a translation ‘to be’ on sentences with the Māori particle 
‘he’11, specifically when a thing in the sentence is pointed out as the equivalent of 
something else, or when it is necessary to indicate the attributes or quiddity of a 
thing. Hypothetically, what something is threatens to become self-evident for the 
Māori psyche as much as Heidegger – who took many of his cues from Idealist 
and Romantic philosophies12 - argues it has for the West. Some solace may be 
found in the fact that, according to Heidegger, Being as primordial activity is not 
solely manifested linguistically but more importantly is focused on the disclosure 
                                                
11 As in ‘he whare tērā’/[that is a house]. ‘He’ may not strictly equate with ‘is a’ in this 
example, as it is commonly given, but instead may draw one’s attention to the 
manifestation of a thing – [that house manifesting]. In that sense, the house is disclosed as 
that thing, together with the constant relationship of Being. With guidance from Novalis, 
Heidegger, and Māori belief, we would note that the house discloses itself as a coming 
together of the work of individuals, together with their ancestral and colonised histories, 
materials, attitudes, and land, as well as the constant activity of the ‘Gods’ (Heidegger, 
1990), the Absolute/Seyn (Novalis), and the ‘tapa whā’ (Durie, 1994)/four walls of 
health. These latter entities all manifest themselves as equally in the thing disclosed as the 
house as the house itself. 
Another example is ‘ko hea tērā maunga?’, which is commonly taken to mean ‘what is 
that mountain called?’, or ‘what is that mountain?’ It could be reinterpreted as ‘That 
phenomenon arising before us there gathers to it our attention. How does it draw us to 
relate to it?’ 
‘Ko wai koe’, instead of ‘who are you’, may be rendered as ‘in/towards (ko) your 
selfhood (koe), the waters (wai) that you draw on allow you (koe) to be present (ko) as a 
particularly-named entity (wai). How does that selfhood, to which those waters pertain, 
manifest?’ 
 
12  Some important precursors of Heidegger’s thinking are discernible in Novalis’ 
philosophies. Greaves (2010) observes that, despite being in the background, Novalis was 
an important factor in Heidegger’s theories, with Heidegger reading Novalis’ works “a 
number of times” (p. xiv). In her comparisons between Heidegger’s ‘Gestell’ and 
Novalis’ ‘Werkzeug’, Holland (2006) remarks that the relationship between the two 
scholars is more significant than has been previously recognised.  
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of things in the world. He states, for instance, that Being is as obvious to one in 
“jedem Verhalten … zu Seiendem als Seiendem” (1993, p. 4)/“comporting 
oneself towards entities as entities” (1967, p. 23) as when one uses the verb ‘to 
be’. He also emphasises that “[i]n jedem Gebrauch eines Verbum haben wir schon 
Sein gedacht und immer irgendwie verstanden” (2005, p. 18)/[in each use of a 
verb we have already thought, and somehow always understood, Being]. Being 
understood in this sense is beyond linguistic conventions: It is instead conceived 
of as drawing attention to a thing in the world in its autonomous totality within a 
primordial activity.  
 
Das Unbedingte/the unreified 
The other term, das Unbedingte/[unreified], is used by Novalis in a way to 
highlight our paradoxical focus on things in the face of Being. He adopts this term 
specifically to draw our attention to our pursuit of grasping a thing as knowable. 
In the background of this term, however, works Being/the Absolute itself, so that 
the thing-as-knowable ends up retaining its mystery and fluidity. It also shares 
some common characteristics with korekore; it is both a negative (‘Un-’) and 
positively represented thing (‘-bedingte’) and is therefore also mystery and 
transcendent thing. ‘The unconditioned’ shares likenesses with Being/the 
Absolute/korekore, but is used more to highlight the finite (yet very much 
mysterious) thing in the world. Although it does automatically include the 
sublime activity of Being when used, and is contingent on that activity, it tends to 
focus on what is directly before the perceiver, as an illustration of humanity’s 
futile engagement with trying to find a grounding principle. As I want to bring to 
the fore Novalis’ notion of mysteriousness, underpinned by Being, I shall use the 
more immediately mysterious terms of ‘Being’ and ‘the Absolute’. When specific 
terms are expressed by an author in the original text I stay with that usage, but 
otherwise move between terms. I also use them in relation to ontological theories 
that posit a Māori notion of Being, and so occasionally I shall revert to the Māori 
term korekore. 
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Oppositional states as part of a method 
Korekore and das Absolute/Sein/das Unbedingte highlight the need to consider 
oppositional states as one moves towards making an assertion about the nature of 
a thing. The lament “Tērā te Auahi” that I cited in chapter one also asks the writer 
to think about oppositions when certain terms in the lament are brought to the fore 
and laid out in connection with each other. For Māori this signals more 
specifically that one should undertake a critique as much as make such an 
assertion. The dialogue that I have facilitated here between the terms indicates 
that I should engage in a critique as well as propose any outright resolution, and it 
forms the basis of how I approach this thesis.  
 
Method: Thinking after the sentence that pushes 
Recall that my overall method is to establish a dialogue between Novalis’ and 
Māori philosophies to reconnect Māori terms with their Geheimnis. Novalis’ love 
of Geheimnis led him to argue for a philosophical approach that would not only 
preserve the Absolute but would also have as its aim the consciously holistic 
depiction of the world. He proposes throughout his works that one disturb the 
dominating Geheimnislosigkeit by rethinking the relationship of things in the 
world with the Absolute. He terms this activity ‘Romantisieren’, and states the 
following: 
 
Die Welt muß romantisirt werden. So findet man den urspr[ünglichen] 
Sinn wieder…. Indem ich dem Gemeinen einen hohen Sinn, dem 
Gewöhnlichen ein geheimnißvolles Ansehn, dem Bekannten die 
Würde des Unbekannten, dem Endlichen einen unendlichen Schein 
gebe so romantisire ich es – Umgekehrt ist die Operation für das 
Höhere, Unbekannte, Mystische, Unendliche – dies wird durch diese 
Verknüpfung logarythmisirt. (1960o, p. 545) 
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[The world must be romanticised. In this way, one again finds the 
primordial sense…. In that I give the general a higher sense, the usual 
a mysterious look, the well-known the dignity of the unknown, the 
finite an infinite appearance, I am romanticising it – The converse 
operation is for the lofty, unknown, mystical, infinite – they are 
logarythmised by this association.] 
 
In this endeavour Novalis accords with other Romantics, such as the Schlegel 
brothers, who proposed that “[d]ie romantische Dichtart … allein ist unendlich, 
wie sie allein frei ist und das als ihr erstes Gesetz anerkennt” (1798, p. 30)/[the 
Romantic style of poetry … is on its own in being as unending as it is free, and, 
insofar as this is its fundamental law, it is to be acknowledged]. The “romantische 
Entgrenzung” (Strich, 1962, p. 358)/[Romantic removal of limitations] process 
was seen as a means of assigning Geheimnis to the Absolute that it deserved.  
 
Thus there are both metaphysical and political aims to Romantisieren. Poetry and 
philosophy should not really be seen as separate components in this exercise as 
they are both “part of the same process” (Kneller, 2003, p. xxxiii) that calls on 
imagination and logic to transform things in the world. Both of these components 
of Romantisieren are responsible for either lifting or reducing. It is important to 
remember the latter of these two exercises, for the rendering of things to a more 
banal level is a sign of the workability of the exercise. The claim that one must be 
constantly raising the idea of things in the world to greater heights is only 
partially true: Novalis envisaged that romanticising assists us only to the extent 
that we desire, but that at times we must lower those aspects. Both operations are 
important and related and so must be carried out to the “gegenseitigen Vortheil 
beyder Operationen” (1960b, p. 362)/“mutual advantage of both operations” 
(Wood, 2007, p. 98). However, given Novalis’ disillusionment with the 
worldview of his epoch, most of his fragments are aimed at raising the degree of 
humanity’s construction of nature; hence such statements as:  
 
Die Kenntniß des Graderhöhungs und des Gradclassificationsmittels – 
und ihres Gebrauch sezt uns in den Stand – zugl[eich] in die Weite 
und in die Tiefe zu gehn. (1960b, p. 362)   
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The knowledge of raising the degree, and the means for the 
classification of the degree - as well as their usage - allow us to 
immediately proceed into the breadths and depths. (Wood, 2007, p. 
98)  
 
It is at this point that one romanticises, for to macrologise and micrologise one 
must look outside of a usual discipline that tends to describe things in the world in 
one particular, unchanging way. For Novalis, raising our view of things in the 
world to another level was an interdisciplinary activity, drawing on manifold 
sources – including empirical ones13 – to move outwards from geheimnislosen 
realms. There also remains a special place for what may be called ‘first’ or ‘lower’ 
degree explanations for things in the world, signalling Novalis’ positioning of the 
sciences and philosophy. One may rely on these lower explanations to begin the 
process of Romantisieren. Nature’s ‘Sprachlehre’ (Novalis, 1960e)/[grammar] 
illustrates the importance of given, initial signs. Assumed first principles, 
including philosophical ones, provide the first steps, and their imprint lingers 
throughout the Romantisieren process. They should be neither ignored, as a 
reaction to their current overriding importance, nor banished once they appear to 
have served their purpose.  
 
My own method takes place within this expansive field of Romantisieren, as my 
most fundamental aim in this thesis is to give the banality of dominantly posed 
Māori terms the “dignity of the unknown”. This broad description of 
Romantisieren that I have just provided has therefore been necessary from the 
outset, as it informs the reader that this fundamental drive of mine underpins the 
entire thesis. But in order to achieve this grander aim I resort to a more specific 
operation that comprises a part of the Romantisieren project. In this express 
method I am pushed forward to consider a response that theorises about a notion of 
Being for Māori, from Novalis’ writings. Novalis’ writings here form ‘Stoßsätze’, 
                                                
13  For instance he states that “[l]ogische, grammatische, und mathem[atische] 
Untersuchungen – nebst mannichfaltiger bes[onders] phil[osophischer] Lektüre und 
Nachdenken – müssen mir den Weg bahnen” (1960b, p. 363)/“[l]ogical, grammatical, and 
mathematical - in addition to varied and specific philosophical readings and reflections … 
[to show] … the way” (Wood, 2007, p. 99).  
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or ‘sentences that challenge and push’, and my responses form the ‘Nachdenken’, 
or ‘meditative thinking’. Whilst I primarily use the terms Stoßsätze and 
Nachdenken throughout this chapter, at crucial points I refer back to the broader 
project of Romantisieren. 
 
‘Stoßsätze’ – Novalis’ method involving sentences that 
challenge and push 
For Novalis, the Ich/I, including the Ich as a philosophical subject, is one 
manifestation in the world of many, admittedly with the ability to transform the 
world but not as the grounding principle of every activity. The Absolute or Being 
is no more absent from the Ich than it is from anything else. To acknowledge the 
Geheimnis that Being provides to things in the world, including to the Ich, 
Novalis identified that the reader needs to draw some creative conclusions of their 
own. This could happen both through provoking the reader and by grouping 
disparate elements together for an unknown outcome. Things in the world would 
then avoid being self-evident. He indicated on that note that: 
 
Die Darst[ellung] der Philosophie besteht demnach aus lauter Themas, 
Anfangssätzen – Unterscheidungssätzen – bestimmten Stoßsätzen – 
Sie ist nur für Thätige, für Wahrheitliebende da - die analytische 
Ausführung des Themas ist nur für Träge oder Ungeübte - denen die 
Mutter erst fliegen, und sich in einer bestimmten Direction erhalten, 
lernen muß. (1960k, p. 374)   
 
The exposition [Darstellung] of philosophy consists, therefore, merely 
in themes, first sentences – certain sentences that push [Stoßsätze] – 
the exposition exists only for active lovers of the truth. The analytical 
elaboration of the theme is for slow or unskilled ones, those whom the 
mother first needs to teach how to fly, and how to maintain a certain 
direction. (Kleingeld, 2008, p. 278) 
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I wish to bring this method originating from Novalis’ idiosyncratic term 
‘Stoßsätze’ to the fore as an important one for this thesis. Novalis’ approach is 
linked with his critique of ‘Systemphilosophie’/[foundationalist philosophy]. He 
used fragments and aphorisms instead of whole descriptions deliberately as he did 
not wish to solidify or petrify the world to which he was referring, and he desired 
to avoid the “analytische Ausführung” that required step by step assistance.  To 
that extent he tried to use a method of writing that corresponds to the dynamics of 
his thinking. Before one mistakes him for being an arbitrary, non-committal 
character, though, it should be noted that there are strong and discernible 
arguments that are embedded in all of his philosophical fragments, poems and 
essays. He immersed himself readily within the philosophical systems of Fichte 
and Kant and understood them thoroughly, but, as a reaction to their foundational 
nature, and out of a desire to actively preserve Geheimnis throughout things in the 
world and in the process of thinking itself, he did not create a foundational system 
himself. Novalis wanted to preserve thoughts as “Bewegungen und Actionen” 
(1960f, p. 595)/[movements and actions] and believed that to create a final 
philosophical system was to rob thought of its continued creativity and action. His 
general way of thinking lends itself to being rearranged and recombined to prompt 
discussion, which in the case of this thesis focuses on the loss of mystery to things 
in the world for Māori and, finally, on Māori ontological relationships with the 
world through the romanticising of particular Māori terms.  
 
Thinking for Novalis is largely a creative faculty, one that requires an impetus, a 
challenge or push from an external force. In his Das Allgemeine Brouillon he 
highlights the importance of some form of contacting force:  
 
Die Plastiker oder Atomisten haben einen Stoß (bewegende Kraft.) – 
die Musiker einen modificirenden Körper – Einen Anstoß nöthig. 
Fichte gehört zu den Musikern…. Beyde haben einen Anstoß – eine 
Berührung nöthig. Die Einen zum Gestalten – die Andern zum 
Bewegen. (1960b, p. 383)  
 
Sculptors or atomists require a thrust (mobile force.) – musicians a 
modifying body – an obstacle. Fichte belongs among the musicians.… 
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Both require an obstacle – a contact. The one to form – the other to 
move. (Wood, 2007, p. 115) 
 
A first principle is less important to identify, because the push, while apparently 
determinable, is itself communicated to by a number of factors, some 
unidentifiable, leading Novalis to ask in that same fragment “[w]ozu überhaupt 
ein Anfang? Dieser unphil[osophische] – oder halbphil[osophische] Zweck führt 
zu allen Irrthümern”/“[w]hy do we need a beginning at all? This unphilosophical 
– or semiphilosophical goal is the source of all error”. What is important for 
Novalis here is that there is a form of contact that can be either emotional or 
physical, or both. For the perceiver it may be thought of as an 
‘Anfangssatz’/[starting proposition] but with its own autonomy it is the product of 
other interrelated elements and events.  
 
As Novalis’ approach is linked to his suspicion of Systemphilosophie, I am 
permitted to draw on his ideas as provocations to consider a response that contains 
aspects of Māori metaphysics. This response takes into account the effects of 
colonisation, is affected by Geheimnislosigkeit, and in turn is suggested as an 
impetus for readers. This provocation is not necessarily one marked by an adverse 
opinion, however (although it may be): It can be stimulating because it draws 
together a number of seemingly unrelated elements to involve an outcome that an 
engager might suspect but cannot know with certainty. The Stoßsatz method, 
then, is characterised by its openness, creativity, and by its element of 
unexpectedness, and is linked with an equally unexpected outcome.  
 
 
The validity of Novalis’ method lies in the following: 
 
1. It secures the Geheimnis in the process of thinking and therefore evades 
Geheimnislosigkeit. 
2. In its process, as much as its outcome, it reflects the Geheimnis of the 
Absolute/Being, which itself displays elements of the creative and 
contingent.  
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3. For both the coloniser and the colonised who are affected by a 
geheimnislosen view of the world, it is disruptive. The method interferes 
with a comfortable view of things in the world, and is likely to be 
liberating because it threatens to dismantle commonly held principles that 
over time have become entrenched and lacking in mystery. In its critique 
of and challenge to generally accepted worldviews it is a highly political 
method.  
4. By this method, one engages with opposing viewpoints before one makes 
positive affirmations about a thing in the world. For a colonised people, 
this acknowledgement and articulation of the antithetic element is 
particularly important. As Novalis notes, one may not adequately describe 
things in the world anymore with affirmations of traditional certainty, as 
one also has the reality of present and future to account for. 
5. It is theoretical, and involves the imagination.  
6. It may be called ‘spiritual’ but in an everyday sense, not in a rarefied 
fashion. It involves the driving together of cognition, imagination, political 
astuteness, and the history and locality of the engager, as well as of 
Being/the Absolute. 
7. For Māori, it may offer a way of bringing all these elements together in a 
theoretical explanation for a thing in the world. This theoretical exercise, 
though, is to be thought of as active, as the whole essence of the person 
and their relationships with things in the world, is actually involved. 
8. It comes with responsibility attached. Stoßsätze may be quite powerful if 
they are original. They should be helpful. The poet Hermann Hesse, a 
great admirer of Novalis, stated that “jedem Anfang wohnt ein Zauber 
inne/Der uns beschützt und der uns hilft zu leben” (1961, p. 199)/[at every 
beginning lives an enchantment within/That protects us and helps us to 
live], emphasising the creative and assisting force of every critique and 
inaugural proposition. Stoßsätze can begin the activity of theory but 
remain helpful in any outcome.  
9. Importantly, it is not just reactive but constructively playful, as it groups 
elements in unforeseen combinations with each other, often resulting in 
outcomes characterised by Geheimnis. 
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In its most general sense, and reminiscent of Heidegger’s legein, this thesis draws 
heavily on the last aspect, as it brings together German and Māori traditions with 
an unknowable outcome. More specifically, I shall draw on Novalis’ method in 
the following way in this thesis: 
 
Novalis’ Stoßsätze  My creative and instinctive reaction informed 
by Māori philosophy  My own articulated response to the 
Stoßsätzen. 
 
In the context of this thesis it should perhaps be clear that ‘a Māori discussion 
about a thing in the world’ is in fact ‘my own articulated response to the 
Stoßsätzen’, but in my thesis I refer also to other Māori writers’ works so that I 
can provide some clarification of my response. The Stoßsatz method is thus meant 
to be rigorous, but it may not be systematic. The reader will also have already 
observed that, at the beginning of this chapter whilst starting a discussion about 
the oppositional nature of Being, I brought Maori Marsden into a dialogue with 
Novalis; this then opened up my response. This is a possible aspect of the 
‘symphilosophischen’/[philosophically unified] nature of the Stoßsatz method. In 
certain other places there is an evident dialogue occurring between Novalis and 
elements of Māori scholarship and thought. An important facet of the Stoßsatz 
method, then, is its possibility to allow two different traditions to come into 
dialogue with each other. Novalis noted that the production of ideas comes about 
through the impacts of diverse substances: 
 
Der Poët braucht die Dinge und Worte, wie Tasten und die ganze 
Poësie beruht auf thätiger Idéenassociation – auf selbstthätiger, 
absichtlicher, idealischer Zufallproduktion - (zufällige – freye 
Catenation). (1960b, p. 451) 
 
The poet employs things and words like keys, since the whole of 
poesy is based on the active association of ideas – on the self-active, 
purposeful, and idealistic production of chance – (fortuitous – free 
concatenation). (Wood, 2007, p. 168)  
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The poet strikes the keys, and the sound acts as a Stoßsatz. But the keys are an 
impetus to begin with, and so is the poet him- or herself. The poetic sound that 
emerges shows the complex nature of the Stoßsatz method. It is a mixture of the 
key, the sound, the poet, and the impact of other unseen things in the world. The 
metaphor that I have interpreted here demonstrates that there is ongoing 
discussion between a variety of elements. Arranging fragments of thought next to 
each other, in the context of this thesis, brings them to speak with one another.  
 
Chapter three draws heavily on Te Maire Tau’s “Ghosts on the Plains” and to that 
extent is similarly symphilosophisch. Yet in that chapter it is Novalis who clearly 
has the igniting word and makes it possible for me to respond to Te Maire Tau in 
this thesis in the way that I do. In all cases involving Stoßsätze the view that this 
method appears tidy (in that it first refers to one tradition then another) should be 
revisited, as the engager may have to alternate between both traditions. However, 
Novalis’ influence is perceptible in my responses, and indeed is the beginning 
provocative sentence at each point. 
 
Similar Māori practices of challenge and provocation 
Novalis has directed my attention to this method, but it should be noted that there 
are also Māori precedents. The Māori equivalent terms are numerous. For 
instance, the term ‘kupu whakaaro’ incites the thinker to respond to a word or set 
of words. The term ‘aro’ can also be used in the sense of ‘kōaro’, referring to a 
regard of a thing so that it is inverted; thus ‘kupu whakakōaro’ could signify the 
regard to respond to the word with the result that a conventional approach is 
overturned. ‘Kupu whakakōkiri’ is the challenge that a word or set of words 
invokes, and ‘kupu ohorere’ the immediate provocative response that the words 
arouse in the reader or listener. In practical ways, the Stoßsatz method was 
utilised in traditional learning settings, with the learner being encouraged to 
respond imaginatively to a stimulus, with fresh, even unanticipated perspective 
the focus (Hemara, 2000) rather than correctness. Contemporary political and 
research activities in indigenous contexts reveal a call to imagination: Graham 
Smith (2003), speaking of the need for Māori to recapture their imagination as a 
liberating force, posits that colonisation tried to stifle creative Māori thought and 
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rob it of its ability to theorise; and Linda Smith (1999) offers that “indigenous 
elders can do wonderful things with an interview. They tell stories, tease, 
question, think, observe, tell riddles, test and give trick answers. Conversely, they 
can also expect that an indigenous researcher will do the same back to them” (p. 
136). Carrying this into practice in the academic arena, Māori academic Hoskins 
(2010) refers to Levinas in her doctoral thesis in a ‘kanohi ki te kanohi’/[face to 
face] relationship with indigenous thought and ethics, but has not referred to this 
as a method of prompting, even though there may be elements of this in her 
approach. What I show here is that, even in potentially colonising practices, 
spectacular opportunities may offer themselves for the use of Stoßsätze to address 
those practices’ very nature. Māori have been sent on an entirely other direction 
by the overwhelmingly devastating impact of colonisation, but, far from 
dampening any Māori ability to respond, colonisation has ironically opened itself 
up to response by Māori14.  
 
Stoßsätze: A dialogue between Novalis and aspects of 
Māori metaphysics 
At first glance, the term ‘Stoß’ seems to suggest setting something in motion, but 
Novalis intends for it to have the effect of a chain reaction. It contains a deeper 
aspect of continuity and continued creativity, but having a residual effect, with 
Novalis (1960j) stating: 
 
Der Grund des Naturgesetzes, daß jedes Anstoßes Wirkung ohne 
Gegenwirkung ewig dauere – wo liegt der im Ich – er kann uns im Ich 
manches erklären. (p. 268) 
 
                                                
14 The full extent of cultural and political transformation is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but for specific discussions and interpretations, see: Kaiwai & Zemke-White 
(2004); Anne Salmond (1994) for a brief discussion on the resilience yet adaptation of 
Māori protocol after contact; Royal (2006); Linda Smith (1999); Pihama (2001). 
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The ground of the law of nature that the action without reaction of 
every force continues eternally – where does [this principle] lie in the 
I – it can explain much about the I. (Kneller, 2003, p. 167) 
 
There is a link between the Stoßsätzen and the creative outcome, with the 
outcome one of deep personal embeddedness: “Eine überraschende Selbstheit ist 
zwischen einem wahrhaften Liede und einer edeln Handlung” (Novalis, 1960h, p. 
332)/“There is a surprising similarity between a genuine song and a noble deed” 
(Novalis, 1990, p. 167). As the self continues in its creative pursuit, so it is 
evidence of impetus and creative activity. The powerful effect that nature and 
poesy have on various characters in Novalis’ works, including Heinrich from 
Heinrich von Ofterdingen, and Rosenblüte from “Die Natur” in Die Lehrlinge zu 
Sais, stays with those participants, provoking them to consider nature in its fullest 
and continuously impacting extent. 
 
I argue that both Novalis’ and traditional and contemporary Māori belief would 
resist any notion that Stoßsätze are merely stimulating functions and can 
thereafter be discarded from what ensues. To begin with, some Māori writers 
(Browne, 2005; Pere, 1982; Raerino, 2000) acknowledge the enduring nature of a 
word. Because of the overall embrace of the word that they talk about, one may 
move onward after encountering the word but with the expectation that the 
essence of the word remains. Pihama, Smith, Taki, & Lee (2004) draw on the 
function of ‘kupu’ as the “kakahu/[cloak] of sound” (p. 21). Admittedly about the 
spoken word, this ‘kakahu’ may cloak the speaker as much as any aspect of the 
word. As written Stoßsätze, it is not inconceivable that the kupu could have their 
own effect, perhaps providing a similar ‘cloak’. A metaphor, ‘cloak’ suggests that 
removal is possible. Certainly Māori believed that the effect of a word on the 
perceiver could be either enhanced or undone, further showing that the subject 
operates within the subtle influence of a word on contact with it. Located as a 
subject within the wider sphere of reo/language, one may be moved onward to 
new and imaginative grounds but always with the continuation of the old ground. 
 
One may undertake an interpretation of certain Māori terms here to understand 
this admittedly unconventional idea that entities ‘stay’ with others. Here we are 
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discussing not the stimulating impact of those words (although indeed they do 
provide impetuses for much creative discussion) but the fact that things in the 
world remain under their influence. With the word whakapapa/genealogy, for 
instance, there exists a complex web of interrelated phenomena within which one 
operates. As an allusion to Papatūānuku/[Earth Mother] one is automatically 
reminded of the earth (hence ‘papa’). One is born of the earth – nourishing 
substance - as a manifestation of Papatūānuku, and is also becoming (‘whaka’) 
earth. An interpretation of this language suggests that the earth is inescapable. A 
term denoting noun and verb at once, whakapapa reveals that all finite things in 
the world might move forward into new terrains but always within the world’s 
primordial influence. In its draw back to Papatūānuku, whakapapa innervates and 
arouses finite things. In its way it acts as Stoß/[jolt] to them. Whenua, the Māori 
term for both land and placenta, completely embraces Māori. It therefore “sparked 
the Māori imagination” (Royal, 2011 n.p.)15, but never disappears as a jolt for that 
imagination.   
 
Novalis (1960m)  avowed that:  
 
Wir stehen in Verhältnissen mit allen Theilen des Universums, so wie 
mit Zukunft und Vorzeit. Es hängt nur von der Richtung und Dauer 
unsrer Aufmerksamkeit ab, welches für uns vorzüglich wichtig, und 
wirksam werden soll. (p. 455) 
 
[We stand in relation to all elements of the universe, just as we do 
with future and past. It is the direction and endurance of our attention 
that determines which should become eminently important and 
effective for us.] 
 
The interrelationship of past and present is a given, but where one takes one’s 
attention – here, to utilise Stoßsätze – is also important. The engager with 
Stoßsätzen is therefore forgiven in thinking of Stoßsätzen as a thoroughly 
                                                
15 The saying “ka tu te ihiihi/ka tu te wanawana/ki runga i te whenua e takoto nei, e takoto 
nei”/“so that the land surrounding us/proclaims its wonder” (Greenwood & Wilson, 2006, 
p. 89) shows the prompt that whenua can provide.   
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founding impetus, or that he or she stands outside of it, but still here the person 
operates as a part of the enduring nature of the impetus. Even here, from a 
linguistic perspective that draws on Māori thought, the kupu’s influence would 
remain. Apparently leaving the Stoßsätze for good, one is still operating from its 
sphere and cannot help but carry remnants of it. To continue this discussion, let us 
examine a sentence in Māori which carries with it dual senses:  
 
Ka puta mai tērā whakaaro mō taku whare i taku kitenga i te moana. 
 
[That thought about my house arose because I saw the lake/from the 
point of seeing the lake: That thought about my house arises because I 
see the lake/because I continuously see the lake.] 
 
Here the crucial components of the sentence are ‘mai … i’. These two particles 
indicate a continuing flow of activity and influence that ‘from’ does not impart. 
Seeing the lake, I suggest, remains as the starting point for thinking about ‘my 
house’ – it does not automatically disappear. These particles together can also 
mean ‘since’, suggesting that the effect is as much about what brought the thought 
about as the continued time in which the thought and the sighting coexist. 
 
Novalis for his part speaks much more directly about the unique and continuing 
nature of the fragments and aphorisms. He relates to the ongoing move towards 
completion, with the imperfect fragment as a constant backdrop: 
 
Als Fragment erscheint das Unvollkommne noch am Erträglichsten – 
und also ist diese Form der Mittheilung dem zu empfehlen, der noch 
nicht im Ganzen fertig ist – und doch einzelne merckwürdige 
Ansichten zu geben hat. (1960o, p. 595)    
[As fragment, that which is imperfect still seems to be most bearable - 
and so this form of disclosure has in its favour that it is not yet 
finished so as to be whole – and indeed, particularly, that it offers 
remarkable views.] 
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The fragment is a mode of expression that I do not replicate for this thesis, as my 
own writing style is characterised by a traditionally academic narrative in which I 
advocate various positions. Despite its adherence to academic conventions, 
though, my thesis should be viewed as serving a larger impetus for further 
thought, which may also lead to further dialogue between marginalised European 
and Māori trains of thought. Occasionally, within some of my greater arguments 
(which, taken as a whole, could serve as impetus for thought) there appear highly 
condensed arguments that are more discrete in nature. In that form they resemble 
fragments to some extent, but they generally emerge as the result of a greater 
argument. A similar surmise may be made about the role of whakataukī/proverbs 
in that they are not meant to be prescriptive but to be calls to action: Pihama 
(1993) notes this about the following whakataukī: 
 
Hutia te rito o te harakere/Kei hea te komako e ko?/Ki mai ki au/He 
aha te mea nui o te ao/Maku e ki atu/He Tangata, He Tangata, he 
Tangata/Pluck the centre shoot from the flax bush/Where will the 
Bellbird sing?/Ask me/What is the most important thing in the world/I 
will say/It is people, it is people, it is people. (p. 4) 
 
She argues that the philosophy behind the saying “demands the active critique of 
and challenging of discourses … that contribute to the imposition of hierarchical 
power relations by the dominant group” (pp. 4-5). A reading of such an assertion 
as the whakataukī embodies does not immediately disclose the need for a critical 
discourse analysis, but what Pihama demonstrates is that different fields of 
knowledge, perhaps normally compartmentalised, are arranged next to each other 
so that the reader can make evolving connections from their placement. This is 
also an approach that Novalis advocates. 
 
The continuous influence of the sentence that challenges and 
pushes 
Just as the Māori whakataukī does not disappear from any subsequent theorising, 
so the first fragment that Novalis provides continues to exert its influence, despite 
having apparently been left behind. In a letter to Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis stated 
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that “[e]s sind Bruchstücke des fortlaufenden Selbstgesprächs in mir – Senker…. 
Erst Poësie – dann Politik, dann Physik en Masse” (1960a, pp. 241-
242)/“fragmentary pieces of the ongoing dialogue that is going on in me – 
shoots…. First poesy – then politics, then physics en masse” (Gelley, 1991, p. 
379)16. “Shoots” suggests a genesis in a seed, with the ongoing influence of that 
seed evident, where the whole plant or tree is potentially present in the very 
beginning – in the inaugural thought, the fragmented or condensed idea. “Poesy”, 
although first, is responsible for the activities that follow it; poesy is not thought 
to have ceased, nor just to have given rise to its predecessors but to have 
continued in them (Gelley, 1991). Friedrich Schlegel himself had considered a 
similar role of the fragment, highlighting its clashing with other fragments in 
bringing forth a new perspective (Speight, 2011).  
 
Through the fragment, both Schlegel and Novalis attempted to force the reader 
into new realms of thought and to avoid reifying philosophical systems. They 
recognised the need for some sort of philosophising together, or Symphilosophie, 
which would acknowledge the moving forward together into new poetic and 
philosophical realms (Cieśla-Korytowska, 2002). An aim of the Stoßsatz method 
is to ensure that my own outcomes are influenced by a deliberate encounter with 
the source of the thinking that occurs: that is, with Novalis’ compelling sentences, 
with a dialogue occurring as well. As I indicated in chapter one, Symphilosophie 
in this sense refers to the conjunction of thought between Novalis and me through 
this method. Some of these aphorisms reach over a distance of several hundred 
years, demonstrating that Stoßsätze work not only in a recent time frame but have 
enduring relevance17.  
 
                                                
16 Novalis also refers to seeds in his popular comment: “Freunde, der Boden ist arm, wir 
müssen reichlichen Samen ausstreun, daß uns doch nur mäßige Ernten gedeihn” (1960n, 
p. 402)/“[f]riends, the soil is poor, we must richly scatter/Seeds to produce even a modern 
harvest” (O'Brien, 1995, p. 320). Novalis clearly hopes for a useful outcome to his 
fragments here, as O’Brien notes, but also a barren soil is started with, meaning that some 
of the seeds may not take effectively. We may infer here, as O’Brien does, that not all 
fragments will have a fruitful outcome. 
 
17 A similar trait is discernible with Māori whakataukī, which still act as jolts for thinking 
even though they, too, may be several centuries old. 
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If the first element remains throughout the imaginative process, as I maintain it 
does, then there are consequences for both any substantive discussions about 
Geheimnis and for my method. For the first part, Stoßsätze appear to cease but are 
intertwined with the imaginative process, even where that process leads to a much 
more expansive outcome than the original Stoßsätze seem to contain. Any 
outcome, then, will be mysterious because it always contains primordial, often 
opaque, vestiges of the first principles that the user refers to. The reader may have 
already apprehended that my argument rests on the premise there is an 
imperceptible element to a thing in the world that is given to it by Being and that 
continues to exert its influence. That there is correspondingly a component of the 
first principle that cannot be scribed out from the last product reflects that grander 
argument. As we shall see, quite apart from being indebted to Fichte for the 
substantive nature of Fichte’s proclamations about a grounding principle, Novalis 
benefited from these proclamations as a kind of Stoßsatz; he uses them in the 
sense of ‘Aufhebung’18, by which he carries Fichte’s declarations with him, but he 
seeks to counter them through his own creative thought process. A process of 
critique is renewed in Novalis’ encounter with Fichte’s thoughts which does not 
do away with them, however. Additionally, yet linked to that Geheimnis-oriented 
force of the Stoßsätze, both Māori philosophical belief and Novalis bestow on 
words an actual force beyond denotative meaning. Recall that Māori writers such 
as Pere, Marsden, and Browne declare that kupu are imbued with divine forces. 
Aspects of their, and others’, writings will be discussed in the following chapters, 
but they may be summarised in a methodological context in the briefest way as 
follows: Language is not an inanimate entity but has a ‘reach’ that moves 
outwards and inwards simultaneously – to other things in the world and also into 
the speaker. Language therefore not only jolts the cognitive faculty of the listener 
or reader – although this is an important aspect of it – but it will also have a much 
subtler effect. The effect of Stoßsätze is moreover to reaffirm the mysterious 
realm that the writer or talker works in through responding to another’s words and 
imagining another scenario through language. 
                                                
18 Hegel’s dialectical term ‘aufheben’, in the sense of lifting a term along with another but 
where they are “aufgehoben”/sublated (Redding, 2010, section 3.2) within a third, is 
similar. Novalis’ own approach is less formally identified, but he does acknowledge the 
vestiges of Fichte’s thought in his term ‘Fichtesising’, for instance. I shall delve into this 
process in some depth in chapter three. 
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The new scenario is not a traditionally pure one, and Novalis indicated that there 
was no going back to traditional or original ways of naming and philosophising in 
their pure form. This shows itself also with Stoßsätze, which retain aspects of the 
original but do not render those aspects as objects that can be returned to or 
‘owned’. As far as Novalis was concerned, modernism had arrived and life had to 
be dealt with on those terms. He bears some resemblance to Enlightenment 
philosophers here (Gjesdal, 2009), but he diverges from them in at least one 
important respect: One may, and indeed should, still think in a poetic way as 
one’s ancestors had done. This poetic mode of interpreting and revealing Being 
was certainly a traditional one, as far as the Romantics were concerned. Tradition 
in this account is never truly compromised as long as one is representing Being in 
its indeterminacy and its continual presence. The Stoßsatz method ensures the 
continuation of the original principle that compels thought, as I have argued. In 
terms of this thesis it could be said that it will not result in a ‘traditional’ or 
‘authentic’ Māori idea as the idea automatically contains elements of Novalis’ 
prompts. Whether this rules out an authentic Māori idea, though, is up for some 
speculation. Currently there is much debate on what constitutes an authentic 
Māori voice. My argument in this thesis, from the outset, is that Novalis would be 
correct: Māori cannot return to an uncolonised world, nor should they devise one 
that is typified by “the mystical, misty-eyed discourse that is sometimes employed 
by indigenous people to describe our relationships with the land and the universe” 
(Smith, 1999, p. 12)19. The Stoßsatz method does not aim to expunge the hidden 
but real principle of the colonising force, but instead aims to clarify that it may 
exist at most times, in most if not all places. Yet the outcome is perhaps not as 
compromised as one might think: In this case it will contain a distinctly Māori 
voice with Novalis as a catalytic partner in dialogue and vice versa. 
 
Another aspect of Romantic methodology is the placement and enduring nature of 
first antithetic signs. These may not be identified as empirical or rationalistic but 
                                                
19  I argue that a mystical assertion may nowadays be termed such because of an 
overwhelmingly current focus on practical, concrete conditions. Yet I take from Smith 
that a highly idealised description is undesirable, and agree with her here. My thesis aims 
to place what might otherwise be explanations about a ‘mystical’ relationship as both 
mystical and concrete. 
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could include these characteristics. An extremely important point of Novalis’ 
comes to light here, especially in view of his overall project of Romantisieren, 
which is a liberating one. The advancement towards higher goals is hindered by an 
unobtainable scientific pursuit of first principles20. However, that humanity tends 
to resort to the idea of linear progression when it comes to Romantisieren is 
conceded by Novalis, who appears to moderate his need for an unadulterated, 
simultaneous, and interdisciplinary approach to raising and lowering degrees with 
the realities of the human tendency to need ‘to start somewhere’. He notes:  
 
Definition und Klassification der Wissenschaften – nothw[endiges] 
und vollst[ändiges] Princip der Definition und der davon abhängenden 
bes[ondern] Definitionen und Classificationen. (1960b, p. 362)  
 
Definition and classification of the sciences - necessary and complete 
principle of a definition, and the particular definitions and 
classifications dependent on it. (Wood, 2007, p. 98)  
 
and even applies that to the simple operations of philosophical arguments when compared 
with the poet: 
 
Je unermeßlicher und mannichfacher der Horizont (die Sfäre) des 
Be[wußt]S[eyns] wird - desto mehr verschwindert die individuelle 
Größe und desto mercklicher wächst – desto offenbarer wird die 
geistige, Vernunftgröße des Menschen…. Die Mannichfaltigkeit der 
Methoden nimmt zu - am Ende weiß der Denker aus Jedem alles zu 
machen - der Phil[osoph] wird zum Dichter. (1960b, p. 406)  
                                                
20 Note in particular the following fragments, all sourced from Novalis’ (1960b) Das 
Allgemeine Brouillon: “Jede W[issenschaft] hat ihren Gott, der zugleich ihr Ziel ist” (p. 
296)/“Every science has its God, that is also its goal” (Wood, 2007, p. 46); “Die 
Phil[osophie] sucht ein erstes und einziges Princip. Der Mathem[atiker] die Quadratur des 
Zirkels und eine Principalgleichung. Der Mensch – Gott. Der Mediciner ein Lebenselixier 
… und vollk[ommenes] Gefühl und Handhabung d[es] Körpers. Der Politiker einen 
volkomnen Staat” (p. 296)/“Philosophy seeks a first and single principle. The 
mathematician, the squaring of the circle and a principal equation. The human being – 
God. The physician, an elixir of life … and complete feeling and control of the body. The 
politician, a perfect State” (Wood, 2007, p. 46). Novalis concludes that those limits 
internal to modern philosophy prevent it from setting out to achieve these ends. 
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The more immeasurable and diverse the horizon (the sphere) of 
consciousness becomes – the more the individual quantity wanes, and 
the more noticeably and perceptibly - the spiritual and rational 
quantity of man increases….. The diversity of the methods increases - 
the thinker eventually knows how to make everything out of each 
thing – the philosopher becomes a poet. (Wood, 2007, p. 132)  
 
He allows the progression from a temporal and conceptual beginning point to 
another, whilst acknowledging that, preferably, humanity will eventually learn the 
art of simultaneity: 
 
Das wird die goldne Zeit seyn, wenn alle Worte – Figurenworte - 
Mythen – und alle Figuren – Sprachfiguren – Hieroglyfen seyn 
werden – wenn man Figuren sprechen und schreiben – und Worte 
vollkommen plastisiren, und Musiciren lernt. 
Beyde Künste gehören zusammen, sind unzertrennlich verbunden und 
werden zugleich vollendet werden. (1960b, pp. 123-124)  
 
That will be a Golden Age, when all words become - figurative words 
– myths - And all figures become – linguistic figures – hieroglyphs - 
When we learn to speak and write figures - and learn to perfectly 
sculpt and make music with words. 
Both arts belong together, are indivisibly connected and will become 
simultaneously perfected. (Wood, 2007, p. 206)  
 
It appears that humanity’s pursuit of Geheimnislosigkeit, in relation to its simple 
temporal and conceptual operations, has a place in Romantisieren. For Novalis, 
this is an inevitability that will lead on to more creative enterprises, but staying 
with comfortable, set definitions of words, notions of chronology and causality, is 
what he resists. Using those set definitions from which to romanticise is what he 
advocates. 
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Thus there is retained in the process of Romantisieren (which is never really 
finally resolved – it is an eternal process) some first principles of precision. In the 
first instance those first principles guide the poet (whose role I discuss later in this 
chapter), who is a true interdisciplinarian. But the poet is never satisfied with just 
strengthening those lower principles so that they construe and build on the same 
forms of ontological knowledge: Instead, the thinker who is on the way to 
becoming a poet is able to construct everything from individual components. In a 
concrete way, alongside the Māori fiction writer the Māori artist is perhaps 
foremost of those able to achieve this. Artists seek to bring back tradition but raise 
it to another level. Jahnke and Ihimaera (1996b) note that: 
 
This has not been easy. To achieve ascendancy Maori artists have had 
to break the mould of that other false face of Maori art imposed by 
and established by the pakeha in place of the true face. They have had 
to battle and dismantle the entire pakeha construction of Maori art and 
culture, that false face which has always insisted that it knows better 
than Maori what Maori art is and how it should be portrayed. (p. 17) 
 
The existence of what Jahnke and Ihimaera term “the entire pakeha construction 
of Maori art” is undeniable but provides what might be thought of as unlikely 
forms of impetus from which to transform the current nature of Māori art. 
 
 
The ethics and responsibility of the Stoßsatz method 
In his Blüthenstaub, Novalis vividly highlights the role of the word. Asserted 
against the backdrop of the French Revolution, he notes that “[d]ie Sprachlehre ist 
die Dynamik des Geisterreichs. Ein Kommandowort bewegt Armeen; das Wort 
Freyheit Nazionen” (1960m, p. 413)/[grammar is the dynamic of the realm of 
spirit. A word of command moves armies: The word ‘freedom’, nations]21. The 
word is more than a denotative reference to a thing in the world; as a social and 
political speech act it has the power to impact on societies (or nation states, in 
                                                
21  Novalis has in mind here the social impact of the French Revolution and the 
commanding words of Napoleon in particular. 
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Novalis’ version). It has a performative and motivational dimension. If the word 
is thought of as a Stoßsatz then its use must be employed with care, precisely 
because of its impact. The responsibility attached to the Stoßsatz method compels 
collective welfare even though it is initially a highly individual pursuit. It can be 
challenging or provoking but it is not meant to be personally injurious. 
 
For Novalis, the past guides the future – “Die Zukunfstlehre gehört zur 
Geschichte” (Novalis, 1960b, p. 320)/“The theory of the future belongs to 
history” (Wood, 2007, p. 66) – but ultimately the user will never completely 
understand the interplay between elements resorted to. At the same time, the 
method calls for some responsibility, both personal and political. The thinking 
poet therefore takes on greater importance than just a composer of aesthetically 
pleasing verse; the person who turns to the Stoßsatz method is there to ensure that 
the mystery of things in the world is never extinguished. This is clearly a personal 
motivation of the poet but it also carries with it a much wider consequence of 
ensuring that humanity does not sink into complacency in their relationships with 
things in the world. In another sense the Stoßsatz method similarly renders 
personal relationships between individuals and communities mysterious, with the 
Other constantly remaining never quite determinable by the self. This concept is 
visible in Novalis’ ‘Magical Idealism’ by which the self is turned outwards to the 
world as a reflection of the self. Also, the Other is constantly in a state of 
‘outwardness’ towards the world and may never be known, whilst the Other is 
related to the self in a way similar to Buber’s (1997) “Ich/Du” 22 /I/you 
relationship: It is simultaneously one with the self but unknowable.  
 
With these accounts we can see that care is needed when dealing with Stoßsätzen, 
as they may be used to make fantastic, outrageous constructions of the Other, such 
depictions having been recounted and critiqued by postcolonial writers including 
Hall (1997), Said (1978), and Sardar, Nandy & Davies (1993). While the mystery 
                                                
22 Buber advocates that humanity should orient towards nature as a ‘you’ rather than an 
‘it’. Like Novalis, this maxim was stated alongside a critique. For instance, Buber (1997) 
declared that “[d]ie Welt als Erfahrung gehört dem Grundwort Ich-Es zu. Das Grundwort 
Ich-Du stiftet die Welt der Beziehung” (p. 12)/“[t]he world as experience belongs to the 
basic word I-It. The basic word I-You establishes the world of relation” (1996, p. 56). To 
experience the world is to set the world apart from the I in Buber’s construction. 
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of the Other might be a prompt to try and get to know the Other, the user of 
Stoßsätze is always aware that the Other is ultimately beyond the grasp of the self. 
This account of the unknowable outcome that the Stoßsatz method foreshadows 
does not provide any immunity from misuse, however. I acknowledge that it may 
perversely have an opposite effect – of providing a challenge to the user to always 
try and get to know the Other. Alongside that drive there is a degree of risk to the 
Stoßsatz method, which the Lehrer appears to have recognised in Die Lehrlinge zu 
Sais when he opened up the discussion to his students on the link between 
humanity and nature23. Encountering the sentence that pushes could well direct 
the subject into speaking of the Other, and indeed the self, in negative ways. 
When writing from a perspective in which the imagination is “reduced to a way of 
seeing and understanding the world” (Smith, 1999, p. 37) then what is taken to be 
imagination is merely a recasting of the banal. The Other is then seen as capable 
of being discussed or imagined in conceptually usual ways.  
The Stoßsatz method and ‘care’ through ‘manaakitanga’ 
The Stoßsatz method may be as open to misuse as any other method, but the idea 
that it must be positively and carefully applied can be fleshed out by a broad 
understanding of certain Māori terms. ‘Kia hiwa rā’, a phrase best interpreted as 
‘alert!’, can be thought of both as an introduction to a speech, but in its own right 
it bestows the right to think, from that point onward in a free manner. 
Additionally it relates that one must be critical for one’s community (Aranga, 
Mika, & Mlcek, 2008), in its close association with ‘manaakitanga’. 
‘Manaakitanga’ is to protect, but the particle ‘akiaki’, related to ‘aki’ (‘mana’ – 
‘aki’), means “to urge on” (Aranga et al., 2008, p. 2). Taken all together, 
Stoßsätze are sentences that push, or urge on, for the benefit of the greater group 
as a means of hospitality or care. The kind of imagination to be employed is not 
the sort that just satisfies an individual want, as it must also keep the care of one’s 
community at the forefront, even though it is an individual exercise. Imagination 
                                                
23 For instance, the apprentice states of the Lehrer that “[v]ielmehr will er, daß wir den 
eignen Weg verfolgen, weil jeder neue Weg durch neue Länder geht, und jeder endlich zu 
diesen Wohnungen, zu dieser heiligen Heimat wieder führet” (Novalis, 1960e, p. 82) 
“[h]e wants us … to go our own way, because every new road goes through new 
countries and each in the end leads anew to these dwellings, to this sacred home” (2005, 
p. 17). Each ‘way’ involves encountering unique points of impetus for the students. 
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in this vein, Smith (1999) notes, is a “way of sharing the world” (p. 37). It is a 
kind of thinking that is ethical and, as Haig-Brown & Archibald (1996) write, 
encourages that one is “to be in harmony with oneself, others, members of the 
animal kingdom, and other elements of nature … [so that] … First Nations people 
respect the gift of each entity and establish and maintain respectful, reciprocal 
relations with each” (p. 253). 
 
I do not use Heidegger’s legein in the remaining chapters, but it is an important 
one to recall here to contemplate my motivation for drawing on these apparently 
unrelated cultural traditions – German Romanticism and Māori philosophy. I 
reiterate Heidegger’s focus that gathering must be of collective benefit, not just an 
exercise in my detached philosophical interest. Māori writers, such as Linda 
Smith (1999), Graham Smith (1997), and Pihama (2001), have written widely 
about the need for Māori academic pursuits to have benefits for Māori 
communities. My thesis has as its basis the desire to add to this growing body of 
emancipatory work for Māori, but through using a different method, more than 
likely involving another outcome. The method and outcome may be of particular 
use to Māori academics and may spark some discussion for Māori communities 
who want to inquire into the issues that a discussion about Being raises for them. 
 
I do not wish to restrict my thesis to Māori academics, however. As I am drawing 
on the works of the German Romantic philosophers and poets with Novalis as 
central theorist, I imagine that my own Māori interpretation of those texts will be 
somewhat different to non-indigenous approaches. The hope here is that I can add 
to the expanding literature in the English-speaking world on the German 
Romantics. Here legein does not just set out to glean from one side, but it is 
instead reciprocated, and my approach to it may in turn provide a lens through 
which the non-indigenous academic philosopher can view the important area of 
mystery. 
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The method of Nachdenken: Thinking within Novalis’ 
Stoßsätzen  
Stoßsätze, either for an individual or collective audience, are stimuli provided for 
the hearer, and then the hearer moves on with the sentence(s) to create new ideas. 
They are particularly addressed to the individual and the responses to them are 
similarly individualistic but may be discussed in communities. It is necessary to 
discuss this move within the Stoßsätze towards new ideas, particularly from a 
Māori viewpoint, as such a discussion aims to appraise the reader of my reasons 
for alighting on certain new ideas in the thesis and combining apparently disparate 
aspects. In the same passage that Novalis introduces the concept and method of 
Stoßsätze he relates the following: 
 
Hemsterhuis hat hier eine herrliche Stelle vom Geist und Buchstaben 
der Philosophie.... Nach ihm ist der Buchstabe nur eine Hülfe der 
philosophischen Mittheilung – deren eigentliches Wesen im 
Nachdenken besteht. Der Redende leitet nur den Gang des Denkens 
im Hörenden – und dadurch wird es zum Nachdenken. Er denkt – und 
der Andre denkt nach. Die Worte sind ein unzuverlässiges Medium 
des Vordenkens. Die ächte Wahrheit muß ihrer Natur nach, 
wegweisend seyn. Es kommt also nur darauf an jemand auf den 
rechten Weg zu bringen, oder besser, ihm eine bestimmte Richtung 
auf die Wahrheit zu geben. Er gelangt dann von selbst, wenn er anders 
thätig ist, begierig, zur Wahrheit zu gelangen, an Ort und Stelle. 
(1960k, pp. 373-374)    
 
Hemsterhuis has a wonderful passage on spirit and letter in 
philosophy…. According to him the letter is merely a help for 
philosophical communication - the true essence of which consists in 
after-thinking [Nachdenken]. The speaker merely leads the direction 
of thought in the hearer - and thereby it becomes after-thinking. He 
thinks and the other thinks after him. Words are an untrustworthy 
medium of fore-thinking [Vordenken]. The genuine truth must, 
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according to its nature, show the way. Therefore, the only thing that 
matters is sending someone onto the right road, or better, giving him a 
certain direction towards the truth. He will then get there 
automatically, if only he is active, desiring, to get to the truth24. 
(Kleingeld, 2008, p. 278) 
 
Nachdenken is creatively guided but not restrained by the Stoßsätzen, and is 
equally a part of Novalis’ Romantisieren project. “Spirit and letter” are linked 
here, with Geheimnis guiding where one goes after having been propelled onward 
by the pushing sentence. The direction is provided in a nonprescriptive fashion: 
“Spirit” cannot be defined, and the hearer’s course of action may be as varied as 
the Stoßsätze are to begin with. Thinking after the guidance that Novalis proposes 
is “unaufhörlich” (1960f, p. 655)/[unceasing], “frey”/[free], in “verschiednen 
Stimmungen”/[diverse moods]. It “enthält eine unerschöpfliche Quelle von Trost 
und Beruhigung”/[has innate to it an inexhaustible source of solace and 
reassurance]. The hearer has to be prepared for following the way thrown open by 
the Stoßsätzen and hence has to be open to the sense of mystery that Novalis 
advocates. Solace and reassurance do not preclude anxiety, uncertainty and even 
fear, but for Novalis they are always present. I posit that Novalis wishes to 
highlight that moving in a direction with an unknown outcome can itself be a 
source of comfort, despite the Geheimnis that attends it. 
 
The mystery of Nachdenken/contemplative thinking: ‘Thinking’ 
within things 
An outcome of the Stoßsätze, Nachdenken is clearly to do with the reaction of the 
person. The response, however, must be thought of as the interplay of elements 
both inside of and discrete from the hearer. The thinking process is ‘free’ but is 
moved about by the stimulus of the original thought and the self-organising nature 
of the Absolute. Things in the world retain contingent as well as determined 
elements, along with the historical experience of the hearer and whatever the 
social and cultural context is in which the reader works, together with 
                                                
24 The reader may like to consider Nachdenken as ‘to think in the wake of’ rather than 
simply ‘after-think’. ‘To think in the wake of’ suggests that there is a sphere of influence 
provided by an impetus. 
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imperceptible aspects, to create a process of thought that the Stoßsätze bring to the 
fore. As I have argued, Stoßsätze remain even imperceptibly influential over the 
outcome, but they work in conjunction with the elements of the Absolute that 
move onto the hearer. Despite this fact, though, there is a certain amount of 
freedom resulting from this whole activity: The Absolute develops and engages 
with the hearer but within its sphere the self acts with openness towards things in 
the world. Mentioning this interplay, I am reminded of Heidegger’s 
‘Geviert’/Fourfold which finds some precedence in isolated parts of Novalis’ Die 
Lehrlinge zu Sais as well as in that work’s totality. In his later work, Heidegger 
tried to articulate a mode of holism that arguably was already present in his earlier 
works (although, according to Harman (2009), his Fourfold would be largely 
ignored by Heideggerean scholars). The Fourfold, or Quadrate as it is otherwise 
called, refers not only to the earth, divinities, sky and mortals, but more 
importantly to their reflection of each other. Each contains within itself all aspects 
of the others. There is also evident in his description what I call a ‘driving 
together’ of the oneness of the Fourfold within a thing, ensuring the continued 
presence of each element, including their necessary interaction amongst and 
within each other. A thing is not just that thing but also the mirroring of all those 
elements of the Fourfold within and around it at the same time. Mortals for 
Heidegger ‘dwell’ as a result of all these elements, dwelling being preserved as 
the freeing of things into their own essence, without constraint by humanity: 
 
Doch  ‘auf der Erde’ heißt schon ‘unter dem Himmel’. Beides meint 
mit ‘Bleiben vor den Göttlichen’ und schließt ein ‘gehörend in das 
Miteinander der Menschen’. Aus einer ursprünglichen Einheit 
gehören die Vier: Erde und Himmel, die Göttlichen und die 
Sterblichen in eins. (1990, p. 143)  
 
But ‘on the Earth’ already means ‘under the sky’. Both of these also 
mean ‘remaining under the divinities’ and include a ‘belonging to 
men's being with one another’. By a primal oneness, the four - earth 
and sky, divinities and mortals - belong together in one. (1971b, p. 
147) 
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As all those elements are constantly manifested in things, time is manifest as a 
necessary issue of discussion, and the things are the confluence of the past, 
present and future: “Die Sterblichen wohnen in der Weise, daß sie das Geviert in 
sein Wesen schonen” (1990, p. 144)/“Mortals dwell in the way they preserve the 
fourfold in its essential being, its presencing” (1971b, p. 148). 
 
Even though not furnishing these phenomena with an explicit rubric, Novalis is no 
less interested in his version of the Fourfold. He does not address the Fourfold 
through prosaic means as Heidegger does (he engages with it in a manner more 
consistent with poetic verse), but he is more concerned than Heidegger with 
addressing its direct effects on the self as the self comes to new ideas. Like 
Heidegger, the thinking that he proposes takes place as a mirroring of the 
Fourfold; one thereby ‘dwells’. Novalis – and Heidegger would quote him 
directly – stated that “[d]ie Philosophie ist eigentlich Heimweh – Trieb überall zu 
Hause zu seyn” (1960b, p. 434)/“[p]hilosophy is really homesickness – the desire 
to be everywhere at home” (Wood, 2007, p. 155). This drive to be at home refers 
to a process of thinking that constantly takes into account the Absolute, by which 
one dwells. The process of thinking that is central here is that of philosophising 
through poesy, which is not confined to lyrical poetry but is a form of being in the 
world. As Hölderlin (1961a) had hoped “dichterisch, wohnet der Mensch auf 
dieser Erde” (p. 372)/[poetically, humanity dwells on earth], meaning that 
dwelling poetically acknowledges the Fourfold. Opposed to this is alienation from 
one’s ‘Heimat’/[place of home], sensed as ‘Heimweh’/homesickness. Heimat, as 
an acknowledgement of poetic dwelling, thus also incorporates a critical analysis 
of estrangement that may itself be ‘dichterisch’.  
 
One may discern recognisable aspects in foreign elements that one encounters, 
even though they may be unusually combined (and here they will have their 
uniqueness). In Die Lehrlinge zu Sais it is the combination of these elements that 
thereafter gives rise to new thoughts, emphasising dwelling or Heimat: 
 
Wie er [der Lehrer] größer ward, strich er umher, besah sich andre 
Länder, andre Meere, neue Lüfte, fremde Sterne, unbekannte 
Pflanzen, Tiere, Menschen, stieg in Höhlen, sah wie in Bänken und in 
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bunten Schichten der Erde Bau vollführt war, und drückte Ton in 
sonderbare Felsenbilder. Nun fand er überall Bekanntes wieder, nur 
wunderlich gemischt, gepaart, und also ordneten sich selbst in ihm oft 
seltsame Dinge. (Novalis, 1960e, p. 80)   
 
When [the teacher] grew older, he roamed the earth, saw distant lands 
and seas, new skies, strange stars, unknown plants, beasts, men, went 
down into caverns, saw how the earth was built in shelves and 
multicoloured layers, and pressed clay into strange rock forms. 
Everywhere he found the familiar, only strangely mixed and coupled, 
and thus strange things often ordered themselves within him. (Novalis, 
2005, p. 7) 
 
For the Lehrer, to dwell is to be immersed within unfamiliar finite things in the 
world and yet still be at home. The travellers in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais are all 
affected by the environment and are then able to tell their stories: 
 
Wie sie [die tausendfaltigen Naturen] so sprachen, strahlte die Sonne 
durch die hohen Fenster, und in ein sanftes Säuseln verlor sich der 
Lärm des Gesprächs; eine unendliche Ahndung durchdrang alle 
Gestalten, die lieblichste Wärme verbreitete sich über alle, und der 
wunderbarste Naturgesang erhob sich aus der tiefsten Stille. Man 
hörte Menschenstimmen in der Nähe, die großen Flügeltüren nach 
dem Garten zu wurden geöffnet, und einige Reisende setzten sich auf 
die Stufen der breiten Treppe, in den Schatten des Gebäudes. Die 
reizende Landschaft lag in schöner Erleuchtung vor ihnen, und im 
Hintergrunde verlor sich der Blick an blauen Gebirgen hinauf.  
(1960e, p. 96) 
 
As they [the thousandfold natures] spoke, the sun shone through the 
lofty windows, and the sound of their words was lost in a gentle 
murmur; an infinite surmise permeated every shape, a tender warmth 
spread over them all, and a wondrous song of nature rose from the 
deepest silence. Human voices were heard nearby, the great folding 
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doors leading in from the garden were opened, and a few travelers sat 
down on the steps of the broad staircase, in the shadow of the 
building. The charming landscape lay in a lovely radiance before 
them, and in the background the eye lost itself in blue mountain 
heights. (2005, p. 73) 
 
Even though they are travellers, and are therefore passing through the temple of 
Saïs, they are brought to think about nature because of the current interplay of 
nature, sun, words, shapes, sensation, earth, light and distance. Here they are 
responding to the stimuli provided, and with the surrounding, intertwining 
elements of earth, divinity, mortals and sky, they are able to speak their 
conclusions. The interplay of the light on the earth, the changing of the sky’s 
colour, the presence of mortals – along with the conversations of manifold voices 
of nature – and the travellers’ own immersion and mirroring of these elements, 
ensure their staying within the equivalent of Heidegger’s Fourfold25. Novalis’ 
mention of these elements while the travellers are talking, and even apart from the 
travellers’ awareness at times, is not by accident: He intends to show the direct 
relationship between all these elements, even their reliance on each other. Direct 
attention to a matter, or to Stoßsätze, ensures that the self moves outwards and 
carries all elements that it encounters with it. We can see here that ‘dwelling’ for 
Novalis is to do with the expansion of the bodily self outwards and its travel to the 
world, for as Novalis noted “Gedanken ... scheinen nichts als Strahlen und 
Wirkung, die jenes Ich nach allen Seiten zu in jenem elastischen Medium erregt” 
(Novalis, 1960e, p. 97)/“thoughts seem to be nothing other than emanations and 
effects which the self induces all around it in that elastic medium” (2005, p. 75).  
 
The Māori self’s thinking within things in the world 
The self’s response in terms of thoughts is hence important. The travellers 
propose theories based on the activities of the Absolute in the realm of nature; 
                                                
25 The finite appearance of these elements is not meant to confine their significance in 
either Novalis’ or Heidegger’s treatment of the Fourfold, I argue. Those elements in turn 
have their ontological relationship with each other and are therefore as much about their 
unseen effect on each other as their appearance to the perceiver. In Māori belief this may 
best be described as an effect of mauri, which I discuss occasionally throughout this 
thesis. 
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these propositions comprise a substantial portion of Die Lehrlinge zu Sais. Yet 
there are many voices involved, with some tentativeness retained in the tenor of 
each. I theorise that my own approach to this thesis, with particular regard to 
Nachdenken, reflects Novalis’ and Heidegger’s respective ideas about the 
interplay of elements as one, resulting in my progress towards certain ideas. 
Māori writers such as Smith (1999), Walker (1996), and Pihama (2001) either 
directly discuss the subjectivity of research and/or allow it as a given in their 
method. Similarly I argue that my response to Stoßsätze is just that – primarily my 
own – but in accordance with the driving together of all those influences alluded 
to above. In terms of theoretical fit, this proposition lines up well with an all-
inclusive notion that Māori operate holistically (Marsden, 2003; Pere, 1997). It 
also corresponds with Māori verse, much of which is personal in nature. We 
additionally see a reflection of these elements in certain terms, and if we interpret 
them beyond their dominant meanings then we may get a glimpse of what the 
term is saying. To refer to the term ‘whakapapa’ again: In the previous section I 
discussed its innate reference to the earth with its retention of ‘Papa’ from 
‘Papatūānuku’. Directed to think by Stoßsätzen, I am engaging with moving 
towards an utterance as a grounding proposition – becoming earth – but never 
quite reaching it. Nevertheless, earth is present at all times in that thinking and 
talking. Besides being earth, though, it is also divinity because it always reaches 
up towards Ranginui/Sky Father, and outwards beyond one’s range of perception, 
in a sense ensuring that one is operating in a realm of Geheimnis. In becoming 
earth, the sky is simultaneously manifested as its mirror image; in becoming earth 
and sky, humanity is always seeking to return to the primordial, and is thus mortal 
in the way that Heidegger emphasised it – as tending towards death as death 
(Heidegger, 1990). Within this one term, then, we can see that one’s ‘dwelling’ is 
in fact a sort of ‘becoming’ within all those elements. One layers (‘whakapapa’) 
aspects of all those elements to oneself, as immersion within them all takes place. 
Thinking within the world of Tūhourangi 
Perhaps this explanation does not specifically lay out exactly how I build on 
Novalis’ Stoßsätze to arrive at my ideas – that is, I cannot say that exactly at this 
point I know that that element is working in a certain way – but I can broadly 
explain my responses to those sentences in the following, more concrete, ways. 
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These more concrete explanations reflect the Fourfold, Novalis’ Die Lehrlinge zu 
Sais, and whakapapa as a phenomenological term. One may begin thinking of an 
individual Māori response to Stoßsätze in terms of one’s history. As I am a 
member of the Tūhourangi iwi, my responses are in turn a synthesis of historical 
influences – all including earth, sky, divinities and mortals – that are related to 
Tūhourangi. Things in the world that have affected Tūhourangi have all been (and 
continue to be) affected by those elements in whakapapa. The eruption of 
Tarawera that I talked of in the introduction chapter through the lament is one 
example: As well as being the third generation down from that event, I also carry 
the history of that eruption – including the interrelationship of all elements within 
that event - alongside the tourist trade that cropped up around the tribal area, 
alongside the subsequent selling of the wharenui/meeting house to Clarendon 
Park in England, to cite some other instances. Being concrete historical events as 
well as arrangements of the Absolute, all these happened with a sense of 
Geheimnis, with the result that I am not even aware of their, and other historical 
events’, complete influence.  
 
Other things in the world also drive together with each other, including the self 
within their activity. They in turn carry their history. These things – whether they 
are one’s ‘maunga’/mountain, ‘awa’/river – do not just exist as isolated 
phenomena: They act within the world. Thus my own tribal saying is of 
significance in Nachdenken, even though the phenomena that comprise it are not 
physically present. This saying is the following: 
 
Ko Tarawera te maunga 
Ko Okataina me Tarawera ngā roto 
Ko Te Arawa te waka 
Ko Tamatekapua te tangata 
Ko Ngātoroirangi te tohunga 
Ko Ngāti Hinemihi te hapū 
Ko Ngāti Tarawhai me Tūhourangi ngā iwi 
 
There are elements listed here that make up the Māori individual. They are names 
of specific ancestors, things in the world, and social structures. Maunga, or 
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mountains, roto, or lakes, are the things in the world that have special significance 
for me as a writer generally. In particular reference to this thesis, they are 
important because I dwell within them, even though I may not be physically near 
them. This dwelling occurs because they all themselves dwell within each other, 
reflecting each other. In turn, they are enabled and arranged by emanations of the 
Absolute, and link through their action to other things in the world. As I am 
placed within them, they have an impact on me: In this reading of their 
significance, they are not merely solid identities waiting for me to identify them 
through referring to them, but they are living entities. While I respond to 
Stoßsätze I am affected by these entities. The ancestors mentioned, although 
deceased, are still present in that they move throughout all these elements as well. 
They resemble the living in this respect, and are hence ‘dwellers’ as well. Part of 
the movement of the Absolute, they also impact on my responses. Social 
structures can be understood as manifestations of the bodies of water mentioned, 
the mountain, and the names of those ancestors. They are not separate from those 
other elements mentioned, and work together with those others to impact on my 
thinking. 
My discussions with my aunt 
One cannot account for every sort of impact on the thinking for Nachdenken – 
this is the extent of the Geheimnis of things in the world – but, naturally, 
relationships with others are important here. Discussions with my aunt were 
especially informative and come to mind immediately. These discussions took 
place on an almost daily basis from the age of 15 through to 18. They were not 
only about the transference of ideas but probably also involved a synthesis of 
those elements above, as well as many others. Responding to her Stoßsätze, she 
and I would have been mirroring those elements at once26. Given the state of flux 
that all those elements are in – Novalis especially was at pains to point this out in 
Die Lehrlinge zu Sais - my aunt would discuss ideas, and provide Stoßsätze, to 
reflect the need of those elements to retain their fluidity. She would therefore 
never set out to answer a question directly; my impression was that she wanted to 
                                                
26 The German adjectives and adverb ‘ineins’ and ‘einst’, which means ‘at once’, as in 
past, future and instantaneity together, are appropriate here. The English phrase ‘at the 
same time’ could suffice, but tends to stress a chronological dimension more than ‘at 
once’, which even then does not completely match the sense of ‘einst’. 
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both convey a larger and more thorough complexity to her answer, and did not 
want to cut through the hidden meaning or significance that lay behind and around 
the direct question. Often she would rely on poetic or metaphoric language to get 
her point across and would discuss whakapapa only at certain times and with 
certain people. At these times, it could be said, I was providing sentences that 
compelled her to think, and her response was her own but guided by my question.  
 
Nachdenken: The self’s creative response 
In relation to the grand project of Romantisieren, Beiser has written extensively 
on the apparent tension between self and nature. In his German Idealism: The 
Struggle against Subjectivism he gives a succinct introduction to Novalis’ oft-
maligned ‘Magical Idealism’. This term is meant to encompass Novalis’ working 
approach to Romantisieren. Its occult connotations have contributed to Novalis’ 
works being treated at times as if scrofulous, yet alongside the undeniable 
supernatural element there is a workable one. Novalis does not shelve human will; 
on the contrary, Beiser states that Magical Idealism involves refining the senses so 
that humans can be both active and passive. Where Fichte and Kant had argued 
too strongly in favour of the subject, Novalis brings to the fore an awareness of 
one’s duty to reflect Being through romanticising things in the world. If we reflect 
the mystery of Being through Romantisieren, we are to transform the world so 
that it regains its Geheimnis. Here a parallel may be noted with the 
‘tohunga’/[specialist] Hohepa Kereopa who, in a discussion with Paul Moon 
about gardening, stated that one would not be disappointed with an outcome of a 
crop if one just listened to the will of the garden (Moon, 2005). Further, Novalis’ 
Magical Idealism takes on a similar hue in Kereopa’s discussion: 
 
The way we, as Maori, look at plants is that each species has total 
power. That is power over themselves, over their relationships with 
other plants, and everything. Now, each species is like a whole 
universe unto itself. So each species has mauri – which is that life 
force. And because each species has mauri, they are tapu. But there is 
a higher power – God – and all these universes of plants and people 
and whatever are all directed by God. So unless you relate with God, 
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you can’t relate honestly with the world which he created, so what are 
you left with? (Moon, 2005, p. 43)  
 
We can see two sides to Kereopa’s argument here: human will (revealed in their 
relationship with what Kereopa refers to as ‘God’) and a “higher power – God.” 
Beiser (2002) believes, in accordance with Novalis, that the human subject has the 
responsibility of bringing into balance “activity and sensibility, inner and outer 
sense” (p. 424). Through this balance one reflects the activity of the Absolute. 
Thus it is with listening to what Beiser calls ‘the world’ that the self is brought 
into harmony. As echoed throughout the complete Das Allgemeine Brouillon, 
which focuses in a fundamental sense on various elements and their relationship 
with each other, Novalis advocates that the “inner and outer sense enjoy an 
interplay with one another…. This harmony means that they must each retain 
their specific characteristics when united with one another” (Beiser, 2002, p. 424). 
When thinking with Romantisieren as the aim, one is encouraged to reflect those 
aspects that Beiser raises as an ethical response to the self’s, and Being’s, creative 
impulses. 
The transformative ability of the self: Poesy 
Until this point I have been stressing the importance of things in the world and 
their impact on thought. This activity is one within which all other activity takes 
place, but I now need to address in more detail the place of subjectivity in relation 
to the world – namely, the self and its interplay with Being - whilst preserving the 
mystery of things in the world in that interaction. Novalis’ views are not 
necessarily straightforward but they are nonetheless comprehensible when read in 
the context of the activity of Being. He tempers the human will to act, including 
Nachdenken, whilst emphasising it. Even though humanity is sourced within 
primordial Being, it would be a mistake to think that humanity has no agency as 
far as Novalis is concerned. Das Allgemeine Brouillon in particular indicates that 
humanity is necessary for the unity of poetry and science. Alongside his Fichte-
Studien, the Das Allgemeine Brouillon fragments perhaps highlight most the 
innate ability of the individual, and thereafter the collective, to impose their will 
on things in the world. That the “ächt synthetische” (1960b, p. 250)/[truly 
synthetic] person needs to be versatile is a clue to his overall thesis that, in the 
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absence of an organic way of interacting with the world, the world and the people 
in it will remain at the same level, without progress. As with Schiller, who, in 
speaking of the disjointed nature of disciplines, believed that “es [ist] die 
Dichtkunst beinahe allein, welche die getrennten Kräfte der Seele wieder in 
Vereinigung bringt” (1840a, p. 1231)/[the art of poetry is almost on its own in 
being able to reunite the fragmented forces of the soul], Novalis believes that it is 
precisely the ability of the self to embody many different abilities that brings 
about ‘genius’. Throughout his works, Novalis alludes to the action of the self, 
whether it is the searching of Rosenblüte in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais, or the ‘love’ 
that people tend to have for the day in his Hymnen an die Nacht. What 
characterises all this subjectivity is the desire of the poet – reflecting Novalis’ 
wish also – to aspire ‘upwards’ towards the unknowable. Thus an artist seeks 
upward movement towards “höhere ... Einheiten” (1960b, p. 258)/“higher … 
unities”, building on the “Einheiten der niederern Künstler”/[unities of the lower 
artist]. Novalis wants the artist to continue on the track of change, even though the 
artist might have felt they have finally arrived at their zenith. 
 
It is here that the vital concept of poesy enters our discussion as one of the most 
exciting and daring projects of the Romantics. Friedrich Schlegel, an avid 
proponent of Romantisieren, had explicitly subscribed to its importance with his 
statement that:  
 
Wie die Novelle in jedem Punkt ihres Seins und ihres Werdens neu 
und frappant sein muß, so sollte vielleicht das poetische Märchen und 
vorzüglich die Romanze unendliche bizarr sein; denn sie will nicht 
bloß die Phantasie interessieren, sondern auch den Geist bezaubern 
und das Gemüt reizen. (1964a, pp. 83-84)  
 
[Just as the novel must be new and striking in its being and becoming, 
so the poetic tale and eminently the romance should be infinitely 
bizarre. The romance does not set out to just interest fantasy, but 
instead to also enchant the spirit and to pique the temperament.]27 
                                                
27 Eichner (1956) notes that the use of ‘Roman’ in the 18th century embraced a number of 
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As Beiser explains, Schlegel had equated poesy with human creative power, not 
just the literary art of poetry. Both as a literary and non-literary art, poesy 
encompasses a wide and often interrelated range of moods and genres. Recall also 
that Novalis thought poesy had the ability to liberate from Geheimnislosigkeit, 
and, additionally, that the ironic situation of the colonised situation had to be 
placed alongside poesy at all points of its operation. Poesy for him never occurred 
in isolation from whatever was undesirable; instead the undesirable provided 
impetus for poesy to take place. On the strength of Schlegel’s conviction about 
the breadth of poesy, Beiser (2003) states that “the most essential feature of any 
Romantic work is ‘its becoming,’ the fact that it is never complete but that it 
destroys itself only to create itself forever anew” (p. 17). Novalis also wanted to 
view poesy as a means of assuming a greater degree of health: Poesy is a 
philosophical and artistic ‘work in progress,’ just as some emanations of the 
Absolute such as nature and history can be understood as ‘works in progress’. In 
poesy, the self and nature, as an emanation of Being, are accounted for as working 
together. 
 
As an exercise in poesy, the never-ending nature of Nachdenken is reflected in its 
incremental process. At each point, the poet – who is the character responsible for 
Romantisieren, and who need not be a poet in the conventional sense but is 
capable of transforming things in the world – is him- or herself engaged with 
change, in all aspects of existence. Nachdenken, compelled by Stoßsätzen and 
poetically bringing together different things in the world, is therefore not a 
distancing exercise; the poet is, as it were, thoroughly involved in Nachdenken so 
that they are moved at each step by the unanticipated outcome.  Additionally, the 
poet’s deep involvement with Being in this activity ensures that “[d]a sich das 
magische Poeten-Ich dem Absoluten nähern soll, dürfen Subjektivität und 
Objektivität in ihm einander nicht überbieten” (Fiebich, 2007, p. 69)/[because the 
magically poetical I is meant to approach the Absolute, subjectivity and 
objectivity are not allowed to outdo each other], demonstrating that the world, as a 
fluid expression of Being, is meant to be thought about without the conventional 
binary oppositions. A thoughtfully critical method, nearing the Absolute in 
                                                                                                                                 
genres, not just the novel. Schlegel believes that it is linked to the creative spirit of poesy.  
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accordance with these contingencies, is step-by-step, without one ever actually 
arriving there. Novalis alludes to that ongoing journey when he rhetorically 
exclaims “[w]elche unerschöpfliche Menge von Materialien zu neuen 
individuellen Combinationen liegt nicht umher!” (1960o, p. 534)/[which 
inexhaustible amount of materials for new individual combinations does not lie at 
hand!] The self as subject will never deal with all things or objects in the world, 
and so the subject is itself involved in the greater activity of the Absolute. Thus, 
according to Franke (2011): 
 
Novalis beruft sich auf soziale und ökologische Begriffe, die ihren 
Sitz im Leben, in organischer Konkretheit erkennen lassen und doch 
auf eine mystische und spirituelle Dimension verweisen. (p. 79)  
 
[Novalis appeals to social and ecological concepts which may be 
recognised by their place in life, and in organic concreteness, but 
which refer to a mystical and spiritual dimension.] 
 
Nachdenken is hence a highly personal, yet Being-driven, exercise. One may at 
best describe how it works generally, but it is much more difficult to predict the 
specific actions of the Fourfold-oriented elements when one is involved in 
Nachdenken. The poetical practice of thinking, and grouping strange elements 
next to each other, does not expose the interplay of those elements but it does act 
in synchronicity with them. Novalis described this active philosophising thus: 
 
Wenn man anfängt über Philosophie nachzudenken – so dünkt uns 
Philosophie, wie Gott, und Liebe, Alles zu seyn. Sie ist eine 
mystische, höchstwircksame, durchdringende Idee – die uns 
unaufhaltsam nach allen Richtungen hineintreibt. Der Entschluß zu 
philosophiren - ... der Stoß auf uns Selbst zu. (1960o, p. 523)  
  
[Whenever one starts to consider philosophy, it appears to us, like 
God and love, to be everything. It is a mystical, highly effective, 
pervading idea that pushes us unceasingly in all directions. The 
decision to philosophise is a jolt acting upon us.] 
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Reflecting on how we were both thinking was a concern of my aunt’s, and she 
would respond to my questions by moving into an apparently unrelated area, 
echoing what Novalis (1960o) calls “eine Bezeugung der innigsten Liebe zum 
Nachdenken” (p. 524)/[attestation to the innermost desire to ponder] or 
“experimentiren mit dem Zufall” (1960f, p. 574)/[experimenting with chance]. 
Schleiermacher (1969) concurs with Novalis when he states the impact of what he 
calls the ‘universe’ on humanity, reflecting the unreliability of this impact: 
 
So die Religion [:] das Universum ist in einer ununterbrochenen 
Tätigkeit und offenbart sich uns jeden Augenblick. Jede Form, die es 
hervorbringt, jedes Wissen ... jede Begebenheit ... ist ein Handeln 
desselben auf uns; und so alles Einzelne als einen Teil des Ganzen, 
alles Beschränkte als eine Darstellung des Unendlichen hinnehmen, 
das ist Religion. (p. 39) 
 
[As for religion [:] The universe is an uninterrupted activity and 
reveals itself to us at every moment. Every form that it brings forward 
to us, all knowledge … every occurrence … is an action in itself upon 
us; and so every individual accepts itself as a portion of the whole, 
every limitation as a representation of the infinite. That is religion.] 
 
Royal (2008) reflects on the impact of the wairua from things in the world on his 
thoughts, positioning wairua as something to be remembered and noting that 
“[m]ā te Ao te tangata e tohu e oho ai tōna ngākau, tōna wairua e mārama ai ia ki 
ētahi mea”  (p. 37)/[the world represents itself to humanity, awakens humanity’s 
heart and spirit, and brings it to understand something]. Royal and Schleiermacher 
respectively indicate the impact of external things in the world on the self as an 
interrelated thing. Nachdenken hence becomes impossible to categorically analyse 
and can be either directly related to its compelling Stoßsätze in terms of its 
content or it can be simply moved in a direction so that the original sentence is 
tangentially addressed but elaborated on with what seems to be a completely 
unrelated outcome. In both instances, my process of Nachdenken involves 
grouping elements together, which at first glance are disparate, as they are not 
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connected by the dominant episteme. My overall method of placing aspects of 
Māori thought and response in relation to Novalis’ theories is the prime example: 
Their relationship is one that indeed has provoked some confusion in others, when 
the research has been explained, but it exemplifies Novalis’ – and my – love of 
drawing relationships between seemingly unrelated discourses. For Novalis’ part, 
much of Das Allgemeine Brouillon is concerned with placing poetic, scientific 
and philosophical discourses in conjunction with each other to see what emerges 
for the thinker. For instance, he postulates that “Zahlen Harmonieen – Zahlen 
acustik – gehört zur Comb[inatorischen]  A[nalysis]…. Der Dichter, Rhetor und 
Philosoph spielen und componiren grammatisch” (1960b, p. 360) /“[t]he 
harmonies of numbers – and the acoustics of numbers – are a part of 
combinatorial analysis…. The poet, rhetorician and philosopher play and compose 
grammatically” (Wood, 2007, p. 96). In direct relation to what he calls 
‘Spiel’/play, he asks: “Spielt Gott und die Natur nicht auch? Theorie d[es] 
Spielens, Heilige Spiele, reine Spiellehre” (1960b, p. 320)/[Don’t God and nature 
play as well? Theory of play, holy play, pure teachings of play]. 
 
Poesy and Spieltheorie: Nachdenken and Romantisieren 
Nachdenken after Stoßsätzen may be governed by a desire to romanticise. If it is 
good enough for God and nature to play, as Novalis noted above, then - and here 
is a nuanced reading of that same fragment - it is good enough for humanity to 
engage with the process too. The job of the poet who, incidentally, may or may 
not be intent on producing verse, is to bring together the apparently disjointed 
elements into new relations with each other to create new outcomes, perhaps 
breaking taboos in the process. Poesy and play as a mode of being at home are 
significant theories that inform early German Romantics such as Friedrich 
Schlegel and Schleiermacher as well as Novalis. ‘Spiel’ emphasises the creative, 
constructive aspect of thinking and safeguards against Systembildung/[the 
formation of systems]. The Schlegel brothers, Wilhelm and Friedrich (1798), 
emphasise the role of Romantic poeticising in the following passage:  
 
Die romantische Poesie ist eine progressive Universalpoesie. Ihre 
Bestimmung ist nicht bloß, alle getrennte Gattungen der Poesie wieder 
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zu vereinigen, und die Poesie mit der Philosophie, und Rhetorik in 
Berührung zu setzen. Sie will, und soll auch Poesie und Prosa, 
Genialität und Kritik, Kunstpoesie, und Naturpoesie bald mischen, 
bald verschmelzen, die Poesie lebendig und gesellig und das Leben 
und die Gesellschaft poetisch machen, den Witz poetisiren und die 
Formen der Kunst mit gediegnem Bildungsstoff jeder Art anfüllen und 
sättigen, und durch die Schwingungen des Humors beseelen. Sie 
umfaßt alles, was nur poetisch ist, vom größten wieder mehre Systeme 
in sich enthaltenden Systeme der Kunst, bis zu dem Seufzer, dem 
Kuß, den das dichtende Kind aushaucht in kunstlosen Gesang. (pp. 
28-29)  
 
Romantic poetry is a progressive universal poetry. Its destiny is not 
merely to reunite all the separate genres of poetry and to put poetry in 
touch with philosophy and rhetoric. Its aim and mission is now to 
mingle, now to fuse poetry and prose, genius and criticism, the poetry 
of the educated and the poetry of the people; to make poetry living 
and social, life and society poetic; to poeticize wit, fill and saturate the 
forms of art with matters of genuine cultural value, and quicken them 
with the vibrations of humour. It embraces everything that is poetic, 
from the most comprehensive system of art that contains in itself 
further systems to the sigh or kiss which the child who writes verses 
expresses in artless song. (Eichner, 1972, p. 112)  
 
Poesy is the combination of aspects that at first glance may not be commensurate: 
As transcendental28 poesy it is “aus Philosophie und Poësie gemischt” (Novalis, 
1960f, p. 536)/[a mixture of philosophy and poesy]. Designed to clash together 
the systematic with the contingent, this approach is otherwise known as 
‘romantische Ironie’/Romantic irony, which is “a sort of play that reveals the 
limitations of a view of reality that presumed to have the last word. With the use 
of Romantic irony, Schlegel [and Novalis] showed that there was no last word” 
                                                
28 ‘Transcendental’ for Novalis does not mean a mind that goes beyond all finite things 
but is situated within them (van Riet, 2009). It refers to the creative process of the mind 
within these finite elements. 
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(Millán-Zaibert, 2007, p. 168). Knowledge systems in this activity are broken 
down, bringing them together in a playful yet focused and engaged way. 
Conventions may be transcended in this process; however, their assertions also 
demonstrate that the Absolute transcends our awareness. It is an ambitious 
project, evident in Novalis’ distinctive grouping together of various disciplines of 
knowledge and art within one short space. Schleiermacher (1969) similarly would 
scorn the “Systemsucht”/[pursuit of a system] as it “stößt freilich das Fremde 
ab”/[pushes the unfamiliar away too easily] (p. 44), excluding and destroying 
alternatives, whereas the infinite potentially allows all finite things in the world to 
stand next to each other in interactive and interrelated ways. Schleiermacher, 
along with Novalis, wished to moderate the belief that there is a ‘proper’ and 
controllable association of things with each other that would lead to a magisterial, 
unempathetic system of thought. Novalis gave expression to this concern when he 
recounted the thousandfold natures’ complaint in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais: “[w]ie 
glücklich könnte er [der Mensch] sein, wenn er mit uns freundlich umginge” 
(1960e, p. 95)/“[h]ow happy he [humanity] could be if he treated us amiably” 
(2005, p. 71). 
 
The ethics of Nachdenken 
Evidently there is a responsibility on the self in poetic Nachdenken. My 
discussions with my aunt showed me that, as one thinks, one must have particular 
consideration for others who might be affected by that thinking. Just as one must 
be careful in how Stoßsätze are both approached and provided, responses to them 
require an equal amount of caution, and in a Māori discussion this takes on 
particular significance. Novalis emphasised in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais the caution 
of the Lehrer as he provided Stoßsätze that could be responded to in a way that 
was thoughtful of Being: 
 
‘Wem regt sich nicht’, rief der Jüngling mit funkelndem Auge, ‘das 
Herz in hüpfender Lust, wenn ihm das innerste Leben der Natur in 
seiner ganzen Fülle in das Gemüt kommt! wenn dann jenes mächtige 
Gefühl, wofür die Sprache keine andere Namen als Liebe und Wollust 
hat, sich in ihm ausdehnt, wie ein gewaltiger, alles auflösender Dunst, 
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und er bebend in süßer Angst in den dunkeln lockenden Schoß der 
Natur versink’. (1960e, p. 104)  
 
‘Whose heart does not leap with joy,’ cried the youth with glittering 
eye, ‘when the innermost life of nature invades him in all its fullness! 
When the overpowering emotion for which language has no other 
name than love, expands within him like an all-dissolving vapor and, 
trembling with sweet fear, he sinks into the dark’. (2005, p. 103)  
 
These sorts of thoughtful reactions to the Stoßsätzen provided by the Lehrer show 
that nature is a form of impetus from which the Lehrling works. Yet how one 
refers to nature, as well as how the proceeding thinking evolves, is additionally 
important in this Lehrling’s response. The Lehrer has provided a provocation, and 
the youth answers, affected by what he is discussing even in the Lehrer’s 
language, to make sure that humanity is responsibly sourced within Being. That 
same character then continues further with his belief that: 
 
Sie, die den schöpferischen Sinn der Natur mit Macht erwecken, nur 
ein Geheimnis der Liebenden, Mysterien der höhern Menschheit sein 
sollten, werden mit Schamlosigkeit und sinnlos von rohen Geistern 
hervorgerufen, die nie wissen werden, welche Wunder ihre Gläser 
umschließen. Nur Dichter sollten mit dem Flüssigen umgehn, und von 
ihm der glühenden Jugend erzählen dürfen…. Wie glücklich würden 
die Städte sich wieder dünken, die das Meer oder ein großer Strom 
bespült. (1960e, p. 105)  
 
These phenomena whose potency calls forth nature’s creation, 
phenomena which should be a secret of lovers, a mystery of higher 
mankind, are shamelessly and senselessly evoked by unfeeling minds, 
which will never know what miracles their retorts contain. Only poets 
should deal in the fluid element and be empowered to speak of it to 
ardent youth; then laboratories would be temples…. How fortunate 
would cities laved by the ocean or a great river once more call 
themselves. (2005, p. 107) 
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The youth was discussing here the problem of science when it dissects nature, and 
his assertion that poets have a specialised role in thinking about things in the 
world at another level speculates that not everyone may think in the way that 
Nachdenken foresees. Nachdenken is much more an active process of both 
thinking and feeling than of reciting knowledge in terms of facts. As a process it 
is potentially impactful, and, at a much more practical level, its outcome is 
probably novel and not completely foreseeable. The Lehrer, acting responsibly, 
ensures that discussion takes place within an open forum, collectively, even 
though the initial thought process is individual but within the wider aspect of the 
Absolute. Part of its ethical character lies in its ongoing nature, evident in the 
continual excavation behind the thinking of both the Lehrer and the Lehrlinge, 
leading to some affirmations about Geheimnis. It is therefore less about a grand 
statement than an activity that allows one to make some critical affirmations about 
things in the world, in the context of the Absolute. 
Political and literary seriousness of Romantisieren 
Its association with Spiel/play should not mislead the engager into thinking that 
Romantisieren as a grand project (and necessarily Nachdenken and Stoßsätze) is 
only capricious, sentimental or aesthetic, or even just literary. Indeed, the term 
‘Romantic’ has long caused both literary and political debate: literary, because of 
the Romantics’ often uncertain use of the term; and political because of its 
unjustified arrogation by, and even attribution to, Nazism29, and because of its 
threat, in its own right, to social convention. In terms of its uncertainty within 
literature, writers on Schlegel admit to confusion when trying to describe 
Schegel’s non-specific use of the term (Speight, 2011). Dilthey (1965), appearing 
to ponder both the literal and political effects of the term ‘Romanticism’, 
identifies in general that the term has accrued to it “Mißbrauch” (p. 188)/misuse, 
which, at the time Dilthey was writing, had already been heaped on the term for 
more than half a century. As for its political use, Kamenetsky (1972) echoes the 
problem of the abuse of the label ‘Romantic’ and the philosophies of 
Romanticism, with specific reference to its perversion by Nazism. She cites that 
the National Socialist Hans Dahmen had drawn similarities between the Romantic 
                                                
29 Although Berlin (1999) noted that Fascism did inherit a value of unpredictability from 
the Romantics. This inheritance, however, was a warped uptake of Romanticism. 
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Movement and Nazism, with the result that Romantisieren could be easily 
disregarded because of its apparently fascist roots in the Romantics. But she 
points out that Dahmen had not acknowledged that “a distortion of values had 
taken place, and that what began as theory and philosophy culminated in a 
perverted ideology” (p. 198). The early Romantics cannot be held responsible for 
irrational ‘Nationalromantik’ or the cult of ‘Blut und Boden’/blood and earth, that 
developed later in the 19th century. Biological materialism, racism and Social 
Darwinism all represent ideologies that deny Novalis’ philosophical focus on the 
interrelated and mutually beneficial in natural and social relationships. 
 
Socially, the term can vex those who uphold the grandiosity of “die europäische 
Zivilisation” (Strich, 1962, p. 359)/European civilisation, the specific conventions 
of which seem to be threatened by what Romanticism proposes. Furthermore, 
bringing together both literal and political issues, Löwy and Sayre (2001) quite 
categorically state that: 
 
In reality, for a great many students of Romanticism, the problem of 
contradictions (political ones in particular) does not even come up, 
because they strip the phenomenon of all its political and 
philosophical dimensions and reduce it to a mere literary school 
whose most visible features they then describe in greater or lesser 
detail. (p. 3)  
 
The wrongful but raucous usages of Romanticism and, equally unjustly, the 
frequent and total eclipse of Romanticism by the interpretation of it as a sub-
category of literature, are perhaps testament to its seriousness. That is, both the 
reification and the avoidance of it proclaim themselves loudly. But these 
subsequent usages of, and attitudes towards, Romanticism, do no justice to the 
earnestness of the original German Romantics, who most definitely saw 
Romanticism as a coherent project, neither solely political nor literal, neither 
exclusively philosophical nor poetic. It is at least fair to speculate that the Early 
German Romantics considered Romantisieren to be a project of concerted effort. I 
reiterate even more specifically that the Romantics saw Romantisieren as both 
philosophically and politically transformative. The seriousness of the Romantic 
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enterprise is evident in its definitely emotional and passionate push for change 
that impacts at what I would call the ‘politically metaphysical’ level. By this I 
mean that the Romantics were very clear that a state of ontological balance was 
necessary in facets such as the everyday use of speech and comportment towards 
things in the world. What the poet sets out to do has effects on things in the world, 
including its political institutions and assumptions. This may involve a cloyingly 
sentimental or aesthetic (two adjectives which are nowadays equated with the 
common term ‘romantic’) approach, but not in isolation: An additional aim is to 
“dethrone” (Eichner, 1982, p. 17) instrumental reason and to elevate “the 
irrational faculties of the mind” – faculties that are commonly delineated out from 
each other but that, as Eichner argues, the “Romantics did not always clearly 
differentiate”.  
 
Not seeking to know a thing 
With reason as the dominant agent of experience to be deposed, a major challenge 
to the romanticising poet is to retain the belief that Being renders things in the 
world mysterious. This will not be a simple task, especially if the poet is trained in 
the academy. As one can never know the “eigentliche Ding an sich” (Novalis, 
1960g, p. 56)/“actual thing-in-itself” (Wood, 2007, p. 196) while it is an isolated 
element, one must trust that its manifestation as finite objects, and their grouping 
with other things, renders them as “Bestimmbares und Bestimmtes”/[definite and 
distinct]. This is different to knowing the thing: Its commune with other elements 
merely reveals what makes it different. One may reasonably suspect that the 
thing’s distinctiveness changes according to what is collectively associated with 
it. Varied facets of its nature will be disclosed due to the qualities of its 
surrounding elements. Such a view of the thing results from having firstly 
acknowledged its ‘Unbegrifflichkeit’/incomprehensibility, and then surrounding 
the thing with various elements (and applications) to view its distinctiveness 
without seeking to know it completely. The approach to a thing at this level 
involves a certain amount of emotional responsiveness – either reticence or 
confidence 30 . Reflecting Goethe’s wish that a process of 
                                                
30 We will remember that Rosenblüte revealed both responses to nature, and vice versa. 
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Steigerung/intensification take place through the combination of poetry and action 
(Gray, 1967), one approaches the world in a romanticising way, but may only 
romanticise if one acts in concert with that mysterious relationship between 
things, and between things and the Absolute.  
 
As Beiser (2002) continues, it is not through the blithe recital of arcane spells or 
prayers that is at the basis of Magical Idealism and Romantisieren; it involves 
instead the transformation of the senses and of knowledge so that they can work in 
conjunction with the world, in turn changing the world in accordance with the 
activities of Being. Although one may not be able to achieve this in its entirety, 
one is instead encouraged to continue in that exercise, with the result that the 
process of poetical Nachdenken is never-ending. Yet if one were to utter such 
spells or prayers on the basis of a prompt from things in the world, then this 
provides a different outcome and indeed adheres to Novalis’ idea of poesy. This 
sort of utterance, I argue, is a sort of poetry that is intended to have a deeper effect 
than just aesthetic. A spiritual one joins the social imperative behind Novalis’ 
avowal that words themselves have power here. To that extent, prayers, chants, 
‘spells’ and ‘fairy tales’ are forms of poesy that then have an effect on the hearer 
or reader. In the context of ‘Märchen’/[tales of magic], Novalis (1960b) notes 
about Romantisieren that: 
 
In einem ächten Märchen muß alles wunderbar – geheimnißvoll und 
unzusammenhängend seyn – alles belebt. Jedes auf eine andre Art. 
Die ganze Natur muß auf eine wunderliche Art mit der ganzen 
Geisterwelt vermischt seyn. Die Welt des Märchens ist die 
durchausentgegengesetzte Welt der Welt der Wahrheit (Geschichte) – 
und eben darum ihr so durchaus ähnlich – wie das Chaos der 
vollendeten Schöpfung. (pp. 280-281)  
 
In a true fairy tale everything must be marvelous – mysterious and 
unconnected – everything must be animated. Everything in a different 
fashion. The whole of Nature must be interwoven in a wondrous 
manner with the entire spirit world…. The world of fairy tales is the 
absolute opposite world to the world of truth (history) – and for this 
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reason is so remarkably similar to it – as chaos is to completed 
creation. (Wood, 2007, p. 34) 
 
His “Geistliche Lieder”, hymns to the Christian triune deity, indicate that Novalis 
could also think of the Absolute as that which addresses humanity, and as an 
empathetic and unifying agent. 
 
In all forms of transformative language – poetic, spiritual, even mathematical – 
there exists the potential to render a sense of the mysterious again. Using that 
terminology that reflects his dual mysticism and pragmatism, he states that 
“Magie ist = Kunst, die Sinnenwelt willkürlich zu gebrauchen” (1960o, p. 
546)/[magic is the same as the art of using the sense world at will]. His attempt to 
unify the sciences and poesy in Das Allgemeine Brouillon represents a mammoth 
but incipient attempt at romanticising. The Das Allgemeine Brouillon would have 
an effect on the self that, Schiller also noted in his observation “[beschäftigt] Kopf 
und Herz, Scharfsinn und Witz, Vernunft und Einbildungskraft in harmonischem 
Bunde” (1840a, p. 1231)/[[concerns] head and heart, astuteness and wit, reason 
and imagination in harmonious association] and “[stellt] gleichsam den ganzen 
Menschen in uns wieder [her]”/[and yet again produces in us the whole person]. 
A ‘whakaaro’ response through Nachdenken 
For Māori, the ethicality of thinking that follows on from Stoßsätzen draws its 
relevance from one’s regard for the thing to be thought about, evident in the term 
‘whakaaro’. I expand on this term more in chapter seven. Although it is often 
taken economically to mean ‘to think’, it can be broken down to reveal a deeper 
meaning of ‘to cause to have regard for’. The regard that is envisaged here is not 
solely cognitive but involves the senses also. Royal (2008) claims that “he 
whakamīharo ngā āhuatanga o te Ao – arā, te whitinga o Tamanuiterā, te 
ngungurutanga o te tai, te pōuritanga me te awatea – ēnei tū āhuatanga o te Ao, he 
whakamiharo ki te titiro atu” (p. 60)/[the forms of the world are amazing – the 
movement of the sun, the lapping of the tide, the darkness and the light – these 
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manifestations of the world are amazing to see]. He continues that it is on the 
basis of that sensorial perception of the world that we come to think31. 
 
Quite apart from that interpretation of the term whakaaro, one may see common 
reference to the cordoning off of knowledge from the populace (R. Walker, 1996; 
Walker, 2004). Traditionally, according to these writers, only certain people were 
able or allowed to access specific forms of knowledge.  These writers, however, 
tend to emphasise the protection of knowledge already formed, rather than 
describe whose active thinking would be taken seriously. Thinking anew, or 
innovatively, is well exemplified by the account of Māui Tikitiki a Taranga, who 
set out to change aspects of nature (unethically by current standards, it might be 
argued) after the long ‘apprenticeship’ inherent to being the youngest, and to 
being mistaken for stillborn. He changed the course of the sun, brought fire to the 
world, was eventually killed by Hinenuitepō through neglecting required 
‘karakia’/prayers, but he revealed benefits for humanity, even as the elements that 
converged in his demise were highlighted by his misdeeds. 
 
This common reading of Māui generally promotes an anthropocentric view of the 
self, where Māui self-determinedly reacted to Stoßsätze on the basis of his own 
thinking. I propose that this is an incomplete reading. An ethical undertaking with 
Nachdenken considers the creative process of the individual within the realm of 
the Absolute. Maui did not just act alone: He acted against and with other family 
members, in reaction to the sun and his ancestor who held fire, in tandem with 
birds, and as a part of the interrelated and vast character, in turn, of all those 
elements that he may not have known about. Indeed, issues were brought to his 
attention through the external world and its unitary activity. In relation to the 
Fourfold mentioned previously, one thinks respectfully as part of a greater process 
that comes to bear on the self. With that in mind, one retains one’s personal 
approach but with an acceptance of the activity of Being.  
 
The ‘Nachdenker’/[the person who thinks in the wake of the impetus] in the 
context of ‘whakaaro’ and the Fourfold is charged with the responsibility of 
                                                
31 I argue in chapter seven that in Māori terminology there is room for an interpretation 
that what is not perceptible also comes to bear on the thinking process. 
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ensuring that the outcome – never complete though it is – does not impact 
negatively on the listener or reader. As a Māori writer, I respond to Novalis’ 
Stoßsätze in ways that incorporate the elements of the Absolute with Novalis’ 
concerns. It may appear as if I have placed greater emphasis on Being than I have 
on the creative potential of the self, but my aim instead is to highlight the often-
neglected issue of the interrelationship of a number of finite things on each other. 
Novalis also advocated that one has creative energy and cognitive ability whilst 
residing amongst the Absolute (Stone, 2008): This critical creativity leads him to 
say that “[d]er Künstler ist durchaus transscendental” (1960o, p. 534)/[the artist is 
thoroughly transcendental] and that “Poësie ist die große Kunst der Construction 
der transscendentalen Gesundheit. Der Poët ist also der transscendentale Arzt” 
(1960o, p. 535)/[poesy is the great art of constructing transcendental health. In 
other words, the poet is the transcendental physician]. One may hence draw on the 
artist or the poet to prevail over “ideological atrophy” (Schulte-Sasse, 1987, p. 
xxi); the artist as well as the poet can “express what modern philosophy wants, yet 
is painfully aware that it cannot get” (Gjesdal, 2009, para. 6). Māori are similarly 
aware of the highly impacting nature of their creative responses. Killed by 
Hinenuitepō, Māui had perhaps gone where he should not have – to kill what is 
termed in English the Goddess of Death. His demise is well known amongst 
Māori, and its precedence for appropriate behaviour resonates when Māui is 
discussed in current times. 
 
The form and effect of Stoßsätze in each chapter 
As one who is referring to Novalis, I need to ensure that any outcome is beneficial 
to both the source of this method – Novalis’ theories – and to Māori communities. 
My use of these sentences that challenge and push takes different forms 
throughout the chapters. The reader should note that there are different kinds of 
Stoßsätze apart from provocative ones (although the other kinds could also be 
described as provocative in that they have an effect on the perceiver). There are 
indeed those Stoßsätze against which one reacts: This form occurs mainly in 
chapter three, in which I address, and react to, what for me is the relatively 
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inciteful text of Te Maire Tau. In chapter three I describe Novalis’ 
‘philosophising’ to show that I may similarly ‘philosophise’ against a piece of 
work that I mostly disagree with – here, the impetus that Novalis provides me is 
in the form of an awareness of philosophising. Whilst philosophising I retain 
aspects of Novalis’ substantive affirmations about Being also. Even the method I 
emphasise is partly geheimnisvoll, in that it involves a placing together of 
apparently disparate theories. By the time I have arrived at the summary to this 
chapter, both Novalis and Te Maire Tau have compelled me to consider notions of 
Being that may be relevant for Māori. This chapter aims to bring to the reader’s 
attention the political as well as metaphysical issue that a denial of Geheimnis 
brings about, and highlights that Stoßsätze are as much to do with references to 
inimical or disagreeable sentences and tracts of writing as they are to do with 
amiable theories. As a process of manaaki the chapter emphasises that one must 
acknowledge contrary viewpoints in providing a critique for one’s community. 
 
Additionally, though, there are those that subtly bring into one’s awareness, as a 
phenomenological activity in the sense of ‘whakaaro’/[becoming a concern], an 
entity which then encourages one to imaginatively explore. Chapter four, which 
outlines Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren”, provides this sort of 
impetus: It turns my attention, in a gentler way than Te Maire Tau’s text, towards 
my explanation, as a Māori writer, of Geheimnislosigkeit which I explore in 
chapters five and six. Although it is not an inflammatory text for me, it is no less 
powerful. Here Novalis encourages me to search out colonising events, practices 
and discourses. He highlights for me that colonisation occurs through particular 
incidents, but it is underpinned by a loss of mystery. Both explicitly and tacitly, 
Novalis brings me through his poem “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” to 
consider the greater phenomenon of philosophical colonisation, in conjunction 
with occasional dialogue between him and certain Māori writers. Clearly, the 
events that occur in New Zealand in respect of Māori, as discussed in chapters 
five and six, are different to the ones that took place in Novalis’ time, but Novalis 
has compelled me to become aware of some of the specific events that bring about 
the modes of colonisation that “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” exposes. In 
this process the reader is forced to engage with the disruptive patterns of 
Stoßsätze, which can liberate the reader and their communities from banal, 
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geheimnislose views of things in the world. The political and cultural aspects of 
care/manaakitanga are therefore stressed in these three chapters.  
 
Finally, one should be aware of a specific use of Stoßsatz that aims to 
romanticise. This form of Stoßsätze is expressly meant to ‘lift’ the commonly held 
Māori concepts so that they regain some Geheimnis. These Stoßsätze may either 
be provocative or encouraging. Chapter seven draws on Novalis’ fragments 
explicitly as a means of lifting those core Māori terms, and some others as well, 
so that they take on aspects of the Absolute that I have discussed in chapter three.  
 
Of course each chapter articulates either the loss or recapture of Geheimnis in a 
substantive sense – these discussions are the Nachdenken, and these also take 
place within the broader project of Romantisieren. This discussion, however, 
occurs because of the Stoßsätze provided by Novalis. After these affirmative 
descriptions of loss and recapture, then, I shall describe the resemblance of the 
Stoßsätze to the outcomes flowing from them. My discussion in this chapter 
should signal to the reader that, although this method and thesis generally is in 
written form, it has come about because of the thinking of my ancestors, my 
engagement with another theoretical and cultural tradition, with the view to 
reclaim some ontological aspects of things in the world and their inherent 
interrelationship. There is therefore a very important step that precedes the writing 
of this thesis, and this emphasises that Symphilosophie/[unified philosophy] 
happens in the exchange that occurs between me and various external elements as 
much as the written outcome. One could argue perhaps that a more authentic 
Symphilosophie occurs in the exchange because it is less inclined to be 
permanently etched out as a static and ‘knowledge-producing’ form. The written 
word can tend to objectify these sorts of discussion; it becomes more difficult to 
retain the idea of the unexpected and the Spiel that occurs behind the scenes. The 
method is not just what is in the text, or has produced an outcome, but it is what 
brought about the text to begin with. Yet there are concrete benefits to writing up 
the after-thinking of these exchanges, which is perhaps what Novalis had in mind 
when he reflected that “[b]ey den Alten war die Religion schon gewissermaaßen 
das, was sie bey uns werden soll – practische Poësie” (1960o, p. 537)/[with the 
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old people, religion was, so to speak, that which it should become with us – 
practical poesy].  
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Chapter Three: Philosophising about Being 
and mystery 
In the previous chapters I introduced the terms that name an activity that 
underpins all finite things in the world and that gives those things their 
Geheimnis. These terms – Seyn, das Absolute, korekore, das Unbedingte – are 
innately both finite and infinite and contain within them opposite phenomena. As 
a method, Stoßsätze inspire one to always consider those opposite phenomena as 
one engages in thinking. My discussion of Novalis’ and Māori philosophical 
aspects highlights the continual need to avoid making affirmations without first 
engaging in an oppositional position. In relation to writing, I think of this as 
undertaking a sustained critique. As an aspect of the Romantic method, the 
Stoßsatz method emphasises that those first instances of opposition are retained 
throughout one’s thinking so that, when one finally makes an assertion, the 
opposition is still present even in that utterance. The self is hence an important 
agent in thinking, although in a measured sense. 
 
The purpose of this chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to further delve into the concept and presence of 
Geheimnis by theorising about what gives rise to it: Being. Where I identified the 
terminology for it and gave a brief discussion of aspects of Being in chapter two, I 
now theorise about how Being acts in an everyday sense for the Māori self and 
how it provides things in the world with Geheimnis. I undertake this by making 
some affirmations that are a process of my Nachdenken and that draw on Māori 
scholarship that is oriented towards the ontological realm, as, according to 
Novalis, a thing in the world has its Geheimnis and incomprehensibility through 
the presence of Being (Stone, 2008). 
 
But there is a process that I undertake to arrive at these theories about Being and 
its everyday activity, and this involves referring to Stoßsätze from two sources - 
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Novalis and Te Maire Tau. The Stoßsätze that Novalis provides act as a method 
for me to arrive at those theories and also offer some substantive assistance in 
those affirmations about Being. Alongside recounting Novalis’ assertions about 
the mystery of objects because of Being, I also wish to emphasise the paths that 
he followed to arrive there. Novalis not only had his own ideas about Being as 
mystery but he also referred to another very important writer – Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte – to clarify a notion of mystery that was current and, perhaps interestingly 
for the Māori reader, colonised. Novalis proposes here a form of dialectic, 
whereby one’s existing ideas of mystery are tested against an opposing view, with 
the full force of imagination, to create a fresh perspective. To this extent, Novalis 
provides a Stoßsatz by making me aware of a process of arriving at an 
affirmation. 
 
Novalis sets an example here of reacting to the prompts of a stimulus that is 
antithetic to his own philosophies. In this chapter I follow his example, and react 
to the writings of Te Maire Tau. The Stoßsätze that Te Maire Tau offers are 
inspiring in the process, as in crucial parts I disagree with his argument and at the 
same time appreciate it for bringing the ‘knowing Māori self’ to the forefront as 
an issue. Thus, throughout this chapter I engage with both Novalis’ and Tau’s 
prompts to conclude with some affirmations about Being. What Novalis illustrates 
in his own process is that one should engage fully with a discordant stimulus in 
coming to an utterance about Being and Geheimnis. Indeed, Being itself, as we 
have seen, is involved with both positive and negative elements. Novalis’ method 
to that extent appears to reflect those antithetic characteristics. 
 
Novalis, Fichte, and chapter structure 
Novalis approached Geheimnis with some novelty, displaying similarities in this 
endeavour with other early Romantic writers. Geheimnis for him was preserved 
through the belief that Being is unknowable but at times able to be appreciated in 
its emanations or simply felt. This relationship of humanity to Being characterises 
one of the fundamental differences between Romanticism and Idealism. In the 
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Romantic camp, Being is seen to be unknowable through the intellect32. The fact 
that different terms – the Absolute, Being, the thing-in-itself - were given to an 
unknowable activity that preordained the presence of all objects (concrete and 
abstract) should send an initial signal to the reader that any attempt to confine 
Being through final definitions is to be avoided. With this in mind, Novalis’ 
contemporary, Schelling, who is often considered to be an Idealist but who 
displays some very real Romantic philosophies, noted the negative approach to 
knowing the Absolute by highlighting how radically irreconcilable the word 
‘Bedingt’ [limited, reified] is with its negative ‘Unbedingt’ [the Absolute, 
unlimited, unreified]:  
 
[Bedingt]… [es ist] ein vortreffliches Wort, von dem man sagen kann, 
daß es beinahe den ganzen Schatz philosophischer Wahrheit enthalte. 
Bedingen heißt die Handlung, wodurch etwas zum Ding wird, 
bedingt, das was zum Ding gemacht ist, woraus zugleich erhellt, daß 
nichts durch sich selbst als Ding gesetzt seyn kann, d. h. daß ein 
unbedingtes Ding ein Widerspruch ist. Unbedingt nämlich ist das, was 
gar nicht zum Ding gemacht ist, gar nicht zum Ding werden kann. 
 
Das Problem also, das wir zur Lösung aufstellten, verwandelt sich nun 
in das bestimmtere, etwas zu finden, das schlechterdings nicht als 
Ding gedacht werden kann. (1856, p. 166)  
 
[[Reified] ... [it is] an admirable word. One may say of it that it 
comprises all that philosophical truth holds dear. To ‘en-thing’ means 
the process whereby something is made into a thing. Conditioned, that 
which is made a thing, by which light is shed at the same time on the 
fact that nothing through its own agency can be posited as a thing. 
Therefore, an unconditioned thing is a contradiction. Unconditioned is 
                                                
32 For a full treatment of the extent of this unknowability, see Stone’s (2008) “Being, 
Knowledge and Nature in Novalis”. She indicates that Novalis moved from thinking of 
Being as thoroughly unknowable to its conception as self-arranging. 
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in other words that which is not at all made into a thing, and cannot 
become a thing. 
 
And the related problem that we tried to find a solution to transforms 
now into the determinate. We try to find something that simply cannot 
be thought of as a thing.]  
 
Schelling’s concern is with the impossibility of finding the changing ground that 
is Being even though there is an incessant drive to keep trying. For the later 
Schelling, one cannot say that either the Unbedingtes or the Bedingtes is this or 
that. Nature as a manifestation of Being can only be conceived of as active 
(Schelling, 1858). The depiction of Being as a self-organising, pluriform organism 
(Stone, 2008) is one that Novalis agrees with when he refers to nature as an active 
Absolute: 
 
Es wäre denkbarer, daß sie [die Natur] das Erzeugnis eines 
unbegreiflichen Einverständnisses unendlich verschiedner Wesen 
wäre, das wunderbare Band der Geisterwelt, der Vereinigungs- und 
Berührungspunkt unzähliger Welten. (1960e, p. 98)  
 
More conceivably, it is the product of an inscrutable harmony among 
infinitely various essences, a miraculous bond with the spirit world, 
the point at which innumerable worlds touch and are joined. (2005, p. 
81) 
 
One may glean from this quote of Novalis’ that the Absolute is not circumscribed 
by its finite elements. Although these elements, or things in the world, may be 
organised through the intellect, Being cannot be. Being is instead the sublime 
activity that brings these elements into existence to begin with. It may be 
contingent and chaotic, but it also displays aspects of structure, reliability, nurture 
and harmony (“Einverständnis”). However, Being is not just a ‘super being’ but it 
is comprised of all those finite elements so that, in totality, they are inseparable 
from Being (Stone, 2008). These discrete elements are just as important to a 
concept of Being as the idea that Being is an Absolute, and for Novalis they 
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merge, separate and interrelate because of Being. The activity of the thing in itself 
is what characterises it, and gives things in the world their presence. Being, 
however, may also be hinted at by the poeticising of scientific and mathematical 
terms, although this relates more to the visible activity of Being than Being itself. 
In this act of poeticising, one moves the orthodox symbols of science and 
mathematics to ever-new realms, and thus does not try to use tools to finally 
describe Being. Novalis, a scientist by training, was most eager to explain the 
activity of Being in this poetic manner. Because it is all-encompassing, Being 
impinges on all things in the world and is capable of acting in an almost rational 
way, in that it works by organising itself: 
 
Die Natur addirt, subtrahirt, multiplicirt, potenzirt etc. unaufhörlich. 
Die angew[andten] mathematischen Wissenschaften zeigen uns die 
Natur, als Mathematiker. Die reale Mathematik ist die Physik. 
(Novalis, 1960g, p. 52)  
 
Nature incessantly adds, subtracts, multiplies, raises to a higher power 
etc. The applied mathematical sciences show us Nature as a 
mathematician. Physics is real mathematics. (Wood, 2007, p. 195) 
 
Novalis’ fragment demonstrates two aspects of his belief about Being. Firstly, it is 
active; it moves things in the world so that they are never static. Secondly, an 
aspect of it can be described rationally, or scientifically, so that things in the 
world even act ‘scientifically’ (and in this respect they accord with a force – 
physics – that is organised mathematically – rationally). Both the spiritual and 
scientific are for the Romantics mysterious, at times affecting the self so that 
understanding occurs. 
 
The relatively uncontroversial nature of this brief description of the Romantics’ 
position on Being does nothing, however, to sketch the Idealists’ position on this 
matter. Here we enter much more contentious terrain, for the Idealists are not 
completely lacking in Romantic thought. One commentator who argues for the 
Romantic strain within Idealism is Frederick Beiser, who rejects the strict 
distinctions between the Idealists and the Romantics, preferring instead to 
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problematise the labels themselves and indicate their often unexplored 
similarities. He reads Idealism as a sort of Romanticism to the extent that the 
Romantics possessed ‘objective’ Idealism. Beiser (2002) points to a belief 
adhered to by the Romantics that the “subjective is possible only within 
experience itself” (p. 12) . He notes that the ‘forms’ within which the subject 
manifests is Being or “the realm of pure being itself” (p. 12). 
Preliminary methodical remarks concerning this chapter 
Nevertheless, despite any alleged similarities, it was Johann Fichte, an Idealist, 
whom Novalis reacted against most strenuously yet productively. Indeed, 
Novalis’ expressions about Being that I have cited above were not immediately 
forthcoming: Instead, Fichte called Novalis to action, providing a kind of Stoßsatz 
that would prove to be extremely galvanizing, so that Novalis could then describe 
Being and develop his expression about it in relation to the self on his own 
philosophical terms. In a similar fashion I shall use Novalis’ method of reacting, 
by referring to some of Te Maire Tau’s writings – specifically his “Ghosts on the 
Plains” article - but I shall also keep in mind Novalis’ express assertions about 
Geheimnis and Being through to my own constructions about Geheimnis and 
Being. There are various Stoßsätze involved here, and the structure goes as 
follows: 
 
1. I describe the initial Stoßsätze that partially inspired Novalis to consider 
the issue of Being. These Stoßsätze are the philosophical ideas 
concerning Fichte’s ‘Ich’. 
2. I then describe how Novalis reacted to these ideas while having some 
admiration for them. Novalis used this (mainly) opposing text to arrive 
at his own - although Fichte-informed - ideas about Being. 
3. As Novalis had referred to an inspiring but antithetic text, I refer to Te 
Maire Tau’s “Ghosts on the Plains” as a means of inspiring some ideas 
around Geheimnis and Being. While my method does not exactly match 
that of Novalis’, I shall show that it is desirable to have an oppositional 
viewpoint to respond to when proactively constructing these 
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philosophies. Throughout this exercise I retain Novalis’ express 
articulations about Geheimnis and Being. 
4. These stages culminate in some of my own constructions of Geheimnis 
and Being. Combined with these ‘steps’ above, I also explain and draw 
on the teachings of an aunt, as well as take the important step of 
referring to other Māori writers on the subject. 
 
There are three broader processes that those four above fit into and which 
determine the greater structural framework in this chapter. The first heading, 
“Novalis’ agreement/opposition method”, refers to (1) and (2) above. I then turn 
to the second heading, which is “Adopting Novalis’ method and assertions” and 
relates to all of (3) above. The third heading – “Philosophical fragments that 
propose a notion of Being for Māori readers” – relates to the final fourth stage 
above.  
 
I have listed the process here for clarity, but it is important to note that an earlier 
step has as much of a part to play in the final outcome as a more recent one. 
Novalis believes that philosophising, as he calls it, retains traces of first elements. 
Stoßsätze are related to philosophising for Novalis, as they never entirely 
disappear from the outcome, although they push the thinker in a new direction. 
We will recall from chapter two that one is always ‘stuck’, as it were, with the 
original elements (and all subsequent ones as well), rendering both utterance and 
self geheimnisvoll. 
 
1. Novalis’ agreement/opposition method 
Novalis’ ambivalent reaction to the Enlightenment 
Novalis’ reactions to Fichte can be described as responses within the context of 
the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment generally. By the 1770s, the threats 
posed by both scepticism and materialism – two irreconcilable outcomes of the 
concept of Enlightenment reason – had already been identified in Germany 
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(Beiser, 2000), with the dissemination of the materialist works of de la Mettrie 
and Mauterpuis amongst others on the one hand, and of Hume’s scepticism on the 
other. Despite the inability of the Enlightenment to gain the foothold in Germany 
that it had in France and England, German Romantic and Idealist writers were 
nevertheless very familiar with the problems it offered. Novalis does not mention 
Julien Offray de la Mettrie by name but it seems quite likely that his critical 
reference to the world as “eine ungeheure Mühle” (1960d, p. 515)/[a monstrous 
mill] in Die Christenheit oder Europa directly concerns de la Mettrie’s highly 
radical vision of man and world as machine. Grappling also with Immanuel 
Kant’s division between art and critical reasoning, Novalis drew on the form of 
the fragment to encourage their unity (Gjesdal, 2009): The fragment for Novalis 
would operate within both art and reason, thereby mingling the two realms. The 
teachings of Locke he would call a “System der Materialisten” (Novalis, 1960m, 
p. 462)/[system of materialists], and he would draw comparisons between 
Leibniz’ and Newton’s conceptions of light. His acquaintance with their works 
meant that he could comment from a position of authority. As we shall soon see, 
he was particularly well versed in the philosophies of Fichte. 
 
It was from this vantage point that he would both embrace and resist 
Enlightenment and Idealist philosophy. That early Romanticism links in no small 
part to the Enlightenment has for some time been an acknowledged focus of 
scholarship dealing with the Romantics (Mahoney, 1987), with Novalis, for one, 
being interested in the scientific description of aspects of nature and the 
radicalisation of the creative powers of the individual that the Enlightenment 
augured. Yet it is the poet who is responsible for divulging this inventive potential 
(Mahoney, 1987) and here we start to see a marked divergence from the 
Enlightenment project, which preferred rationalism and empiricism as modes of 
perceiving the world. Resisting the automatic default to solipsism that the 
Enlightenment encouraged, Novalis instead sought a sensual relationship with 
things in the world. In this he accords with the theologian and philosopher 
Schleiermacher who used the term ‘metaphysics’ to denote the tendency of 
modern philosophy to objectify things in the world: 
 
 99 
Die Metaphysik [die moderne Philosophie] geht aus von der endlichen 
Natur des Menschen, und will aus ihrem einfachsten Begriff und aus 
dem Umfang ihrer Kräfte und ihr Empfänglichkeit ... bestimmen, was 
das Universum für sich sein kann und wie er es notwendig erblicken 
muß. Die Religion lebt ihr ganzes Leben auch in der Natur, aber in der 
unendlichen Natur des Ganzen, des Einen und Allen. (1969, p. 35) 
 
[Metaphysics [modern philosophy] proceeds outwards from the finite 
nature of the person, and strives to determine, through its most simple 
concepts and through the circumference of its strengths and its 
receptivity, what the universe can be for the person themselves and 
how the person must necessarily glimpse it. Religion also lives its 
whole life within nature, but in the infinite nature of the whole, of the 
one and all.] 
 
Novalis, then, found it useful in a time of philosophical upheaval to consider what 
mystery might be in relation to its counterpoint, lack of mystery. Colonisation 
does not allow any spaces that are free from its influence: This peculiar nature of 
colonisation is also one that Friedrich Schleiermacher discusses in his Über die 
Religion: 
 
[Vulgäre Aufklärung] ist immer noch der herrschende Teil. Ihr und 
wir ein kleines Häufchen. Ganze Städte und Länder werden nach ihren 
Grundsätzen erzogen, und wenn die Erziehung überstanden ist, findet 
man sie wieder in der Gesellschaft, in den Wissenschaften und in der 
Philosophie…. Durch ihren mächtigen Einfluß auf jedes weltliche 
Interesse und durch den falschen Schein von Philanthropie … hält 
diese Denkungsart noch immer die Religion im Druck. (1969, p. 104) 
 
[[The vulgar Enlightenment] is more and more the ruling party. You 
and we are inconsequential masses. Entire towns and countries are 
trained in its foundation principles, and whenever that training is 
overcome, one discovers it again in society, in the sciences and in 
philosophy…. Through its almighty influence on every worldly 
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interest and through its false appearance of philanthropy … this way 
of thinking always keeps religion on a leash.] 
 
Novalis advocated scrutinising a philosophical stance against which he could 
explicate his own views. He affirms that we can critically consider opposing 
opinions to form other theories, and that in times when philosophical colonisation 
is evident this is a necessary step. The effect of Fichte on Novalis cannot be 
underestimated here, and moreover we shall see that Fichte’s philosophies do not 
delimit those of Novalis’. 
  
The Fichtean prompt for Novalis’ thoughts on Geheimnis 
In 1794 Idealist philosophy would take on a unique complexion with the arrival of 
the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte at the University of Jena. Quite apart from 
the revolutionary impact of Fichte on Kantian philosophy, his role in the 
development of Romanticism would prove to be vital (Bowie, 1997). It is not 
overreaching to claim that his philosophies provided prompts themselves for 
Novalis, even though Fichte, being foundationalist in his approach to philosophy, 
may not have envisaged such an inspirational outcome. Fichte in turn had been 
greatly influenced by the philosophies of Kant and had surfaced from an 
immersion in Kantian philosophy with a change in his own views (Breazeale, 
2009), turning his thoughts now to countenancing a single underpinning principle; 
hence his foundationalist approach. Although remaining faithful to Kantian 
philosophy in many respects, Fichte would soon come to realise the shortcomings 
of that eminent philosopher’s notions of critical philosophy, including the 
possibility of the thing-in-itself (Breazeale, 2009) that Kant had continuously 
noted was “zwar als für sich wirklich, aber von uns unerkannt” (1828, p. xvii)/“as 
something actual for itself but unrecognized by us” (1998, p. 112). 
 
Fichte’s six years at the University of Jena were intensely productive ones and it 
is at this time that he laid the foundations for his rejection of the thing-in-itself 
and the ascendancy of the “Ich”/I. He believed that Kant had failed to adequately 
preserve a notion of practical reason (Kneller, 2007). The thing-in-itself as a 
fundamental concept was impossible on critical grounds and a more secure anchor 
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was required. Drawing on the philosophies of Solomon Maimon and G. E. 
Schulze, Fichte articulated his discomfort at the notion of the thing in itself and 
set about proclaiming the place of the Ich as the single, overarching principle. 
When reading about Fichte’s preference for the Ich, one may also discern 
similarities with Descartes’ proposition that the thinking I is evidence of the I’s 
existence. Both philosophers propose a single principle from which all knowledge 
flows (Mandt, 1997). Mandt argues that Descartes influenced Fichte (and Kant) to 
a great extent, whilst acknowledging the novelty of, in our present case, Fichte’s 
own philosophies. Even so, according to Mandt, Fichte acted as if he were starting 
afresh in philosophising about the subjectivity of a grounding proposition.  
 
I argue that Fichte extended on Descartes’ sceptical philosophy by annihilating 
other objects in the world – they are the not-I. It is the Ich that is the foundation of 
all knowledge, and other objects act as resistance to the Ich. Fichte progressed his 
foundationalist system by proclaiming that it was the I that was at the basis of 
experience: It is “demnach Erklärungsgrund aller Tatsachen des empirischen 
Bewußtseins, daß vor allem Setzen im Ich vorher das Ich selbst gesetzt sei” 
(Fichte, 1997, p. 15)/“the ground of explanation of all facts of empirical 
consciousness that before all positing the Ego [‘I’] must be posited through itself” 
(1868, p. 68)33.  Here Fichte draws a crucial distinction between representing the 
Ich to itself – that is, being conscious of the Ich as an object – and immediately 
completing an act in being conscious of the I. He advocates the latter explanation, 
in which the positing of the Ich is an immediate ‘Tathandlung’/deed. In this 
immediate and first self-positing act, the Ich as fact is not originally any ‘thing’ or 
‘substance’ (Breazeale, 2009) but is at the same time what it “posits itself to be” 
(Breazeale, 2009, para 4.1). In other words the I is, after Fichte: 
 
[A]bsolutes Subjekt … dessen Sein (Wesen) bloß darin besteht, daß es 
sich selbst als seiend, setzt. So wie es sich setzt, ist es; und so wie es 
ist, setzt es sich. (1997, p. 17)  
 
                                                
33 The English version was italicised.  
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[A]bsolute subject … that, the being (essence) whereof consists 
merely in positing itself as being. As soon as it posits itself, it is; and 
as soon as it is, it posits itself. (1868, p. 70) 
 
This activity of the Ich is the “pure act of thinking as such” (Lindberg, 2007, p. 
249). Fichte’s axiom ‘A = A’, with A = Ich-I, provides the starting point for this 
act, and because we are affirming this axiom we are also positing our selves, 
meaning that the axiom can then be expressed as ‘I is I’. The ‘I’ is therefore 
originally productive and is internally creative. However, in positing the Ich so 
actively the Ich also posits the nicht-Ich, because in the affirmation A = A there 
must arise something that is not of the Ich as well. Thus it posits the nicht-Ich as an 
object in opposition to itself, and the self34 and non-self impose limits on each 
other. This non-self as an object of reflection acts as a shock (‘Anstoß’) to the self 
because it is precisely that – an object of reflection. It is opposed to the self 
because the self, in positing itself, has not represented itself as an object of 
reflection. It is to be observed, though, that the self becomes limited through this 
action only insofar as the self posits its own limitation. The Anstoß that Fichte 
talks about provides a chain of abstractions, beginning with feeling, progressing to 
sensation and then to a concept (Breazeale, 2009). It is through this process that 
one is able to consciously experience the world of “spatio-temporal material 
objects” (Breazeale, 2009, para 4.1). 
 
The task of philosophy for Fichte is therefore a “Reflexion über dasjenige, was 
man etwa zunächst dafür halten könnte, und eine Abstraktion von allem, was nicht 
wirklich dazu gehört” (1997, p. 11)/“reflection on what may perhaps for the 
present be taken for that deed-act, and an abstraction from all that does not really 
belong to it” (1868, p. 63). Beiser (2002) sees Fichte’s idealism as “pragmatic” (p. 
                                                
34 Although not explicit in his demarcation of the terms, Fichte’s use of ‘Ich’ appears to 
refer to the very primordial act of positing, where ‘self’ or ‘Selbst’ may take place when 
the Ich becomes self-conscious, having become aware of the nicht-Ich. Many writers, 
however, use the terms interchangeably. In giving the summary of his philosophy of the 
Ich, I have tried to stay true to my interpretation of Fichte here with this specific use of 
the two terms which, it should be noted, apply only to his works and not to those of 
Novalis or Te Maire Tau. With his focus on the Absolute and its workings on everything, 
including the Ich, Novalis is much less concerned with strict use of terms to denote the 
self, and I similarly use them interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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218). Given the finite nature of the self, he notes that the world can only be 
“diminish[ed]” (p. 218) but not completely constituted by us. As we come to 
know the non-self through the process of abstraction, we strive to make nature 
“conform to our own purposes”. The world becomes conceived of in negative 
terms (Nicht-Ich) as an object and in overly rational ways, as it is the cognitive 
state that is able to move things in the world around according to the will of the 
self. 
 
Fichte’s legacy to Novalis: ‘Philosophising’ 
Novalis came to identify the need to engage with Fichte’s philosophies, evident 
from Niethammer’s diary notes of a meeting that Novalis had with Fichte and 
Hölderlin in Jena (Kneller, 2007). Because Novalis disagreed with Fichte at 
crucial points, it is tempting to read Novalis as entirely dismissive of Fichte; 
however, this is to rashly minimise Novalis’ admiration for his mentor. In a letter 
to Schlegel he wrote that “Fichten bin ich Aufmunterung schuldig - Er ists, der 
mich weckte und indirecte zuschürt” (1960a, p. 188)/“I am in Fichte’s debt for 
encouragement…. It is he who awakened and indirectly incited me” (O'Brien, 
1995, p. 81). Fernández (2005) believes that both Fichte and Novalis shared an 
“admiration of man” (p. 91). We get a glimpse here of the creative potential of the 
individual: In its broadest sense, the ability of the individual to reach beyond the 
realms of the banal through their own efforts could be said to announce some 
common ground between the two.  
 
Fichte was also vital as a theorist against whom Novalis could start to create 
certain of his own ideas. I have used the word ‘against’ here purposefully, because 
Fichte’s works created in Novalis an initial unease, or: 
 
[E]ine Aufforderung zur Selbstthätigkeit - ich kann keinem etwas 
erklären von Grund aus, als daß ich ihn auf sich selbst verweise, daß 
ich ihn dieselbe Handlung zu thun heiße, durch die ich mir etwas 
erklärt habe. Filosifiren kann ich jemand lehren, indem ich ihn lehre, 
es eben so zu machen, wie ich - Indem er thut, ist er das, was ich bin, 
da, wo ich bin. (Novalis, 1960j, p. 271)  
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[A] call to self-activity – I cannot thoroughly explain something to 
someone else unless I refer him to himself, unless I bid him to 
perform the same action that clarified it for me. I can teach someone 
to philosophize when I teach him to do it as I do it – when he does 
what I do, he is what I am, is there, where I am. (Kneller, 2003)  
 
Fichte certainly disturbed Novalis, but in his responses Novalis shows that it is the 
initial unease that provokes original thought. It is also important to remember that 
Novalis did not engage with Fichte on a merely superficial level, by either 
brushing aside Fichte’s ideas or critiquing it facilely. Instead, Novalis grappled 
with Fichte’s philosophies at a very deep and sophisticated level, involving some 
measured agreement with Fichte’s strong Ich. Novalis came to the conclusion that 
the Ich should render the world mysterious, in no small part due to Fichte’s 
influence (Kneller, 2003) if not because of Fichte’s substantive theories. His 
intense devotion to Fichte’s works shows itself in both his direct responses to 
Fichte and in the extent to which Fichte’s works stung him to respond with 
indirectly related observations. Novalis’ six groups within his Fichte Studies are 
related to Fichte’s philosophies but are sometimes tangential, reflecting what 
Novalis believed was a method of romanticising. Fichte therefore both provoked 
Novalis and allowed his theories to take a distinctive path by “subjecting the laws 
of thought to a critical examination” (Wood, 2007, p. xxi). 
 
Novalis reacts and arrives at his own theories about Being 
Novalis’ admittedly critical attitude to Fichte’s supreme Ich is tempered with his 
acquiescence to the creative power that Fichte’s Ich announces. Novalis does 
indeed see the merit of the creative self: In a later fragment in the Fichte-Studies, 
he notes that: 
 
Unsre Kraft hat um soviel Spielraum gekriegt, als sie Welt unter sich 
hat. Da unsre Natur aber, oder die Fülle unsers Wesens unendlich ist, 
so können wir nicht in der Zeit dieses Ziel erreichen – Da wir auch in 
einer Sfäre außer der Zeit sind, so müssen wir es da in jedem 
Augenblick erreichen.... Hier ist Moralität und Beruhigung für den 
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Geist, den ein endloses Streben ohne es zu erreichen, was ihm 
vorschwebt, unerträglich dünkt. (1960j, p. 288)  
 
Our [creative] power gets as much free play as it has world under it. 
But since our nature, or the fullness of our being, is unending, we can 
never reach this goal in time – But since we are also in a sphere 
outside time, we must reach it there in every moment…. Here is 
morality and peace of mind, because an endless striving after what 
hovers ever out of reach before us seems unbearable. (Kneller, 2003, 
pp. 186-187) 
 
We are therefore thoroughly dependent on the world under us in our ability to act 
creatively. Humanity is at the whim of the world’s infinity and may never reach 
the end of its creative powers due to this endlessness. The world here becomes 
more than a not-I and takes on the role of caretaker of humanity’s creative 
powers. Its boundlessness dictates its impression on creativity. It is partially the 
world’s (and the ego’s) creative powers that compel Novalis to employ the use of 
the fragment as a means of propelling thought rather than a foundationalist system 
of philosophy, as the fragment pushes the reader forward into their own poetic 
realm. It is this free interplay between the world and the creative Ich that is 
important to Novalis. The Ich here makes artistically creative and, at times, 
scientific sense of the world, but it is a science that is melded with poetry that is 
of greatest consequence to Novalis, as this matches the infinity of the creative Ich 
and the world. Constituting a working with the world, the poetic mind has the 
ability to reconcile extremes, to allow their unity and to then take a place in the 
development of society. As a benefit to society, the creative potential of the Ich 
can romanticise and poeticise both aesthetically and politically. Acting in agency 
to kreative Einbildunskraft/[creative imagination] the Ich may work outside of 
current hegemonic constraints and theorise differently about social situations.  
 
The Ich for Novalis is also a trustee for Being, as the Ich is entrusted with keeping 
Being together and protecting it from being scientifically dissected. His 
Poetisieren and Romantisieren are therefore not concerned with definitive 
assertions – his fragments, although at times assertive, are designed to compel the 
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reader to think, not to systematise things in the world – and it is through poetry 
that one my discern a ‘hovering’ that takes place when he does not fix arguments 
with a final truth. The responsible Ich may propose a theory but the extended 
argument is best created through poesy, or creative potential. With Novalis, form 
and content are harmonised here: The Ich is at once creative and subservient to 
Being. It is for the articulation of the creative power of the ego that Novalis is 
thankful to Fichte.  
 
We can see here that Novalis’ aforementioned ‘debt’ to Fichte is both spiritual 
and political, and that Novalis’ obligation is due to a method of disagreement with 
Fichte. The true nature of this contestation provides the most profound ‘jolt’ for 
Novalis’ method and theoretical substance as far as the self is concerned, and it 
lies in its most fundamental form in Fichte’s positioning of man in relation to 
Being. For where Fichte believed that the ‘I’ was the ground of Being, Novalis 
placed Being as ultimately beyond the self (Nassar, 2006) and yet enabling the 
activity of the self. In his criticism of the belief that one can know Being through 
the self, he suggests almost laconically that one “[g]reift doch eine Handvoll 
Finsterniß” (1960j, p. 106)/[grasps a handful of darkness]. Knowing itself is 
secondary to, or dependent on, the primary essence of Being. Jacobi, another 
contemporary of the early Romantics, also unequivocally states as unsustainable 
the dilemma that Fichte posed, conceiving of the self as incapable of knowing 
Being with certainty: 
 
The decisive difference of my way of thinking from the ways of 
thinking of the majority of my philosophical contemporaries lies in 
the fact that I am not a Cartesian. I begin like the Orientals 
(Morgenländer) in their conjugations with the third, not with the first 
person, and I believe that one simply should not put the Sum after the 
Cogito. I needed a truth which was not my creature, but whose 
creature I would be. (Bowie, 1997, p. 35, citing Scholz, 1916)  
 
As Bowie follows, “we would not recognise when we have reached the end of our 
investigation” (p. 34) in regard to trying to “arrive at final certainty”. We would 
have to know with complete confidence what it is we are seeking in advance.  
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Novalis’ specific reaction 
Novalis arrives at the same conclusion by both logical and poetic means. In his 
Fichte Studies – which, it should be noted, total some 400 pages, representing the 
galvanic impetus that Fichte had provided – he begins his critique by laying out 
the impossibility of Fichte’s ‘A = A’ proposition. To begin with, according to 
Novalis (1960j) “[w]ir verlassen das Identische um es darzustellen” (p. 104)/“[w]e 
abandon the identical in order to represent it” (Kneller, 2003, p. 3); this is because 
“[d]as Wesen der Identität läßt sich nur in einen Scheinsatz aufstellen” (1960j, p. 
104)/“[t]he essence of identity can only be presented in an illusory proposition” 
(Kneller, 2003, p. 3). But how can we ever be sure that we have represented the 
identical? To identify something as the same means that the thing to be 
determined must be in some way different (Bowie, 1997; Nassar, 2006) - 
otherwise we would just be identifying the thing itself, resulting in a tautology – 
thus “A is A”. As Kneller (2003) elucidates, Novalis questions how we can ever 
really know that we have authentically reflected our true selves. The moment we 
state a feeling about ourselves as a certainty it is relegated (or consigned) to the 
realm of representation. Kneller cites Novalis at this point, and I shall also draw 
on this same fragment: 
 
Nicht Selbstbetrachtung kann sie [Filosofie] seyn, denn sonst wäre sie 
nicht das Verlangte. Es ist ein Selbstgefühl vielleicht.... Was ist denn 
ein Gefühl? Es läßt sich nur in der Reflexion betrachten – der Geist 
des Gefühls ist da heraus. (Novalis, 1960j, pp. 113-114)  
 
Philosophy cannot be self-observation, because it would not then be 
what we are after. It is perhaps a self-feeling.… What then is a 
feeling? It can only be observed in reflection – the spirit of feeling is 
then gone. (Kneller, 2003, pp. 12-13) 
 
As such, the idea that a representation holds the ground of truth is implausible for 
Novalis (Bowie, 1997; von Molnár, 1970): After all, in order to state that an 
identity has been made, the things between which an identity is to be made must 
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necessarily be different from each other in order to be elements to be supposedly 
reflected. Assertions of truth require a movement away from the self; it is: 
 
[T]he problem of how to gain the external perspective – which would 
allow one to assert that the universe is ‘really “x”’ (e.g. ‘law-bound 
matter’) – without leaving the place from which that assertion is made 
outside what is described as the grounding reality. (Bowie, 1997, p. 
76) 
 
The problem arises when we try to assert a physics-based truth about the universe. 
Bowie (1997) goes on to note that to think that the world could be explained 
absolutely in scientific laws is problematic, because then what he calls 
“consciousness”35 would have to be able to “explain itself” (p. 76) in the same 
way. Yet it cannot. In order to manage that task, the self would firstly have to be 
already completely familiar with what is to be explained; otherwise it would not 
know when it had arrived at the complete explanation of the thing. 
 
Novalis’ argument that one may only dimly feel Being is based on his belief that:  
 
Alles Seyn, Seyn überhaupt ist nichts als Freyseyn - Schweben 
zwischen Extremen, die nothwendig zu vereinigen und nothwendig zu 
trennen sind. Aus diesem Lichtpunct des Schwebens strömt alle 
Realität aus - in ihm ist alles enthalten - Obj[ect] und Subject sind 
durch ihn, nicht er d[urch] sie. (1960j, p. 266)   
 
[All aspects of Being, Being above all is simply being free – hovering 
between extremes that are both necessarily unifying and divisive. 
From this point of light of hovering all reality flows – in it is 
contained everything – object and subject are there because of it, it is 
not there because of them.] 
                                                
35 Although Bowie uses the term ‘consciousness’, Māori may have self-hood even 
without consciousness. However, as Bowie is addressing the realm of Fichtean self-
consciousness and is using appropriate language for that process, the word 
‘consciousness’ is a fitting one here. 
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The hovering describes the productive but dependent relationship with Being 
generally. In line with Novalis’ intention, it throws into doubt sounds the 
statement that professes to be once and for all definitive. Being is neither 
precisely in one state or another. Its quiddity defies rational explanation because 
of its movement between the extremes that are at once together and apart. Because 
Being gives rise to statements as much as things in the world apparently 
independent of the self, statements about Being are just as indefinite. All things 
are contained within hovering Being: It gives rise to the unpredictability of all 
things in the world, including statements and thoughts. In Novalis’ Hymnen an die 
Nacht one may see similar numerous reflections on the changing state of Being: 
At times the night is a hovering entity – it hovers around “des zarten Mädchens 
Busen und [macht] zum Himmel den Schoß” (1960i, p. 135)/“a tender girl’s 
breasts making her womb heaven” (1988, p. 15) - at others the night provides an 
uncertain gauze through which Novalis sees the changed features of his deceased 
love. When discussing the night in such a poetical way, Novalis is hinting at the 
active nature of Being. In Hymnen an die Nacht it is a productive, irrepressible 
movement that never alights on one element for long.  
 
With Fichte, Geheimnis is inevitably lost to the certainty of the self. Fichte 
mentions ‘hovering’ himself but reduces it to an activity of the self’s imagination. 
Imagination acts between “subject and its projected object, action out of which 
arises, so far as thought can comprehend it, the experience of objectivity or thing-
hood” (Shell, 1992, p. 110). At times uncertain hovering is acceptable, even 
beneficial, between “authority and mere emptiness” (Simpson, 1988, p. 210), for 
instance, but only if it propels humanity towards a state of certain knowledge. 
Novalis addresses the Ich and imagination in his Fichte-Studien, acknowledging 
their validity, but crucially turning them over to ‘Being above all’, as we have 
seen. According to Stone (2008) “Novalis takes [B]eing, or unitary substance, to 
precondition not only the subject/object distinction, but also the subject’s 
consciousness of itself” (p. 145), and its “givenness” means that one may 
approach or seek productivity in the Fichtean sense (Kollias, 2000) but never 
achieve it. Hovering for Novalis can be understood as a moving outwards from 
the self – as a product of Being – towards the uncertainty of Being. Geheimnis is 
thereby retrieved from Fichtean subjectivity. This movement outwards is alluded 
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to by Hölderlin who, similar to Novalis, admired Schiller’s aesthetics, and like 
Novalis tried to extend those aesthetics’ creative potential into the spheres of the 
unknown:  
 
[W]ir haben unsre Lust daran, uns in die Nacht des Unbekannten, in 
die kalte Fremde irgend einer andern Welt zu stürzen, und wär es 
möglich, wir verlieβen der Sonne Gebiet und stürmten über des 
Irrsterns Grenzen hinaus. (2011, p. 19)  
 
[W]e delight in flinging ourselves into the night of the unknown, into 
the cold strangeness of any other world, and, if we could, we would 
leave the realm of the sun and rush headlong beyond the comet’s 
track. (2002, p. 10)  
 
Hölderlin’s theory of tones, in which one may only express poetry by the tension 
between tones, and which points to an understanding that the Absolute lies out of 
cognitive reach, chimes with Novalis’ Die Lehrlinge zu Sais. Humanity’s 
vulnerability before Being’s manifestations – finite phenomena in nature - is most 
clearly highlighted at a number of stages in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais; it is 
overwhelmingly about the autonomous (but interdependent with humanity) 
ontological essence of nature, and the interaction of humanity with it. One of the 
youths in this fragment of Novalis’ considers that: 
 
Wer … einen richtigen und geübten Natursinn hat, der genießt die 
Natur, indem er sie studiert, und freut sich ihrer unendlichen 
Mannigfaltigkeit, ihrer Unerschöpflichkeit im Genusse, und bedarf 
nicht, daß man ihn mit unnützen Worten in seinen Genüssen störe. 
(1960e, pp. 105-106) 
 
He who has a sound and practiced sense of nature enjoys nature by 
studying it and takes delight in its infinite variety, its inexhaustible 
joy, and has no need to be disturbed in his pleasures by useless words. 
(2005, p. 109) 
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As far as that youth was concerned, nature is engaged with sensually, not in a way 
that emphasises precise cognition. The impossibility of a truly reflective 
explanation, such as ‘A=A’, is an abiding one that philosophers besides Novalis 
have taken up. Novalis’ friend Friedrich Schlegel believed that all truths had to be 
expressed with a sense of paradox to remind humanity that they cannot be 
confidently disclosed, and proposed that: 
 
Alle höchsten Wahrheiten jeder Art sind durchaus trivial, und eben 
darum ist nichts notwendiger, als sie immer neu, und womöglich 
immer paradoxer auszudrücken, damit es nicht vergessen wird, daß sie 
noch da sind, und daß sie nie eigentlich ganz ausgesprochen werden 
können. (1964c, p. 534)  
 
[All highest truths of every sort are through and through trivial, and 
just because of that nothing is more necessary than to express them in 
ever new and, where possible, paradoxical ways, so that it will not be 
forgotten that they exist and that they can never actually be expressed 
with totality.] 
 
Hölderlin (1961b) argued in a similar fashion but in relation to the subject and 
object: 
 
Wo Subjekt und Objekt schlechthin, nicht nur zum Theil vereiniget 
ist, mithin so vereiniget, daß gar keine Theilung vorgenommen 
werden kan, ohne das Wesen desjenigen, was getrennt werden soll, zu 
verlezen, da und sonst nirgends kann von einem Seyn schlechthin die 
Rede Seyn, wie es bei der intellectualen Anschauung der Fall ist. 
Aber dieses Seyn muß nicht mit der Identität verwechselt werden. (p. 
216) 
 
[Where Subject and Object are absolutely, not just partially, united, 
and with that so united that no division can take place, without 
destroying the essence of that which is to be sundered, there and in no 
other way can we talk of Being, as is the case in intellectual intuition. 
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But this Being must not be interchanged with identity.]  
 
Originally Being is the primordiality which unifies all judgements. Hölderlin’s 
proposition is that Being is not a proposition so much as an original given. 
Heidegger spoke also of the importance of contemplating the Being of beings, an 
activity that science in itself was incapable of carrying out, as its existence cannot 
be explained by its own essence (Glazebrook, 2000). For Heidegger, then, science 
could not explain its ontological existence by means of its own laws. More 
broadly, we may take from this that the thing attempting to explain itself does not 
know when it reaches the true reflection of itself in its pursuit of its own essence. 
 
According to Stone (2008), though, whether the self can grasp Being cognitively 
involves an unresolved and enduring debate. One such dispute occurs between 
Manfred Frank and Frederick Beiser, two contemporary Novalis scholars, in 
which Frank on the one hand argues for the unknowability of Being, and Beiser 
on the other advocates that Being is knowable because “it is a self-realizing 
organic whole which develops in an intelligible way” (Stone, 2008, p. 141). Frank 
argued that: 
 
Denn nur ein Grundsatz, dessen Existenz feststeht, böte sich an für 
Deduktionen, die nicht nur die Geltung von Sätzen, sondern auch die 
Sachhaltigkeit einiger unserer Gedanken über die Welt einsichtig 
machen. (1997, pp. 49-50) 
 
[Because only a grounding proposition, whose existence holds fast, 
lends itself to those deductions that not only make the validity of 
propositions comprehensible but also the objective nature of our 
thoughts about the world.] 
 
Of course Frank’s argument suggests that knowledge would only be possible 
through the generation of knowledge of a fundamental ground. Beiser (2002) 
places great emphasis on the “self-awareness of the knowing subject” (p. 13), 
stressing the knowable nature of Being as it organises itself and gives rise to the 
self. Although this discussion is unresolved, it is likely that Novalis argued for a 
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type of knowledge of Being that was not discursive. In Das Allgemeine Brouillon, 
he poses an apparent conundrum: 
 
Das Universum ist das Absolute Subject oder der Inbegriff aller 
Prädicate. Hierinn liegt schon seine unermeßliche und zugleich 
meßliche Gliedrung, weil nur dadurch der Inbegriff aller Prädicate 
möglich wird. Man muß nothwendig erschrecken, wenn man einen 
Blick in die Tiefe des Geistes wirft. (1960b, p. 381)  
 
The universe is the absolute subject, or the totality of all predicates. 
Both its immeasurable and measurable structure are based on this fact, 
for only in this manner does the totality of all predicates become a 
possibility. We would indeed be shocked if we were to gaze into the 
depths of the spirit. (Wood, 2007, p. 113) 
 
There is both a knowable and unknowable element to Being (Stone, 2008), but its 
knowability is emotional rather than cognitive. We find here a capacity for 
intuition that involves knowledge as feeling alongside ignorance, prompting 
Novalis (1960b) to add that:  
 
So gut, wie alle Kenntnisse zusammenhängen, so gut hängen auch alle 
Nichtkenntnisse zusammen – Wer eine Wissenschaft machen kann – 
muß auch eine Nichtwissenschaft machen können – wer etwas 
begreiflich zu machen weis, muß es auch unbegreiflich zu machen 
wissen – Der Lehrer muß Wissenheit und Unwissenheit 
hervorzubringen vermögen. (pp. 375-376)   
 
Just as all knowledge is connected, so all ignorance is also connected 
– Whoever is able to create a science – must also be able to create a 
nonscience – and whoever knows how to make something 
comprehensible, must also know how to make it incomprehensible – 
The teacher must be capable of bringing forth both knowledge and 
ignorance. (Wood, 2007, p. 109) 
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As he would later mention in his “Monolog”, Being for Novalis is that which 
propels the self into both knowledge and ignorance. In this he agrees with both 
Hölderlin and Heidegger who generally believe that it is Being, not the self, that 
“makes all experience possible” (Beiser, 2002, p. 357). Novalis (1960o) proposed 
therefore that “[a]ller wirklicher Anfang ist ein 2ter Moment” (p. 591)/[every true 
beginning is a secondary moment] because our assertions of truth are dependent 
on what precedes and follows them (Bowie, 1997). For the Romantics, making a 
definitive assertion about the world is the ‘trivia’ that Friedrich Schlegel speaks of 
precisely because even the signs used to formulate the utterance are dependent on 
the ontological given as well as other signs. This is not to say in post-modernist 
fashion, though, that all truth is relative; indeed, Bowie (1997) indicates that this 
sort of position is “undemonstrable” (p. 79). As we shall see later, Novalis 
believes the constant striving towards final and determinate truth is a human 
inevitability, but that it will never be arrived at. 
 
2. Adopting Novalis’ methods and assertions for a 
process of active philosophising 
Novalis’ philosophising as the basis for my own  
Novalis highlights that an object’s Geheimnis is due to the activity of the 
Absolute. His method of arriving at that conclusion involved ‘Fichtesising’ - 
reacting to a different opinion (that of Fichte’s) and thinking self-consciously 
about his own process of philosophising. Fichtesising is a term he coined to 
convey a “deepened analysis of the activity of philosophizing itself” (Wood, 2007, 
p. xxii) or a “result of applying the Fichtean method to philosophy, of making 
philosophy itself ‘self-conscious’” (Kneller, 2003, p. xxxiv). It was made self-
conscious by “ironic mimicry” (O'Brien, 1995, p. 82), through which he to some 
extent copied Fichte’s style whilst still diverging from it. His deviation would 
occur through rereading certain of Fichte’s terms and style so that it could provide 
an alternative philosophy (O'Brien, 1995). Novalis was therefore more concerned 
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with the method of arriving at certain philosophical assertions than he was with the 
substantive outcome. As Mahoney (2001) explains: 
 
Die Fichte-Studien waren in ihrer erhaltenen Form nicht zur 
Veröffentlichung bestimmt, sondern stellen dar, was Friedrich von 
Hardenberg im Brief an seinen Bruder Erasmus vom 12. November 
1795 ‘dringende Einleitungsstudien auf mein ganzes künftiges Leben, 
wesentliche Lücken meiner Erkenntniß und nothwendige Uebungen 
meiner Denkkräfte’ nennt. Gerade deswegen sind Hardenbergs 
Studienhefte alles andere als ein laufender Kommentar zu Fichtes 
Wissenschaftslehre. (p. 37) 
 
[The Fichte Studies were not destined for publication in their 
conceived form, but instead are meant to represent what Friedrich von 
Hardenberg, in a letter dated 12 November 1795 to his brother 
Erasmus, names as ‘urgent introductory studies into the entirety of my 
artistic life, into the giant gaps in my knowledge and the necessary 
practice of my powers of thought’. Precisely because of that fact, 
Hardenberg’s notes on the Studies are far from a running commentary 
on Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.] 
  
That this results in an uncertain outcome for Novalis should be obvious to the 
reader, simply because Novalis did not know what track his thoughts would 
follow; indeed, Fichte’s philosophy “not only offered Hardenberg a theoretical 
basis for his writing, but spurred this writing into new directions” (O'Brien, 1995, 
p. 82). The unpredictability of this method lies in acknowledging that any outcome 
is undefined from the outset – an adventure into the unknown.  
 
Yet Geheimnis is to be linked much more with Novalis than with Fichte. Indeed, 
Fichte’s conception aimed to divest the world of mystery, even if the initial act of 
self-positing is itself mysterious. My own argument for a notion of Geheimnis that 
engages Māori philosophies of ontology proposes that Māori are likewise less Ich-
focused than Fichte proposes. Despite the fact that the individual – the tohunga, for 
instance – could change the external world with the power of thought, I shall 
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ultimately explore that the individual was still reliant on the mystery of 
transformational processes and things to achieve this. Therefore, while Fichte 
brings the Ich into sharp relief, unlike either Novalis or Māori he does not place 
this Ich into subservience to any other being. I shall now turn to Te Maire Tau’s 
(2001) “The Death of Knowledge: Ghosts on the Plains” to continue the process of 
philosophising about mystery and Being. I shall argue that this is a relevant 
method of thinking about philosophy for Māori who are concerned with the 
ontological realm; it is necessarily creative, and it reminds the philosopher that 
colonisation is a constant presence (and that traditional, pre-contact discourse on 
its own is insufficient when discussing mystery and ontology in a contemporary 
context). One must in this setting respond to discourses that are partly or wholly 
discordant with Māori ones. In this endeavour, one can engage responses to texts 
that are jarring and are avowedly based on feeling and thinking about outcomes 
that are relevant for today. For this section I shall refer in detail to Te Maire Tau as 
a source of agitation for me, against which I advance a theory about mystery that is 
relevant for Māori. This process of philosophising is carried out together with 
Novalis’ romanticised theories about mystery and Being. 
 
Te Maire Tau’s “Ghosts on the Plains” 
The value of Tau’s “Ghosts on the Plains” 
Little writing exists that is devoted solely to the intersection between Māori 
consciousness, colonisation and traditional views of the world, and I believe that 
such writing is undertaken bravely. One particularly controversial piece of 
scholarship for me was written by Te Maire Tau, Māori scholar and researcher, 
who aimed to point out the vulnerability of Māori knowledge in the face of 
Western colonisation. As Novalis had been to Fichte, I am grateful to Tau for 
introducing the less familiar terrain of Māori selfhood as an issue. I have 
generally observed that the topic of the Māori self is dealt with either by 
subsuming it within collectivist discourses, or by aligning it with traditional 
archetypes. Both of these approaches are valid but not exhaustively so. The theme 
of selfhood is central to Tau’s thesis - even though he may not have intended it to 
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be – because the place of the knowing self in relation to things in the world is of 
primary concern to him. Tau interrogates those dealings with the issue of the self 
by rigorously questioning traditional Māori epistemology. By bringing it into 
question, in “Ghosts on the Plains” he fearlessly disrupts the idea that traditional 
knowledge is somehow infallible. To that extent he accords with the romantic idea 
of Novalis’ that one cannot return to a bygone era, and that tortuous paths have 
always been trodden after colonisation as one comes to question how one knows 
things in the world. As we shall soon see, however, Tau places much more 
emphasis on what is epistemically certain than either Novalis or I do. 
 
Although it is not my aim here to compare Tau’s writing to Fichte’s, one may 
broadly perceive a harmony between his and Fichte’s basic theory: that humanity 
seeks to engage with nature as if humanity is not governed by anything prior. That 
is, humanity is the ground of experience. Tau does not “fetishize” (Martin, 
forthcoming, p. 2) systems like Fichte does – after all, Tau’s concern is less with 
incrementally establishing a ground notion of consciousness than with providing a 
commentary on how Māori knowledge was overwhelmed. Nevertheless, he does 
make some basic assumptions about humanity’s place in relation to Being and its 
object manifestations to arrive at his point. After making these assumptions, he 
then attempts to provide an account of how this form of consciousness never 
could amount to ‘proper knowledge’ in a Western rational or empirical sense. 
According to him, Māori were exposed and vulnerable in the colonising 
relationship.  
 
Briefly, Tau’s argument can be summed up as follows: Tau asserts that Māori, 
prior to colonisation, could only reflect themselves onto objects in the world. By 
this, he asserts, “all things are ultimately known through the connection to the 
self” (p. 136). A whakapapa/genealogy that he cites, giving the genesis of Pākehā, 
provides evidence of this knowledge base. Reciting the whakapapa itself is not 
important for my critique here, but what is central is his summation of the 
whakapapa. He contends that:  
 
While one could use this whakapapa as an example of how Māori 
knowledge systems could expand to include the unknown, the reality 
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was that their knowledge system was exposed on two fronts. First was 
the inability to adapt quickly enough to alterations in the environment. 
Secondly, the framework was meant to represent a knowledge system 
but in real terms was an arrangement of beliefs underpinned by a 
paradigm of genealogy. (p. 136)  
 
According to Tau, from this “a continuous self-validating loop is established” (p. 
136). He provides a number of examples by which this ‘orthodoxy’ leads to a 
death of Māori knowledge. With this death, Māori knowledge is proven to be 
merely belief and is overwhelmed by the knowledge of the West. The social 
repercussions – discussion of which is beyond the scope of my thesis – include 
that there are benefits for Māori in accepting changes to knowledge systems, in 
the corrosion of “old traditions and beliefs, allowing for the growth in knowledge” 
(p. 141). Essentially, Tau’s work provides some very interesting and thought-
provoking instances of all these factors.  
 
The Ich-focus of “Ghosts on the Plains” 
First, Tau’s basic assumption about humanity and nature is to be addressed. He 
places the genesis of human action – broadly similar to Fichte – in the self. 
Matching Fichte’s broad, overall intention of the self, Tau proposes that 
awareness of and relationships to objects in the world are grounded in the Ich. It is 
the Ich that reflects the Ich in the world. Unwittingly, Tau proposes that Māori 
engaged in a Fichtean awareness of the world: In line with Larmore’s observation 
that for Fichte “all knowledge is grounded upon the I and its relation to itself” (p. 
146), Tau advocates that an explanation of the world “came from the observation 
of their [Māori] immediate experiences” (p. 138). He implies that it was the initial 
impression of the world that was important to Māori, again with the self as the 
origin of that impression. While Tau does not go far in his discussion about Māori 
consciousness, he does place a lot of emphasis on the act of positing the self as a 
first, initial activity. He states in his article, for instance, that: 
 
This fact [how Māori perceived the past] meant that Māori acted and 
behaved in a way that was fundamentally different from Pākehā 
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because just as Māori imposed their past onto the landscape, the 
landscape therefore set the boundaries for how the present could be 
understood and, therefore, how the future would be written. (p. 139)  
 
The landscape may set limits on human interaction but this is construed as useful 
for the human understanding and writing of present and future. Its limitations are 
directed at human activity. Again reminiscent of Fichte, nature is the resistant 
nicht-Ich; it reminds the Ich of its unfulfilled state but also affirms it as ground. 
The individual and collective self, or Ich, is brought here to awareness of itself by 
being made aware of the landscape. The self then names it. While Tau asserts that 
Māori saw themselves as the landscape, in fact by his depiction of Māori first 
principles of consciousness the Māori self is not the landscape. 
 
Using Tau’s selfhood as Stoßsatz: Dialogue with “Astralis” 
The key point to be made here is that Tau either tacitly disagrees with the 
proposition that the self is an ongoing element in the primordial activity of Being, 
or at least he simply does not acknowledge it. In descriptions of Being that 
Novalis provides we see that, because one cannot comprehend Being, there is a 
mystery to all things in the world. This mystery is not one of our making but 
exists because of the self-organisation of Being. Novalis’ poem “Astralis”, 
referring to the birth of poesy, structurally bears a striking resemblance to a chant 
given by Te Maire Tau.  
 
Novalis’ (1960h) poem, lines 47-55, reads thus: 
 
Es bricht die neue Welt herein 
Und verdunkelt den hellsten Sonnenschein, 
Man sieht nun aus bemoosten Trümmern 
Eine wunderseltsame Zukunft schimmern, 
Und was vordem alltäglich war, 
Scheint jetzo fremd und wunderbar. 
<Eins in allem und alles im Einen 
Gottes Bild auf Kräutern und Steinen 
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Gottes Geist in Menschen und Thieren, 
Dies muß man sich zu Gemüte führen. 
Keine Ordnung mehr nach Raum und Zeit 
Hier Zukunft in der Vergangenheit.> (p. 318)  
 
 
[The new world begins 
And darkens the brightest sunshine 
One now looks out of overgrown ruins 
At a wonderfully strange, shimmering future, 
And what was previously banal, 
Is now so strange and wondrous. 
One in everything, and everything in one 
God’s picture imprinted on leaves and stones 
God’s spirit in man and animal, 
One must take this to heart. 
No order any more in space and time 
Now, future in the past]. 
 
Tau refers to a Ngai Tahu chant explaining the creation of things in the world: 
 
Na Te Po, Ko Te Ao 
Na Te Ao, Ko Te Aomarama 
Na Te Aomarama, Ko Te Aoturoa 
Na Te Aoturoa, Ko Te Koretewiwhia 
Na Te Koretewiwhia, Ko Te Koreterawea 
Na Te Koreterawea, Ko Te Koretetaumaua 
Na Te Koretetaumaua, ko Te Korematua 
Na Te Korematua, Ko Te Maku 
Na Te Maku, ka noho i a Mahoranuiatea, ka puta ki waho ko Raki 
Na Raki, ka noho i a Pokoharuatepo 
 
From the first glimmer of light, 
emerged the long-standing light until light stood in all quarters, 
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Encompassing all was a womb of emptiness, 
an intangible void intense in its search for creation 
until it reached its ultimate boundaries and became a parentless void with the 
potential for life. 
Thus moisture emerged and coupled with Mahoranui a Tea, a cloud that grew 
from the dawn. 
From this union came the heavens, 
Who coupled with Pokoharuatepo…. (p. 137) 
 
Both items refer to creation, and express Being and the infinite in a sort of 
mythical and mystical primordial setting. Novalis is intent on making a point 
about the unknown; here, he is attempting to represent Being through a set of 
tensions, in which dark and light, strangeness and banality, future and past, 
physical and spiritual, are forced together to give birth to a spiritual being. A 
shimmering future awaits the beholder, but the horizon is not a definite, 
determined one; it lies behind the knowledge of the onlooker, changing between 
the two polar regions of light and dark and so on. As one who was sceptical about 
definitive, orthodox Biblical theologies of monotheism, but who thought that it 
could operate as a way of accessing pantheism (Barth, 1972), Novalis refers to the 
pantheistic emanations of ‘God’ as metaphorical for Being, and states that these 
are the source of a spiritual influence on the physical realm, suggesting that there 
is as much of a ‘shimmer’ within these objects as there is on the horizon for the 
onlooker. Long-held assumptions are hence discarded, as the light, in its infusion 
with darkness, comes to highlight this new poetic world. Time and space cease to 
be the sole defining factors: In the traditional Māori chant, it is a state of being 
that comes first, and, similarly, Novalis deals with the Judaeo-Christian 
God/Being. Both the chant and the poem are opposed to Fichte’s Ich because they 
propose that what is important is activity that is prior to, but decisive for, the Ich. 
Even Novalis’ merging of God and Being further cement the mystery of the 
poem: ‘God’ is neither just God nor just Being, but both are the same and are 
influential on all the elements in the poem. 
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Creation lying beyond incremental ‘knowledge’ 
Let us hold that ontological intention of Novalis’ for a reading of Tau’s recited 
chant, which he uses - along with other elements - as proof for the problem of 
Māori knowledge as against Western knowledge. Again, I speculate that this 
chant is about a set of interacting opposites, including light and darkness, 
boundary and void, moisture and dryness. The reference to these opposites seeks 
to highlight an unknowable movement that lies beyond, but also within, the words 
themselves and their arrangements with each other. Like Novalis, what comes to 
the fore here is that which precedes human consciousness, giving birth to a 
constantly present way of being and thinking as much as to the names which are 
given. The creation that is described is not sequential in the sense that the last step 
is left behind; what is taken to be a previous step is carried into the present one, 
leading to what Novalis has noted in “Astralis” with the words “Now, future in 
the past”. Just as perceivable and visible phenomena pass and merge, so Being 
allows the constant folding over into the future of the unseen and mysterious. 
Thus, the form of darkness and silence that is “Te Pō” holds sway over the 
ensuing states of being. In other words, Te Pō did not just evolve those other 
states of being and now ceases to exist; it is as much a part of current states of 
being as those arriving.  
 
I argue that this interpretation of that chant, guided by Novalis in the form of his 
poem, has consequences for Tau’s thesis. Noting that we now have a much more 
rational explanation for the creation of the world, Tau argues that “[w]e now 
know that the world was not created from a giant act of copulation” (p. 138). This 
“giant act of copulation”, however, suggests that a definitive event took place that 
brought about the world, a turn of phrase that does not do justice to the process of 
creation. What has preceded the act of copulation is avoided with a focus on the 
event. This may be to do with the step-by-step layout and account of the process. 
The translation that is offered deceives the reader into thinking of those states of 
being as separate and superable, when what the chant is trying to convey is that all 
current states of being are dependent on that initial presence of Being that is 
nevertheless enduring. Even when attempting to clear some validity for the 
elements of this chant, Tau consigns the elements to human-derived forms: 
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But what is important is that the creation chant and lullabies show 
how a people attempted to explain the world and that the explanation 
came from the observation of their immediate experiences. The world 
was a mirror of their lives. Light and darkness were personified as 
male and female elements. Heaven and earth were projections of one’s 
father and mother. With these primal elements established, the world 
of plants, fish, rocks and stars was ordered and understood as a cosmic 
family. All things referenced back to the individual and ultimately to 
the centre of creation – the self. (p. 138) 
Fundamentally unknowable entities in the chant 
Solidifying the primordial agency of Being through embodying it in physically 
identifiable forms occurs here. Although this may have occurred traditionally, I 
suspect that ‘male’ and ‘female’, ‘mother’ and ‘father’ were not as straightforward 
as Tau suggests they are. The use of these terms may be reductionist; whilst it is 
true that the earth was probably conceived of as ‘female’ (Hanson & Hanson, 
1983), this is not to be reduced to a familiar form36. The same applies to 
‘male/father/sky’. Moving on, Tau is ensnared by the instrumentalist process of 
translated language. If we accept that all those states of being amount to an act of 
copulation, then he may be partially correct. However, the chant that refers to the 
parent talking to the child is not sufficiently explicated in the English version: 
 
E tama i kimia, e tama i rapā! 
I rapā tāua ki roto 
Ki te Kore te whiwhia 
Ki roto te Kore te rawea; 
Pupuru, mau ake ki te kanoi o te uha na. 
 
Ko Kura-waka ano Kura-waka, ka tohia ki te one 
Ko tohi-nuku ano ko Tohi-raangi ano, 
Ka kukune, Hawai-iki, e. 
O son searched for, O son sought for! 
                                                
36  In other words, the terms are more anthropocentric, and personalised to human 
familiarity, than they were traditionally. 
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We two were sought for in the intangible void,  
And with the shapeless Void; 
Once held fast, and suspended on a female strand. 
 
The Crimson-bowl remained a Crimson-bowl, until soil sanctified, 
As was the conception in Hawaiki. (pp. 137-138) 
 
Nau mai, e tama, kia mihi atu au; 
I haramai koe i te kunenga mai o te tangata 
I roto i te ahuru mōwai, ka taka te pae o Huaki-pōuri; 
Ko te whare hangahanga tēna a Tāne-nui-a-rangi 
I te one i Kura-waka, i tātāia ai te Puhi-ariki 
Te Hīringa matua, te Hīringa tipua, te Hīringa tawhitorangi…. 
 
Welcome, O son, let me greet you; 
You indeed have come from the origin of mankind 
From the cosy haven emerged, out from the barrier of Darkness ajar 
Out of the abode fashioned by the renowned Tāne-of-the-heavens 
On the sands the Crimson-bowl, wherein the Exhalted-one rejoiced 
In the implanting of parenthood, sacred implanting, heavenly implanting in times 
remote…. (pp. 137-138)  
 
The translation of those chants given to us is certainly construable so that the self 
is seen as willing the human form onto the world. Yet the mention of te kore is 
not as easily dealt with. Indeed, te kore is one manifestation of Being, and stands 
behind the chant, with both the child and parent being found within Being (“I rapā 
tāua ki roto/Ki te Kore te whiwhia/ki roto te Kore te rawea”). Both the writer and 
the child are to be found within the Being that cannot be grasped or had (te 
whiwhia), and that cannot be felt (te rawea), thus identifying that the Being that is 
under discussion at the time of the poem is not determinable. Indeed the 
composer(s) of that chant are themselves moved by Being to give words to many 
facets of creation and movement. 
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Tau is correct, I believe, when he states that this does not amount to knowledge in 
the objectifiable sense; however, I argue that the intention of the chant does not lie 
in gleaning knowledge. Like many other chants of its kind, greater emphasis is on 
allowing a space for Being to reveal itself and then to conceal when appropriate. 
In these instances, there may be different feelings attached to the chant at each 
time even one reader approaches it. This, as Novalis would have it, is the activity 
of Being as it moves the utterer to convey feelings and words in various ways. 
The independent movement that heralds the Absolute, or Being, is found at the 
end of the chant in the use of the word/name “Hīringa”, which is given as 
“implanting”. Implanting partially conveys the intention of the word, which can 
also mean “pure energy” or “determination” (King, 2007, p. 273). Thus, the idea 
that implanting is an exercise that is really only to do with transmission is 
incomplete; the implanting is really only happening because of the presence of 
pure energy. But that entire process of implantation is also only capable because 
of the proximity of those names that are given in the chant – those names are not 
only conceptually but also affectively linked in the text. The relational nature of 
Tāne-nui-a-rangi, Kura-waka, Puhi-ariki, and the various Hīringa come to bear in 
ways that defy the strict text, revealing Being for both the reader and the utterer. 
 
How may one know any of this for sure? The nature of Being as an independent 
force that surpasses human understanding in its totality, as noted by Novalis, 
ensures that its movement is not certain to humanity. In this reading of what is 
usually common sense, we can see that Māori traditionally – and to a lesser extent 
contemporarily – allowed a much more fluid, relational notion of the effects of 
words and the things that they referenced. Tau’s article on the other hand is 
underscored by the same sort of certainty that the translation in English provides 
us with, and thus supports his overall thesis that Māori did not possess knowledge 
in the objectifiable sense. This certainty manifests itself in a number of ways. 
Firstly, Tau states that there was a “projection of the self” (p. 136). In this way, 
the Māori self to begin with is certain; the outside world, after all, is grounded in 
the supreme Māori self. It is the absolute self that starts with the projection. The 
self has been decided on, at some point, as an autonomous entity. Even as an iwi, 
hapū or whānau, the self – as group – is itself first and foremost in the world. One 
could say that such a certain view of the self is as a result of the self’s awareness 
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of itself; the awareness is based on senses and perceptions of the outer world, and 
is aware because of a number of immediately present attributes that the self 
possesses. 
 
Related to that point: According to Tau, because the self is first, then its certainty 
lies in its ability to regard the world. However, in that light, the world is not 
reciprocally coming to bear on the self, apart from maybe in ways that are directly 
perceivable. Thus the self is certain of its priority in the world because it 
possesses a number of attributes that allow it to perceive the world and affect it. 
The self is held out as being grounded in whakapapa and so on, as prior impacts, 
but this prior grounding is just genealogical – it is not currently and continuously 
grounding the self. Whakapapa is rendered certain, as a foregoing part of the self. 
The self, therefore, has full licence to label the world as he/she sees fit, simply 
because he/she is first in the world. He/she is not being guided or moved to do so 
by anything prior or transcendent to him/her. 
 
3. Philosophical fragments that propose a notion of 
Being for Māori readers 
Thus far I have employed Novalis’ method of reacting to text in order to start a 
process of philosophising about Being, the outcomes of which may be interesting 
to Māori readers. One could stop there and come to some conclusions about Being, 
without including any substantive input about Being from Novalis. Ignoring 
Novalis’ beliefs about Being that I cited earlier in this chapter, and just from my 
response to Tau’s prompts, I could already conclude the following in a tentative 
sense: 
 
- Being flows between man-made delineations. 
- Being operates in the background of our activities. 
- Being comes forth at times in traditional text and insights. 
- Being is not equivalent with ‘knowledge’. 
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Yet, as Pihama (2001) argues, one may refer to Western theory and at the same 
time ensure that “the foundation for analysis will be Māori” (p. 92). Indeed, as she 
notes, this can be useful. I argue that, having drawn on Novalis’ method of 
philosophising, I can also consider Novalis’ direct assertions about Being and 
incorporate them where appropriate in creating theories about Being for interested 
Māori and Western readers. For Novalis also actively adds to the above list by 
providing more detail to it. In particular, he emphasises the following crucial 
points (in italics) alongside the above list: 
 
- Being flows between man-made delineations: it does not stop at a 
point delineated by the self. 
- Being operates in the background of humanity’s activities: this does 
not preclude its everyday activity. 
- Being comes forth at times in traditional text: it also gives rise to 
current forms of expression. 
- Being is not equivalent with ‘knowledge’: it may, however, give rise 
to tentative knowledge about things in the world at times. 
 
Novalis’ assertions about Being (and the relation of the self to Being), and my 
approach to Te Maire Tau’s text as one that provokes a response to a colonised 
notion of mystery (and is hence made self-conscious, mirroring Novalis’ gratitude 
to Fichte’s philosophies), merge to allow me to offer my own theories about 
Being, and its link with mystery. Together with Novalis’ descriptions about 
Being, Tau’s text provoked responses in me that are informed by my specific 
(Māori) philosophical thought, and intuitions; that is, they are not immediately 
based on the rational process of intellect, even though I structure my argument 
after I have identified parts of Tau’s text that jar against my own experiences and 
background. Combined with Novalis’ and Tau’s arguments and methods, we may 
get a glimpse of what Novalis desires when he states that:  
 
Der ächte gegenseitige Beobachter operirt, bemerckt, vergleicht in 
allen seinen Sinnen und Vermögen zugleich oder successive, zu 
Einem Zweck. (1960b, p. 379)  
 
 128 
The true reciprocal observer simultaneously or successively operates, 
contemplates and compares using all of his senses and abilities toward 
a single goal. (Wood, 2007, p. 112)  
 
In continuing with an outcome - some of my own assertions about Being and 
mystery – I should acknowledge some of my own subjective inclinations that 
inspired responses to Tau and which then ‘push’ me to construct a mystical notion 
of Being from a position of being Māori. A formative experience was the time 
spent with my aunt: 
 
From the age of 15 until about the age of 18, after my grandfather had died, I 
spent just about every night until quite late with an aunty of mine. She had 
asked me to bring my grandfather’s whakapapa book, and from that time 
onwards we had many discussions about the names in the book. 
 
When my grandfather was dying, he asked my aunt to ‘take care of the family’. 
My aunt apparently had no idea what he was talking about, but stayed around 
our immediate family. Not long after he had died I mentioned to her that my 
grandmother had given me this whakapapa book. It was at that point, she 
realised, that she saw what my grandfather had meant. She explained this to me 
in quite some detail and wanted me to understand that there are some things 
outside of our control – those things that are controlled by what she called 
‘wairuas’. 
 
There was very little that my aunt did not attribute to those outside forces 
which, as she described them, were quite beyond our knowledge. For her, the 
reason for her help became clear, even though the type of help she was to give 
was something she would never have thought of, by her own admission. For 
three years she encouraged me to think of every event in terms of what was 
before, or greater than, my own perspective. This was a form of critical 
thinking for her; it meant that I had to look underneath the surface of things in 
order to become familiar with the idea that those things were fundamentally 
beyond my complete knowledge. 
 
One example was the whakapapa book itself. The book was precious because 
of the intention of my grandfather, it contained his focus. Thus it contained 
aspects of him that continued to come to the fore, according to my aunt, even 
though he had died. But also the names, their immediate combination with 
other names, and their link back to whenua/land, were phenomena that were 
beyond my complete knowledge. So when we would talk about whakapapa, the 
time would have to be right, certain people could not be present, the way in 
which those names were to be discussed would change (sometimes used along 
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with certain ‘qualifiers’ such as ‘wairua’, sometimes not used with them, 
sometimes used with ‘tīpuna’/ancestors, and so on). But there was also a 
‘silence’ in these discussions. Cherryl Smith (2007) has described how Māori 
often believed questions were interruptions; the silence, I theorise, was not just 
about having a breather from discussion but also a means of allowing other 
unspoken elements to come to the fore. 
 
My aunt recoiled from any assertion that humanity has complete control over 
things and determinate knowledge about them. Yet she was an incredibly 
practical woman. She did not distinguish between the things before her and the 
unseen aspect of things in the world. 
 
In a similar fashion to Novalis, I acknowledge the assistance that Tau’s article 
offers in bringing the issue of the Māori self to the fore in a postcolonial context. 
Tau emphasises the self; we can take from that the importance of systems of 
thinking that are based on reason, but within what Linda Smith (1999) notes is a 
“uniquely ‘Maori’ way of looking at the world and learning” (p. 174). Even 
though there is evident in Māori existence a colonised reality, the need to continue 
that Māori way of thinking but in a currently colonised situation is part of the 
emphasis that Tau brings to bear here. This means incorporating, or holding the 
presence of, Māori traditional discourses as they are uttered within these contexts. 
The process of philosophising, then, is one that Tau stresses as a means of getting 
Māori readers to think about the place of the self in the world. Ultimately for me, 
this has meant including my own experience recounted above – it took place in a 
colonised context, in the sense that it was relatively current – whilst responding to 
the meaning behind Tau’s philosophies. Novalis also helps here because he 
offered some very cogent ideas about Being and mystery. Together with other 
Māori writers, what follows are some theoretical expressions about Being, and 
resulting mystery, that have their genesis in the entire process that I have engaged 
in, outlined above; these expressions are aligned with “channelling collective 
creativity in order to produce solutions to indigenous problems” (Smith, 1999, p. 
158) and are intended to be both contemporary and innovative. Being provides 
Geheimnis to things in the world for the Māori self in the following ways: 
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Named and unnamed Being: Its ongoing activity 
Despite its unknowability, because of its overall activity Being is considered even 
in the most banal contexts. Here it becomes necessary to think of Being as an 
activity which impinges on both traditional and colonised settings, and the Māori 
self needs to think of Being as present in both when carrying out any task, even 
when it is not named. 
 
That it is at times not named should not lead one to think it is not coming to bear 
on everything to do with the person. While some Māori writers may name Being 
explicitly, often it is left unmentioned. It is variously called ‘Te Ao Tua Atea’ 
(Raerino, 1999), or, in its potential, korekore (Marsden, 2003), but may be called 
nothing at all. Indeed, “to think that Being only exists when noted by name would 
itself raise problems” (Mika, 2011a, p. 3). At times it is useful to identify it 
specifically, but this act should not be confused with explicitly defining it. It may 
be glimpsed when either named or not referred to: 
 
Although Being for Māori may be glimpsed through the use of the 
term, its real ongoing existence pulses within a holistic relationship 
with the world. This may or may not be expressly noted. We do obtain 
glimpses of its linguistic revelation, through such words as 
‘whakapapa’, which can mean ‘to layer’ as much as ‘genealogy’. As a 
verb, it moves vibrantly and actively throughout history and the 
current era, as well as through humanity and nature (Mika, 2007; 
Royal, 2007; Pohatu & Pohatu, 2007). Indeed, utterances about its 
unknowability abound, with hints of its presence only being uttered to 
humanity now and then. The word ‘ako’, with its multi-layered 
definitions that can all act simultaneously (Thrupp & Mika, 2011), 
also provides a glimmer into a greater role of the natural world in 
humanity: a process which is also about learning and teaching, ‘ako’ 
serves as a holistic and occasional revelation of the natural world and 
its primordial atmosphere, and is, hence, evident even where a 
mention of the word Being is absent. (Mika, 2011a, p. 3)  
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I build on the words ‘whakapapa’ and ‘ako’ in this context in chapter seven. My 
point here is that giving a brief definition of a word provides a collective 
understanding of what it is referring to but does not do full justice to an insight of 
its relationship with Being. Being will also be present even when it is not 
explicitly stated: It moves throughout the words and expressions in Māori 
existence when it is not uppermost in the minds of writers. Indeed, this mode of 
operating within Being may be one that accords Being its unknowability – in 
contrast with ‘equating’ it with another thing – and allows it to be best revealed 
(Kollias, 2000). 
 
Along with those writers cited, I assert that Being is by its nature inclined to 
movement. Whether or not this is a ‘hovering’, as we have seen Novalis posit, is 
uncertain. The ‘hovering’ of Being is important because it demonstrates that Being 
will neither land on the subject or the object (or the I/nature) because it underpins 
them both in an active sense. It does not, however, rest on one or the other 
specifically, because then it would be stationary. In his discussion about Being, 
Marsden (2003) states that Being takes on the characteristics of the positive while 
“not entirely emancipat[ing] itself from the negative” (p. 20). Raerino (1999) 
similarly notes that Māori believe that “everything has an oppositional 
counterpoint” (p. 32), evident in the concurrent nature of life and death, and 
darkness and light. These oppositions provide the extremes between which Being 
floats. This neither/nor working of Being is significant, identifying that the 
physical state of an object is not all there is to the object, as an animate thing might 
be physically dead, for instance, but hold life in an unseen sense (for example, a 
dead body still possessing some degree of mauri or, conversely, a living person 
labouring under a devitalised mauri). Māori consider themselves to be the 
embodiments of their ancestors, and this ensures that, as Raerino noted, that life 
and death are always present with each other. Underlying all phenomena and 
experiences, Being is such that those seemingly opposed elements are in fact a part 
of each other at all times. 
 
 
 
 132 
In “Overcoming Being in favour of knowledge” I explored other writers’ accounts 
of Being’s movement as follows: 
 
Marsden (2003) points to the paradox contained in the term ‘korekore’ 
as a doubling of the term ‘kore’. Kore means nothingness but in its 
doubling it ‘… assumes the characteristics of the positive’ (p. 20) due 
to its ‘… thorough-going negativity’ (ibid). It represents the ongoing 
manifestation of Being, and provides the living momentum for the 
universe and all things within it. In this activity it is complementary 
with mauri, or life force, which is needed to keep korekore ‘in being’. 
This uninterrupted flow between objects is echoed by Raerino (1999), 
who deliberately includes the human element when he observes that 
there is a sacredness to mātauranga that derived initially from ‘The 
energy flow … from the Atua to the Tangata’ (p. 5) ending eventually 
back with the Atua. He continues that with the concomitant entry of 
light to the world and the unfolding of human life, mātauranga Māori 
came into existence. A process of learning in its broadest sense could 
occur if there was an acknowledgement of the Being that underpins 
activities such as karakia and waiata.  
 
Being is also related to movement in Pohatu’s (n. d.) description, 
written within the context of well-being. He notes the working 
together of whakapapa and movement; referring to the transition 
outwards of mauri, he states that whakapapa links can then  ‘… ‘move 
out’ through the generations’ (p. 3), indicating that there is a whole set 
of influences beyond humanity’s control over ‘all worlds’. Royal 
(2009) explicitly points to a connection between movement and 
mātauranga, as mātauranga for him is also about ‘departure’ (p. 36), 
involving the human need to physically venture outwards.  In this 
sense, there is very little room for belief in static phenomena; and 
objects and the knowledge to be gleaned from them must avoid the 
tendency toward this paralysis. The process of naming and identifying 
links - relating to the world as a whole – was an active, interdependent 
one. The tenor of Pohatu & Pohatu’s (2007) writings is that this 
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activity continues, whether one is cognisant of it or not: it enables 
Māori to ‘… imagine, feel and appreciate the soul, pulses, and rhythm 
of our worlds’ (p. 17). Learning is analogous with, and even 
dependent on, the flux of nature: for instance ‘… the flight of the sun 
across the sky’ which is ‘… symbolic of the life journey of the 
individual’ (Royal, 2007, p. 55). (Mika, 2011a, p. 3)  
 
The activity of Being means that a thing in the world is always in a state of flux, 
even thought it appears to be constant. As both its backdrop and its essence are 
intimately connected, then both are always changing. Things in the world thus 
retain their Geheimnis because of that changing state that is provided by the 
Absolute.  
 
Being intuited in text and in silence 
Leading on from my first assertion about Being, I related the following: 
 
As Pohatu (n. d.) notes, lessons exist about the uncertainty of Being 
for humanity; thus, where Being is not mentioned – not contained 
within one term – it may retain more of its mystery. In certain Māori 
verse, then, the given, static translation offered will need to be 
overcome in favour of the verse’s Being-oriented context (Aranga, 
Mika & Mlcek, 2008). In Hauroa’s Lament for the Brave, recorded by 
Ngata (1974, p. 227), the translation provided may give some 
assistance in a fleeting understanding of the verse’s more primordial 
depth, but should be avoided as a final depiction of the verse’s point: 
 
Takoto rawa iho ki te po 
E huihui ana mai o tatou wairua 
Kia piri, kia tata mai ki taku taha. 
Matatu tonu ake, ka maranga  kei runga 
Whitirere ki te ao, tirotiro kau au; 
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A, me he wairua atua te tarehutanga iho 
E te manawa i raro kapakapa tu kei runga!  
 
For this discussion the first two lines are particularly relevant. The 
given translation of the first line is ‘Composing myself for sleep in the 
night’. However, there is no subject in this sentence, suggesting that 
the ‘self’, while implicit, is subsumed in a greater activity. This more 
fundamental movement is a lying down, but is towards the night, or 
into the night, which implies that the indefinite self is engaged with 
travelling through a state of uncertain being – which is another 
meaning of ‘te po’, besides the commonly given ‘night’. The 
movement towards this unknowable state of being is never arrived at, 
suggesting that the state of being can also not be grasped by, or 
encountered through, cognition alone. Movement in the direction 
towards the mysterious would be a particularly suitable setting for the 
activity of the second line, the given translation of which is ‘Kindred 
spirits gathered all around’. The structure of this line, with the use of 
the particles E … ana, suggests continuous change in all the past, 
present and future tenses, not merely in the past as the translation 
offers. Thus, Hauroa articulates a collapse of those parts of time, and 
implies that there is an ongoing, spiritual action set up even in the 
writing. 
 
Such renditions of verse might be evidence of literary licence on the 
part of the interpreter, but are, I argue, necessary for the Māori reader 
to both challenge the conventions of linguistic certainty, and also to 
encourage a process of what Novalis (1960a) called ‘romanticising’ 
(p. 545) – the lifting of the banal to the creative, allowing, at times, 
the revelation of what he termed the Absolute, and what Heidegger 
noted as Being. These sorts of descriptions and interpretations are not 
just abstract ideas that allow us to staircase to discussing something 
rational; instead, they reveal aspects of Being to humanity. The Māori 
language, as a metaphorical means of communication, clears the way 
for Being to emerge in ways that respect its primordiality. Its 
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metaphorical nature allows for gaps in understanding so that Being 
can appear from time to time. Silence is therefore highly valued 
amongst Māori, allowing more to divulge itself than what was 
possible solely through utterance. Being itself is affected by the 
interrelationship between the self and the natural world, with the result 
that speaking, art, silence, and contemplation produced a conduit for 
Being to hold sway. Although it is often stated that karakia and so on 
were highly important here (Beattie, 1990; Best, 2005/1924; Mead, 
2003; Moon, 2003; Robinson, 2005), I speculate that these were 
mechanisms merely for reminding humanity of the existence of Being: 
Being is beyond the control of humanity, and so may even emerge 
through an apparently ordinary thought or interaction. (Mika, 2011a, 
pp. 3-4)  
 
Things in the world disclose elements of their mystery because Being can be 
alluded to (but not precisely represented) in various modes of expression. 
Engaging in those expressions, humanity is likewise geheimnisvoll because its 
members are acting, intuiting and reflecting within those mysterious things in the 
world. 
Being, present in both solitary and combined words.  
Being is therefore present when not perceived by the Māori self. Like Novalis, 
Being unifies everything for the Māori self: The omnipresent nature of Being is 
illustrated in the holistic nature of terms such as ‘mauri’, ‘wairua’, ‘mana’, ‘te reo’, 
‘kaitiaki’ and so on that writers mention (Barlow, 1991; Browne, 2005; Durie, 
2001; Pere, 1982, 1997; Pihama, 2001). Not only the phenomena behind these 
terms but the terms themselves reflect the activity of Being; thus Browne (2005) 
highlights the link of Māori words to spirituality and their ongoing relationship 
with each other, not just as letters forming eventual words but as links to both 
concrete and abstract things. Many Māori stress the constant interplay between 
humanity and Being in both traditional and postcolonial ways, and many writers 
declare outright the fact that humanity and nature are closely linked (Marsden, 
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2003; Pere, 1982; Rapatini & Bradley-Vine, 2005; Royal, 2009b); others (Smith, 
Whatahoro, Matorohanga, & Pohuhu, 1913; Tikao & Beattie, 2004) describe the 
interrelationship of Being and human without naming it explicitly. Recounting the 
process of creation, Robinson (2005) notes of the Pohutukawa that “it covered her 
[Papatuanuku’s] whole body…. All things can be traced back to this one garden, 
be they plants, reptiles or human” (p. 35). As he implies, that ‘one garden’, as 
primordial as it is, is itself the subject of a vast process of creation, indicating that 
the engagement of Being with humanity is continuous as well. The traditional 
voice embodied humanity within nature through what Krupa (1996) calls 
“metaphor”; he observes that “[a]bout half of all lexical metaphors in Māori take 
their vehicles from the realm of nature and [the] majority of them come from the 
domain of fauna, flora or animal and plant anatomy” (p. 21). He provides an 
extensive list of metaphors; given their vast array of them we can assume that 
Māori have not simply decided to adopt them as linguistic tools but that they 
actually arose from the natural world and their effect on humanity. In current times 
Māori may also refer to the intervention of Being with humanity in broader terms. 
Thus Russell (2005) asserts that “[i]n terms of whakapapa though, they [rural New 
Zealanders] are not ‘of’ it [land] in the literal and cosmological sense that we 
conceive of ourselves to be; that is, as actually being the landscape” (p. 154). 
 
Despite the apparent precision of words, things in the world that they refer to 
contain their own autonomy. Given life by the Absolute, things in the world may 
be referred to by words but those words may not neatly prescribe them, as the 
utterer of those words, the nature of those words, and the things that they refer to 
are constantly geheimnisvoll through Being. 
 
Humanity as creative agency, within the domain of the 
Absolute 
We may think of Novalis’ term Romantisieren as describing a set of activities that 
transform the world in synchronicity with Being. At times this transformational 
process will involve contrasts - “Entw[eder] such ich nun die Unbekannten 
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Größen mit Functionen der Bekannten zu gleichen, oder umgek[ehrt] – Zur 
leztern RechnungsArt gehört der Infinitesimalcalcül” (1960b, p. 261)/“I now 
either seek to equate the unknown quantities with functions of the known, or the 
inverse quantities – Infinitesimal calculus belongs to the latter type of calculation” 
(own emphasis) (Wood, 2007, p. 18) - showing that Being stands behind the 
rational measurement and transformation of the universe, involving both known 
and unknown. Calculus here involves not staying with one but moving between 
two extremes for a constantly changing outcome. Here we encounter the ability of 
humanity to interact with Being. Novalis’ encouragement that humanity should 
understand Being as a consistently prior but mysterious force, also lending 
mystery to objects in the world, suggests that even in common activities Being 
provides humanity’s encounter with objects and the world in general. Thus, 
although Fichte had proposed that one should have an idea of what nature looks 
like from the standpoint of the Ich, Being (and the objects in the world that it 
reveals) is uncontrollable. Humanity may not decide how Being best fits: The 
objects in the world that Novalis believes are the manifestations of Being are 
organised by Being, not by humanity.  
 
Novalis discusses Being abstractly in his philosophical writings and in his poetry. 
When highlighting the mystical, dynamic role of the poet, he is careful to include 
the description of nature (which he sometimes uses interchangeably with Being or 
the Absolute) as containing a ruling “wildes, gewaltthätiges Leben” (Novalis, 
1960o, p. 524)/[wild, violent life]. This sort of direct expression about Being is 
then reflected in his poetic verse. We see this unrestrained vitality recurring in his 
fragment “Die Natur”. His “Die Natur” intends to reveal man’s constant pursuit of 
enjoyment in nature, evident in Hyazinth’s easy communication with nature. An 
obvious message of the tale is the synthesis of man and nature. Hyazinth is 
constantly talking to animals, birds and other natural phenomena. Interestingly he 
is ridiculed for this practice by other humans, presumably because they have 
forgotten their own ability to communicate with nature. His later exasperation with 
the gossipy spirit of some beings in nature early into the fairy tale suggests that his 
relationship with nature does not rely on an enjoyment of it, although later in the 
fairy tale there are times when he revels in its existence.  
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For the Māori self, not seeking to know everything about a natural phenomenon 
was considered paramount: discussions about ancestors, for example, would take 
place at some times and not at others, showing a tentativeness towards how deed 
and person would be talked about (despite at times the deed and person being 
recounted in some detail). The uncertainty of the effect of such a discussion – its 
uncontrollability – is evident here. This somewhat undetermined notion of Being 
contrasts with knowable, clear positionings of nature, or, in line with Heidegger’s 
(1977) ideas about Gestell, with anticipated constraints that are placed on nature so 
that it conforms with humanity’s expectations. 
 
It may be safely assumed that a drive to relate in a geheimnislose way with the 
world prefers knowledge to the existence of Being. In a discussion about memory, 
Royal (2005) alludes to both Being and knowledge, and argues that “knowledge is 
within the body” (p. 16). Memory relies on sensation which is oriented by the 
body rather than the simply cognitive knowing that is brought about by “images 
presented by text and screen” (p. 16). The bodily experience of Being is one that 
does not privilege the uptake of factual information but instead allows that the 
body may feel instances of awareness – which may indeed be brought on by facts, 
but may also be induced by quite unpredictable interactions with elements outside 
of the person. Being therefore organises the interplay of quite disparate elements 
so that they invoke responses in the human body. A greater emphasis is placed 
here on the mystery or uncertainty of elements outside of the control of humanity 
(even though humanity may respond to the arrangement of these elements in 
rational or emotional ways). According to Awatere (2008) it is whakapapa that 
provides that “interrelationship” (p. 5). He continues by exploring the converse 
situation, in which naturally interrelated aspects of the world are posited as being 
isolatable: 
 
The ability of CV [contingent valuation] to package one aspect of the 
indigenous perspective and present it as representative of all things 
indigenous is both appealing and appalling. In effect it has 
decontextualised the indigenous perspective, rendering it malleable 
and conducive to the ‘mainstream’ agenda. CV can be seen as having 
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the power to condense Māori ontology to a single ‘magical’ number. 
(p. 14)  
 
Awatere is not just bringing to the indigenous reader’s attention the undesirability 
of capitalism in its broadest sense; he is more forcefully indicating that the prior 
act that allows a particular action to occur (in this case ‘CV’) is manifestly 
undesirable.  
 
Humanity is constituted and moved by Being and other things in the world. 
Despite apparently being the sole driver of action in relation to things in the world, 
because humanity is impacted on by expressions of things in the world, things in 
the world in their ever-changing essence, and the backdrop to those things, the Ich 
is itself never certain. Humanity is hence geheimnisvoll because of the infinite 
combinations of all these aspects. 
 
Language as a potential unifier of Being and beings 
Importantly for my thesis, there is a link between language, Being and things in 
the world that suggests an ongoing relationship between all three. For instance, 
the word ‘tangata’ in Tau’s cited chant refers to the human person. This word 
intends to refer not just to the physical dimensions of the person, however, but 
also the spiritual and mental dimensions (Durie, 1994; Pere, 1997). ‘Tangata’ 
carries with it the history of everything that has occurred both to that person and 
to the people and other beings that precede and follow that ‘tangata’. ‘Tangata’ 
therefore reveals the natural world around the person as much as the notion of 
‘person’. Alongside its disclosure of things in the world, it has the capacity of 
driving together all apparently disparate elements that the self is both aware and 
unaware of. The word acknowledges that holistic relationship of all things and is 
not just limited to the sound of the word and its immediate reference to the 
phenomenon thought of as a person. At all times the word calls forth the various 
aspects of the person’s character, related to that person’s relationship with 
everything. Hence the word may stay phonetically the same and is to that extent 
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‘reliable’, but it opens up onto a person or people that are continuously impacted 
on by history, other present things in the world, and events and things that are yet 
to occur. 
 
The enduring, permanent nature of an object is only so because of humanity’s 
construction of it. If we take Novalis’ notion of Being, as developed above in a 
Māori context, to its fullest extent, in fact the thing is not permanent. The object 
may have been constructed as a discursive, understood one and may then appear 
static, but the unseen nature of Being means that anything could be happening 
with the object beyond our perception. Even words that signify things in the world 
would have to be considered infused with life, if we take those words of 
Marsden’s and Raerino’s seriously, because of their relationship with the thing 
that they signify, with the relationship of one word to another, and the relationship 
of the thing being signified by that word to all other things. This view of language 
eludes the idea that a word is just an envelope of denotative meaning. While 
Being does not force together an object and a word referring to it so that they are 
inseparably one, it definitely has the potential to strike an ontological relationship 
between the two that is of greater strength than Saussure would agree with. 
Ferdinand de Saussure was the main linguistic champion of structuralism. His 
work, titled Course in General Linguistics, would soon be heralded as a major 
revolution in linguistic theory, and is worthy of mention here. Briefly, Saussure’s 
language is concerned with the ways in which language functions at a precise 
moment by considering “how the elements fit together” (Johnston, 2006, p. 187). 
The relationship between a ‘sound-image’ (signifier), which is essentially 
psychological and not an audible sound, and the concept (signified), is arbitrary. 
Saussure’s theories on language neglect the deeper connections that Being can 
make through a word with the rest of the world apart from the thing being referred 
to. 
 
Language that is cognisant of Being is everyday language as much as ceremonial 
language, because it connects so strongly with the material and metaphysical 
surroundings of the user. Being is nowadays viewed as a sacred event but its 
effects and activities have as much of an impact on everyday contexts as 
determinedly mystical ones. Even when using a language that is not one’s own, 
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Being still comes to play on the speaker. Language carries the often-imperceptible 
history and surroundings of the speaker and the listener. Because of this 
imperceptible quality to language, both the wielder of it, and language itself, are 
geheimnisvoll.  
Summary  
Novalis’ own beliefs about mystery through his deliberations about Being, 
alongside those of Tau, and of the express articulations of other Māori writers, 
were productive for my own assertions in respect of a Māori view of mystery 
through Being. My assertions come about through my awareness of a dialectical 
situation. In this dialectic I drew on a number of interacting elements. Firstly I 
discussed Novalis’ reaction to Fichte’s proposal that the self is the ground of all 
consciousness. Here Novalis was grateful to Fichte for both bringing into debate 
the issue of self-hood and for highlighting that the self’s experiences are important 
in philosophising. I then took Novalis’ own dialectic response – his assertions 
about Being – and Fichte’s endorsement of a self-conscious approach to 
explorations about mystery and the self, and applied them to my own cultural 
context. The productivity of drawing on Novalis’ ideas about mystery allowed me 
to posit my own considered theories about contextually positioned (that is, 
colonised and current) mystery. Invaluable here were Tau’s writings that I coupled 
with Novalis’ poetry, fragments and fairy tales, my own experiences, and Māori 
writings. 
 
Having considered what both Geheimnis is, as an outcome of Being, I shall now 
turn to a discussion of the historical, political and social factors that have 
encouraged the Māori self to think of objects in the world as being free of 
Geheimnis. We shall see in this second part of my thesis that there were a number 
of mechanisms that oriented the focus of the self toward the direction of 
Geheimnislosigkeit. 
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Chapter Four: Poesy as Stoßsatz: “Wenn 
nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren”. A critique of 
Geheimnislosigkeit 
Thus far I have discussed Geheimnis and its origin from Being. I also hinted at a 
certain aspect of Geheimnislosigkeit, namely its Ich-focus. There are many forms 
of Geheimnislosigkeit, and the purpose of this chapter is to identify some of these, 
as Novalis recognises them, to bring my attention to philosophical 
Geheimnislosigkeit for the Māori self. This chapter provides the impetus for a 
discussion in the following two chapters, with those two chapters drawing on a 
Māori application of Novalis’ themes as Stoßsätze in his poem “Wenn nicht mehr 
Zahlen und Figuren” (“Wenn nicht mehr”) from Heinrich von Ofterdingen. In the 
poem Novalis identifies that there are abstract, fundamental and philosophical 
manifestations to Geheimnislosigkeit as well as everyday ones. Here, also, I build 
on the former chapters by considering the self, at an everyday level, as a 
geheimnislose entity that then thinks of things in the world as similarly 
geheimnislos. In chapter three I argued that Māori traditionally experienced Being 
as prior to self and objects, and as organising the relationships between them, with 
the self’s perception occurring after that activity. Being for the Māori self was 
perhaps explainable in stages but this does not represent the true process of Being: 
Being is instead felt and thought of as overflowing, non-schematic and even non-
sequential. Novalis assisted in my approach to that theme by alerting me to the 
fact that we may talk about Being but that, at the moment we try to confine it, it 
will evade us. We may say that Being is this or that, and this may help our 
representation of it, but to think that such an assertion neatly defines Being is a 
flawed exercise.  
 
Resistance to, or unawareness of, Being in everyday human activities is therefore 
the focus of this chapter. I argued in the preceding chapter that establishing the 
conscious self as ground for all philosophical perception of the world leads to 
Geheimnislosigkeit. One consequence of this is the wrongful belief that Being 
does not impinge on the activities of humanity – namely, that humanity is entirely 
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autonomous – but that instead, if it is to be discussed it all, then it should be kept 
as a rarefied, abstract concept. I argued in the previous chapter that Being does not 
just stop at a particular point of creation: It spills forth into everyday terms and 
activities. Geheimnis, an outcome of that encroachment, should be similarly 
viewed as continuously present in things in the world. 
 
Through Novalis’ poem “Wenn nicht mehr”, the current provides specific 
Stoßsätze as well as one meta-push to discuss colonisation for Māori. This 
response of mine to those Stoßsätze occurs in chapters five and six. Thus in a 
general sense “Wenn nicht mehr” brings to our attention that a change in 
worldview is likely to occur through the import of other notioins of philosophy. In 
this chapter, the message of this overarching Stoßsatz is that very problem, and we 
could decide to solely devote ourselves to the philosophical colonisation of a 
Geheimnis-oriented view of the world just on that grand point. However, there are 
many subtler, but equally as important, manifestations of this imposing meta-
colonisation that “Wenn nicht mehr” identifies and which illuminate aspects of 
philosophical colonisation. These specific Stoßsätze really describe both the 
detailed ways in which Geheimnislosigkeit emerges, and the ways of 
Geheimnislosigkeit that the self as grounding principle allows. This chapter 
therefore continues Novalis’ project of critique. 
 
The substantive importance of “Wenn nicht mehr” 
There are numerous works in which Novalis explains his resistance to 
Geheimnislosigkeit: however, “Wenn nicht mehr” articulates and structures his 
concerns most concisely. His concerns in “Wenn nicht mehr” are many. They 
cover capitalist human behaviour; the scientific representation of knowledge 
production which excludes the mysterious; problems associated with thinking 
about Geheimnis and its creator, Being, in merely cognitive ways; and the nice, 
neat conceptions of things in the world that actually constrain its mystery. One 
may broadly state, as Walker (1993) does, that Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” 
“begins with rejection of unitary and reductionist vision” (p. 45), and I argue that 
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the vision is directed to a very general spectrum of things in the world, including 
those I have just listed. “Wenn nicht mehr” is an appropriate text of Novalis’ to 
refer to because it achieves two outcomes: It castigates the rationalist excesses of 
the Enlightenment but at exactly the same time it highlights Novalis’s preference 
for creative “chaos inherent in natural systems” (Walker, 1993, p. 47). Kellner 
(1977) also points to the overall lament of the poem, in which “quantitative 
knowledge was rejected, the reduction of the world to matter in motion deplored, 
the notion that the world can be plotted onto a table of laws discredited” (p. 218). 
For Kellner, the poem describes a widespread phenomenon of Geheimnislosigkeit 
that then manifests at the most basic level of human activity. 
 
Constituting a group subjected to the influence of Western philosophy through 
European colonisation (with greater influence coming from British quarters), 
Māori might also be interested in the influential figures of Descartes (whom I 
mentioned in chapter three), Locke, Hume and Bacon, with “Wenn nicht mehr” as 
a backdrop. Descartes is charged with being the father of modern philosophy 
(Johnston, 2006) and lived at the onset of the Scientific Revolution. The Scientific 
Revolution would act to repudiate the notion that materiality was possessed of a 
spiritual force (Pepper, 1984) and Descartes’ famous ‘cogito, ergo sum’ maxim 
would accordingly reify the pure thinking human and would allow the affirmation 
of God’s existence through reason (Tarnas, 1991). Bacon, his British 
contemporary, devised experiments and drew conclusions from them so that one 
could reason inductively.  Locke would agree with Descartes that God’s existence 
was provable but now through “concrete experience” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 309), and 
Hume would bring “[s]ensory experience, not ideal apprehension, [to the] standard 
of truth” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 340) in a more extreme way than Locke. In the case of 
the rationalist Descartes, the self was certain, and for the empiricists Locke and 
Hume helped make what one perceives of total significance (Johnston, 2006).  
 
I argued in chapter three that Fichte was Novalis’ main cause of consternation – 
Fichte “was, in his own way, an eighteenth-century rationalist” (La Vopa, 2001, p. 
61) – but ideologically Novalis’ concern with Fichte is equally translatable to 
Descartes, Locke and Hume. Novalis’ resistance to the centrally focused entity of 
the self might conjoin with his reply to empiricism, although such a response may 
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be more moderate: After all, he did insist in his “Teplitzer Fragmente”, which form 
part of the Vorarbeiten zu verschiedenen Fragmentsammlungen, that forms of 
empiricism could eventually lead to Magical Idealism through a creative 
combination of disciplines. Beiser (2002) argues that Novalis advocates placing 
aesthetic emphasis on Fichte’s and Kant’s systematic philosophies; thus, the labels 
of rationalism, empiricism and idealism are not so inimical to Novalis if they are 
used actively against each other. Yet it must be remembered that Novalis’ own 
mystical leanings preclude a pure solipsist approach to things in the world, as he 
had huge respect for the impact of things in the world on the self even when those 
things were not perceptible. 
 
Novalis may be said to share commonalities with William Blake. Blake’s diverse 
messages are contained in the labels assigned to him, with even his very identity 
forming the beginning of Nathan’s (1975) introduction: 
 
What is Blake? As a lyric poet he is concerned with philosophy; as a 
philosopher he is concerned with the problems of daily living; as a 
realist who lives in the present, he is concerned with eternity. As an 
extreme radical, he is against the use of force. (p. 11) 
 
Novalis can be described as equally multi-faceted, and his “Wenn nicht mehr” 
addresses in quite some depth the sheer latitude of the content he wished to 
critique and cover. Novalis’ own identity matches that of Blake’s in extensiveness, 
and its breadth coincides within the verses of “Wenn nicht mehr”: He is cautiously 
anti-Enlightenment, but more precisely anti-reductionist; he is critical of the 
uptake of colonised behaviour and is hence a radical himself; he is concerned with 
acknowledging Being in the present, even though he, too, is “concerned with 
eternity”. “Wenn nicht mehr” exhorts the reader to see radicalism, identity, Being 
and present-day living as intimately connected, and to resist the 
compartmentalisation, and perhaps eventual dismissal, of each of these individual, 
important elements. Novalis’ staunchness in this regard refers to both the identity 
of the person and to things in the world, reflecting Schleiermacher’s (1969) similar 
wish that all things in the world be viewed as connected, with the centrality of the 
things’ integrity as all-important: 
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[I]m Universum kann [das Ding] nur etwas sein durch die Totalität 
seiner Wirkungen und Verbindungen; auf diese kommt alles an, und 
um ihrer innezuwerden, muß man eine Sache nicht von einem Punkt 
außer ihr, sondern von ihrem eigenen Mittelpunkt aus ... betrachtet 
haben, das heißt ... in ihrem eigenen Wesen. (p. 102) 
 
[I]n the universe [the thing] can only be something through the totality 
of its activities and connections; everything depends on this, and in 
order to be conscious of it, one must not regard it from a point outside 
of itself, but instead from its own middle point … this means, then, in 
its own essence.] 
 
“Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” – 
manifestations of Geheimnislosigkeit 
The melded character of humanity and Being is evident in the way nature, the 
signs of the Absolute (Stone, 2008), helps and hinders humanity. This holistic 
involvement is noted by Novalis (1960l) in the following way: “Ich weis nicht 
warum man immer von einer abgesonderten Menschheit spricht. Gehören Thiere, 
Pflanzen und Steine, Gestirne und Lüfte nicht auch zur Menschheit” (p. 490)/[I do 
not know why humanity is always spoken of as something apart. Is it not true that 
animals, plants, stones, stars and winds also constitute humanity?] In his “Wenn 
nicht mehr” humanity may only escape its current modernist state when the 
elements of the Absolute – he cites ‘light and shade’ – are both allowed to come 
forth. The initial malaise which he sees restricting man is never fully dispensed 
with: In his poem “Es färbte sich die Wiese grün” he charges that the process of 
movement towards a god-like state for man is marked by stages which remain 
within his or her spirit (Schrock, 2006). Thus mankind’s apparent progress is at all 
times informed by nature; indeed, mankind is nature, is immersed within and part 
of nature, but may only rationalise precisely because of the fact that Being 
organises its manifestations, the movement of which results in perception. 
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Novalis’ (1960h) “Wenn nicht mehr”, from the posthumously published notes for 
the second part of his novel, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, can be read as a warning 
against Geheimnislosigkeit, with the retention of some human agency allowed as 
well. It reads as follows: 
 
Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren 
Sind Schlüssel aller Kreaturen, 
Wenn die, so singen, oder küssen 
Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen 
Wenn sich die Welt in’s freie Leben, 
Und in die Welt wird zurück begeben, 
Wenn dann sich wieder Licht und Schatten 
Zu echter Klarheit werden gatten, 
Und man in Märchen und Gedichten 
Erkennt die ewgen Weltgeschichten, 
Dann fliegt vor Einem geheimen Wort 
Das ganze verkehrte Wesen sofort. (p. 360)  
 
When numbered technicality 
has ceased to be the single key 
to every life’s identity 
and those who kiss or dance or sing 
their deeper truer knowledge bring, 
restoring this world’s liberty, 
setting all living beings free 
in all their primal clarity, 
the real world in which we live 
poets and story tellers give, 
where one potent single word 
scatters all nonsense we have heard37. (Dane, 2011 n. p.)  
                                                
37 Wordsworth (2007) wrote in a similar fashion, at times introducing the dehumanising 
effects of a mechanistic philosophy, in which he also laments the self-assuredness of 
science. In this he is typical of the English Romantic movement generally:  
 
When, hereto, I placed before your sight 
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Let us now turn to an analysis of the separate couplets of his poem. 
 
Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren/Sind Schlüssel 
aller Kreaturen 
The first couplet, “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren/Sind Schlüssel aller 
Kreaturen”, encapsulates Novalis’ resistance to the common belief that one can 
have immediate access to Being and its manifestations, such as nature, at will. 
Zahlen and Figuren for Novalis are a means of interpreting the world but are not to 
be used in wrongful assumption and practice that nature is separate from humanity. 
Novalis iterates Being’s inherent intervention in all human affairs when he notes 
of humanity’s relationship with truth that “[m]an muß ... überall repraesentiren 
(im thätigen, producirenden Sinn) können” (1960b, p. 445)/“[w]e must everywhere 
… be capable of representing (in the active, productive sense)”  (Wood, 2007, p. 
164). Humanity is indeed capable of utilising Zahlen and Figuren but not in a way 
that demonstrates a static, repetitive view of things, or in a way that operates 
against the manifestations of Being. 
 
In an additional fragment quite near to the aforementioned one, Novalis laments 
that humanity has tended to prefer “[e]ine Idee” (1960b, p. 446)/[o]ne idea over 
another, which has “die andern erstickt”/[stifled the others]. He promotes 
collecting those ideas together “[i]m geistigen Nat[ur] System” (1960b, p. 446)/“in 
the system of spiritual Nature” (Wood, 2007, p. 165) instead of using them to 
isolate and prefer certain ones. This is not to suggest that humanity should lack 
                                                                                                                                 
a most familiar object of our days,  
A Little-one, subjected to the Arts 
Of modern ingenuity, and made 
The senseless member of a vast machine, 
Serving as doth a spindle or a wheel. (p. 279) 
 
He remarked on the tendency of science to destroy life through its method, and his words 
reflect those of Novalis. Under science, according to Novalis, “starb die freundliche 
Natur, und ließ nur tote, zuckende Reste zurück” (1960e, p. 84)/“friendly nature died, 
leaving only dead, quivering remnants” (2005, p. 27). Novalis was not precisely averse to 
science but to science as a total explanation of things in the world so that the world is 
rendered static.  
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discernment but, as he continues in that same fragment, that those preferred ideas 
should be set down in their “eigenth[ümliche] Nachbar[schaft]”/[specific 
neighbourhood[s]] so that they continue to grow in community with their 
surroundings. Of course here the interplay between a preferred idea and its 
neighbourhood(s) leaves us with no certain outcome because any outcome is 
poentially at the whim of the relationship between them all. Methods that are 
thought of as belonging to one group instead belong to “[d][as] 
ConfusionsSystem”/[the system of confusion]; one’s Zahlen or Figuren appear to 
provide assurance but instead fall into a system that mimics the unknowability of 
Being. 
 
In his translation of the poem, Peter Dane equates ‘creatures’ with ‘life’s identity’. 
One’s identity, then, should thrive in its own right. More personal than ‘creatures’, 
one must be on guard against the seduction of numbered technicality. Here we 
start to get a glimpse of Novalis’ veiled reference to the problem of hegemony, 
evident in the use of the double genitive in the phrase Schlüssel aller Kreaturen. 
This usage suggests that the key is to all creatures but it also implies that the key is 
of all creatures, in the sense of belonging to them.  Is Novalis here hinting that 
through the colonisation of numbers and figures, through its hegemonic play, the 
key he refers to is gradually endorsed by that which originates from the creator of 
that key? If so, then the condition that Freire (1970) refers to, the adoption of tools 
of colonisation by the colonised, becomes pertinent: 
 
Submerged in reality, the oppressed cannot perceive clearly the 
‘order’ which serves the interests of the oppressors whose image they 
have internalised.  Chafing under the restrictions of this order, they 
often manifest a type of horizontal violence, striking out at their 
comrades for the pettiest reasons ... the oppressed feel an irresistible 
attraction toward the oppressors and their way of life.  Sharing this 
way of life becomes an overpowering aspiration.  In their alienation, 
the oppressed want at any cost to resemble the oppressors, to imitate 
them, to follow them. (p. 44)  
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Freire’s warning against the uptake of colonised behaviours is hence a poetic 
device of Novalis’, yet it is more than just a stylistic intervention. Figures and 
keys to and of all creatures means a general caution to those impacted on by the 
excesses of the Enlightenment. But we should not forget that Novalis was himself 
a mathematician. As Fritz (2009) indicates in relation to this, Novalis actually 
cherishes mathematics - more than his Enlightenment contemporaries, in fact - but 
nevertheless wishes that both mathematics, and a mathematical representation of 
things in the world, were not used for mastery in the way they are. His hidden text 
in these verses implies that it is when the uptake of this mastery tool is complete 
(or perhaps even just a threat) that the colonised is endangered. 
 
Novalis suggests that the purity of creation itself is overtaken by the grand truth of 
science and enters into a co-creation of numbers and figures. The preference for 
this view of nature comes forth in the idea that one may communicate a sense of 
logical equivalence. More intriguing in this specific context is: 
 
[T]he etymological relationship between the noun Zahlen (numbers) 
and the verb erzählen (to tell a highly concentrated story), suggesting 
that the process of telling such a story is imbued with numbers by its 
very nature. This form of ‘erzählen’ embodies Novalis’ unease with 
the almost contractual nature of telling a linear story – that ‘this’ is 
built logically on ‘that’ – resulting in a tightly controlled version of 
language. With such a version of language, the story itself is 
constrained so that it lacks spontaneity. In short, although a highly 
valuable tool for modern man, quantifying language is not poetic. 
(Mika, 2011b, p. 93)  
 
This becomes problematic for Novalis when a value of either ‘worthy’ or 
‘unworthy’ is assigned to speech as a final measure. Again, we see a mathematical 
preference for this method, in which conversation is valued solely according to 
whether there are logical responses between the talkers. Knowing Novalis’ 
simultaneous love and wariness of numbers, we can glimpse a tolerance towards 
this attitude, as long as it does not do away with other, less rational and abstract 
conversation. The quantification of the ‘good’ of a story, especially on its rational 
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merits, is almost a financial exercise, and if we allow this etymological 
interpretation of Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” then a loss of mystery becomes 
evident to the life of a story in favour of an accounted-for balance. This almost 
contractual notion of speech – this built directly and linearly on that – predicates a 
belief in the control of language so that its adherence to the rules of rational 
speech is its paramount role.  
 
In Die Christenheit oder Europa, Novalis avows that spontaneous speech as well 
as sounds of the universe have been restricted by the “modernen Denkungsart” 
(Novalis, 1960d, p. 515)/[modern way of thinking]: “der Religions-Haß ... machte 
die unendliche schöpferische Musik des Weltalls zum einförmigen Klappern einer 
ungeheuren Mühle, die vom Strom des Zufalls getrieben ... sey”/[the hatred of 
religion … has turned the unending, creative music of the cosmos into the 
standardised clatter of a monstrous mill, driven by the stream of coincidence]. 
Sound typified by communication that is founded on cognition, the solipsism of 
the self, and the over-critiquing of the mysterious, all figure here as part of 
Novalis’ critique. Again characteristic of the early industrial form of the 
Enlightenment, particularly La Mettrie’s philosophical materialism, which 
dominates not only the everyday way of thinking but also the ways in which 
things in the world are organised, Novalis’ Die Christenheit oder Europa in 
particular considers the historical and social consequences of thinking things in 
the world lack mystery and their own spontaneous sound and mode of 
communication. 
 
Kreaturen include manifestations of nature, and Zahlen and Figuren may hence 
provide access to things in nature as well as nature as a whole. Nature may 
become banalised through concise descriptions of it: Nature in this sense is neatly 
packaged and ready to be objectified. Talking about nature as a ‘thing’, rather 
than an autonomously but connected activity and entity, is one way in which this 
occurs. Die Lehrlinge zu Sais shows in poetic form the uncertainty of the three 
Lehrlinge in respect of the place of man in nature, and thus reflects the 
ambivalence with which one even should discuss nature, leading Novalis (1960e) 
to state that: 
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Man kann nicht sagen, daß es eine Natur gebe, ohne etwas 
Überschwengliches zu sagen, und alles Bestreben nach Wahrheit in 
den Reden und Gesprächen von der Natur entfernt nur immer mehr 
von der Natürlichkeit. (p. 85)  
 
[One may not say that there is a nature without being gushy, and all 
pursuits of truth in talk and discourse about nature increasingly 
distance one from the natural.] 
 
More forgiving than Novalis, Schiller noted that the poet had begun to speak of 
nature since the time of the ancients had passed. Where the ancients “empfanden 
natürlich” (1840b, p. 1195)/[felt things naturally], members of humanity since 
those times instead “empfinden das Natürliche” (p. 1195)/[feel the natural], with 
nature appearing as a discussed phenomenon. Yet despite this lenient attitude, 
Schiller rejected absolute depictions of nature as much as Novalis did. The 
domain of reflecting on nature in determinate ways is that of the Enlightenment 
philosophers, who have “schließen und folgern gelernt, wie ein Schuster das 
Schuhmachen” (Novalis, 1960m, p. 431)/[learned to infer and bring to logical 
conclusion like a shoemaker has learned to make shoes].  
 
Marsden (2003) supports Novalis’ thesis that this tendency to discuss nature 
predominantly as a tangible event has meant that “[m]odern western man has 
fallen into the trap of regarding values as tangible goods” (p. 118). Speaking of 
the way in which Māori view nature, Raerino (1999) offers that Māori did not talk 
of ‘nature’ on the basis that it was not separate, and that this led “a great chief [to] 
speak of himself as the mountain or the river; these cannot be objectified or 
externalised. They are not ‘out there’; but ‘in here’” (p. 73). The dialogue that is 
occurring here between Novalis and some Māori commentators takes on deeper 
significance when, as the Lehrling identifies, the idea that ‘nature’ is a static 
concept is antithetic to the: 
 
Mannigfache[n] Wege[n] [der Menschen]. Wer sie verfolgt und 
vergleicht, wird wunderliche Figuren entstehen sehn; Figuren, die zu 
jener großen Chiffernschrift zu gehören scheinen, die man überall, auf 
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Flügeln, Eierschalen, in Wolken, im Schnee, in Kristallen und in 
Steinbildungen, auf gefrierenden Wassern, im Innern und Äußern der 
Gebirge, der Pflanzen, der Tiere, der Menschen, in den Lichtern des 
Himmels, auf berührten und gestrichenen Scheiben von Pech und 
Glas, in den Feilspänen um den Magnet her, und sonderbaren 
Konjunkturen des Zufalls erblickt. (Novalis, 1960e, p. 79)  
 
Various … roads of man. He who follows and compares them will see 
strange figures emerge, figures which seem to belong to that great 
cipher which we discern written everywhere, in wings, eggshells, 
clouds and snow, in crystals and in stone formations, on ice-covered 
waters, on the inside and outside of mountains, of plants, beasts and 
men, in the lights of heaven, on scored disks of pitch or glass or in 
iron filings round a magnet, and in strange conjunctures of chance. 
(Novalis, 2005, p. 3) 
 
That ‘nature’ becomes fixed by a static description of it is something that Novalis 
resists. A number of senses are brought to bear in knowing, where one “ahndet … 
den Schlüssel dieser Wunderschrift, die Sprachlehre derselben; allein die 
Ahndung will sich selbst in keine feste Formen fügen, und scheint kein höherer 
Schlüssel werden zu wollen” (1960e, p. 79)/“suspect[s] [in the various roads of 
man] a key to the magic writing, even a grammar, but our surmise takes on no 
definite forms and seems unwilling to become a higher key” (2005, p. 3). The 
Sprachlehre that Novalis refers to is a grammar but not the academic, linguistic 
sort that is commonly conceived of. Instead it belongs to the great 
“Chiffernschrift”/[cipher script] which is nature as language. The Sprachlehre is 
the formation of nature into a structure (O'Brien, 1995) that may not be 
understood determinately. Novalis suggests that we struggle instinctively to form 
a definitive concept of this grammar but our efforts often end in disappointment, 
which is a form of homesickness that philosophy poses as one of the greatest 
challenges to modern thought. Further, O’Brien notes that “[t]he language of 
nature resists comprehension because all approaches to it are already mediated by 
language” (p. 199). The double property of language – as discusser of nature and 
as nature itself – means that in talking about nature we are never able to grasp its 
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full grammar. As an outcome of “[e]in[em] Alkahest[, das] scheint[,] über die 
Sinne der Menschen ausgegossen zu sein” (Novalis, 1960e, p. 79)/“[a]n alkahest 
… hav[ing] been poured over the senses of men” (Novalis, 2005, p. 3) all talk is 
about nature in one form or other. Our senses are constantly deceived by the 
language of nature as nature, with the ‘Formen’ constantly playing and changing 
before our senses. Language is never just about language as a distinct, rarefied 
phenomenon – it is also nature. 
 
One may see a circuitous reasoning here that is also reflected in the journey of 
Hyazinth, the protagonist of the tale of Hyazinth and Rosenblüte, as he seeks Saïs 
but finds her instead where he began: in Rosenblüte. This realisation requires 
moving through nature as a talking, sentient phenomenon, in which Novalis talks 
about nature as if nature were talking itself. Nature has to have its say before self-
realisation occurs. Language as a tool which is directed towards a thing is 
therefore not a genuine medium through which one may either talk about nature 
or allow nature to talk: Indeed it will ‘fix’ nature (or allow humanity to proceed as 
if they had fixed nature). Nature in this latter view is left discovered and reified, 
as if it will express itself in a predictable manner. However, nature for Novalis is 
partly unpredictable, just as its language is; in synch with nature’s volatility, 
Novalis attributes wildness to it, such that it is completely indomitable and 
remains “sheer otherness” (Kuzniar, 2003, p. 435). “Die Natur” in particular 
expresses the capriciousness of nature, with its friendliness on the one hand but 
hostile character on the other. Its inhabitants are amiable but are also capable of 
mocking. 
 
Nature’s relationality with humanity, the interdependence of things in the world, 
and the need for proper ways to describe these connections, all come forward in 
Die Lehrlinge zu Sais in which Novalis asks a series of questions about the 
inseparability of humanity and manifestations of nature: 
 
Drückt nicht die ganze Natur so gut, wie das Gesicht, und die 
Gebärden, der Puls und die Farben, den Zustand eines jeden der 
höheren, wunderbaren Wesen aus, die wir Menschen nennen? Wird 
nicht der Fels ein eigentümliches Du, eben wenn ich ihn anrede? Und 
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was bin ich anders als der Strom, wenn ich wehmütig in seine Wellen 
hinabschaue, und die Gedanken in seinem Gleiten verliere? (1960e, p. 
100)  
 
Is it not true that all nature, as well as face and gesture, colour and 
pulse, expresses the emotion of each one of the wonderful higher 
beings we call men? Does the cliff not become a unique Thou, 
whenever I speak to it? And what am I but the stream, when I look 
sadly down into its waters and lose my thoughts in its flow? (2005, p. 
89) 
 
Here Novalis is avoiding the typical ‘othering’ of nature that can occur through 
scientific discourse, and even uses language that refers to things in the world as if 
they are related. This venture into the use of poetic language alone signals that 
there is a different relationship between language and object than is assumed by 
Zahlen and Figuren. 
 
Wenn die, so singen oder küssen/Mehr als die 
Tiefgelehrten wissen 
The second couplet, “Wenn die, so singen oder küssen/Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten 
wissen”, refers to the Romantics’ belief in love as the creative principle and to the 
need for poetry to bring this fundamental principle into being and to the awareness 
of the audience. Those who love, those who sing, are able to know more than the 
deeply learned. Interestingly, as a poet Novalis does not call them ‘singers’ or 
‘lovers’, resisting assigning a label to them and instead stressing the process of 
song and love by using a verb (and preserving for them some sort of agency). In 
this focus he challenges the view that ‘singing’ and ‘loving’ belong to a select 
group of people and instead makes it universal and accessible for all. 
‘Tiefgelehrten’ is used in an ironical way, depicting those who have valued 
rationalism and empiricism over other relationships with the world and resonating 
paradoxically throughout Novalis’ works. It can be said to stand in for the 
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phenomenon of the Cartesian ‘living, moving brain’ and the denial of sensations 
which might “misunderstand and misconstrue the order of nature” (Descartes, 
1964, p. 137).  
 
The “mind-world correspondence” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 342) that Descartes 
advocated indeed stands in direct contrast to Novalis’ idea of love that Novalis 
wishes to highlight in these verses. Although the love that Novalis speaks of in 
others of his works – such as Hymnen an die Nacht – does contain aspects of 
sentimentality, instead it is much bigger, encompassing also how one connects 
with others, with things in the world, and with the issue of whether one is 
cognisant of Being in this regard. In Die Lehrlinge zu Sais the master 
demonstrates love for both things in the world and for the students by encouraging 
the students to see the relationship between those things as well as treating the 
students with sincerity. The students’ progress from a scientific view to a holistic 
one matches Novalis’ own experience, which characterises scientific training at a 
higher, more poetic level, and although the students’ specific experiences with the 
stones as separate entities are not invalid, it is in the stones’ relationships with 
each other whilst retaining some individual character that love as a philosophical 
attitude is nurtured.  
 
Novalis’ singen und küssen transcends the intellectual workings of the 
Tiefgelehrten and may be brought into dialogue with the Māori term ‘aroha’/love. 
Singen und küssen signify “a spiritual aspect of one’s life that was at the base of 
one’s whole reason for being, where one acknowledges the presence (aro) of the 
breath of life within others (haa) and nurtures and cares for them, both 
individually and as a group” (Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector, 
2007, p. 22). Moreover, the ‘ha’ (or ‘haa, as it is expressed in that quote), is 
involved as a regard for the emotions of the other; hence, one “looks or ‘breathes’ 
into another” (White & Mika, forthcoming, n.p.). ‘Ha’ in this regard is similar to 
the idea of love that the Romantics propose is born of Being and that characterises 
a sensual relationship with the world such that Being is the underlying force. 
Empathy with the world as a whole is not calculated in advance but is 
spontaneous and, to a large extent, unpredictable. The ‘deeply learned’, on the 
other hand, explain things in the world in their quantitative terms – what 
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Heidegger (2003) termed the “Dingheit des Dinges” (p. 57)/[thingness of things] 
– and are the products and exponents of “der Bereinzelung und getrennten 
Wirksamkeit unserer Geisteskräfte, die der erweiterte Kreis des Wissens und die 
Absonderung der Berufsgeschäfte nothwendig macht” (Schiller, 1840b, p. 
1231)/[the segregation and disunified activity of our mental powers, which the 
increased extent of knowledge and the specialisation of the professions make 
necessary]. For Novalis, however, their primary concern should be the “[i]nnigste 
Gemeinschaft aller Kenntnisse” (Novalis, 1960m, p. 451) /[the most intimate 
community of all forms of knowledge]. The ‘deeply learned’ are intent on 
pursuing knowledge in its rarefied and confined sense (even though relevant 
knowledges may be allowed to sit next to each other, for instance in the 
Academy).  They are concerned with abstract principles and are “d[ie] 
traditionellen Vertretern akademischen Wissens” (Fritz, 2009, p. 3)/[the 
traditional agents of academic knowledge]. According to Rousseau (1992) the 
rationalism that resounds with these thinkers is to be viewed with some scepticism 
due to the basic incapacity of humanity to know with absolute certainty.  These 
exponents follow established methods that produce knowledge but do not allow 
for what Beiser (2003) describes as a need for more “discursive language” (p. 14). 
Novalis sees poesy as a healing power when the dichotomy of subject and object 
– the method of the Tiefgelehrten - becomes overwhelming: Suspension of the 
“logical faculty” (Fife, 1911, p. 19) is not enough to completely displace the 
negative or ambitious effects of intellect, which can only ameliorate its 
consequences (Stockinger, 2004). Humanity as the subject of logic is split off 
from its surroundings so that the surroundings are actually viewed as being 
intrinsically separate, not merely separate by humanity’s construction. The 
problem that Novalis envisages here is that the actual workings of Being are 
ignored in favour of a position that favours a logical perspective. The full extent 
of Being – its mystery, creative contingency – is neglected. Instead of seeking the 
“Überirdische” (Kaiser, 1988, p. 125)/[celestial] through a sacred experience of 
the earthly, one is limited by “Abstraktheit” (Kaiser, 1988, p. 124)/abstraction. 
 
A tome of Novalis’ that strongly questions both the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution is his Die Christenheit oder Europa. If Novalis’ Fichte-Studien was 
feted as a contribution to Romanticism of magnum opus proportions, it would be 
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his treatise Die Christenheit oder Europa that perhaps fomented the greatest 
reaction from some of his peers, even though – or perhaps because - it was 
marked out as a grand failure (O'Brien, 1995). Written in 1799, it would not be 
until 1826 – well after Novalis’ death - that it would be published. It attracted 
controversy from its inception, including parody from Schelling, suspicion from 
Schleiermacher (who saw ‘Papacy’ in it), and strident opposition from Schlegel’s 
wife, Dorothea (O'Brien, 1995). These detractions in total led to Die Christenheit 
oder Europa being put to the side. After being dispatched it would be referred to 
as a reactionary tome, one that looked with nostalgia to the past but did little to 
achieve much else. Such an overly simplistic interpretation of Die Christenheit 
oder Europa would become outmoded, but that reception would remain typical 
until the 1960s (O'Brien, 1995), when the essay would be regarded anew as a 
somewhat more sophisticated piece of work than widely assumed. The reason for 
its relative failure, however, lies not in its substance but in its wrongful reception. 
Like others of Novalis’ works, it is multi-layered and intends to address Novalis’ 
uncertainty about the French Revolution and the Enlightenment in an ironic way. 
Die Christenheit oder Europa asserts that there are consequences for a loss of 
spirituality and religion in Europe, and that these make themselves known at a 
social and political level. Taking aim at the sudden ubiquity of a philological and 
linguistic understanding of language, particularly religious language, Novalis 
(1960d)  states in Die Christenheit oder Europa that: 
 
Indeß liegt dem Protestantismus bei weitem nicht bloß jener reine 
Begriff [der Revolutions-Regierung] zum Grunde, sondern Luther 
behandelte das Christenthum überhaupt willkürlich, verkannte seinen 
Geist, und führte einen andern Buchstaben und eine andere Religion 
ein, nemlich die heilige Allgemeingültigkeit der Bibel, und damit 
wurde leider eine andere höchst fremde irdische Wissenschaft in die 
Religionsangelegenheit gemischt – die Philologie – deren 
auszehrender Einfluß von da an unverkennbar wird. (p. 512)  
 
[Far from that pure concept [ruling by revolution] being all that there 
is to the foundation of Protestantism, Luther also treated Christianity 
in a completely haphazard manner, misjudged its spirit, and 
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introduced another Letter and religion, namely the holy, universally 
valid Bible. With that, unfortunately, another highly foreign and 
worldly science was mixed into religious matters – philology – whose 
emaciating influence from that point on becomes unmistakable.]  
 
Novalis intends on pointing out to the reader that the linguistic and scientific 
revolution is just one outcome here. It is the philosophical effect of the 
introduction of another response to things in the world that he is especially 
interested in: 
 
Dem religiösen Sinn war diese Wahl höchst verderblich, da nichts 
seine Irritabilität so vernichtet, wie der Buchstabe. Im ehemaligen 
Zustande hatte dieser bei dem großen Umfange der Geschmeidigkeit 
und dem reichhaltigen Stoff des katholischen Glaubens, so wie der 
Esoterisirung der Bibel und der heiligen Gewalt der Concilien und des 
geistlichen Oberhaupts, nie so schädlich werden können; jetzt aber 
wurden diese Gegenmittel vernichtet, die absolute Popularität der 
Bibel behauptet, und nun drückte der dürftige Inhalt, der rohe 
abstracte Entwurf der Religion in diesen Büchern desto merklicher, 
und erschwerte dem heiligen Geiste die freie Belebung, Eindringung 
und Offenbarung unendlich. (1960d, p. 512)  
 
[This choice was most destructive to the sense of religion; nothing 
destroys its sensitivity to such an extent as the letter does. In the 
previous state of affairs it could never have become so harmful, given 
the great extent of flexibility and the substantiality of the Catholic 
faith, as well as the esotericising of the Bible and of the holy power of 
the councils and of the spiritual head. But now these counteragents 
were quashed and the overwhelming popularity of the Bible 
maintained; and now the sketchy contents and the raw, abstract sketch 
within these books struck more manifestly and weighed down the 
sacred spirit of unconstrained vitalisation, permeation and revelation.] 
 
It is the ‘Letter’ that encourages people to focus on the visible, with the result that 
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they have no longer any respect for Being. The Bible, reducing religion to the 
knowable through the Letter, is avidly taken up by the ‘erudite’, and knowledge is 
placed into opposition with faith and art. Faith assumes a mere supporting role, an 
auxiliary towards knowledge. By focusing on the Letter, a complete system of 
knowledge flourished that had nothing to do with “[dem] Sinn der Welt” (1960o, 
p. 594)/[the meaning of the world]; it is the ‘Buchstabe’/letter that has rendered 
humanity static. This static position is opposed to Novalis’ own; his love of 
contextual relationships means that environment, history, earth, and the nature of 
things must be allowed to flourish in their interrelationships.  
 
Here, again, we must take account of the lack of mystery that was threatening the 
social fabric of Europe at the time of Novalis’ writing. Even though the German 
Enlightenment was “weak and of short duration” (Wellek, 1965, p. 49), followed 
by a late Industrial Revolution, Novalis’ early response illustrates in broad terms 
the coming to power of fragmented, scientific perceptions of the world. In this he 
shares the ambitions of the English Romantics, such as Wordsworth and 
Coleridge, who sought to “link one to the Infinite” (Saunders, 1965, p. 4). 
Novalis’ reaction is aware of those growing philosophies that characterise the 
admittedly condensed Enlightenment and slow Industrial Revolution of Germany 
at that time, but he does not wish to understate their effects: He indicates the very 
crux of the problems they pose rather than their specific technological and social 
manifestations, specifically because his concern is voiced particularly early. 
Where there could have been a tendency to focus solely on those manifestations 
as technology progressed (and, despite the weak impact of the Enlightenment at 
that time, its progress is indeed evident in Germany), the Romantics may have 
been unusually positioned because of the Enlightenment’s somewhat more 
blunted impact. The Romantics’ early placement in relation to the development of 
the Enlightenment, and their influence by English pre-Romanticism and Rousseau 
(Wellek, 1965), as well as by the decisive reaction of the Sturm und Drang’s 
Johann Georg Hamann (Berlin, 1999), may have provided them with some 
distance from those distracting symptoms of the Enlightenment and allowed them 
to focus on the emergence of its first, basic principles instead. 
 
Yet in Die Christenheit oder Europa, more than in any of his other writings, we 
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see Novalis focusing on an outcome of those philosophies of alienation, scientific 
thinking, and rationalism. Scientific progress, while not a problem when 
poeticised, becomes detrimental when it expunges Geheimnis from life. The 
elements that are affected in that fragmentation are made geheimnislos, and it is 
through poesy that they are brought back into relationship with each other again. 
 
Wenn sich die Welt in’s freie Leben/Und in die Welt wird 
zurück begeben 
The third couplet – “Wenn sich die Welt ins freie Leben/Und in die Welt wird 
zurück begeben” – reflects the Romantics’ stance that human life is characterised 
by freedom, affecting choices in thinking and in lifestyles. “[I]ns freie Leben 
begeben” means that these choices can be explored and then focused on a 
coherent life. By exploring these choices the individual is meant to construct a 
path of development that produces identity and meaning, both for the self and the 
collective. There is greater good to be attained from engaging with the world. In 
turn one is delivered back to one’s own world, more aware of its breadth and 
depth. A person is then able to produce what they have experienced in greater 
depth through their absorption into the wider world. 
 
Freedom and the playfulness of the name ‘Novalis’ 
This socio-political interpretation fits well with how Novalis advocated for the 
freedom to transform nature. Romantisieren encompassed the ability to transform 
nature but, in turn, to be transformed by nature. One’s membership with society 
depended on how well one could organise the elements of the world for the 
greater good. Recall though, that Being could rearrange those elements 
spontaneously, influencing how humanity could transform them. Even the name 
‘Novalis’ opens onto Novalis’ own playful expression: The impetus for change, 
from Enlightenment’s ‘Zweckrationalismus’/[instrumental rationality] to a more 
poetic existence, is reflected by Novalis’ (1960m) assertion that “[w]ir sind auf 
einer Mißion: zur Bildung der Erde sind wir berufen” (p. 427)/[we are on a 
mission: We are called to cultivate the earth]. The message of change from a 
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conditioned, static form of thinking to a more holistic one is woven throughout 
that fragment: To begin with, in its recollection of a cultivated earth it hints at the 
ancestral name ‘Novali’ itself (O'Brien, 1995)38. The inclusion of the name is 
significant for Novalis because it ensures that he himself is embodied in his 
writings, linking to his belief that, to a large extent, writing is an emotional 
activity. In this the individual is forged with their writing so that they hopefully 
take on poetic form themselves.  
 
The name ‘Novalis’ explicitly avoids the noble form ‘de Novali’ and also 
indicates a preference for the possessive structure that is less grandiose than ‘von 
Hardenberg’ and more playful. It is playful in a number of ways. First, the act of 
sowing is a wager on how well something will grow, in that its outcome is 
dependent to a large extent on chance and on the interactions of things in the 
world. The name also points to the arrangement and rearrangement of things in 
the world through sowing: One may arrange a certain place as suitable for sowing, 
and then within that place constantly reorganise the planting. Here we are 
reminded of the irony of Romantic thinking and statements, which are 
characterised by the positioning of various terms and ideas next to each other, 
only to be changed around from time to time: 
 
Das Gemüt sehnt sich nach Erholung und Abwechselung, und wo 
sollte es diese auf eine anständigere und reizendere Art finden, als in 
der Beschäftigung mit den freien Spielen und Erzeugnissen seiner 
edelsten Kraft, des bildenen Tiefsinns. Nirgends hört man so anmutige 
Sänger, findet so herrliche Maler, und nirgends sieht man auf den 
Tanzsälen leichtere Bewegungen und lieblichere Gestalten. (Novalis, 
1960h, p. 206)  
 
[Our temperament longs for convalescence and change, and where 
should this respectable and charming way of doing things be found 
but through the involvement with free play and production of this 
fashion’s most precious power, of creative force. Nowhere else will 
                                                
38 The name Novali means ‘the person who ploughs/develops new land’. 
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we hear such graceful singers, or will we find such beautiful painters, 
and nowhere in the dance halls will we see easier movements and 
lovelier forms.] 
 
Here Novalis refers directly to the identity of singers and painters, in contrast to 
his earlier couplet of “Wenn die, so singen oder küssen/Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten 
wissen” where he prefers to think of the activity of singing and kissing. This is an 
example of the Romantic irony that Novalis fully embraces. In the above 
quotation he names a ‘way’ or ‘fashion’ – in other words, a set mode of operating. 
His preference for the identity of the person may be related to his wish to remain 
in synch with the initial concreteness of ‘way’/‘fashion’. Yet even here the reader 
is thrown into some confusion with the last clause of that quotation, which reverts 
to what we have seen in the “Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren” couplet: not a 
dancer or Kreatur/creature, but the almost mysterious emergence of movement 
and form. His combination here of humanised, concrete description on the one 
hand, and more mysterious signs of activity on the other, point to the play that 
Novalis advocates. 
 
Play or Spiel is thus meant to be a mission itself. The goal here is one that 
involves a ‘down to earth’ approach, with play being “gemeine – und höhere” 
(Novalis, 1960b, p. 320)/“common – and higher” (Wood, 2007, p. 65). The free 
life that is envisaged is equivalent to the capacity to think and play freely. A sense 
of renewal is therefore inherent to the name ‘Novalis’, with Kluckhohn (1960) 
observing that “als ein Neuland Rodender und Saaten Streuender mochte der 
Dichter [Novalis] sich selbst empfinden” (p. 2)/[the poet [Novalis] liked to think 
of himself as a clearer of (new) land and a scatterer of seeds]. It is precisely the 
new moment in Novalis’ writings that he brings to our attention.  
 
A more mystical interpretation is equally plausible here; two meanings are 
therefore possible which are not exclusive. In this second reading, ‘freie[s] Leben’ 
aligns with Novalis’ equivalence of Being and freedom. The universal activity 
that underpins all existence should be seen as a responsible force to which the 
world should be returned, thereby freeing itself from the social problems that are 
incurred by an overly rationalistic approach. The phrase ‘earthly strife’, taken 
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within the wider context of the poem, is that which is wrought by representing 
things in the world as purely within the control of humanity, rather than those 
things being, in the first instance, part of the ‘freie[s] Leben’.    
 
Wenn dann sich wieder Licht und Schatten/Zu echter 
Klarheit werden gatten 
This couplet alludes to Novalis’ beliefs about the relationship between light and 
dark and binary oppositions in general, and specifically refers to the debate 
between Goethe and Newton in relation to the nature of light. It is likely that 
Novalis had Newton in mind when he stated in Die Christenheit oder Europa that: 
 
Die [klügeren] Mitglieder waren rastlos beschäftigt, die Natur, den 
Erdboden, die menschlichen Seelen und die Wissenschaften von der 
Poesie zu säubern, - jede Spur des Heiligen zu vertilgen, das 
Andenken an alle erhebende Vorfälle und Menschen durch Sarkasmen 
zu verleiden, und die Welt alles bunten Schmucks zu entkleiden. Das 
Licht war wegen seines mathematischen Gehorsams und seiner 
Frechheit ihr Liebling geworden. Sie freuten sich, daß es sich eher 
zerbrechen ließ, als daß es mit Farben gespielt hätte, und so benannten 
sie nach ihm ihr großes Geschäft, Aufklärung. (1960d, p. 516)   
 
[[Shrewder] members busied themselves tirelessly with purging the 
poetry from nature, the earth, the human soul, and the sciences – 
eradicating every trace of the sacred, spoiling the memory of all 
virtuous events and people by sarcasm, and divesting the world of all 
colourful decoration. Due to its submission to mathematics as well as 
its brashness, light had become their [those members’] favourite. They 
delighted in the fact that it would sooner be refracted than play 
amongst colour, and so their great concern – Enlightenment - became 
its namesake.] 
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Maintaining light and dark as opposing forces is not an option for Novalis, even 
though these forces may separate from time to time, only to reunite. Newton’s 
claim that white light was reliably unwavering and unchanging once it separated 
into primary colours was one that Goethe had resisted (Burwick, 1987). Goethe 
claimed instead that the “prismatic picture” (Burwick, 1987, p. 32) was always 
changing. Goethe’s resistance to Newton’s assertion of static light is typical also 
of the Romantics’ resurrection of the fluid nature of existence, which contains 
echoes of Heraclitus’ philosophy of the flux of things in the world. According to 
Burwick, Goethe actually demonstrated that any colour chosen from Newton’s 
spectrum would “cast a shadow in complementary colour and a full array of 
colours could be seen in the dioptric Säume [band] of the shadow” (pp. 32-33). 
 
For Novalis, as for Goethe, the binary opposition revealed between light and dark 
was one that could only be reconciled by a focus on the relationships between 
them. In other words, Novalis encourages their unification so that one could move 
about freely into the world. He disputes the widely held notion that only light will 
bring about enlightenment and suggests that the two be brought together so that 
there the focus becomes one of holism rather than delineation. Novalis 
emphasises that both may not be kept in opposition with each other: In keeping 
with the focus on constant change in the Romantic tradition the continuous 
movement between light and dark is one that Novalis strives to acknowledge, 
rather than strict delineations evident in classicism (Blankenagel, 1940). This 
emphasis on balance is close to that of Māori writers, including Pere (1982), 
Jackson (1988), Mikaere (1994), who agree within their own topics of focus that 
the separation of one phenomenon from another, in a definitive sense, leads to a 
fragmented relationship with the world. Novalis’ proposal that the elements of 
light and dark is reminiscent of the drive towards a respect for creative chaos, 
advocated often throughout his novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen (Walker, 1993). 
Indeed the fictional ‘Golden Age’, a time that Novalis remembers and anticipates 
through Heinrich von Ofterdingen, is conditional upon a state of chaos and is 
“heralded by the melting of the winter ice and the return of the flow to the world” 
(Walker, 1993, p. 49). He foresees great movement in swirling and changing 
states of both light and dark and expects that, through their union, clarity could 
ensue. Rather than the Enlightenment notion of static objects and linear forces in 
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physics, he advocated for a return to an older belief in the cyclical structure of 
nature. 
 
The poet is the person who can unite different factions of Being, but because light 
and clarity themselves unite, creating a higher clarity, then the poet is really just 
giving expression to the true self-organisation of Being. In the first instance it is 
the autonomous workings of light and shade that provide illumination. As with 
‘freie[m] Leben’ there are two occasions at work here: one involving the 
spontaneous, unknowable organisation of Being, and the other more social, in 
which society should be composed of true poets who can reflect nature in an 
everyday sense. The poet is meant to work with binaries and manifest their 
joining; he or she must provide the elements of Being with a voice.  
 
In his Hymnen an die Nacht Novalis (1960i) banished an epistemological and 
metaphorical preference for light: Although it is “allerfreulich … mit seinen 
Farben, seinen Strahlen und Wogen” (p. 131)/[all-joyful … with its colors, rays, 
and waves] and “schwimmt tanzend in seiner blauen Flut”/[swims dancingly in its 
blue flow], Novalis tends towards the night – not to oppose it to light but to point 
out its potential which itself contains elements of light (fire, sun, sight). In these 
relevant verses of “Wenn nicht mehr”, as with Hymnen an die Nacht, we see a 
role for humanity as the true refractive mirror of Being’s manifestations. 
Humanity’s activities should therefore organise themselves around this role for 
Novalis. The aim of the poet is, in a social sense, to present humanity as a whole 
with a vast array of choices that reflect the cloaked and sometimes opaque ways 
of Being.  
 
Und man in Märchen und Gedichten/Erkennt die ewgen 
Weltgeschichten 
One of Novalis’ concerns is with describing the story of the world. It is through 
literature and art that this can best be achieved, although scientific propositions 
and traditional, rationalistic writing can play a part in compelling the author to 
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think more poetically. Here we encounter his Märchen und Gedichte which may 
be superficially translated as ‘fairy tales and poems’ but which mean more than 
those labels. Märchen und Gedichten are expressive critiques and descriptions by 
which one may come close to the mysterious, and are not limited to any specific 
genre. The story of the world – or its natural and cosmological ‘history’ as 
‘Geschichte’ also translates – is a non-linear process, in which even the past is 
present, the past affects the future and, somewhat oddly, the future flows back to 
the past and present. Novalis’ contemporary, the theologian Schleiermacher 
(1969), also advocates a move away from a linear sense of history towards a 
temporally unified one with a view that “[a]ber nicht nur in ihrem [So-] Sein 
müsst ihr die Menschen anschauen, sondern auch in ihrem Werden” (p. 67)/[you 
should not only consider humanity in its static appearance but also in its state of 
becoming]. With a link to the spiritual (religiösen) realm, history is forever 
returning to its beginnings there: 
 
Geschichte im eigentlichsten Sinn ist der höchste Gegenstand der 
Religion, mit ihr hebt sie an und endigt mit ihr – und alle wahre 
Geschichte hat überall zuerst einen religiösen Zweck gehabt und ist 
von religiösen Ideen ausgegangen. (Schleiermacher, 1969, p. 67) 
 
[History in its actual sense is the highest subject of religion: With it, 
history lifts itself up, and with it history ends – and all true history has 
had, in the first instance, an omnipresent religious meaning, and has 
proceeded outwards from religious ideas.] 
 
Having a spiritual genesis and ending means that expression is all-important to 
describe history. These stanzas continue the theme of the previous lines but with 
more emphasis on the poet. Again, in “Die Natur”, Novalis considers that the only 
way to embrace the whole of nature is through the spirit of poetic craft. Through 
one voice, poets and natural scientists become one person. Poetry ensures that the 
poem is the object of the vision of nature (von Molnár, 1970). Apparently this 
representation indicates that Being remains a subject status and that the poet is 
merely tracing its path. One may recognise the story of the world, because it is 
something that is reflected at the individual level. As with Hyazinth, who 
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identified that his journey through nature concluded with him recognising what 
was familiar, one recognises something because it is familiar. The emphasis here 
is not on the gleaning of knowledge but on the wonder at realising that the story 
of the world presents itself to its beings. 
 
As I indicate in chapter five, at times Novalis will satirise himself, revealing in the 
“Monolog” the capriciousness of language. His “Dialogen” in some ways disclose 
that a truer way of discussing the world generally is achieved by turning the world 
into a story. The sixth Dialogue revolves around a conversation between two 
drunks. I shall not quote this dialogue in its entirety, but the first lines will show 
the reader what is intended: 
 
[A.] Höre du, es ist einmal Mode, von der Natur ein vernünftig Wort 
zu reden – wir müssen auch unsern Beytrag liefern. Nun – was wirds 
– fange doch an mir zu antworten. 
[B.] Ich besinne mich schon lange auf einen recht natürlichen Anfang 
unsers Gesprächs – ich presse meinen natürlichen Verstand, aber der 
ist vertrocknet, und hat nicht ein bischen Saft mehr. (1960c, p. 669)  
 
[[A.] Hey, it’s become fashionable to throw the word nature around, 
and discuss it in rational terms. We’d better do the same and add to 
the conversation. Ok, what’s it going to be? Go on, give me an 
answer. 
[B.] I’ve been racking my brains for ages trying to come up with a 
properly natural start to our conversation – I’m squeezing out my 
natural understanding, but it’s dried up, and there’s not a drop left.]  
 
The dialogue shows not only the problem of ‘nature’ as the subject of discussion 
but also that of common speech generally. It happens in this dialogue that the 
issue of ‘nature’ being made into a solid, known thing through common usage is 
highlighted, but any phenomenon may be subject to that process by being ‘thrown 
around’. Heidegger gives a more current indication of this problem in his coining 
of the term ‘Gerede’, along with an analysis of its meaning. ‘Ge-’ as a prefix 
signifies a confused “gathering together of several items of a kind” (Hirsch, 1978, 
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p. 169) and can signal a negative connotation. The collection of many words 
together indicates that there is a stockpile of them at humanity’s disposal, even 
though for Heidegger these modes of speech can be an impetus for other ways of 
talking (Hirsch, 1978). These words, however, only cement a conventional way of 
thinking and, even more importantly, an orthodox relationship between humanity 
and the world that the words are held out to open onto.  
 
Dann fliegt vor Einem geheimen Wort/Das ganze 
verkehrte Wesen sofort 
Novalis’ constant use of ‘wenn’, a form of parallelism (Feldman, 2010), draws the 
reader’s attention to a continuous weaving of time throughout the words. Time 
comes in from the sides of the poem, infusing itself so that it is a concern for the 
reader. A subtle collapse of time occurs through this continuous process, which 
points to the future, and through the accompanying and equally consistent use of 
the present tense. Novalis looks to a future when numbers and figures are no 
longer the keys to all God’s creatures. Also the futurity and presence of each 
factor is necessary at once, suggesting that each element will and can exist and 
form with the other. Each preferred state is listed with no precise tense assigned to 
each, suggesting that they are all desirable. By dealing with Zahlen, Figuren, 
Tiefgelehrten, Light/shade binary, one may then banish alienation of man from 
mystery – das verkehrte Wesen – with a single word.  
 
Novalis’ optimism is due primarily to the role of the poet. The poet is finally able 
to utter the Word of wisdom, evident in the final lines “Dann fliegt vor Einem 
geheimen Wort/Das ganze verkehrte Wesen sofort”. This sacred ‘word’ is used in 
conjunction with Einem, a hint at the sacred and ineffable, one that is given 
special significance through the capitalisation of the usually banal indefinite 
article ‘einem’. In the context of Novalis’ poem it assumes a quality of uniqueness 
- the all comprising only One which is another way of putting his notion of 
panentheism, a cosmological view which recurs frequently in his works. A sacred 
word is given effect through the bringing together of opposing dualities such as 
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light and darkness, which will occur by considering a world without measured 
edges. It is through this, Novalis believes, that the delusion that Being is 
knowable will be dispelled, and the newly transformed idea of Being as 
mysterious will be moved towards the sacred. 
 
The mention of a ‘word’ here reminds us that Novalis’ had specific views on 
language. Novalis sets out one of his most strident treatises on language in Die 
Lehrlinge zu Sais which, along with his “Monolog”, is his most thorough 
treatment of the subject (O'Brien, 1995). Intrinsic to his treatment is a constant 
expression of Being, which as we have seen predefines the self and precedes the 
self’s consciousness. In addition to these expressly language-related works, his 
views on language may be inferred from his other sources as well. He sets about 
his task by referring to language both directly and indirectly, motivated by his 
need to point out to his reader in a number of ways that excessive objectification 
through language can occur. His methods do entail an upfront warning, although 
generally this is a rare tactic for Novalis, who prefers to warn through poeticising 
the potential of an issue rather than baldly stating what the problem is.  
 
The dialectics of “Wenn nicht mehr” 
Novalis’ poem occasionally emphasises the absence of a phenomenon or activity – 
‘if there were a lack of something, then this would occur’. Those activities or 
phenomena, currently carried out or utilised but which are less preferred than those 
others that he lists, are not meant to just fade away or be totally replaced. They are 
present, after all, and this should count for something, but because they presently 
overwhelm humanity and nature they need some moderating. Novalis is aware that 
humanity needs tools of rationalism and scientific thinking yet asks humanity to 
come to terms with the stark contrast and discomfort that the ‘preferred’ and ‘non-
preferred’ provide when used next to each other. The poem in its entirety uses 
some devices that impinge on its obvious meaning. With these devices Novalis 
wants to both make certain that the poem is about mystery and to draw our 
attention away from relying on the certainty that the surface meanings of the words 
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offer. Thus the poem denotes meaning – this is the extent to which we can have 
some certainty about the points he wishes to make – but underpinning the words 
lies the mysterious Being. The poem then reflects the utter mystery of Being.  
 
Novalis had an outcome in mind by placing such divergent elements directly 
alongside each other. He had a love of oppositions: Such fragments as “[i]n einer 
wahrhaft robusten Constitution ist der Wechsel der Zustände sowohl schnell, als 
langsam – heftig und schwach – Groß und klein – Mannichfaltig und einfach” 
(1960b, p. 350)/“[i]n a genuinely robust constitution the alternation between the 
stages is both rapid and slow – vehement and weak – large and small – diverse 
and simple” (Wood, 2007, p. 89), frequent as they are, display not only a love of 
paradox but also a need to contravene on a modern reader’s love of strict 
categories. A sort of dialectic is provided for humanity, which can basically be 
reduced to the love of rationalism against the mystical workings of Being. Both are 
necessary in his provocation; the total absence of the ‘less preferred’ would itself 
not be desirable because the resulting void would be filled by the ‘preferred’ one. 
This thoroughgoing mystical state would be equally undesirable for Novalis as it 
would simply mean that one frame of thinking has come to dominate.  
 
Both poetic device and denotative meaning of his words issue a challenge for the 
anthropocentricist. Modern man in Novalis’ poem would be moved away from just 
viewing Enlightenment rationalism as a means of engaging with the world. But 
this is unlikely to happen if humanity does not realise the current workings of 
elements that occur. That is, just because they are not currently acknowledged 
phenomena – both isolated and co-existent – does not mean that they do not exist 
regardless. A problem arises then for the anthropocentricist: he is confronted with 
the possibility that the world does in fact operate in an holistic fashion, that its 
holistic arrangement can continue without him being aware of its working, and he 
does not have control over nature as much as he thinks he does. Indeed, he is 
caught up in these workings of Being and thus is just another element within 
Being’s grasp. Yet, on the other hand, modern humanity, with its overriding 
fixation on numbers, figures, rationalism, binary oppositions, properties and so on, 
cordons off those elements of Being that do not fit with a preordained 
anthropocentric relationship with the world. This will have consequences for 
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humanity, as the lack of correspondence between the workings of Being and of 
humanity will only lead to a search for the truth of nature in “ihre[r] Krankenstube, 
ihr[em] Beinhaus” (Novalis, 1960e, p. 84)/“her sickroom, her charnel house” 
(2005, p. 27).  
 
Here Novalis’ apparent contradiction may be summarised. One may educate 
nature, but nature opens up things to emerge in the first place. This is characteristic 
of humanity’s engagement with nature. In all of Die Lehrlinge zu Sais a dialectic 
takes place between nature and the student; even if it appears that activity starts 
with the student in their determining of the world – because the student is recorded 
as saying something, as an example - in fact this rational process takes place 
within an infinitely unknowable scheme of Being, whether this is alongside the 
voices of nature, against the play of light from the world, from the arrangement of 
stones, and so on. Even when one is apparently making a statement that fits with 
the requirements of logic, preceding this – and allowing it to happen – is the freely 
creative mood of nature, as an emanation of the Absolute.  
 
Thinking affirmatively within the problem: Overcoming 
Geheimnislosigkeit 
In Fichte-Studien Novalis begins his famous description of the striving after a 
philosophical ground with the surmise that “Filosofiren muß eine eigne Art von 
Denken seyn” (1960j, p. 269)/“[p]hilosophizing must be a unique kind of 
thinking” (Kneller, 2003, p. 167). His use of the term ‘philosophizing’ refers to 
the pursuit of clarity, and of “Vivificiren” (1960o, p. 526)/[enlivening]. In Das 
Allgemeine Brouillon, in which he attempts to bring together all the sciences into 
the domain of poesy, he further indicates that pure philosophy may be 
“uninterressirt” (1960b, p. 249)/[disinterested]. It is placed in that same fragment 
in opposition to a “Phil[osophie] des Geistes überhaupt”/[philosophy of the spirit 
in general], suggesting both that the spirit itself may philosophise and, socially 
speaking, one may philosophise with a sense of community. To philosophise is to 
take an active attitude towards things, and the orientation towards something may 
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be either clarifying or, as the tendency of “spirit” would have it, tentative and 
dependent on context, with the former, despite needing a degree of activity, 
nevertheless an outcome of a certain lack of emotional impetus. Taken in its 
totality, the postcolonial reader may note the following about philosophising in 
the context of “Wenn nicht mehr”: 
 
1. We can see from Novalis’ grouping of elements in “Wenn nicht mehr” a 
reiteration of the theme of opposition that I discussed in the preceding 
chapters. Geheimnislosigkeit should be considered as fully as possible. To 
move on to positive utterances without considering Geheimnislosigkeit in 
depth threatens to render those Geheimnis-related utterances geheimnislos. 
The equal consideration of each is a critical exercise that must take place 
at all times. For the colonised person, any discussion about an apparently 
obvious thing in the world must similarly take place alongside a 
consideration of how one’s perception of that thing in the world might be 
affected by Geheimnislosigkeit. Both “Wenn nicht mehr” and the ever-
present negativity and positivity of korekore support the use of the 
imagination in these discussions. 
2. Although Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” suggests that one must firstly 
consider the negative in order to actively contemplate the positive, in fact 
the two occur at exactly the same time. To be sure, “Wenn nicht mehr” 
utilises a ‘if (negative)/then (positive outcome)’ structure; however, 
embedded in all the verses are simultaneous, ironical positionings of both 
negative and positive phenomena. 
3.  Through recognition of Geheimnislosigkeit one may come to the 
conclusion that one has only limited ability to make definitive assertions 
about things in the world. Even in these situations, Geheimnislosigkeit has 
made one aware of one’s own incapacity to find exact words that align 
with both Geheimnislosigkeit and Geheimnis. 
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Chapter Five: The epistemological and 
ontological loss of Geheimnis as a colonising 
act on Māori 
Novalis’ poem “Wenn nicht mehr” resonates closely with another of his 
fragments that deals with the philosophical split between the subject and the 
object - a divide which forms the basis for empiricist and rationalist traditions in 
Western philosophy. In it he uses the term ‘Urtheil’ which is commonly defined 
as ‘judgement’ but has its etymological roots according to Donehower (2007) in 
the sense of ‘original division’: 
 
Die Gabe der Unterscheidung, das reine trennende Urtheil muß, um 
nicht tödtlich zu verwunden und überall Haß zu erregen, mit großer 
Behutsamkeit auf Menschen angewandt werden. (1960f, p. 653)  
 
[The gift of distinction, the pure original division [in subject and 
object, and conceptual demarcation] must, in order to avoid being 
harmful and inciteful of hatred at every juncture, be employed upon 
individuals with great caution.] 
 
In ‘original division’, Novalis refers to the prominence of distinction made on the 
basis of the intellect. He concedes that there is a place for this practice but thinks it 
should not be exercised without careful consideration for its effects. ‘Urtheil’ 
reflects a move into individual components through the corresponding process of 
judgement: The danger here is that, as things in the world are regarded and 
fragmented, a deep sense of alienation manifests:  
 
Man haßt es [das trennende Urtheil], theils aus Schmerz über den 
Verlust eines befriedigenden Irrthums, theils aus Gefühl eines 
erlittnen Unrechts, weil auch das schärfste Urtheil eben durch die 
Trennung des Untheilbaren, durch die Absonderung von der 
Umgebung, der Geschichte, dem Boden, der Natur der Sache zu nahe 
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tritt, und über die Ansicht der einzelnen Erscheinung an sich ihren 
Werth, als Glied eines großen Ganzen, vergisst. (1960f, p. 653)  
 
[The distinction that typifies judgement is to be detested partly due to 
the pain that is experienced when one may no longer take solace in 
being wrong, and partly due to a feeling that one has suffered 
injustice. Even the most acute distinction/act of judgement will cause 
insult through the separation of the inseparable, through the 
disassociation of the environment and of history, of the earth, and of 
the nature of things. By viewing the appearance of the individual it 
forgets its own worth as a member of a greater whole.] 
 
Individualised, and separated from its relationships with other things in the 
world, the isolated thing (and here Novalis includes people) is made an object for 
the subject’s gaze. At this point, the onlooker is lifted out of the context of those 
things – their interplay – and made distant from them. This assertion of Novalis’ 
suggests that the rupture of things in the world causes damage to the relationship 
between them; in the process, importantly, the perceiving self is also hurt. As one 
constrains those things, the self is constrained. It is only poesy that resists that 
project of fragmentation: 
 
Die Poësie heilt die Wunden, die der Verstand schlägt. Sie besteht 
gerade aus entgegengesetzten Bestandtheilen - aus erhebender 
Wahrheit und angenehmer Täuschung. (1960f, p. 653)  
 
[Poesy heals the wounds that intellect causes. It comprises contrary 
parts – soaring truth and pleasurable deception.]  
 
An overarching theme of Novalis’ critique that I have outlined in the previous 
chapter, and reiterated in this quote of his, is one of modern humanity’s tendency 
to constrain or banalise things in the world, thereby ignoring their Geheimnis.  
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Stoßsätze to be addressed 
This grand theme of his prompts me to consider how a similar phenomenon 
occurs here in New Zealand in respect of Māori. Novalis identifies that there are 
other more specific Stoßsätze that, within that grander theme, I shall address in 
this chapter. With particular regard to how Māori are constantly impinged on by 
colonisation, I express these in the following way: 
 
How are Māori encouraged, in modern times, to forget aspects of Being that I 
mentioned in chapter three, and to constrain things in the world, including the 
self? Specifically, drawing on the main themes of “Wenn nicht mehr”, what is the 
nature of this constraint, 
 
- through the use of reifying words and language? 
- through the active fragmentation of things in the world, including, but not 
limited to, the opposition and exclusion of particular things at any one time? 
- through the preference of one idea or method over another? 
- through assigning numbers – which may include a financial value but are by no 
means restricted to that - to things in order to explain them fully? 
- through the idea that a thing in the world can be discussed as a separate entity 
from other things? 
- through the essentialising of the ontological self by responding in accord with a 
self-evident question or utterance, and in the staticising of the self to a historical 
entity? 
 
Most of the Nachdenken that takes place in the chapter brings those separate but 
related themes together. 
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The forgetting of everyday Being: “Das ganze 
verkehrte Wesen”  
That Māori are currently affected by the strict reifying and colonising operation of 
numbers and figures – for example, in the form of instrumental science and 
capitalist economy - as a primary means of describing things in the world may not 
be surprising, but how vastly and covertly its reach is may be more astonishing. 
Indeed, to describe the whole nature of this form and manifestation of 
colonisation, which is less about the removal of a tangible resource and more 
about the subtle imposition of a geheimnislosen worldview, would require another 
thesis. For this thesis I contend that it is sufficient to begin examining the very 
broadest parameters of Geheimnislosigkeit as it has impacted on Māori and then 
to offer some more specific examples of where it manifests. Zahlen and Figuren 
are emissaries of Geheimnislosigkeit in the sense that they bring about the 
forgetting of the Absolute39. In relation to colonisation, much Māori attention has 
tended to be directed towards the loss of a real thing, with land and language two 
obvious examples40. Land and language in a Māori worldview are linked41, but 
                                                
39 Sheilagh Walker (1996) emphasises the addition of a negative influence when she 
states that “[there] is also a spiritual disease; it attacks the hinengaro of Maori. The name 
of this spiritual disease – ‘internalisation of colonisation’. Here the disease is most 
potent…. [The] causes are hard to see. They came in latent form, in the crevices of the 
minds, in the processes of thought, in the guise of World Views that sought to 
appropriate, dominate and negate other World Views that it found in its path” (p. 122). 
Casting Māori as the ‘other’ as a process of racism is one part of the problem discussed in 
this chapter, but it is the uptake of viewing things in the world, including the self as 
‘other’ from other things in the world, which I mainly focus on.  
 
40 While these are two outstanding examples, there exists some discussion about loss of 
wellbeing (which tends to be written about as tied to loss of language and land): see for 
instance Levien (2007); Reid and Robson (2006). The following authors describe loss of 
culture in its various forms: Ranginui Walker (2004); Smith (1999); Pihama (2001); 
Melbourne (1995). 
 
41 As one gives one’s tribal saying, for example, there is an acknowledgement that one’s 
language is linked to landscape, and that land gives the utterer the ability to refer to it.  
This is also the nature of ‘whakapapa korero’ (T. Smith, 2000) which I define in English 
as ‘layers of expression that acknowledge the Absolute’. 
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have been fought for in separate forums42, have been formed as separate political 
issues for successive governments (with Māori language being primarily posited 
as an educational concern and land a legal one). How successful claims have been 
to have land returned and language recognised has varied widely. The significance 
of land and language as separate entities has been highlighted as items of loss; 
they were formerly here but now are not, and they have been made focused things. 
The fact that they then had to be moved out as separate phenomena from each 
other further entrenched a belief that they are to be focused on as different 
entities43.  
 
Whether it was the loss itself of solid entities that would threaten Geheimnis is 
hard to determine, but one may expect that their solidification as separate and 
unrelated phenomena would start to generally orient the focus of Māori towards 
Geheimnislosigkeit. I speculate that at the instant they were regarded as concrete 
phenomena they were proclaimed to be highly visible and definable and were 
presented to the awareness of Māori in that way44. In terms of language this would 
                                                
42 Occasionally, land and language have been fought for in legal forums, but they are 
regarded as separate issues. The Te Reo Māori claim (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986), the 
prime example of a legal fight for the validity of the Māori language, sought intervention 
to save the Māori language from demise, and framed language as a separate entity that, in 
this case, was in need of saving.  
 
43 Whilst Māori did indeed see the uniqueness of various phenomena, their inherent link 
was always recognised. This is quite different from the belief and practice that they 
should be separate events, leading  Ka`ai and Higgins  (2004) to observe that “for Māori, 
this definition [whakapapa meaning connections between people] extends beyond human 
relationships into connections between humans and their universe. This intricately woven 
whakapapa has often made defining individual customary concepts extremely difficult, as 
each concept is defined by its relationship with other concepts and not in isolation” (p. 
13).  
One’s traditional interaction with things in the world was thought of as interrelational. 
For indigenous peoples generally, stories – ‘Weltgeschichte’ as Novalis would call them 
– relate directly to the nonhuman world and back again (Whitt, Roberts, Norman, & 
Grieves, 2001). To “converse with”, as Whitt et al note is “to live or keep company with” 
(p. 734), suggesting not only that there is a mysterious way of interacting with things in 
the world through language. More tacitly, there is a manner of interaction that lacks 
company and thus mystery. 
 
44 As spiritual phenomena, things in the world were understood as possessing mystery. 
Pere (1997) clarifies this when she states that “[t]he physical realm is immersed and 
integrated with the spiritual realm. A powerful belief in spirituality governs and 
influences the way one interacts with other people, and relates to his or her environment” 
(p. 16). Here, Pere indicates that the physical realm is not all there is to those perceivable 
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have happened even without Māori being expressly told of their visibility: It 
would have happened as soon as foreign concepts were conveyed through the 
Māori language, such as occurred in the Mission Schools of the early 19th century 
– and in the subsequent notion that one should think and talk about the world as 
precisely as possible. The introduction of Christian-based language to Māori, to 
both bring the Christian word and to spread the practice of literacy, may have seen 
a contrast of language to its message occur. In cases where the message being 
disseminated is so different to a previous belief, then it is possible that the 
medium through which that message is disseminated is focused on. Language is 
made a solid, evident phenomenon. Although we can only speculate about that 
event, it is clear that many aspects of this new Christian belief diverged sharply 
from traditional ones. As one missionary described in respect of his daily routine 
in the classroom: 
 
I begin with prayer with them, then set them their lessons and 
spelling, then ask them questions or teach them to repeat lessons 
which I have made for that purpose concerning God, the Creation, the 
fall of man, the law of God, the birth of Christ, His death, regeneration 
and such like things.... After this I sing an hymn and close in prayer. 
(Elder, 1934, pp. 258-259) 
 
The difference between traditional and colonised religious belief is beyond the 
scope and general concern of this thesis; however, the above instance of religious 
instruction, in content at least, reveals a marked difference from a Māori belief in 
many gods, in gender (Mikaere, 1994)45 , and generally in life, death and 
                                                                                                                                 
things in the world. It is the mystery of things for her that brings one to focus on things in 
the world. 
 
45 Pere (1982) explains that Māori did not impose hierarchies of importance on the basis 
of gender. This reflects itself in the very language of Māori, according to her. Yet the 
replacement of ‘tangata’ to mean ‘him’ (Pihama, 2001), and similarly ‘ia’ with ‘him’ or 
‘her’ (Mikaere, 1994) has had profound influences not only on how women are 
positioned in relation to men, but also on the new ways in which terms would now 
become disturbed issues for Māori. 
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afterlife46. The largely fear-ridden message of the fall of man, for instance, 
encouraged a fixation of the language of its delivery. The use of ‘tētahi’ when 
describing a supreme deity could jar with the traditional use of ‘ētahi’ in relation 
to a number of deities. If that were true, then the sound and form of language 
would have been brought into stark relief to the listener and reader, thereby taking 
on new psychological and philosophical significance. With that, language 
suddenly becomes a separate phenomenon. 
 
The actual subsequent loss of language, a devastating blow to Māori for 
successive generations, would have further entrenched the movement of language 
into a separate, almost demanding concern for Māori, but before it was withdrawn 
from Māori it was instrumentalised to identify a thing in the world as if it were 
merely a separate, reified object. One’s speech is then not thought of in terms of 
its link to the external world but as a self-directed event. Land is similarly held 
out to be a self-evident entity; one may trace its demarcation out from other 
elements of existence when it was listed alongside other concrete resources in 
article two of the Treaty of Waitangi47 . Land took its obvious form as a 
Zahl/number when it was assigned a name and number by the Native Land Court, 
with successors’ names listed nearby with their own share attached. Again, as 
with language, the loss of land ensured that land itself, posed as a separate, 
‘chartered’ event, would be a cause for concern for forthcoming Māori 
generations. 
 
Zahlen and Figuren should not be associated with just a series of traumatic events, 
either, even though they may best be constrained and discussed in that way. That 
is, although those historical events were occurring which are perhaps more 
obviously to do with the visibilising and solidification of things in the world, there 
has always been an everyday interaction between the Māori self and 
                                                
46 The various ways in which Māori were affected by a Christian view of the world are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. For an indepth consideration, see Simon (1990), who 
delves into some of the substitutions of one group of philosophies for another.  
 
47 Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi: “o ratou whenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga 
katoa”/[their lands, their places of residence and all their prized possessions]. 
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Geheimnislosigkeit48. This relationship highlights the propensity of institutions to 
carry out their practices in a way that encourages Māori to view things in the 
world as clearly visible and solid. It may therefore be said that Māori are 
continuously exposed to a form of oppression through mystery being expunged. 
This form of oppression has a different emphasis to the types of racism that Māori 
frequently encounter, or from the lack of funding that comes the way of Māori 
communities that would see them perform on a par with the mainstream populace: 
It arises instead from an anticipation of philosophies underpinning Western 
institutions that Māori will conform to a set of expectations in not only conscious 
ways but also in their ontological, deeply primordial ‘fit’. Through meeting these 
expectations, Māori make not only other things in the world equivalent to the 
anticipated set of equivalences of these institutions, but they also align their 
ontological selves up with those equivalences. By this, I mean that the constant, 
unseen change that the self is given through the Absolute is restricted by the 
engagement of the Māori self through some institutional expectations. This 
correspondence between Māori and the philosophical wish of the institution is 
therefore a far more fundamental one than the issue of which social group Māori 
are allowed to align themselves with, or whether a certain Māori group would be 
allowed to call themselves ‘iwi’ or not49.  
                                                
48 Things in the world were thought of as spiritual as much as physical, to the extent that 
no great distinction was made between them. In relation to this, Pere (1982) states that, 
from day to day, “children developed an appreciation of their inherent spirituality through 
being exposed to such things as karakia (incantations, invocations), or to people talking 
about their own spiritual experiences.… The spiritual world became just as meaningful 
and as present for the children as the physical worlds that surrounded them. Nothing was 
done or attempted without some thought being given to the spiritual side of things” (p. 
54). She notes the traditional belief that quotidian activities are seen as posing both 
spiritual and physical realities for Māori. 
 
49 I draw a subtle but marked distinction in the examples that I have provided in these 
paragraphs between the social discrimination that occurs with racism (institutional and 
overt) and the very deep ‘pull’ of colonisation on the Māori self. Yet I acknowledge the 
link between the two forms of colonisation, and argue that the ontological equivalence 
brings about the subsequent conformity with institutions’ wishes that one sees 
manifesting in common settings. Therefore, by being made obvious entities, Māori are 
then able to fit in with the social criteria of whether they can call themselves iwi, whether 
they are eligible for funding for various health and educational initiatives, whether they 
may speak Māori in general settings, and so on.  
However, to focus on those social inequities without firstly identifying that arguably far 
more fundamental, often individual, experience is to only consider the surface 
manifestations of colonisation. Indigenous writer Waziyatawin (2004), along with Māori 
writers such as Smith (1999), Sheilagh Walker (1996), and Smith (2003), emphasises the 
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How deeply the sense of Being, and then the Māori self, is disturbed by these 
expectations in advance is impossible to quantify, but one may theorise about the 
disruption by drawing simultaneously on certain traditional and counter-colonial 
discourses. I noted the following about the practice of naming: 
 
Naming and reference still show flashes of … traditional beliefs. One 
would still be careful to call someone else by a name which was 
suitable for a particular location, even though the person may bear a 
number of names. Care had also to be taken when reciting whakawai, 
or translating ancestral sayings, where behind the words lay the mana 
of a number of authors, who immediately connected to the mana of 
particular lakes, mountains, and other whenua (Seed-Pihama 2004: 
50). (Mika, 2007, pp. 187-188)   
 
If the main message here is that the fluidity of the self is to be retained at all costs 
– and that, moreover, there were certain values attached to that process – then 
Zahlen and Figuren, as Novalis would have them in their literal and especially 
their ontological senses, threaten to move the self towards the opposite of that 
existential state. The reverse of this fluidity would be a fixed state of being50, 
                                                                                                                                 
huge colonial project that characterises the changes made to indigenous minds, through 
“the combined efforts of government institutions and Christian workers” (p. 360). I 
speculate that it is difficult to devote the spotlight to theoretical possibilities such as 
spiritual, emotional and intellectual colonisation without being tempted to refer back to 
those social inequities that manifest thereafter, but a focus on the underpinning causes 
and beliefs appears to be precisely what Cherryl Smith (2000) advocates when she states 
that “I have realised the urgency of beginning to make Maori philosophy more overt in 
our approaches to all aspects of the way we live our lives and the ways that we engage 
academic practice” (p. 44). 
One resolution to this problem is to theorise. My argument for decolonisation here is 
different to that of Pihama’s, which pushes for a unity of theory and practice; instead, I 
contend that it is now necessary to firstly theorise about the vast reach of colonisation, 
but, as Pihama (2005) rightly asserts, “within our experiences and practices” (p. 197). 
Theorisation in this way is reflective of what the individual brings with him or her, but it 
does not have as its first concern an immediately practical outcome (although this is 
preferable in the long term). I speculate that the focus on practical outcomes is a form of 
what Smith (2003) terms ‘common-sense’, distracting Māori from thinking about the 
highly theoretical activity of colonisation.    
 
50 McIntosh (2004) discusses that a ‘fluid’ identity is preferable to either a ‘fixed’ or 
‘forced’ identity. A fluid identity emphasises that self and the collective constitute 
culture. In this chapter, I argue that institutions have not just removed tangible Māori 
values and resources such as land, language and culture but have replaced them with 
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through having as its aim a neat order and arrangement of responses and 
interactions by Māori. Māori are brought into line, epistemologically and 
ontologically, with the expectations of institutions in numerous ways. It is the 
equivalence that is at issue here, for it ensures that Māori connect neatly with the 
preordained expectation of those institutions. Western institutions raise as 
questions the characteristics of Māori, the expectations of which Māori must 
meet. The institutions do not explicitly insist that Māori answer to those criteria 
but they confine the responses of Māori – in a literal and figurative sense – so that 
Māori either are in accordance with them or not. This either/or response insists 
that Māori orient themselves towards the external world as either an equivalent 
entity or as an entity that does not neatly fit. The effect of the highlighting of 
certain characteristics that the institution wishes to see from Māori is that Māori 
carry this highly illuminated, preferred self into other aspects of their lives that do 
not appear to be institutionally involved at all. The notion of Being, and the 
Geheimnis that results from it within things in the world, becomes forgotten. 
 
Preventing the autonomous manifestation of 
things: Die Tiefgelehrten 
Rowley Habib, a poet from Ngāti Tūwharetoa, penned the work “Ancestors”, 
which does not have the optimistic outcome envisaged by Novalis’ “Wenn nicht 
mehr” but does similarly require the reader to consider both the broader 
implications of colonisation and the events that enabled a change in worldview: 
 
Where once my ancestors grubbed for the fern’s root 
They build their hygienic homes now. 
And where the wild pig roamed and rooted 
They’ve measured the land into precise sections 
Worth 3000 dollars (or to sound better 
For the prospective buyer, 1500 pounds] (cited in Roscoe, 1992, p. 154).  
                                                                                                                                 
another worldview altogether.  
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Not only does the poem deal with settlers’ problematic developments with land 
that formerly belonged to Māori, as Roscoe (1992) correctly notes, but it also 
suggests that the land has been expunged of its natural, spiritual significance. 
Here we come close to a Zahlen and Figuren description if we draw away from 
those terms as just literally representing numbers and figures. Earth and its 
manifestations have been replaced with the “hygienic”, to begin with. Cleanliness 
is placed in the poem just after foraging for food, as a latecomer to the land. 
“Ancestors”, “grubbed” and “fern’s root” are all juxtaposed, indicating the wild, 
unkempt nature of the land, but “hygienic” and “homes” point to neatly contained, 
packaged and controlled environments. Noticing this, the poet is aware of the 
philosophical contrast. Zahlen and Figuren are reflected in the last three lines: 
Land can be cordoned off, measured and sold. ‘Precise sections’ are now the key 
to a correct perception of land, and through these Schlüssel, Kreaturen are 
dispatched. Moreover, through the neatly delineated sections, one can possibly 
relate in a much more logical way to land, which used to be an untamed 
phenomenon. Thinking about land outside of its colonially packaged way – that 
is, as one would in a way close to singen and küssen – is untenable. Taken in its 
totality, the poem suggests that one is encouraged to think of nature in ways 
plausible to the Tiefgelehrten51. 
 
Example: The Waitangi Tribunal: Die [trennenden] 
Weltgeschichten 
While this interpretation of Habib’s poem highlights certain substantive 
similarities with Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr”, I argue that the reader is even more 
urgently encouraged to consider both poems as precedents to focus on the 
somewhat gloomy nature of general institutional interaction for Māori, and not 
just physical loss that events bring about in a tangible sense but also their ongoing 
philosophical effects. Habib’s poem brings to our attention the problem of land 
loss and is an appropriate introduction for the geheimnislose impact of law. The 
                                                
51 ‘Tiefgelehrten’ for Novalis include priests, academics, jurists and statesmen. 
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Waitangi Tribunal is a good example to highlight the problem here, because it 
deals specifically with Māori grievances52. As a creature of statute the Waitangi 
Tribunal will unsurprisingly carry out the philosophical agenda of the dominant 
Western legal system, but it is rarely critiqued as being deeply prescriptive in its 
form and process. At the outset, when a claim is first lodged it is given a ‘WAI 
number’53. At this stage the claim is registered and referenced, and while the 
registration and numbering of a claim “are not an indication that the claim is well 
founded, or that the persons bringing it are appropriate representatives for those 
on whose behalf [the] claim is brought” (Waitangi Tribunal, 2007, p. 12) – this 
stage is just thought of as an administrative one - the beginning of the overall 
reduction of things in the world that normally hold their full mystery occurs 
through prescribed claim54. Thereafter occurs the process of research, which is 
overwhelmingly technical in nature, recounts historical events with a standard of 
proof as its aim, and speaks about things in the world and people also with that 
same objectifiable standard of proof in mind 55 . The greater the degree of 
Geheimnislosigkeit of the people and other things in the world the more those 
things in the world meet with the threshold of a claim. 
 
                                                
52 Just because it deals with obviously Māori issues does not mean that it is the sole forum 
of Geheimnislosigkeit for the Māori self, however. 
 
53 I have highlighted ‘number’ here to signal to the reader that the literal symbol of a 
number is ascribed to things in the world at the earliest stage of the process. The Zahlen 
process occurs earlier than this, however, with things in the world anticipated as separate 
entities even before any submission is made to the Waitangi Tribunal. I argue that the 
nature of the grievance itself compels Māori to suddenly orient themselves towards the 
things involved in that grievance as if separate from other things. 
 
54 The inherently emotional nature of the claim is avoided by the use of a statement of 
claim that lays out the nature of the grievance in a contained way.  
 
55 Accompanying the legal process is an administrative one that closely engages with the 
compliance of things in the world, including the client(s). This process is both manifestly 
and essentially Zahlen-based. Alongside the registering of the claim, clients are asked to 
provide financial and personal details if applying for Legal Aid. They then form part of a 
statistical analysis for the Ministry of Justice. Lawyers themselves are asked to justify 
their expenditure and are expected to keep time sheets. The sorts of details I describe here 
are expected given the huge government funding behind the expenditure, but they require 
some subtle translations from geheimnisvoll to geheimnislos.   
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In this process Māori claimants, or others with an interest in the claim, are 
allowed to give evidence. Here I argue the self is actively involved in connecting 
neatly with the sorts of questions that a legal institution prefers. The questions in 
that forum have an already desired response in mind and posit the Māori witness 
as the knowable other, regardless of whether the questions are in cross-
examination or evidence in chief. The entire process is designed to meet the 
overall strict standard of proof of a juridical system, with Māori themselves 
participating as interrogated entity. Before even a question is posed, then, the 
Māori witness is caught within the expectation/response process of an institution 
which attempts to remove all sense of the Absolute, and hence Geheimnis, from 
the written material, the witnesses and the questions and answers themselves56. In 
this exercise, language no longer brings together elements of Being, as I noted in 
chapter three, but instead aims to remove the interrelatedness and ultimate opacity 
that Being affords things in the world. 
 
This process involves a spectacle in which various actors participate. Māori are 
quite familiar with being the spectacle, I argue, but have not considered the 
moderated, highly restrictive forums in which this has taken place. Their 
familiarity with being highly visible (and audible) has its roots early in contact 
times. I contend that the regard that Māori and Pākehā had for each other at the 
outset was reciprocated; firstly, Pākehā regarded Māori as the Other and hence as 
a spectacle, and the regard that Māori in turn had for the onlookers was one that 
subconsciously recognised the need of Pākehā to witness the spectacle. Whether 
fighting to maintain control of lands - within the Native Land Courts or on sites of 
battle - or whether deciding that they had to fight to maintain cultural integrity, 
Māori were forced into providing a sensible event while trying to preserve all they 
                                                
56 The problem of the ‘institutional question’ is not widely written about amongst Māori. 
When discussed, colonisation is frequently a problem reduced to its overt physical 
symptoms, not thought of in the first instance as an influence on the recesses of the 
philosophical mind as we have seen Sheilagh Walker (1996) argue. With specific 
reference to health, Barnes (2000) highlights the focus that research has on visible 
elements that can be discovered and evidenced: “Frequently, issues of concern to Maori 
are not seen to be adequately addressed by non-Maori researchers and fail to answer 
questions other than those that are causation, disease and individually focused” (p. 3). 
The problem could be a similar one when Māori are forced into a Western institutional 
setting to explain a thing in the world in terms of its precise qualities and traits with no 
other discussion about related things in the world. 
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held valuable. As an offshoot, Māori constantly adhered to the behaviours that 
Pākehā expected; although there were individual ‘surprises’ relating to Māori 
behaviour, Māori would fight to defend their lands because they were ‘savages’57 
and as savages they would perform savagely. I propose more controversially that 
Māori were forced to watch the Other for further injustice, and so they developed 
a set of anxieties around adhering to Pākehā expectations, involving monitoring 
where Pākehā surveyors were, what the Pākehā headmistress was doing (and 
hence whether their children were performing), what the Pākehā judge would rule, 
and where the next onslaught would originate from. I assert that, although there 
were varying degrees to which Māori were subjected to the process of visibility, 
there were very few Māori, if any, who remained unscathed by an urge to watch. 
In watching, they were encouraged to believe that what lay before them was the 
most important thing; the phenomenon that gave rise to them could therefore be 
ignored. 
 
The highly visible, evident self and thing: [Un]echte Klarheit 
With this historical experience, it should come as no surprise that Māori would 
find themselves as the subjects of the spectacular in such forums as the Waitangi 
Tribunal. All actors or participants, such as lawyers, judge, and registrar, have 
their own role, and “the narratives that they encourage make the relations between 
the actors concrete and spectacular” (Mika, 2007, p. 194). Each of these actors 
thus fulfils a specific role of language by which their utterances have a purpose, to 
be heard and viewed by the other actors. Here, the process carefully scribes out 
what one may utter, and it is perhaps the Māori witness, having the relationship to 
the things in the world to be discussed, that is most tightly restrained. To begin 
with, a new identity is carved out for the Māori witness: 
 
Shalleck (1993: 1733) considers directly the impact on the client of 
the legal process, and argues that the construction of a client occurs in 
the exercise of law, primarily in two stages. Firstly the client is 
stripped of individual identity; they are therefore completely removed 
                                                
57 See for instance Moloney (2001), who examines the varying beliefs of settlers to 
perceived degrees of Māori civilisation. 
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from their social situation. This is an important step because it also 
replaces the context in which their case arose with the confines of the 
law. Their identities are then replaced with legal discourse and 
considerations. They are basically defined by the courts, a 
phenomenon reminiscent of Foucault’s (1989) analysis of the body in 
relation to the medical profession. (Mika, 2007, p. 194) 
 
Becoming a speaker about things in the world is the identity of that individual. 
They may possess tribal affiliations and specific Māori language skills but these 
attributes only make them more suitable to meet what is expected of them as 
knowledgeable other. As we saw in the introduction to this chapter, Novalis 
believed that Geheimnislosigkeit through a Zahlen approach to things in the world 
results in an ontological estrangement from “Umgebung”/[context], 
“Geschichte”/[history], “Boden”/[earth]. Importantly, this is not an estrangement 
dealt with by a philosophical term such as ‘ontological’ but might be better 
described as a traumatic one, with ‘trauma’ equating etymologically with the 
“Wunden” that he talks of. 
 
The fact that each identity in the court process has their role is perhaps evidence 
of their own constraint by the court process. My own concern is with Māori, but it 
is important to note that this constraint of other, seemingly unrelated persons – 
their divestment of their own identity – could have an impact itself on the Māori 
witness. This aspect of interaction between the actors is concerned with utterances 
– what may specifically be said and what may not. In this scenario, the Māori 
witness is asked a question, quite simply, but the question operates as a sort of 
constraining act of Vordenken, asking that the Māori witness respond in kind and 
with the equivalence that was set in train by the questioner. If we think about the 
realm within which Māori witnesses are forced to utter responses set down by the 
questioning other, then it becomes obvious that those witnesses are not separate 
from the questioner. But the relationship between them is not a beneficial one to 
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Māori; it is instead oppressive, because the room for open response, and the 
ability for the Māori witness to retain their own Geheimnis, is tightly prescribed58. 
A consequence of viewing things in the world as highly significant, at least to the 
degree that such institutions as the Waitangi Tribunal require, is their separation 
out from everything else. Discussing a thing in the world in this context, Māori 
are required to focus on it as a separate entity, neatly delineated out from its 
overall background59. For instance, in the Foreshore and Seabed case the term 
‘foreshore and seabed’ became the vernacular for what is thought by Māori to be a 
living, related being. The uptake of this form of naming occurred despite the 
Waitangi Tribunal’s (2004) acknowledgement that it is constrained by legal 
English: 
 
The need to distinguish the foreshore from the adjacent dry land and 
seabed arises from the English common law, which developed distinct 
rules for that zone. In Maori customary terms, no such distinction 
exists. We wanted to take our language out of the English legal 
paradigm. We raised with Sir Hugh Kawharu, a witness in our 
inquiry, whether there was a Maori term that clearly embraced the 
whole of the foreshore and seabed. Te takutaimoana was a term that 
he felt may be variously understood by different groups in different 
situations. To some, it had more of an inshore connotation, whereas 
                                                
58 Indeed, this sort of oppression must be considered in the numerous assertions that 
Māori law relied on spiritual balance, supernatural intervention, or tikanga (Jackson, 
1988). Where many writers tend to emphasise ‘spiritual balance’ as coming about 
through certain traditional practices, I focus here on the possibility that such a balance 
came about by the awareness that fragmentary situations and practices were undesirable. 
Constraining the response of the other by anticipating their purpose in advance constitutes 
an ontological problem for the Māori self (Mika, 2007). 
 
59 The problem of separating a discussion of something from the thing itself was one that 
Novalis was acutely aware of. As I note later in chapter seven, for instance, he questions 
the assumption that sign and signified are only arbitrarily related. The greater role of 
expression, through language, carving or weaving (in a Māori context) would instead be 
mystically informed where “[e]in reiner Gedanken – ein reines Bild, - eine reine 
Empfindung sind Gedanken, bilder und Empfindungen – die nicht durch ein 
correspondirendes Object erweckt etc. sondern außerhalb der sog[ennanten] 
mechanischen Gesetze – der Sfäare des Mechanism entstanden sind” (Novalis, 1960b, p. 
430)/“[a] pure thought – a pure image, - a pure sensation, are thoughts, images and 
sensations – that have not been aroused by a corresponding object etc. but have originated 
outside so-called mechanical laws” (Wood, 2007, p. 152). 
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others might understand it as also connoting the high seas. The word 
papamoana, simply meaning the bed of the sea, did not seem to be as 
widely used. We have therefore reluctantly resorted to the English 
terminology, foreshore and seabed. (pp. xi-xii) 
 
The use of legally defined language as a focus for discussing the thing has certain 
implications in the above example. Māori are brought to meet the expectations of 
the Tribunal in imagining that they are outside of the activity of the Absolute. In 
this they are encouraged to think of the entity in terms of its qualities60. The 
descriptions that will follow from this way of thinking ensure that the entity 
remains at some distance from the witness, and in using institutionally appropriate 
language, in Māori or English, the Māori self is effectively lifted out of their 
holistic engagement with the thing discussed, and Being is rarefied or forgotten in 
that exercise. 
 
                                                
60 Novalis states generally in Die Christenheit oder Europa that one can be alienated from 
things in the world through the kind of knowledge that seeks to define things in a final 
sense: “Mit Recht widersetzte sich das weise Oberhaupt der Kirche, frechen 
Ausbildungen menschlicher Anlagen auf Kosten des heiligen Sinns, und unzeitigen 
gefährlichen Entdeckungen, im Gebiete des Wissens. So wehrte er den kühnen Denkern 
öffentlich zu behaupten, daß die Erde ein unbedeutender Wandelstern sey, denn er wußte 
wohl, daß die Menschen mit der Achtung für ihren Wohnsitz und ihr irdisches Vaterland, 
auch die Achtung vor der himmlischen Heimath und ihrem Geschlecht verlieren, und das 
eingeschränkte Wissen dem unendlichen Glauben vorziehn und sich gewöhnen würden 
alles Große und Wunderwürdige zu verachten, und als todte Gesetzwirkung zu 
betrachten” (1960d, pp. 508-509)/“With [good reason and] justice, the wise head of the 
church resisted impudent developments of the human powers, and untimely discoveries in 
the realm of knowledge, that were at the expense of the sense for the divine. Thus he 
prevented the bold thinkers from maintaining publicly that the earth is an insignificant 
planet, for he knew all too well that, if people lost respect for their earthly residence and 
home, they would also lose their respect for their heavenly home and race, that they 
would prefer finite knowledge to an infinite faith, and that they would grow accustomed 
to despising everything great and miraculous and regard it as the dead effect of natural 
laws” (Beiser, 1996, pp. 62-63). 
Novalis hints that this alienation is not a mental one but a complete one, involving the 
very essence of the individual. 
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Overriding focus on highly visible presence: Zahlen 
und Figuren 
Participation in Waitangi Tribunal hearings, and the subsequent separation of 
things in the world from their contexts that occurs in a setting discussing a Māori 
view of things, is quite widespread. Knowledgeable elders, technical experts, 
presiding officers and lawyers are all involved. Yet one sees even more frequent 
participation in other court, educational and medical settings. The above example 
of the Waitangi Tribunal starts to introduce the glaring obviousness of the 
physical self, separated from its relationship with other things in the world (apart 
from what may be discussed in a detached way). This deterioration in the 
relationship of the individual to those things may even occur if the things in the 
world are discussed in Māori: The setting calls for a linear identification and 
discussion between a thing to be discussed and the discussant61, regardless of the 
language used. Although the relationship between discusser, thing, and of thing 
with thing may be buoyed to a certain extent by the location of the hearing – if it 
takes place on a local marae, for instance, then an argument could be made that, 
together with the use of Māori language, one is still amongst the interplay of 
things in the world – this relationship is compromised with the self’s movement 
                                                
61 Novalis resisted the practice of complete identity between thing and impression of the 
perceiver: “Auf Verwechselung des Symbols mit dem Symbolisirten – auf ihre 
Identisirung – auf den Glauben an wahrhafte, vollst[ändige] Repraesentation – und 
Relation des Bildes und des Originals – der Erscheinung und der Substanz – auf der 
Folgerung von äußerer Aehnlichkeit – auf durchgängige innere Übereinstimmung und 
Zusammenhang – kurz auf Verwechselungen von Subj[ect] und Obj[ect] beruht der ganze 
Aberglaube und Irrthum aller Zeiten, und Völker und Individuen” (1960b, p. 397)/“All 
the superstition and error of all times and peoples and individuals rests upon the 
confusion of the symbol with what is symbolised – upon making them identical – upon 
the belief in true complete representation – and relation of the picture and the original – 
of appearance and substance – on the inference from eternal similarity to complete inner 
correspondence and connection – in short on the confusions of subject and object” 
(Bowie, 1997, p. 66). The thing, while related to the subject, had to be approached as 
possessing its own, ultimately unknowable qualities. 
Nevertheless, the thing being represented had a link with the representation, although this 
association could not be depicted or expressed precisely. 
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into making statements of certainty about things in the world, and indeed with the 
self’s movement into isolation from other things62.  
 
This movement is at its most obvious in, but as we have seen is not limited to, a 
physical alienation. Answering questions with an outcome in mind, the self is 
anticipated and then viewed as an object of focus63. The solid, highly visible and 
physical self has its genesis in New Zealand history at a very early stage, from the 
insistence that one be present to lay claim to land in the courts as soon as the 
Native Land Court was established; with the setting up of the Native Schools, 
which among other consequences resulted in the child’s attendance being an 
issue64; and even with the outlawing of the practices of tōhunga, who worked with 
the mysterious in healing65 and not solely with the solid entity, the body, before 
                                                
62 According to Novalis, it is modern human tendency to make things in the world certain 
through the initial certainty of the self: “Die Geschichte der Welt als Menschengeschichte 
zu behandeln, überall nur menschliche Begebenheiten und Verhältnisse zu finden, ist eine 
fortwandernde, in den verschiedensten Zeiten wieder mit neuer Bildung hervortretende 
Idee geworden, und scheint an wunderbarer Wirkung und leichter Überzeugung beständig 
den Vorrang gehabt zu haben” (1960e, p. 84)/“To treat the history of the universe as a 
history of mankind, to find only human happenings and relations everywhere, is a 
continuous idea, reappearing at the most widely separate epochs, always in a new form, 
and this conception seems to have excelled all others in miraculous effect and 
persuasiveness” (2005, pp. 23-24).  Novalis identifies the replicating nature of the pursuit 
for certainty as it manifests itself in different guises but also observes in that same excerpt 
the importance of human creativity in relating to things in the world. His aphorism serves 
two ironic functions: to warn against thinking that one will validly only find the self 
everywhere, and simultaneously to recognise that creativity is a human asset.  
 
63 “Klügere Mitglieder wußten jedoch die schon warmgewordenen Zuhörer sogleich 
wieder mit kaltem Wasser zu begießen” (1960d, p. 516)/“More clever members knew 
how to throw cold water on their inspired audience” (Beiser, 1996, p. 70). In Die 
Christenheit oder Europa, as we have seen, Novalis states that this objectification had 
implications for the everyday practices of education and scholarship which were given a 
“neuern, vernünftigen, gemeinern Sinn” (Novalis, 1960d, p. 516)/“new, rational and 
common sense meaning” (Beiser, 1996, p. 70), working themselves into the institutional 
level. 
 
64 With the Education Ordinance 1847 Governor Grey instituted boarding schools to 
provide Māori children with the opportunity to focus more on education in an 
environment dedicated just to that and away from “the demoralizing influence of the 
Maori villages” (Barrington, 1966, p. 2). 
 
65 Mark and Lyons (2010) interviewed Māori healers and found that those healers’ 
practices engaged with what is now often termed ‘the supernatural’. The mysteriousness 
of things in the world and the effect on individuals may, amongst other factors, be linked 
back to inherited curses, or to a “lack of respect for the land” (p. 1760). In this latter 
scenario, sometimes the land itself needs healing for the ‘client’ to also heal. Healers 
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them. The last instance in turn has its precedence and subsequence in the idea that 
health should be predicated on the fragmentation of things in the world, through 
combating the undesirable by ‘proper’ hygiene practices66, and by the idea that an 
expert, himself trained in focusing on things in the world in isolation, is solely 
able to deal with ill health67. These self-consciously health-focused practices 
would sit alongside notions of racial superiority through measurements of native 
peoples, blood quantum practices and, in an interdisciplinary sense, through cross-
fertilisation and support from other disciplines such as law and education. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
talked of receiving signs in different ways about either land or client. According to Cram, 
Smith and Johnstone (2003), Māori health focuses on the holism of the body, spirit, 
emotion and mind, echoing Mark and Lyon’s thoughts in a more general way. 
 
66 There was an extensive push to have Māori conform to Western ideals of hygiene, 
beginning in the mid-19th century. The government of the time established vaccination 
programmes and hospitals (Dow, 1999) to try to combat Māori mortality rates, but these 
were thought to be quite inadequate (Simon & Smith, 2001). However, after Pope’s 
appointment as Inspector, sanitation programmes began in earnest, due in part to his 
belief that there was widespread “[n]ative ignorance and neglect of sanitary laws” 
(Education: Native Schools, 1884, p. 1). Native Schools adopted active policies on 
hygiene, which, according to Simon and Smith (2001), were directly related to “wider 
policies of assimilation and the domestication of Maori” (p. 203). Simon and Smith 
discuss the widespread impact of the “Laws of Health” and the “Gospel of Soap and 
Water” with direct reference to narratives provided by past pupils and teachers. Māori 
communities often resisted the imposition of hygiene rules on their children, although at 
other schools parents acquiesced. 
 
67 The privileging of Western medical science - which along with beliefs in civilisation 
fuelled these hygiene and health policies - reached one apex of many in 1907 with the 
introduction of the Tohunga Suppression Act. This Act was designed to prevent tōhunga 
from carrying out their healing practices and was backed by Native Minister Carroll 
(Durie, 1994). Besides actively making traditional practices illegal, one of the Act’s 
objectives was to force Māori to consult Western medicine, as traditional healing 
practices were thought to be exacerbating the ill health of Māori. The damaging effects of 
this Act on Māori communities have not been proven empirically, but it is commonly 
acknowledged amongst Māori to have delivered one of the most devastating blows to the 
social structures of Māori communities and to the qualitative and quantitative knowledge 
aspects of Māori healing. In statements of claim to the Waitangi Tribunal which are 
lodged on behalf of iwi, for instance, this Act frequently comprises a considerable and 
formative part of the grievance, with Durie (2001) describing it as “the greatest blow to 
the organisation of Maori knowledge and understanding” (p. 51). 
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Health as an issue of physical presence: Licht und 
Schatten 
A physical focus on health can to a certain extent explain the trauma experienced 
by groups of people when they are forcibly transplanted from a context that is 
characterised by traditional diet and practices into a foreign one. The onset of 
diseases like diabetes and cardiovascular diseases in relation to Māori is often 
posed as a social problem of colonisation, to the extent that these explanations 
note that the pre-colonisation diet did not predispose Māori to those and other 
diseases that they are now prevalent sufferers of (Cambie & Ferguson, 2003; 
Rush, Hsi, Ferguson, Williams, & Simmons, 2010), and that this diet may even be 
used to combat those problems. These accounts accord with a Zahlen-based 
explanation in their indication that Māori have been moved out of a certain, more 
authentic mode of living in relation to the foods and activities that they engage 
with. Practices associated with food and eating – indeed, the nature and function 
of food at its most fundamental level – are also currently forgotten so that the food 
is constructed as an inert source of wellbeing, according to these explanations. 
 
Zahlen-derived explanations for the place of the self in relation to the expert, and 
the self as that which reveals disease, are more fundamental than even those 
outlined above, though. In law and medicine the same problem exists as a current, 
disciplining one, where Māori must appear before the clinic or the court as a 
highly evident entity, displaying a particularly evident phenomenon – medical or 
moral68. The fundamental principle of both is that the criminal or the invalid is 
actually physically present before what Foucault (1989) terms ‘the Gaze’. Here, 
obviously, what is extremely important to the practice of medicine and law is the 
physical presence of the Māori individual, an idea that itself may be critiqued. My 
earlier critique of the Waitangi Tribunal holds true for other courtroom practices 
                                                
68 In both medical and legal academic and political contexts it is often argued that Māori 
figure disproportionately because of the traumatic and intergenerational effects of 
colonisation – see for instance:  Durie (2005); Jackson (1988); Walker (2004); Durie 
(2003); Goldsmith (2002). Spiritual dispossession is an element of trauma which, I am 
arguing, continues in the apparently straightforward and clinical forums of law and 
medicine. 
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as well. In the case of medicine – for instance, in the visit of the Māori self with 
the doctor – the Māori individual can be given a diagnosis after his or her 
individual appearance. Rather than the body being thought of as ‘tinana’, where 
the energy of mauri, and the interplay of the Absolute as it relates things in the 
world to what is called the body, illness is seen as a result of “personal 
dysfunction” (Durie, 1985, p. 483) and is demarcably evident in that sense. The 
diagnostic tools introduced by Western science are extremely useful for the 
visibilising of the physical body: They can firstly frame the body in relation to a 
state of normalcy and then assess where disease lies and, moreover, its properties. 
After Foucault, the Gaze can plunge deeply into the viscera of the person before it 
by reading the signs of illness inscribed on the body. The body is therefore a 
phenomenon that displaces air and space and may be thought of as a measurable 
entity. Disease is similarly a physical manifestation, exhibiting itself within 
individual bodies. Alongside – or beneath - the general change in the perception 
about diet amongst Māori due to colonisation, then, there rests a much more 
fundamental change in the way that disease, associated with the Absolute and 
other things in the world, is represented. 
 
In tandem with this change, new names, many of which etymologically reflect the 
physicality and isolation of these diseases, were introduced. In traditional belief 
‘mate’ could refer to an imbalance of tapu and noa, even in the case of ‘mate 
tangata’69. This expression for an imbalance takes into account the activity of 
things in the world as they come to bear on the ancestral body, which itself 
actively participates with things in the world. However, terms such as ‘measles’70, 
‘diabetes’71, and ‘cancer’72 - terms which Māori encounter regularly – are now 
                                                
69  Durie (1994) maintains that mate tangata, “accidents, injuries sustained through 
combat” (p. 17), could be distinguished from mate atua, which were believed to be 
illnesses with no physical causation. Despite this apparent distinction, many Māori will 
still attribute a spiritual cause to mate tangata. 
 
70 Measles derives from Middle English ‘maseles’, referring to pustule, or spot on the 
skin (Onions, 1966). 
 
71 Diabetes derives from Greek for ‘to go through’, where the disease was “marked by 
immoderate discharge of urine, containing glucose” (Onions, 1966).  
 
72 According to Onions (1966) ‘cancer’ derives from “crab, creeping ulcer” … “on 
account of the resemblance to a crab’s limbs of the swollen veins about the part affected.” 
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dominant, together with their tendency to describe a solid, physical manifestation. 
The significance of this change is more than just an incidental change in names; it 
reflects the overall drive to keep the body scribed out from its context, in stark, 
visible relief, and to identify with as much precision as possible an offending 
element. 
 
The drive of the self to express him- or herself with 
precision: Schlüssel aller Kreaturen 
Encouraged by the apparent reification and visibility of things in the world, the 
self is able to prescribe some criteria for what a thing actually is. To some extent 
this assuredness, for the Māori self at least, arises as a response to a history of 
traumatic events that catapulted Māori into social uncertainty. From very early 
contact times, Māori had to contend with a number of situations in which things in 
the world would be compulsorily explicated and affirmed as comprising certain 
characteristics. The lived experience of Māori was such that very little would 
resemble what it first appeared to be. The uncertainty introduced by colonisation 
ensured that the grounds shifted for Māori, leading to a particular insecurity, both 
individually and collectively73. Individually, the Māori self was left hesitant in 
their approach to a number of institutions. Rules governing the individual would 
change. In the case of Māori land, for instance, Māori were confronted with a 
whole host of changes, with land devolving in continuously changing ways 
between various statutes74. Education would similarly manifest a host of changes, 
                                                                                                                                 
 
73 There are numerous writings about the traumatic impact of colonisation on indigenous 
peoples. For those which allude to a subsequent sense of uncertainty, see: Smith (1999); 
Pihama (2001); Duran, Duran and Brave Heart (1998); Brave Heart (2004); Farrelly, 
Rudegeair and Rickard (2005). The continuing institutional push for Māori to define 
things in the world with precision is, I argue, equally as traumatic as those well-known 
events that took place with colonisation. Trauma in this sense is not solely confined to 
what can be felt or defined; it is instead a largely hidden phenomenon that resides in the 
murkiness of everyday dealings with Geheimnislosigkeit. 
 
74 Since the Native Land Act 1865, Māori have had to contend with a bewildering raft of 
legislation that deals with who may succeed to land shares, who may set up trusts for the 
administration of shares, who may buy shares, who may sell shares, and which 
application forms are the correct ones for all these processes to take place, to name some 
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from biblically based teaching to secular teaching, and through the 
allowance/disallowance of Māori language in schools.  
 
The drive to be precise about things in the world is then perhaps stronger in a 
social sense for indigenous peoples despite assured assertions being in conflict 
with a philosophical respect for the Absolute. The Geheimnislosigkeit of the ‘I’ 
understandably becomes an overriding concern here. Thus criteria are established 
by and about the traumatised group. Philosophically, the drive to find the ground 
of existence comes about by an expectation that the self is the ground of 
awareness and can then discern what a correct proclamation is about a thing in the 
world. Institutionally, this takes place in the most common settings and with what 
appear to be the most banal media: Governmental forms that specify a number of 
tribal names that the Māori individual is meant to align with and tick are an 
immediate example. At a grander but less socially pervasive level, this drive can 
be expressed through criteria that are set up to neatly package a formerly 
mysterious thing in the world, such as in highly prescribed research. An approach 
to research that posits the self as the inquirer and the other as knowledgeable 
shows that the assuredness of things in the world can occur especially in 
institutions that wish to find a thing out75. An already established research 
method, for instance, would mean that there is an expected outcome from which 
expected objects, defined in advance, would be engaged with to produce answers. 
Some indigenous writers argue for an historical precedence to research: 
 
The charter for rangahau in Maori culture is laid down in a Maori 
explanation of the genesis of the world.  In this particular version 
(Walker, 2004) of the Maori genesis of the world Tane and his 
                                                                                                                                 
examples. These causes for uncertainty also highlight the administrative problems that 
Māori would have to surmount in order to have land viewed as discussable by the Courts 
to begin with. At all times, though, the self and land were highly visible and 
geheimnislose entities, despite the various regulations overseeing them. 
 
75 Jones (2001) questions the possibility of there being any satisfactory pedagogical 
approach to teaching. She contends that because of the chasm between indigenous 
understanding of knowledge and western pedagogy “all teaching … is inevitably 
unsatisfactory or impossible – because it is based in the persistent and inevitable 
pedagogical fantasy about the linear and cumulative increase in knowing” (p. 288).   
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siblings lived in a world devoid of light between their sky father and 
earth mother.  The siblings saw the light through the armpit of their 
father and this formed the question of what was beyond, light, the 
metaphor for knowledge became the catalyst for rangahau.  They 
wished to separate their parents from their primeval embrace so as to 
experience the world outside their parents.  They were also faced with 
the dilemma of whether separating their parents was ethical.  Some of 
the siblings supported the idea and some did not and they had to solve 
the problem of just how to separate their parents.  Many of them tried, 
unsuccessfully, as they tested their theories on how best to achieve 
their goal.  Eventually it was Tane who as a result of his searching 
nature, separated his parents (Walker, 2004).  The spirit of enquiry, 
theorising, empirical testing and knowledge created and inscribed in 
the Maori creation is woven through other ancient narratives. 
(Edwards, 2009, p. 17) 
 
The emphasis here is on the creative individual, which as we have seen is not 
inimical to a reading of Being. Here, the creative individual is read as performing 
a deed for change, but the matter of emphasis is an important one: Edwards 
emphasises that the acting individual is solely responsible for creating a point of 
inquiry (and thereafter a resolution): I argue on the other hand that the individual 
is constantly interacted by, and interacts with, other things in the world that are 
sometimes unidentifiable, and thus is affected by a desire to find out. But in 
deciding that the self is the beginning of this process, one has managed to avoid 
the impact of the Geheimnis so that one stands out from other things in the world. 
A precise definition of the self is arrived at through the current sort of research 
that does not acknowledge sometimes unknowable elements of things in the 
world. 
 
The excerpt of Edwards’ may also intend to acknowledge the Absolute, but unless 
it is explicitly allowed for then the idea dominantly becomes that the desire to 
inquire into another thing in the world is due to the self. That the self is the alpha 
of this process is one that Meyer (2008) likewise resists when, citing Calvin Hoe, 
she asks “[t]he question is, Who is the self? You’re not just who you are now. 
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You’re aligned with people who have gone through it lots and lots of times” (p. 
218). With Meyer’s assertion we can see that the certainty of the self is brought 
into issue far more than it is by Edwards. Meyer goes on to say that knowledge is 
“a life force connected to all other life forces. It is more an extension than it is a 
thing to accumulate” (p. 218). Thus she subscribes to an active, ongoing process 
of coming to be acquainted with things in the world so that we can “enter spaces 
of wonderment”.  She poses an altogether less empirical and more 
phenomenological approach to things in the world, as a means of progressing a 
research methodology. The self is inquisitive as a response to other things in the 
world, and the other is possessed of their own Geheimnis and avoids being an 
entity to approach for knowledge. 
 
Adhering to specific criteria might be reasonable if it were just an occasional 
‘incident’, but it is the pervasive essence of rigid and precise categories that is 
vexing for Novalis’s critique, as we have seen. The Māori health researcher might 
be expected to perform according to Rangahau Hauora Māori: Investment Signal 
published by Health Research Council of New Zealand (2012), for instance, and 
one might then think that it is just an isolated example of how one should operate 
in terms of one’s role as inquirer, but in fact it is the constant presence of a drive 
for precise selves and others that is important for Zahlen and Figuren to continue. 
Some forms of research, where the self is self-assured, are just examples of that 
problem. Another manifestation of this drive for an evident self is in the 
positioning of the self as a traditionally acting entity. It is to this example that I 
now turn.  
 
The split between ceremonial and everyday thought 
Among the other consequences of this colonising process is that the individual is 
encouraged to move outside of the interplay of things in the world so that they can 
discuss those things. In their identity as discussants it is assumed that the Māori 
knowledgeable/knowable other will provide information about those things, rather 
than dwell within their mysterious relationship. The witness in a legal setting is 
encouraged to move out of the dwelling that Novalis encouraged in Die Lehrlinge 
zu Sais to look at those things in the world as if they lay before him or her. 
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Expressions of identity play an important role here: As we have seen, the 
utterances that such institutions as the Waitangi Tribunal aim for are those which 
can neatly and precisely deal with things in the world, including Māori. 
Constituting agents of Zahlen and Figuren, Western institutions are concerned 
with concise discussions, and the kinds of literature that Māori encounter from 
Government departments may either be sourced in language about Māori or 
require involvement by Māori in many forms. In the former, which is largely 
linked with governmental policy, Māori can read about themselves as if they are 
obvious, evident entities, acting in set and certain ways, or they can be viewed as 
problematic entities which do not meet a set of normal expectations. Both 
instances here, however, have as their basis the same descriptive, highly 
classifying aspect of language. Here, Māori are this or do that.  
The institutionally prescribed traditional self 
As the clear entities that policy proposes, Māori fall into a concise category of 
either transparently traditionally acting beings or else of ontologically unmatched 
to Western institutions, particularly to law, health and education. The language of 
policy that talks about Māori as currently evident entities that are nevertheless 
historically derived appears to confer upon Māori the certainty of tradition76. It is 
a language that is borne of observations of anthropologists, historians, and 
behaviourists77. Ultimately it is a discourse that, because of its assured approach 
                                                
76 Barcham (1998) notes this tendency in his assertion that “[t]he continual reference by 
government and the courts to perceptions of Maori society of today as a replica of Maori 
society of 1840, fails to take in to consideration the evolution of Maori society” (p. 306).  
 
77 Heidegger thinks that tradition itself becomes obscured and solidified rather than 
viewed as a silently manifest continuity: “Die hierbei zur Herrschaft kommende Tradition 
macht zunächst und zumeist das, was sie ‘übergibt’, so wenig zugänglich, daß sie es 
vielmehr verdeckt. Sie überantwortet das Überkommende der Selbstverständlichkeit und 
verlegt den Zugang zu den ursprünglichen ‘Quellen’, daraus die überlieferten Kategorien 
und Begriffe z. T. in echter Weise geschöpft wurden. Die Tradition macht sogar eine 
solche Herkunft überhaupt vergessen. Sie bildet die Unbedürfigkeit aus, einen solchen 
Rückgang in seiner Notwendigkeit auch nur zu verstehen” (1993, p. 21)/“When tradition 
thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so 
inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition 
takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access 
to those primordial ‘sources’ from which the categories and concepts handed down to us 
have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had 
such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is 
something which we need not even understand” (1967, p. 43). Although Heidegger was 
 202 
to things, locates Māori in a particular space so that they may thereafter talk about 
themselves as either traditionally certain or uncertain. Māori are hence caught 
here in a language that is dichotomising, with preference being given to those that 
can read themselves as traditional, according to the unstated criteria of the policy 
literature. It must be said that the language of policy, when it concerns Māori, 
never blatantly offers Māori a choice of whether they are traditional or somehow 
non-traditional, but it opens up a solidly preferred, yet not directly stated, mode of 
identity. The language that expresses this preference may start at the beginning, in 
the form of an ancient proverb: 
 
E kore e ngaro 
He kākano i ruia mai i Rangiātea 
 
I will never be lost 
For I am a seed sown from Rangiātea 
 
This proverb is included at the beginning of a report undertaken by the Law 
Commission (2001) titled Maori Customs and Values in New Zealand Law. Taken 
solely it will not threaten a Māori view of the world, but it does hint at what is to 
come in the report. The report itself is nothing unusual in that it arises as the result 
of a perceived problem – in this case, that Māori tīkanga/customs are not reflected 
in Western law – and it does offer some discussion about the changing nature of 
tīkanga and identity, yet in order to explicate a desired approach to integrating the 
two laws it is the very tidy, concise language depicting traditional activity that is 
referred to. The language of solution is that which describes this activity.  
The restriction of tikanga to the ceremonial realm 
Māori custom is simplified in these reports. A dominant means of securing a 
simplified custom is through the traditionalising of behaviour, for if government 
literature were to engage with an idea of a sophisticated culture that critically 
engaged with language and Geheimnislosigkeit in a philosophical manner to solve 
                                                                                                                                 
expressly discussing the uncritical uptake of a Being-denied Western metaphysics, his 
comments may be useful for the Māori reader as they suggest that one focus critically on 
the set of behavioural traditions as solid, identifiable entities. For him, this is an 
undesirable and uncritical mode of interaction with one’s heritage. 
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the problem of what is essentially the dominance of Western institutions then 
clarity is thwarted. Where the ill health of Māori is raised as an issue, for example, 
then a similar reversion to the apparently traditional ways of behaving is seen 
tacitly or explicitly as a panacea, with the result that the idea of a Māori culture is 
preserved. Māori culture is thereby neatly contained, and through the discourse of 
traditionalism it cannot threaten to overrun the fraught nature of the institutions 
that Māori have problems with. Another means of description that may outline 
some traditional behaviours but that is primarily and overtly critical, not just 
descriptive, is much more likely to produce difficulties for those institutions. This 
is not just because it expressly threatens those institutions in what it articulates but 
also because it is uncontainable: It is less likely to make culture highly evident for 
a start, and it threatens to move the focus away from an expected and predictable 
behaviour – usually ritualised - of Māori, to the problem of the institution itself.  
 
In focusing on a set of traditional practices, such discourses threaten to neglect the 
birthright of the self to dwell on a daily basis within the realm of being Māori. 
The practices in themselves do not threaten a respect for this ‘withinness’, but an 
emphasis on them as preferred skill-sets does. An emphasis on traditional 
practices – the ability to perform or carry out a traditional practice in particular – 
means that the possibility of an everyday experience of dwelling within things in 
the world, without any outward expression, is discouraged or even disallowed. 
Here, a person may carry out an activity in an everyday sense but this is not seen 
as especially Māori. Yet the traditional idea that one is the embodiment of one’s 
ancestors, mountains, lakes and so on has its basis in the belief that what is 
performed is contingent on what the interplay of those elements is. What are now 
thought of as traditional practices, in other words, are obvious expressions of 
being part of that interplay but are not definitive of it. 
  
The problem of one ontologically special language: A place for non-speakers of 
Māori 
The power that Novalis believed was innate to poesy has consequences that 
branch into two directions for the Māori self. The first scenario is that the Māori 
language is inherently special and powerful. In order to transform things in the 
 204 
world that are important to Māori collectively, at least in a spiritual sense, one 
should be conversant with the Māori language. The ability to comport oneself 
authentically towards things in the world is dependent on using te reo Māori, 
because te reo Māori somehow possesses an inwardly unique specialness when 
compared with other languages. This line of thought places particular emphasis on 
the need for speech, and, moreover, speech in a proper language. This view of a 
language special above all others is one that Heidegger preferred – and one that 
often earns him sharp criticism - with his assertion that “[d]enn diese 
[griechische] Sprache ist (auf die Möglichkeiten des Denkens gesehen) neben der 
deutschen die mächtigste und geistigste zugleich” (1953, p. 43)/“[f]or along with 
German the Greek language is (in regard to its possibilities for thought) at once 
the most powerful and most spiritual of all languages” (1959, p. 57). While not 
stated outright, the assumption is that one should not attempt Māori ceremonies 
without a certain level of competency in the Māori language. It is a view that is 
easily the most accepted amongst Māori communities and individuals. The Māori 
individual who wields te reo Māori in a poetic sense would be especially 
identified as an expert rendering spaces and people ‘noa’/[occupying more of a 
common space than a sacred one] or ‘tapu’ [within a space of sacrality]. Te reo 
Māori, used after poesy, does then escape the confines of Zahlen. 
 
Despite the apparent distinctiveness innate to the Māori language, however, it is 
instead its ability as one language of many to reflect the relationship of things in 
the world, with its glimpses of Being, that makes it powerful. If we keep Novalis’ 
Zahlen in mind, then language that expresses the interrelationship of things in the 
world is that which is capable of dispelling the ‘perverse word’. As language 
produces “eine Welt für sich aus” (Novalis, 1960c, p. 672)/[a world by itself], 
according to O’Brien it is “a ‘natural’ phenomenon among others” (p. 197), and 
hence reflects the interplay of things in the world. In this the Māori language is 
not singular, although for the Māori self it may be of psychological solace that it 
represents the relationship more effectively than other languages. Language in 
general reflects this relationship when used poetically, and individuals that do not 
speak or understand Māori may still be capable of comporting themselves towards 
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things so that all those elements retain their Geheimnis78. Further, specific 
knowledge of the Māori language may not be necessary for some individuals who 
are Māori but lack traditional knowledge. In these cases language as a specific 
entity may or may not be a factor in the comportment of those individuals to 
things, but the individuals are nevertheless operating within the interplay of those 
things. When they do speak, their words – even if in a language other than Māori 
– have an effect on the outer world. In other words, they operate in an ancestral 
and ontological space that, with regards to the ontological sphere, is not 
substantially different from those who possess traditional knowledge or who can 
speak Māori. 
 
My argument here is not to downplay the importance of any inherent uniqueness 
of Māori language, but instead to note that the Absolute that gives rise to this 
uniqueness is shared by other languages, or that it even exists within realms of 
silence. What is crucial is whether any language being used reveals that there is a 
fluid relationship between things. There is also a social aspect to my argument, 
because often the abilities and skills of Māori to act in a Māori way are 
overlooked if they do not have the accompanying knowledge. Whilst both 
traditional and non-traditional individuals, carrying outward expressions of being 
amongst things in the world, do not convey with them the currently preferred 
ways of acting in a Western sense, they are nevertheless as much a part of those 
things in the world. Both groups of people – some of those working with 
traditional practices, and some operating in an everyday sense within things in the 
world but who do not have any Māori knowledge – are working with things in the 
world whilst operating within them. Consciously aware of this, these individuals 
come close to matching Novalis’ idea of the creative self. The individual saying a 
karakia to clear the house after a death, for instance, is clearly acknowledging the 
Geheimnis of things in the world whilst actively calling on some things for a 
desired effect, but the individual who undertakes the most banal task is at times no 
less in that same space. 
 
                                                
78 Especially if they choose to romanticise what is normally assumed to be the given 
approach to things in the world. I apply this process in chapter seven. 
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The everyday self operating within Being 
My argument for the parity of these selves is less prescriptive than that commonly 
allowed for the Māori individual because it claims that practices are one important 
area of several. In all these modes of being, the self appears to be immersed 
within the workings of the Absolute, and conveys that appearance to others. 
Whilst I do not deny the importance of traditional practices as expressions of 
specific acts with the Absolute, the emphasis on them detracts from the 
significance of that immersion. This over-emphasis may result in a focus on 
events disparate from the ongoing activity of Being, as I have argued. A third sort 
of individual, commonly thought of as operating within a space of intellectualism, 
is the one who actively engages with the theory and/or reality of colonisation. 
That they consciously react against, and commonly operate within, Western 
frameworks, shows a similar creativity to that of the other selves. The Spiel of 
creativity here is one that deliberately considers the form and essence of 
colonising practices and operates with things in the world whilst being immersed 
within them. This individual does not seek to transcend their present moment by 
highlighting a static traditionalism but instead stays within that moment to 
critically engage with things brought into their awareness. I argue that the current 
influx of Western educated Māori – teachers, lawyers, doctors, academics, 
scientists, alongside activists, for instance – potentially carry with them a way of 
operating that discloses to others the outward expressions of their relationship of 
things in the world, including history, colonial oppression and freedom, and 
ancestors. The conditional here, I continue, is that they remain thoughtful of 
Western colonisation in carrying out their professional duties79. This is often a 
difficult undertaking for these individuals and so is a kind of dwelling that 
requires an engagement of thinking about, and awareness of, things in the world 
other than the traditional. The act of thinking here, as we shall see in chapter 
seven, is a conscious withholding from the self as central figure; the thinking here 
operates much less with static bytes of knowledge and much more with being 
tentative towards the Geheimnis of things. I argue that this is a thoughtful but 
                                                
79 In this way of thinking, I argue, they are engaging in the metaphysical dialectic that has 
been founded by korekore by constantly taking into account an oppositional or colonised 
reality. These professional roles are conventional evidence of the ‘Tiefgelehrten’, but the 
static regard that underpins them may be disrupted by an awareness of their 
metaphysically colonising tendencies. 
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precarious space because the self must somehow have a traditional respect for 
Geheimnis and the Absolute but also be thoughtfully open to the practice of 
thinking that things in the world are geheimnislos. In pre-contact times this would 
have been thought of as a space that is equally as precarious as that occupied by 
the tohunga who is opening a wharenui, for instance: In both cases, the self is in a 
state of dwelling amongst things in the world but especially adopts a position of 
vulnerability in respect of those things80. 
 
It may be obvious to the reader that I am moving towards a suggestion in this 
section: that the notion of tīkanga be broadened. ‘Tīkanga’ is overwhelmingly 
constructed as a set of behaviours that carry with them discernibly unique traits of 
Māori expression. My argument in this section has been that such an approach 
accords with a constrictive manifestation of Zahlen and Figuren and threatens to 
reject a somewhat prior phenomenon – a belief that one is operating within the 
realm of Being. A counter-argument could be mounted that the term itself does 
not preclude these other modes of operating amongst things in the world but that 
it instead just intends to point to traditional behaviours. This is a credible 
argument, but the term itself has proliferated in reference to traditional behaviours 
to the neglect of that prior state of being. 
The positioning of language as an instrument of precision 
There are two problems to be discussed in relation to language. These are: 
 
1. That language itself is a phenomenon that is thought of in advance and 
then in practice as an instrument to convey precise meaning. 
2. That individual Māori terms, even when not contextualised amongst 
institutionalising discourses, may be used to open up a geheimnislose view 
                                                
80 López (1998) highlights this vulnerability when discussing the responsibility of the 
indigenous scholar in “writing against the mainstream” (p. 226). Briefly, he asserts that 
the problem lies in “engaging non-traditional epistemological forms in research” which 
he undertakes to be audible against “scientistic frameworks”. Specifically in respect of 
research, Mahuika (2009) observes the postcolonial experience of having to provide the 
‘other’ Māori perspective in certain mainstream contexts and notes the continuing burden 
of this set of anxieties. His remark can be broadened to engage with the experiences of 
many indigenous professionals as they mediate between the colonising nature of 
Geheimnislosigkeit and arguing for various Māori worldviews. 
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of things in the world. This problem may occur even if those terms are 
held out to be inherently important. 
 
Due to my focus on Māori terms in the thesis, and their colonisation by a 
geheimnislosen view of things in the world in the first instance, I shall leave the 
latter problem until the following chapter, but turn to the first of these problems 
now. 
 
The precedence that specifically develops the position of language as merely an 
envelope of precise meaning81 takes many forms in New Zealand, and a complete 
description is beyond the scope of this thesis82. Pawley (1989) who refers to the 
                                                
81 And yet “a piece of writing or a speech therefore has its own mauri” (C. Smith, 2000, 
p. 43). The process of speaking is hence an action of mauri as much as the final outcome. 
Just as the process does not emphasise correctness as the predicate for mauri, neither does 
the outcome. 
 
82 By sheer dint of its existence, the education system abstracted the worldview of Māori, 
and thus the objects referred to. It also set about interrupting and reconfiguring directly a 
Māori view of the world. Literature dealing with the education of Māori in Western 
schools is densely populated with comments about the apparent superiority of English, 
often with no justification of those assertions. However, there were a number of instances 
in which the precision of the English language was mentioned in support of its 
importance. In the second reading of the 1867 Native Schools Bill in the House of 
Representatives, for instance, Carleton (1867) mentioned the imperfect state of the Māori 
language in comparison with English: 
 
They could never civilize them through the medium of a language that 
was imperfect as a medium of thought. If they attempted it, failure 
was inevitable; and civilization could only be eventually carried out 
by means of a perfect language. (p. 863)  
 
The 1867 Native Schools Act insisted that instruction be in English. That provision of the 
Act was subsequently upheld by Takamoana (1871), who was a Member of Parliament, 
and Simon & Smith (2001) note that in 1877 Wi Te Hakiro petitioned Parliament for an 
amendment to the 1867 Act, along with 336 others. Their proposed amendment specified 
that prospective native schoolteachers were to have no facility in the Māori language. 
That Māori were supportive of the move to oust Māori language and to embrace the 
teaching of English is undeniable, but this also probably indicates the success of the 
wider social and economic machinery of colonisation at that time.  
Carleton’s comments reflected the near universal endorsement, common to that era, of the 
linguistic superiority of English. English would provide Māori with access to the civilised 
world, but in its own right it was naturally precise and capable of correctness. The Māori 
language could only be used if it would step the students up to a better usage of English; 
hence Māori was seen as an auxiliary language, although the use of Māori altogether in 
schools would later be banned. Māori would have been associated with a preliminary step 
to a language that was naturally precise, and by implication was contrasted with the idea 
of precision. The focus on the precise use of language continued well into the twentieth 
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“analytic task” of studying another language gives a good example of the view of 
language as an instrument of precision. He continues that: 
 
We need to treat language as part of a culture, a system of knowledge, 
and look at the structure of that knowledge as it is codified (author’s 
own emphasis) in the structural formulas and the vocabulary of the 
language. That means examining the semantic organisation of the 
vocabulary and of discourse. (p. 21) 
 
The clear belief here that language should be systematised and broken down into 
its smallest components to be ready for an ‘analytic task’ is by no means solely 
that of Pawley’s. It has its roots in the linguistic study of language, which is a 
scientific study of language (Fromkin et al., 2000). Resorting to linguistics to 
unambiguously describe the framework of language has also been taken up with 
some enthusiasm by leading Māori writers in the area of language revitalisation. 
For instance, Karētu and Waite (1989) assert that “[f]ortunately, those who 
developed the writing system were good linguists – their legacy is a system 
founded on scientific principles” (p. 219). They also highlight the special and 
important aspects of te reo Māori. It is important to note here that a scientific 
study of language may lead to a technical understanding. Thus it is not wrong per 
se; it may indeed be achieving exactly what it set out to achieve. But more critique 
should be directed at the extent to which institutions endorse a scientific approach 
to language, to things in the world and then the terms that refer to them. The 
instances that could be recounted here are numerous: One example lies in a 
                                                                                                                                 
century, with the inspector of Māori schools noting in 1931 that Māori students were still 
not able to correctly express themselves in English (Barrington, 1966). Through those 
statements and in those forums, Māori were thus subjected to a view of precise, correct 
language, not one that was spiritual or emotional. 
It is true that knowledge traditionally had to be passed on accurately, with well-known 
writers such as Benton (1989) stating that “[t]raditional Maori education placed great 
emphasis on linguistic proficiency” (p. 7); however, the accuracy element may not have 
been the determining one in respect of language for Māori. Other explanations altogether 
could have been equally compelling, including the non-human, nature-derived origin of 
some forms of language, for instance, or the relationship of mauri with language. But the 
focus of schools, statute, and legal institutions was not on those alternative explanations, 
and thus Māori were overwhelmingly exposed to the notion that language was a tool for 
the communication of correct ideas. The very sources of language were being displaced 
with a subjectivist, yet objective, view of language. 
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research project I worked on with other researchers, which focuses on Māori 
attitudes to fertility. In January 2009 a discussion document titled Consultation on 
the Use of In Vitro Maturation in Fertility Treatment was published by Advisory 
Committee on Reproductive Technology and released for feedback. The one page 
section “Māori Perspectives” deals with ethical practice under the Human 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 and at times bolds the words ‘te ao 
Māori’, ‘whakapapa’, ‘mana’, ‘whanaungatanga’, ‘tino rangatiratanga’, 
‘kaitiakitanga’, ‘whare tangata’, and ‘tikanga’. These Māori words, then, are 
represented as novel ones that are moved out in the text, and impact on the reader 
as significant and possibly separate phenomena 83 . However, that they are 
immediately equivalent with their common English translations within the terrain 
of written text becomes clear. For instance, in the fourth paragraph:  
 
Some Māori have raised concerns over who has the mana to make 
decisions about the use of assisted reproductive technology. 
Recognition of mana through the potential involvement of whānau in 
decision-making is important because it: 
• gives whānau an opportunity to explore ways to address 
infertility (an expression of whanaungatanga). (Advisory 
Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology, 2009, p. 10) 
 
In the context in which they are used, these words mean no more than their 
English counterparts, where ‘mana’ could be substituted with ‘power’, ‘whānau’ 
with ‘families’, and ‘whanaungatanga’ with ‘family bondedness’. While Māori 
might know these words to be more than the connotations of the English 
translations, or indeed something else altogether, it is still likely that these 
unproblematic equivalences can move into common discourse. Unless these 
words are defined as something much greater in the context in which they are 
used, then they are constrained by the dominant Western context.   
                                                
83 Novalis laments that fragmenting things in the world has dire consequences for the 
delicate interrelationship between them. This method can be contrasted with the holism of 
the poets: “Wenn diese [die Dichter] mehr das Flüssige und Flüchtige mit leichtem Sinn 
verfolgten, suchten jene mit scharfen Messerschnitten den innern Bau und die 
Verhältnisse der Glieder zu erforschen” (1960e, p. 84)/“Poets have lightheartedly pursued 
the liquid and fugitive, while scientists have cut into the inner structure and sought after 
the relations between its members” (2005, pp. 25-26). 
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Quite apart from that political problem that characterises the hegemonic 
movement of a Māori term to meet the strict meaning of its counterpart, language 
is also dominantly treated as a way of transferring one’s rational knowledge and 
thoughts. Language is then treated in advance as an instrument that is for the 
benefit of an acceptable progression of ideas. Novalis (1960c) has a great deal to 
say about this in his “Monolog”: 
 
Es ist eigentlich um das Sprechen und Schreiben eine närrische Sache; 
das rechte Gespräch ist ein bloßes Wortspiel. Der lächerliche Irrthum 
ist nur zu bewundern, daß die Leute meinen - sie sprächen um der 
Dinge willen. Gerade das Eigenthümliche der Sprache, daß sie sich 
blos um sich selbst bekümmert, weiß keiner. Darum ist sie ein so 
wunderbares und fruchtbares Geheimniß, - daß wenn einer blos 
spricht, um zu sprechen, er gerade die herrlichsten, originellsten 
Wahrheiten ausspricht. Will er aber von etwas Bestimmten sprechen, 
so läßt ihn die launige Sprache das lächerlichste und verkehrteste 
Zeug sagen. (p. 672)  
 
It is a strange thing about speaking and writing; a real conversation is 
just a game of words. One can only be amazed at the ridiculous 
mistake, that people think they speak for the sake of things. Of the fact 
that language is peculiar because it only concerns itself with itself, 
nobody is aware. That is why it is a wonderful and fruitful secret, - 
that precisely when someone speaks just in order to speak he 
pronounces the most splendid and original truths. But if he wishes to 
speak of something determinate, temperamental old language makes 
him say the most ridiculous and mistaken things. (Bowie, 1997, p. 65) 
 
Novalis confers upon language a certain kind of ‘logic’ but not in the 
conventional sense. Language is logical because it enables thought to take place 
through the relation of concepts to each other, not because single words are self-
explanatory through their denotative meanings. Language in the poetic and 
authentic sense is mystical – the guiding nature of the Absolute revealing itself 
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from afar, hidden behind words – so that what we refer to modernly as real 
language is merely an expression of what that guidance is. Glimpses are provided 
of the relationships between things but the things themselves may not be 
determined, although it is humanity’s drive to define them that demarcates 
humanity as unique. The ‘Wortspiel’ that Novalis anticipates here is also a 
serious one because of the manifestation of the Absolute that is to take place 
through language, and because it is meant to connect the self to things in the 
world and the self’s history with other things in the world. 
Language viewed as possession 
A view that language is humanity’s possession and that it can be used as such is a 
striking example of a thing in the world rendered geheimnislos. As we shall see in 
the following chapter, words are then used to reflect the thing in the world as a 
static entity. Yet ‘language’, dominantly conceived, is in its own right rendered 
similarly static. In the case of Māori, this may be seen in the proliferation of the 
term ‘taonga’ in relation to Māori language. Alongside merely being a term that 
indicates preciousness, ‘taonga’ is also widely used in relation to language itself. 
As King (2007) states when discussing the slogan ‘He taonga te reo’: 
 
This adage has achieved prominence in Māori rhetoric and song in 
recent years, particularly since its enshrinement in New Zealand law 
in the 1987 Māori Language Act. The preamble to this Act states that 
Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi ‘confirmed and guaranteed to 
the Māori people, among other things, all their taonga’ and that ‘the 
Māori language is one such taonga’. The Māori Language Act 
instituted a Māori Language Commission (Te Taura Whiri i te Reo 
Māori) which has taken the sentiment enshrined in its founding Act 
and promulgated it widely, using it in titles to several of their 
publications. (p. 61) 
 
She continues that its prominence has made it possibly the most widely cited 
metaphor in respect of te reo Māori. Such a metaphor places the language as an 
object, wherein the language becomes a “timeless unchanging treasure, or object” 
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(p. 71)84. She emphasises here how the language in effect has been made a 
permanent, fixed object in its association with taonga. Despite continuing to be 
arranged by Being among other things in the world, language itself may 
nevertheless be detrimentally affected by how it is referred to and by the labels 
that are affixed to it. However, the preciousness of language, or implicitly its 
taonga status, is something that is articulated to form both the basis of language 
rejuvenation and language possession. For instance, Tīmoti Karētu (1990) posits 
that:  
 
[F]or me language is central to my mana [prestige, power, authority]. 
Without it could I still claim to be Māori? I do not think so for it is the 
language which has given me what mana I have and it is the only 
thing which differentiates me from anyone else ... what makes me 
Māori apart from the blood of my Māori ancestors which courses 
through my veins, is my language, the key to the song, proverb, 
legend, philosophy and rhetoric of my Māori world. (p. 17) 
 
Here, language has ‘given’ the author some respect. It is therefore useful to the 
subject, and although it appears that language is something that intervenes with 
the subject of its own free will, by its nature it nevertheless fulfils a deep desire of 
the subject. 
 
That language has taken on such pride of place is not surprising, as Māori have 
been exposed to a dominant belief that power resides in its correct usage. As I 
have argued, what underpins a notion of language as a precise instrument is the 
belief that language belongs to the self. When this view predominates then I 
speculate that the self is denied from thinking of language as embodying other 
qualities85.  
                                                
84 Kaiser’s (1988) discussion of  Zahlen identifies that it is the rigid version of the written 
word – “eine Abstraktions- und Verfestigungsform der lebendigen Mitteilung” (p. 
121)/[an abstract and solidified form of living disclosure] – that has taken precedence. 
  
85 The view that language does not embody any spiritual quality, for instance, is contested 
by several Māori writers, who have different ways of ascribing a spiritual dimension. 
Browne (2005) focuses on the principle of ‘wairua’/[spirit] to explain the ontological 
aspect of language: “Wairua, a spiritual phenomenon, as described by participants in this 
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Summary 
There are two facets to Geheimnislosigkeit that emerge strongly in this chapter. 
Firstly, it can comprise a preference for a method that remains largely 
unassailable, such as a scientific one. In this aspect, a sort of grand truth appears 
that may manifest as a dominant approach to utterances, to the other and to the 
self. I have given some examples of this: These have included the primary belief 
that the other is knowable, and that language is a precise and self-derived 
phenomenon. Additionally, though, the method itself, quite apart from its social 
dominance, is characterised by its ability to rob things in the world of their 
Geheimnis through its pursuit to render things in the world separate from their 
context, to give humanity special powers in that pursuit, and to make things in the 
world highly visible. 
 
Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” provided an effective Stoßsatz for me to write about 
the problems of Geheimnislosigkeit. I noted in the introduction to this chapter that 
                                                                                                                                 
study enters the learning environment through a variety of means, which can then be 
utilised within the teaching and learning process. It is posited that this is essentially 
through a physical gateway as paralinguistic phenomena, such that sound vibration 
derived from positive thought intent with related kinaesthetic body responses act as 
vehicles to transport wairua” (p. 6). Jeffries and Kennedy (2008) discuss the deeper 
aspects within Māori language as “manifestations … of the intrinsic relationship between 
tangata whenua … and the rest of the natural world” (p. 10). These writers argue for a 
spiritual component to language. 
Royal (1998) contends that it was Maori Marsden’s “emphatic expression of [his] 
statements that, at first, influenced the process of my entry into Māoritanga” (p. 20). 
Within the context of his discussion about “mysterious complexities of the spirit”, Royal 
shows that Marsden’s assertions about the deeper nature of the Māori metaphysical world 
themselves were imbued with a metaphysical quality, which then compelled him to take 
action. He continues that Māori did indeed make sense of the world empirically but as an 
influence of subjective experience, and posits: “I found that the subjective, spiritual 
reality of Māoritanga is accessed by objective, empirical symbols. The outcome of my 
research was to discover the Te Ao Mārama world view and philosophy. I have found 
that the Te Ao Mārama philosophy together with its analytical tool known as whakapapa 
is an attempt by traditional Māori society to explain, describe and account for everything 
in the known universe. This includes the phenomenal world experienced on both 
intellectual (te taha hinengaro) and physical (te taha tinana) planes as well as those 
illusory and subjective experiences of the spirit (te taha wairua)” (p. 22). I argue that it is 
the spiritual reality of the Absolute that allows the individual to encounter the empirical 
symbol to begin with. 
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his poem mapped out the Zahlen and Figuren in an exploratory way, meaning that 
my own voice was retained in the critique of a complex, philosophical problem 
that Māori are potentially threatened by. Underlying this discursive voice I 
referred to both Novalis’ and Māori reference points that highlighted my critique. 
This chapter has paved the way for a discussion that relates specifically to how 
Māori terms are agents of this Geheimnislosigkeit, especially when liberally used 
and referred to in science, education, law and medicine. Although I have decided 
to bring Māori terminology into issue in the following chapter, in fact the terms 
that I choose are merely one lens through which one may consider this 
Geheimnislosigkeit. While building on this chapter, the following one can also be 
seen as a direct result of my exploration of “Wenn nicht mehr”. It is therefore a 
further process of Nachdenken as this chapter has been. 
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Chapter Six: Nachdenken: The geheimnislose 
constraint of Being in some Māori terms  
Those philosophies of displacement and Geheimnislosigkeit that I outlined in 
chapter five, which I derived from Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr”, prepare the 
ground for geheimnislose terms to be attached to things in the world. In modernity, 
things in the world lose their Geheimnis and lead to a strict, prescriptive use of 
terms that carries on the intention of these philosophies. 
 
The current chapter reflects on the subversion of commonly used Māori terms so 
that they meet the expectations of those philosophies that are Zahlen-based. The 
Māori terms I have chosen are ‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’, ‘mātauranga’, and ‘whenua’. 
For the first part of this chapter, I continue Novalis’ discussion about language and 
its link with the notion that things in the world should be addressed in accordance 
with their continued evolution from Being. I then argue that in particularly 
dominant use of Māori terms there is a forgetting of the Absolute that delivers 
things in the world their mystery, with the result that those things become 
geheimnislos. This happens in various ways depending on the term referred to: 
‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’ and ‘whenua’ are defined in constrained ways, and 
additionally they are not given as reflecting each other; and ‘matauranga’ is a new 
term that reifies a cognitive and instrumental approach to the world. In all cases 
the terms, when normally used, avoid the impact of the Absolute and seek to find a 
pure, unmysterious phenomenon. The reader will also discern a strong theme that 
is carried on from chapter five: that the self is also rendered geheimnislos as it 
engages in a geheimnislose manner with things in the world, through a dominant 
use of terms.  
 
Novalis’ views on language, continued 
I concluded the previous chapter by emphasising Novalis’ views on language. 
Language for Novalis is a philosophical issue because it is a crucial human 
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phenomenon, not because there is any one special language that has more access 
to the Absolute than others. It is instead “das wunderbare Gespräch in zahllosen 
Sprachen unter den tausendfaltigen Naturen” (1960e, p. 95)/[the wonderful 
conversation of the thousand-fold natures in countless languages] that allows 
Being to manifest in its creativity and in both its darkness and luminescence. I 
extrapolate from that idea of Novalis’ that there is then conversely no language 
that is immune from being intruded on by a lack of mystery. With this issue in 
mind, Novalis has the following to say in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais: 
 
Es mag lange gedauert haben, ehe die Menschen darauf dachten, die 
mannigfachen Gegenstände ihrer Sinne mit einem gemeinschaftlichen 
Namen zu bezeichnen und sich entgegen zu setzen. Durch Übung 
werden Entwickelungen befördert, und in allen Entwickelungen gehen 
Teilungen, Zergliederungen vor, die man bequem mit den Brechungen 
des Lichtstrahls vergleichen kann. (1960e, p. 82)  
 
It may have taken a long time before men came upon the thought of 
designating the various objects of their senses with a common name 
and of setting themselves in opposition to them. Through practice 
developments were furthered, and in all developments separations and 
divisions occur that may well be compared with the dispersion of a 
ray of light. (O'Brien, 1995, p. 209)  
 
Although Novalis’ propositions about language are sometimes contradictory – and 
all the more complex for that - he remains convinced that the ‘essence’ of 
language is only known indirectly. He argues that “[n]ichts in der Welt ist blos; 
Seyn drückt nicht Identität aus” (1960j, p. 247)/“[n]othing in the world simply is; 
Being itself does not express identity” (O'Brien, 1995, p. 111), leading him to 
conclude that the word should not neatly sum up the object. Language according to 
Novalis is participatory in illusion, and if Being does not try to once and for all 
conclude the essence of a thing, then neither should language. The eventual 
denigration of the thing in the world through humanity’s expression of it is 
obvious here, with Novalis still retaining some caution in how he portrays this 
relationship between language, the describer, and thing. This tentative mode of 
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description continues in the murky nature of the thing, further emphasising that 
one’s use of language, even to talk about one’s expression and things, should be 
tempered with caution: 
 
Mich freuen die wunderlichen Haufen und Figuren in den Sälen, allein 
mir ist, als wären sie nur Bilder, Hüllen, Zierden, versammelt um ein 
göttlich Wunderbild, und dieses liegt mir immer in Gedanken. (1960e, 
p. 81)  
 
I take delight in the strange mounds and figures in the halls, but to me 
it seems as though they were only shapes, cloaks, ornaments, gathered 
around a divine, miraculous image, and this is always in my thoughts. 
(2005, p. 13)86 
 
Here we see that Novalis is carefully describing the things as if they are unusual, 
mysterious, or full of wonder. Being inspires humanity to converse through 
language, with Novalis saying that: 
 
Es dünckt dem Menschen, als sey er in einem Gespräch begriffen, und 
irgend ein unbekanntes, geistiges Wesen veranlasse ihn auf eine 
wunderbare Weise zur Entwickelung der evidentesten Gedancken. 
Dieses Wesen muß ein Höheres Wesen seyn, weil es sich mit ihm auf 
eine Art in Beziehung sezt, die keinem an Erscheinungen gebundenen 
Wesen möglich ist. (1960o, p. 528)    
 
It appears to man as if he were engaged in a conversation, where some 
kind of unknown, spiritual being wondrously incites him to develop 
the most evident thoughts. This being must be a higher being, because 
it is placed in such a relation with himself that it cannot be a being of 
the world of appearances. (Wood, 2007, p. xxvi) 
 
                                                
86 While containing elements of the unfamiliar, ‘wunderlich’ also carries with it an 
element of wondrousness and mystery. 
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Friedrich Schlegel, another German Romantic with whom Novalis collaborated, 
also highlighted the inherent power to poetic language. In his “Über die 
Unverständlichkeit” Schlegel revealed his wish for language: 
 
Ich wollte zeigen, daß die Worte sich selbst oft besser verstehen, als 
diejenigen, von denen sie gebraucht werden, wollte aufmerksam 
darauf machen, daß es unter den philosophischen Worten, die oft in 
ihren Schriften wie eine Schar zu früh entsprungener Geister alles 
verwirren und die unsichtbare Gewalt des Weltgeists auch an dem 
ausüben, der sie nicht anerkennen will, geheime Ordensverbindungen 
geben muß. (1964c, p. 531)  
 
I wanted to demonstrate that words often understand themselves better 
than do those who use them, wanted to point out that there must be a 
connection of some secret brotherhood among philosophical words 
that, like a host of spirits too soon aroused, bring everything into 
confusion in their writings and exert the invisible power of World 
Spirit on even those who try to deny it. (1971, p. 260). 
 
The ontological language arranges elements: To that extent, “[d]ie logischen 
Begriffe verhalten sich aber zu einander, wie die Worte, ohne Gedanken” (1960o, 
p. 526)/“logical concepts relate to one another as do words, without thoughts” 
(O'Brien, 1995, p. 132). This influence underpins every human use of that 
language, such that, as Heidegger (1971c) would later posit, “[d]ie Sprache 
spricht” (p. 12)/language speaks itself. Novalis, too, believes that language might 
move to depict a final form but it is precisely its inability to achieve this that 
gives it its power and influence (O'Brien, 1995). The task of language is to reflect 
the mystery of these things in the world and to take on creative form. While the 
ensuing loss of clarity might be intimidating for those influenced by pure 
philosophy, he believes that it is only the hazy form of language that will lift a 
veil onto a deeper relationship with the world, as language (alongside 
mathematical formulae): 
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[D]rück[t] nichts als ihre wunderbare Natur aus, und eben darum [ist] 
sie so ausdrucksvoll - eben darum spiegelt sich in ihr das seltsame 
Verhältnißspiel der Dinge. (1960c, p. 672) 
 
[[E]xpresses nothing but its wonderful nature, and precisely because 
of that it is so expressive – precisely for this reason the strange game 
of relations reflects itself in it [language]].  
 
His conception of language shows itself throughout his works; he notes 
specifically that grammatical translations – and by this he means ones that have 
precision as their greatest goal – are born of “Gelehrsamkeit”/[erudition] but do 
not require anything else apart from “discursive Fähigkeiten” (1960m, p. 
438)/[discursive abilities]. It is as if the problem lies not so much in the event that 
occasionally words do not fit as the pursuit of their perfect fit. Quite explicitly, 
Novalis resists the practice of trying to capture the thing in the world in isolation 
from other things through language: 
 
Will er [der Sprecher] aber von etwas Bestimmten sprechen, so läßt 
ihn die launige Sprache das lächerlichste und verkehrteste Zeug sagen. 
(1960c, p. 672)  
 
But if he [the utterer] wishes to speak of something determinate, 
temperamental old language makes him say the most ridiculous and 
mistaken things. (Bowie, 1997, p. 65) 
 
Language is not separate from things in the world, because for Novalis it has its 
own relationship with other things quite apart from those things’ mediation 
through human intellect. Glimpses are provided of the relationships between 
things but the things themselves may not be determined, although it is humanity’s 
drive to define them that demarcates humanity as unique. The orthodox practice 
of logic, as an outcome of the “rohe, discursive Denker” (1960o, p. 524)/[rough, 
discursive thinker], is that of the scholastic, because “er vernichtet alle lebendige 
Natur”/[he destroys all living nature], by attempting to capture the thing in the 
world with absolute clarity and without giving it Spiel to interact and develop.  
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Just like any other thing in the world, we should therefore think of language itself 
as a thing in a state of flux. In chapter three I discussed “Lament for the Brave”, 
with brief reference to how the given English translation hindered a more poetic 
representation of the night, the self within the darkness, and the significance of 
these for Being. The narrow translation given of “Lament for the Brave” could 
just be an incidence of space allowable – only one given translation could be 
provided and the one that was provided just happens to be inimical to the more 
continually active Māori text. However, the fixing of things does occur in such 
translations, and with their publication they are the dominant ones relied on. For 
the orthodox language philosopher who believes that language is apprehended by 
thought alone, the more active language is bewildering for humanity: 
 
Nur augenblicklich scheinen ihre Wünsche [der Menschen], ihre 
Gedanken sich zu verdichten. So entstehen ihre Ahndungen, aber nach 
kurzen Zeiten schwimmt alles wieder, wie vorher, vor ihren Blicken. 
(Novalis, 1960e, p. 79)   
 
Only at moments do their [humanity’s] desires and thoughts seem to 
solidify. Thus arise their presentiments, but after a short time 
everything swims again before their eyes. (Novalis, 2005, pp. 4-5) 
 
Representing things as identifiable and fixed to begin with – as static objects - 
will cause problems for the philosopher, who, in abstracting them, will be part of 
their illusory nature. We can see from the above fragment of Novalis’ that 
humanity’s consciousness of things is unreliable, due to the activity of those 
things; yet fixing objects is a preoccupation of modern humanity as it seeks 
Geheimnislosigkeit of things. In our article titled “Kia Hiwa Ra” (Aranga et al., 
2008) we noted that the act of translating into a colonising language is a 
hegemonic practice, in that it clears things in the world of any mystery and 
imprecision. An English translation of a Māori text, then, sets the initial text 
firmly in the realm of fixed understanding. We gave an example of a lament: 
 
In A Lament for Te Huhu for example (Ngata & Hurinui, 1974), 
Papahia grieves for his elder brother, Te Huhu, who had died. In it he 
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draws on a mist formation, seen and felt at the same time, to give 
impetus to his grief:  
  
E titiro ana ‘hau te puia tu noa   I observe the mist that stands  
I runga i a Heke, tineia kia mate,   Above Heke, clear it away  
Kia mate rawa hoki, kei tae hoki ake,  Dissolve it clearly, that it may 
not recur  
E mahara ana roto ki te kino ra ia,  For the mind recollects the evil  
Ka tauwehea nei, e i!    That was happily removed.  
 
In the footnotes to this lament, a ‘cloud of evil resulting in disgrace’ is 
referred to, caused apparently by the emanation from Heke’s 
personality. Heke was a personality who had fought against law and 
order, and if such a mist is seen standing from earth to sky it is seen as 
a portent of war. This stanza of the lament is important for a number 
of reasons. Firstly it shows that the cloud is perceived not just through 
sight – it is after all a ‘cloud of evil’. Hence the cloud is perceived 
emotionally too. Although the verb ‘titiro’ meaning to see with the 
eyes was used, the other important part of the stanza was the emotion 
it evoked – a part of the reading of the landscape. It also shows that 
signs could be read from the landscape to determine what was going 
to happen, and that these signs could manifest visually, emotionally 
and spiritually. (p. 6)  
 
Of course, the poeticising of the literal is key to Novalis’ aim of poetry, and in the 
above section of our article we were attempting to re-read the text in order to 
acknowledge Geheimnis. This is not to say that our response to the text was 
irrational – a charge which Novalis would have distanced himself from – but 
merely that the neatly provided translation into a colonising language caused the 
Māori text to lose its vitality in a veiled way, and also acted to undermine the 
creative and emotional aspects of its messages. 
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Geheimnislose terms in focus 
Similarly, Novalis’ “Monolog” contains a critique of humanity’s drive to find 
clearly defined elements through language at every step.  This expectation of 
humanity about language poses the problem here. Novalis’ assertion that precise 
translations are limited by their focus on denotative meaning is echoed in a far 
more intense manner by Marshall and Martin (2000), who refer to Māori 
researcher and academic Cherryl Smith when they state that language is not 
simply open to the translation of meaning. Marshall and Martin raise the 
important function of words, as units of language, in maintaining the integrity of 
things in the world when they say that the cross-translation of words only leads to 
the Māori term (in their examples, ‘mauri’ and ‘wairua’) being “inserted violently 
into the pakeha world” (p. 22). There is an expectation for the most part that an 
empirical, simplistic translation will suffice, resulting in the kinds of Zahlen-
derived violence that Marshall and Martin refer to. The holistic relationship 
between things in the world is corroded by a translation that is based on the 
objectifying comportment towards those things. 
 
Like Marshall and Martin, I am interested in those immediate parts of language 
that are taken to refer directly to the thing in the world. Because the thing in the 
world is largely assumed to be a phenomenon separate from others, as Novalis 
alluded to when he stated that mankind has set themselves in opposition to 
objects, it is ‘captured’ so that it can be “inserted violently” into a colonised 
meaning. As an entity that resides in Being, humanity has the ability to interpret 
things in the world because of the interplay of things. The consciousness of 
humanity arises because of that interplay; indeed, as O’Brien (1995) notes, the 
self is “understood as a specific instance of universality and ideality” (p. 116), but 
humanity in modern times has tended to regard the thing in the world through 
strict, static terminology. The activity of the thing is overlooked, a view that runs 
counter to Novalis’ love of active representation of the Absolute. Of course, the 
thing was immediately active both in itself and in its relationship with other 
things, so object and activity were one and the same, and this should be reflected 
by the term, which in this reflection has some agency itself. In this chapter I shall 
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refer to those common terms listed above from the point of view of Being but by 
pointing out their Geheimnislosigkeit in their use and context. In most cases, 
Geheimnislosigkeit renders the terms as nouns and tends to ride over the inherent 
activity of the things to which those terms relate.  
 
1. The positioning of ‘whakapapa’ as highly visible 
‘genealogy’ 
Linda Smith (1999) indicates that a primary aim of imperialism was its move to 
classify things in the world according to a set of Western historical and cultural 
imperatives. Indigenous peoples themselves were objects of categorisation. It 
would follow, I argue, that terms which even hint at humanity’s relationship with 
things in the world were then subverted so that they would refer to the solidness 
of the indigenous person and the separateness of things in the world. As Cherryl 
Smith (2000) indicates, “[i]t is misinterpreted when writers translate whakapapa 
as genealogy, for genealogy usually covers the human and in a lineal descent 
fashion” (p. 45). Overwhelmingly, the word ‘whakapapa’ is equated with 
‘genealogy’. It is suddenly revealed as an object, transportable towards its 
substitute term genealogy. It has become reduced from locating itself in a holistic 
discourse to one that enables the process of linear categorisation. Even in the word 
‘genealogy’ there exists an etymological trace that favours a directly causal 
description of ‘kinship’, evident in its focus on ‘generation’ or ‘race’ (Onions, 
1966), with that definition underlying the accepted method of ethnographers 
(Bouquet, 1996). With the creation of whakapapa as methodical kinship, some 
very central Māori tenets and philosophies were simultaneously created, to the 
extent that their reinvention is now almost unquestioned. Almost subtly, 
whakapapa was coming to be thought of as a biological event, and its application 
as such is evidence of that more fundamental issue of how things in the world are 
thought of in the first instance. 
 
If Māori writers on the area of whakapapa are describing whakapapa as equivalent 
with genealogy, then they may simply be choosing that route. The reasons for this 
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are many, and include their resistance to disclosing any deeper nuances of the 
word for cultural and intellectual property reasons. In the case of research, they 
may be attempting to render the word, among others, acceptable for a Western 
context: They may believe that to introduce the more profound ‘traces’ of the 
word would be destructive to certain people in the community from which the 
word derives, and so on. These reasons are underpinned by the desire to allow the 
true depth of the word to flourish in the private domain that Māori occupy. In that 
sense the word has a subterranean life on the one hand and a public, politically 
useful life on the other. In the public domain the word becomes the term of 
convenience for what is essentially an object, while some agency over the matter 
is retained for the users and their communities.  
 
Nevertheless, the precise problem with the Geheimnislosigkeit of a word is that it 
is supported by all hegemonic aspects of colonised life. Although we may not 
consider the dominantly objectifying definition for a word to be on the colonising 
agenda, it does suit the coloniser that there is universal acceptance of that static 
view of a word and the object it relates to. As already indicated, major colonising 
institutions enjoy and draw constantly on the discourse of Zahlen for their 
survival. Additionally, there is a seduction in the apparent symmetry inherent to 
explanations that embody a sense of finality, even though the search for such final 
ground leads, according to Friedrich Schlegel (1964c), not to the essence but to 
“[e]inige[n] Gegenstände[n] des menschlichen Nachdenkens” (p. 337)/[some 
oppositions of human thought]. The problem of “assertion itself” (Bowie, 1997, p. 
79) – in this case, about the precise meaning of a term – is thus problematised 
here. The comfort that accompanies those explanations, we will remember, is one 
that Novalis warns against as accompanying the ‘keys to all creatures’, where the 
keys become ‘of’ all creatures.  
 
A not untrue, but a particularly scientific, rendering of whakapapa emerges in the 
following utilitarian, symmetrical description: 
 
In a commonly applied form, that of recording human descent lines 
and relationships, whakapapa functions as a genealogical table or 
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family pedigree in which the lineages connect each papa or layer (a 
metaphorical reference to each generation of a family). 
 
The extent to which this underlying theoretical rationale for human 
whakapapa applies to the nonhuman has hitherto remained 
unexplored, at least in the published literature. To understand the 
meaning of plant and animal whakapapa requires knowledge of not 
only plant and animal names but also their accompanying narratives. 
Typically, these take an allegorical form in which explanatory theories 
as well as moral principles are explicated. In its totality, Māori use of 
whakapapa and narrative creates a ‘metaphysical gestalt’ or whole, 
integrated pattern, for the oral communication of knowledge. (Roberts 
et al., 2004, p. 1) 
 
Such explanations - and even others that try to envisage whakapapa as being 
related to other traditional cultural institutions, such as “[i]t is safe to assume, 
however, that both [whakapapa and mauri] enliven each other, for if to possess 
mauri is to be alive, then this requires the belief and practice of whakapapa” 
(Mika, 2007, p. 186) - suggest that whakapapa steps in to fulfil a function. We can 
see with Roberts et al that whakapapa ‘records’ something, ‘functions as’ 
something, and ‘applies to’ something. It acts as a “fundamental form of knowing: 
it functions as an epistemological template” (Whitt, Roberts, Norman, & Grieves, 
2003, p. 5). Whakapapa “enlivens” something, too. Here it is a useful or necessary 
event for humanity, and its importance in this regard is seen as its primary 
function. The productivity of the verbs used in the first example expedites the 
“oral communication of knowledge”. Roberts et al later consider the use of 
whakapapa as a “taxonomy” (p. 7), at which point we see an obvious movement 
of whakapapa into the strict discourse of science87  – specifically, into the 
specialised area of the genetic modification of organisms. Novalis might have 
participated in this discussion by adding that whakapapa has been empirically 
constructed and that it has become part of the “versteinerte Zauberstadt” (1960f, 
p. 564)/[petrified enchanted city] that he refers to. In its usefulness to humans it is 
                                                
87 The writers intend for this discussion around whakapapa to occur in a scientific 
context. 
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interpreted through its rational properties, and examined, regarded and 
represented as a tool to come to know and manipulate the world better. Its 
properties have also been fixed and its subsequent clarity allows one to know the 
abstract object that it represents better. We therefore know the natural world better 
because we believe whakapapa is the taxonomical framework that groups it for us. 
The permitted scope of whakapapa 
Although Novalis was keen to explore scientific principles, on their own they 
could not ‘romanticise’ things in the world in accordance with Being. The fixing 
of constant attributes, he argued, ignored the flux of nature and would lead only to 
self-affirming complacency. The world is known by that method and need only be 
thought about again to the extent that one has to continue to add to knowledge 
through that scientised method. When the world is subject to an overtly scientific 
method, by the ‘Tiefgelehrten’ as he calls them, it is merely treated to another 
expression of grouping and objectification. Thus the scientific method could only 
exist because of that initial drive, as Novalis would have it, to scientise the world. 
However, with science now forming a meta-narrative in research and technology, 
it is important that we do acknowledge how science has especially secured 
whakapapa within its overt discourse. Whakapapa then moves within a discursive 
field to describe a smaller scientifically identified element, such as ‘gene’. Yet a 
move within a discursive field – or, towards a more thoroughly scientised 
interpretation – is the only movement allowed for the Māori term. It is as if those 
Māori terms are only important to the extent that they merely support their 
Western equivalents in prescribing a particular view of the world.  
 
Example: Whakapapa prescribed within traditional metaphor 
The prescribed travel of the traditional term within the field that scientism 
operates is obvious when there are links made between empirical knowledge and 
whakapapa. Barlow (1991) remarks that “whakapapa is the genealogical descent 
of all living things from the gods to the present time; whakapapa is a basis for the 
organization of knowledge in respect of the creation and development of all living 
things” (p. 173). Again, whakapapa is connected to knowledge, with the emphasis 
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being on knowing whakapapa in order to generate knowledge. The kind of 
knowledge anticipated here is scientific knowledge, generated by thinking of 
whakapapa as an already known tool. Whakapapa in this context has to be known: 
It must be the product of a conscious human activity. It might simply be 
summarised that whakapapa was created by humanity. However, the 
anthropocentric attitude towards whakapapa denies any belief that whakapapa 
exists before our perception of it, as Pihama (2001) argues it does. This may occur 
also through the use of metaphor, where an essentially scientific discipline – in 
this case, linguistics – is given Māori credibility by assimilating Māori ideas of 
whakapapa into the birth of ‘language modalities’: 
 
The following analogy may be used to describe [the] entire 
evolutionary process. The oral-culture of pre-european Māori can be 
termed as the ‘Mother language’ (te whaea o te reo tupu). This term is 
encapsulated through the myths and legends of Papatūanuku or 
‘Mother Earth’, as well as, the established international term of 
‘Mother Tongue’ used by Linguists and Educationalists alike. As a 
consequence of European contact and amalgamation, the language 
changed to adopt the new mode of discourse through the means of a 
written symbolic system. There, it is appropriately called the ‘Father 
Tongue’ (te matua ā-tuhi). Thus, a marriage of the old and the new 
was consummated. In the following years, the offspring (or bi-
products) of this language relationship are called the ‘child progenies’ 
(ngā uri o te reo Māori), these can be termed the ‘language 
modalities’. (Laws, 2001, p. 2) 
 
Laws equates traditional Māori traditional terminology with scientific linguistic 
phenomena. The equivalence could be thought of as a form of poetic treatment 
(and hence revitalisation) in the sense of Novalis, but instead I argue that the 
direct equation still inserts the traditional Māori terms over into the 
‘versteinerte’/petrified world of the linguistic equivalents.  
 
Drawing either literally or metaphorically on traditional names in these contexts, 
to explain the phenomenon of whakapapa, is a natural outcome of its scientised 
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treatment. At times the attempt is made to describe holistically whilst 
genealogical names are denoted. In the Report of the Royal Commission on 
Genetic Modification (Ministry for the Environment, 2002) the following 
comments were made: 
 
To Maori this duty [of kaitiakitanga] is easily explained by tracing 
whakapapa (genealogy) up through the ancestors, to the Gods, and 
ultimately to Papatuanuku, the Earth Mother, and Ranginui, the Sky 
Father. By going sideways in these kinship links, Maori trace descent 
lines for all living creatures and so have to honour them as kin. (p. 19)  
 
A focus on identifiable, solid beings is primary in this explanation of whakapapa, 
and indeed it appears to be of concern to many similar documents. Although the 
writers acknowledge the holistic relationship with the environment, they can only 
do so by referring to those beings listed. The list of those beings as constitutive of 
whakapapa is the sole descriptive, and whakapapa becomes solidified by a focus 
on the entities that apparently constitute it in its entirety. As an approach to 
whakapapa borne of common sense this may be of obvious help to those who 
learn and practise recounting whakapapa, but it may also lead to confusion, where 
the solidity of whakapapa is equated with the solidity of other entities, such as 
‘genes’. When that misunderstanding occurs, ‘whakapapa’ is listed as being 
affected because it is the ‘gene’ that is being affected with the patenting of life 
forms. Their equivalence is not immediately acceptable, however, particularly 
when they are asserted to so neatly fit onto each other.  
 
Example: ‘Fertility/infertility’ concurring with 
geheimnisloser/geheimnislosem whakapapa 
Words that are thought of as immune from contamination by Geheimnislosigkeit 
may actually assist other geheimnislose terms. This hegemonic relationship 
between the colonised and colonising terms occurs between the word whakapapa 
and the words ‘fertility/infertility’ in current policy. Terms in Māori that are 
avowed to reflect Being by their very nature are sometimes warped to fit the 
already affected terminology that they find themselves associated with. The 
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significance of the term ‘whakapapa’ is said to lie in the fact that fertility ensures 
the continuation of whakapapa (Glover, McCree, & Dyall, 2008), and that 
reproductive technology might be inimical to the spiritual nature of whakapapa 
(Glover & Rousseau, 2007). The problem here is that this Māori term may itself 
be prescribed so that in fact it supports the hardened implication of 
‘fertile/infertile’. At times ‘whakapapa’ slips in and out of scientific description, 
but whether it is located in or out of explicitly scientific text is irrelevant; when it 
is defined in a determinate way, it will assist a similarly hardened 
‘fertile/infertile’.  
 
The reductionist approach of the method of science is familiar to various Māori 
academics88, with descriptions of its tendency to dissemble an organism and 
isolate its parts. Often science is blamed for this approach. Despite being a 
scientist, Novalis would have empathised with those concerns with such 
assertions as “[j]ede Simplification ist von der andern Seite eine Complication” 
(1960b, p. 299)/“[e]very simplification is, on the other hand, a complication” 
(Wood, 2007, p. 49), referring to the apparently clarifying nature of the method of 
science as really a complicating one, leaving in the end more doubt than certainty, 
and as a method that has only emerged (as Heidegger had also argued 
(Glazebrook, 2000)) because of a far more fundamental, ontological orientation 
towards things in the world. Importantly, this does not only occur in strict science: 
‘Research’, drawing from an “‘archive’ of knowledge and systems, rules and 
values which stretch beyond the boundaries of Western science to the system now 
referred to as the West” (Smith, 1999, p. 42), manifests as the result of that same 
fundamental ontological and metaphysical comportment. This kind of primordial 
regard, as I noted in chapter five, is one characterised by a view of things as 
orderable and lacking mystery. As a preordainment of thought it occurs in an 
incidental but organised way, and concurs with what Novalis (1960e) describes as 
“[der] Glaube an [den festen Körper], der ihre Abhängigkeit und Niedrigkeit nicht 
ohne Bedeutung [veranläßt]” (p. 83)/“a not unmeaningful belief in their [solid 
bodies’] baseness and dependence” (2005, p. 23). In the case of our current 
example of whakapapa, the flurry of words equated with it - ‘gene’, ‘genealogy’, 
                                                
88 See for instance: Cheung (2008); Hutchings and Reynolds (n.d); Gardiner (1999) 
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‘genetic inheritance’ – is evidence of the clamber to accord objects their rightful 
place, according to their empirical identification, including the human condition 
as it relates to fertility/infertility. Thus the definite meaning of whakapapa does 
not counter discussions of fertility/infertility; whakapapa is merely arranged to 
support the hardening effect of ‘fertility/infertility’. There is a danger, then, that 
what are taken to be holistic terms are merely forced into geheimnislose 
utterances and realms. 
 
The danger that the hardening of terms poses may depend on the context of the 
term. In cases where Māori use the term without trying to define it, it may resist 
the lure of Geheimnislosigkeit. Terms like fertility/infertility overtly cast the body 
in a fixed way, especially in medical and legal contexts. Whakapapa will avoid 
this by not having a set equivalence in English. Nevertheless, the word shows 
itself to be vulnerable to the hardened nature of policy. The Advisory Committee 
on Assisted Reproductive Technology (2009) noted that “[k]nowledge and 
protection of whakapapa is a key concern that has been expressed to ACART…. 
Some Māori are concerned that whakapapa would be disrupted through the use of 
some assisted reproductive procedures” (p. 10). In that context the word 
whakapapa could conceivably be understood in a broad sense. It is just mentioned 
and undefined. However, the paragraph continues: 
 
The HART Act requires that information about donors be kept by 
providers and the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages. 
The Act specifies that ethnicity and any relevant cultural affiliation 
must be recorded, along with, in the case of Māori donors, the donor’s 
whānau, hapū and iwi affiliations. 
 
This paragraph does not mention whakapapa, but its reference to various 
components in the paragraph just cited, I argue, moves whakapapa over to a strict 
ordering with those other components. ‘Whakapapa’, having been dealt with in 
terms of a lack of mystery, is still present even though it does not now need to be 
mentioned. In this sense, terms such as whakapapa are vulnerable to the context in 
which they are used, particularly when used amongst other terms which are 
themselves geheimnislos. Hence whakapapa must now match up with the keeping 
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of information about donors, with the recording of cultural affiliations, and with 
whānau, hapū and iwi affiliations. It will therefore have to be thoroughly 
identifiable. Whakapapa is brought into a moment of certainty in these instances. 
Even in the use of the phrase ‘Māori donor’, whakapapa is fixed so that it fits 
easily with not just the identity but also the body of the Māori donor. The Māori 
donor is an identifiable body, against which whakapapa can be recorded. The 
Māori donor is a fertile entity that has a whakapapa, and the word whakapapa 
assists the fixing enterprise of ‘fertile/infertile’.  
2. The introduction of epistemic certainty through 
‘mātauranga’  
With that frequent interpretation of ‘whakapapa’ there is a close link to the 
generation of knowledge that involves the cognitive self as the foremost element. 
As I argued in relation to Te Maire Tau’s text in chapter three, though, the 
connection that the Māori self wanted to articulate with everything in relation to 
them was not to be reduced to an epistemological process. Even in cases where 
‘knowledge’ is given a Māori gloss in the form of ‘mātauranga’ (Mika, 2011a) - a 
post-contact term used in conjunction especially with the growth of the 
knowledge economy (Royal, 2009b) – the primordial activity of the Absolute 
stands as the primary focus. The temptation to render those continuous processes 
of Being/the Absolute as ‘knowledge’, even through the mediatory role of 
mātauranga is, I argue, an elucidation of Novalis’ warning about the delusion of 
having the self as a ground for all perceptions to flow from. The self as first and 
as certain is able to regard and group objects – abstract and concrete - so that they 
provide epistemic certainty. To do this, the self can ignore the prior activity that 
allows those objects to exist to begin with and that may rearrange those objects. 
This view ignores the important words of Marsden (2003) about humanity’s 
relationship to spiritual values: 
 
Spiritual values are always beyond the full grasp of mortal man. They 
are ultimate and absolute in nature and yet always beckoning man 
onwards. The closer one approximates to the ideal the greater the 
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satisfaction. There is always a gap between the ideal and practice; 
between becoming and being; but towards that excellence all things 
strive. The Māori expression is, ‘Kia eke ki tōna taumata’ – that it 
may attain to the excellence of its being; or, to authentic existence. 
This refers not only to humans but to all created things. (p. 39) 
 
Marsden’s words suggest that the spiritual affects all aspects of existence. In the 
present topic – knowledge – knowledge that is spiritual is not just ceremonial 
knowledge; instead the self is involved in a relationship with the world that is, in 
Marsden’s words, ‘spiritual’ in its physical activity. What is prior to any 
prospective knowledge, then, is this relationship.   
 
The explicit equivalence of mātauranga and knowledge and scientific knowledge 
occurs frequently in literature. Mātauranga is sometimes equated with science. 
This equivalence is not universally held; David Williams (2001) explores that 
issue in research dealing with the WAI 262 claim, and refers to those who 
disagree with a perceived correspondence between the two terms, and indeed 
Philip Catton (2009) asserts that the two are not the same. How science and 
mātauranga do not equate but may be reconciled with each other is also widely 
discussed in literature. Writers and academics are ready to pose differences 
between the two terms, perhaps because science as a methodology is readily 
accepted by some as being vastly different to mātauranga. With science appearing 
to be intimately associated with abstraction, precision and the visible idea, it 
seems more obviously and clearly to some as being dissimilar to mātauranga.  
 
With the growth of the knowledge economy, including the transfer of knowledge 
based on Western commercial enterprises which have socially and politically 
exploited indigenous peoples (Smith, 1999), discussions about the various layers 
of knowledge – sociological, political, economic and so on – have taken on 
particular importance for some Māori (Royal, 2009b). Some writings of 
indigenous academics may be adumbrated here. To begin with, there is often 
expressed a dissatisfaction with the positivist nature of the language that goes to 
construct Western cultural knowledge. In this regard, Anne Waters (2004) notes 
that there are problems inherent to that language, because it sets up oppositions 
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between things in the world, whereas indigenous languages, in their intention and 
construction, tended to draw back from that practice. Thus language as a 
reflection of disparate worldviews is the initial problem. Linda Smith (1999) 
argues that dominant philosophies mean that Western researchers simply could 
not grasp the fact that an object of study could “contribute to anything. An object 
has no life force, no humanity, no spirit of its own, so therefore ‘it’ cannot make 
an active contribution” (p. 61). Here we begin to consider the possible converse, 
more in line with the organisational but unknowable effects of the Absolute that 
Novalis noted, where things in the world have a mode of communication with 
humanity, and where the object is given potential subject status. Kovach (2009) 
reflects that “tribal knowledge is not Western knowledge” (p. 30) because the two 
emerge from completely different perceptions of the world and of the place of the 
self within that world. She believes that the holistic perception that certain 
indigenous peoples have of the world is inherent to the way the world is 
discussed: “When Cree and Soulteaux Elders talk about the world as being alive, 
as of spirit, it makes sense because this is reinforced on a daily basis in the 
language” (p. 66). 
 
Linda Smith’s words in particular hold implications for whether the concept of 
knowledge as an outcome of Geheimnislosigkeit can exist in indigenous 
philosophy when the object in the world does have a ‘life-force’. They 
immediately bring into dispute any belief that the object in the world may be 
known, outside of constructed beliefs about the object by the knower. What 
becomes more important, if we draw out Smith’s words, is that there is a sense of 
relationship with the object such that an epistemic certainty is of secondary 
importance. Buber (1997) notes here that “[i]n jeder Sphäre, durch jedes uns 
gegenwärtig Werdende blicken wir an den Saum des ewigen Du hin, aus jedem 
vernehmen wir ein Wehen von ihm” (p. 13)/“[i]n every sphere, through 
everything that becomes present to us, we gaze toward the train of the eternal 
You; in each we perceive a breath of it” (1996, p. 57). Crucial here is whether the 
word knowledge – or even its now Māori equivalent, mātauranga – should be 
given the wide scope that it has been afforded. Most debates around knowledge in 
an indigenous world tend to assume that there was ‘knowledge’, with knowledge 
sometimes being equated with, not dependent on, relationships with the Absolute 
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and the object before the subject. Western knowledge, however, assumes a 
cognitive attitude towards the object. 
 
Knowledge is hence taken as a universal phenomenon without much thought to its 
immediate discursive effects – what the belief that the object in the world may be 
known heralds for the Absolute, as an example. The two terms mātauranga and 
knowledge are uncritically interchangeable. However, there are critiques that, 
while not contesting the basic correspondence of the two terms, do start to 
question the types of knowledge that are being referred to. Barnes (2006) for 
instance disrupts the immediate precision between the terms mātauranga Māori 
and Māori knowledge in the following way: 
 
In 2005, MoRST’s Vision Matauranga was developed to ‘assist 
research funders, researchers and research users when they consider 
research of relevance to Māori – particularly its distinctive aspects and 
how this might be supported’ (Ministry of Research Science and 
Technology 2005:6). The glossary describes matauranga Māori as ‘a 
body of knowledge first brought to New Zealand by Polynesian 
ancestors … it changed and grew … and grew and changed again (on 
European contact) … becoming endangered … in the 19th and 20th 
centuries.’ I argue that matauranga Māori in this context describes one 
form of Māori knowledge and is a sub-category and not 
interchangeable with the term Māori knowledge as it is used in the 
vision.  
 
Māori knowledge is as broad and varied as any other knowledge. (p. 
8) 
 
Here she draws attention to the vexed question of whether mātauranga Māori as it 
is defined in MoRST’s glossary can be equated with Māori knowledge. She 
clearly advocates the belief that, although mātauranga Māori as defined by the 
glossary might not be Māori knowledge, there is nevertheless such a thing as 
Māori knowledge. In that sense Barnes’ disturbance of the equivalence between 
the two terms might be described as politically derived. Although there is a 
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philosophical assertion in the last two sentences, it does not delve into the 
metaphysical implications that the reification of the epistemically certain self 
raises89.  
The self-focused tendency of ‘mātauranga’ 
There are very deep implications, however, stemming from the word knowledge 
as it is used dominantly and unquestioningly90. To begin with, there is the 
necessity for a phenomenon to be perceived by the subject; a dominant belief that 
language must be the result of the subject’s awareness in order for it to be valid 
will be recalled. I posit that the discourse of knowledge has infiltrated the term 
mātauranga to the extent that absolute subjectivism is vital, and suspect that the 
term itself constrains how academic writers, for instance, write about the 
relationship of the Māori individual to things in the world. Thus in writing about 
mātauranga it is difficult to escape the pull of the subject91. Even writing about 
collective group experiences does not mitigate that occurrence because it is still 
the cognitive ability of the collective group that is emphasised in the writing. 
Additionally it is almost impossible through the medium of text to describe the 
experiences of the supposedly inanimate object, unless poetry or other forms of 
verse are resorted to, with the teacher in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais having stated that: 
 
Ein Verkündiger der Natur zu sein, ist ein schönes und heiliges 
Amt…. Nicht der bloße Umfang und Zusammenhang der Kenntnisse, 
nicht die Gabe, diese Kenntnisse leicht und rein an bekannte Begriffe 
und Erfahrungen anzuknüpfen, und die eigentümlichen fremd 
                                                
89 Such an exploration may not have been her intention in this article. 
 
90 This is not to say that Māori did not have a concept of ‘understanding’ a thing in the 
world as it presented itself to them. The words ‘mātau’, ‘mōhio’ and ‘mārama’ all convey 
that there may be a comprehension that those things offer. All of these verbs reflect 
uncertainty because they automatically involve themselves actively with the Geheimnis 
of things in the world. 
 
91 The centrality of the subject becomes clear in such statements as ‘the exploits of 
ancestors form the backbone of knowledge’ or ‘knowledge is handed down from one 
generation to another.’ 
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klingenden Worte mit gewöhnlichen Ausdrücken zu vertauschen. 
(1960e, p. 107) 
 
To be a prophet of nature is a sacred and beautiful office…. Not the 
mere breadth and system of knowledge, not the gift of relating this 
knowledge easily and purely to familiar concepts and experience and 
of exchanging the peculiar, strange-sounding words for common 
expressions. (2005, p. 115) 
 
One can see the human centred nature of knowledge (mātauranga), particularly 
when that type of knowledge is not qualified but is merely cited as a self-evident 
term. If we refer back to Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” we recall that he was 
critical of relationships with the world that revolved around quantification. 
Underlying this warning was his recoil from setting out to know anything in the 
world with certainty at all. As he noted, “[w]as für eine Beziehung ist das 
Wissen? Es ist ein Seyn außer dem Seyn, das doch im Seyn ist” (1960j, p. 
106)/“[w]hat kind of a relation is knowledge? It is a being outside of being that is 
nevertheless within being” (2003, p. 5), demonstrating further that Novalis 
believed that knowledge of the world was a constant movement backwards 
between the I and the world – not just from the I-as-ground outwards. Beiser 
(2002) emphasises this important aspect of Novalis’ assertion about the 
relationship between the subject and object, and notes that in order for there to be 
a correspondence of one to another (thus producing knowledge), there needs to be 
common ground or even an identity between the two. Talking with certainty about 
the Absolute is moderated for Novalis, and so any knowledge that emerged from 
the movement of things in the world was offset by the very fluidity of that 
movement and of the things themselves. 
 
The orientation of things so that they conform to solid, knowable objects before 
Māori is hugely consequential. This occurrence does not just stop at itself, though; 
it paves the way for a framing of the world such that an epistemological, knowing 
relationship with it is far more important than a Being-related involvement with 
things in the world is (Guignon, 1983). The term ‘mātauranga’, therefore, carries 
with it a reduction of a formerly mysterious view of the world to something much 
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more economical and manageable, even when the word ‘holistic’ is used 
alongside it. Georgina Stewart (2007), for instance, indicates “[a]nother important 
point is that mātauranga is holistic, without the compartmentalisation of Western 
conceptions of knowledge” (p. 139). Yet I believe the problem lies in the 
terminology of ‘knowledge’ itself, even if expressed in its Māori equivalent 
‘mātauranga’. Its greatest difficulty, in other words, is the expectation that 
relationships that underpin Māori and the outer world are reduced to form either 
knowledge or mātauranga. In this colonised reading of those relationships, the 
human self becomes the most important arbiter of the outer world and is able to 
choose how they will relate to that world. An issue of tyrannical language arises. 
Those activities are narrowed precisely so they have to conform to an epistemic 
view of things in the world. Māori interrelationships with the world, which may or 
may not result in knowledge, are replaced with a concise term that stands in for 
those interdependent activities. Given the “fascination with epistemology” 
(Guignon, 1983, p. 13) 92  that characterises the modern age, those 
interrelationships must prove to be productive and hence identifiable as present, 
tangible forms of knowledge.  
 
Indigenous writers have identified the problem with the apparent fixation on 
epistemology. Kincheloe and Steinberg (2008), however, note broadly that: 
 
                                                
92 Ermines (1995) considers the economy of the term ‘epistemology’ for indigenous 
peoples in the following statement: “Ideology is one determinant of the quality of 
research on epistemology. Early ideas such as Destutt de Tracy’s (1801) definition of 
ideology as the science of ideas used to distinguish science from the metaphysical suggest 
the Western world’s direction and purpose in seeking the nature and origin of knowledge. 
Subsequent categorization and selective validation of knowledge by Western science has 
inevitably influenced Western ideology as the driving force behind knowing” (p. 102) . 
In its use as a discourse, epistemology is understood to refer to knowledge as its central 
focus. In respect of research, Kovach (2009) raises the crucial question of reducing things 
in the world to whether they are capable of providing knowledge or not: “Indigenous 
forms of inquiry find an ally in the qualitative approaches that assume the relationally 
constricted aspect of knowledge production. Granted, qualitative approaches are based 
upon a non-animistic premise, which differs from tribal epistemology, and so deeper 
questions remain…. [such as] What does it mean to privilege human-centric knowledge?” 
(p. 43). 
The focus on the term ‘epistemology’ may, however, outweigh any similar focus on 
Being. It may also render indigenous philosophies more susceptible to the nice, neat 
“language of frameworks” (p. 43). 
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[I]t appears that Cartesian-Newtonian-Baconian epistemologies and 
many indigenous knowledge systems differ in the very way they 
define life – moving, thus, from the epistemological to the ontological 
realm…. Many indigenous peoples have traditionally seen all life on 
the planet as so multidimensionally entwined that they have not been 
so quick to distinguish the living from the nonliving…. [T]he Andean 
peasants’ and other indigenous people’s belief that the rivers, 
mountains, land, soil, lakes, rocks, and animals are sentient may not 
be as preposterous as Westerners first perceived it. (p. 151) 
 
Indigenous peoples will have varied terms for ‘the ontological realm’ – we have already seen 
that Māori writers approach it in several ways – but it should be noted that the ‘ontological’ is 
itself a stand-in word for a complex set of events, involving things in the world. Language as 
a phenomenon may be a problem if it seeks to refer economically to this complexity, leading 
Heidegger to note that: 
 
Insofern es den Menschen stellt, d.h. ihn herausfordert, alles 
Anwesende als technischen Bestand zu bestellen, west das Ge-stell 
nach der Weise des Ereignisses und zwar so, daß es dieses zugleich 
verstellt, weil alles Bestellen sich in das rechnende Denken 
eingewiesen sieht und so die Sprache des Ge-stells spricht. Das 
Sprechen wird herausgefordert, der Bestellbarkeit des Anwesenden 
nach jeder Richtung zu entsprechen. (1971c, p. 263) 
 
Because Framing challenges man, that is, provokes him to order and 
set up all that is present being as technical inventory, Framing persists 
after the manner of Appropriation, specifically by simultaneously 
obstructing Appropriation, in that all ordering finds itself channeled 
into calculative thinking and therefore speaks the language of 
Framing. Speaking is challenged to correspond in every respect to 
Framing in which all beings can be commandeered. (1971a, pp. 131-
132) 
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Royal, from an indigenous perspective, notes a similar problem with language that 
is predicated on singling out a thing for description, as it completes nicely the 
process of ordering in the name of knowledge. A unit of meaning is ascribed to 
the thing through that language such that language merely affirms the place of that 
thing in relation to humanity: 
 
A claim activity commences with an assertion about a relationship 
between a group of people and an object. The ‘statement of claim’ 
locates the people and object in space and time. In order for the claim 
to be successful, this ‘location’ has to remain fixed so that various 
judgements can be made about the nature of the claim. (Royal, 2009b, 
p. 35) 
 
Our role as subjects is likewise affirmed through this dominant process, even in 
the presence of authentic Māori language. This diminution of Being can be seen 
in the word ‘mātauranga’, even (and especially) when “it is possible that 
‘mātauranga Māori’ will help facilitate the Māori dimension of New Zealand’s 
knowledge economy” (Royal, 2009b, p. 12).  
 
3. The self-focus of ‘ako’  
As to the fallibility of humanity in its attempts to find an absolute ground through 
its own efforts, Novalis notes that: 
 
Was thu ich, indem ich filosofire? ich denke über einen Grund nach. 
Dem Filosofiren liegt als ein Streben nach dem Denken eines Grundes 
zum Grunde.... Alles Filosofiren muß also bey einem absoluten 
Grunde endigen. Wenn dieser nun nicht gegeben wäre, wenn dieser 
Begriff eine Unmöglichkeit enthielte – so wäre der Trieb zu 
Filosophiren eine unendliche Thätigkeit – und darum ohne Ende, weil 
ein ewiges Bedürfniß nach einem absoluten Grunde vorhanden wäre, 
das doch nur relativ gestillt werden könnte – und darum nie aufhören 
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würde. Durch das freywillige Entsagen des Absoluten entsteht die 
unendliche freye Thätigkeit in uns – das Einzig mögliche Absolute, 
was uns gegeben werden kann und was wir nur durch unsre 
Unvermögenheit ein Absolutes zu erreichen und zu erkennen, finden. 
Dies uns gegebne Absolute läßt sich nur negative erkennen, indem wir 
handeln und finden, daß durch kein Handeln das erreicht wird, was 
wir suchen. (1960j, pp. 269-270)  
 
What do I do when I philosophize? I reflect upon a ground. The 
ground of philosophizing is thus a striving after the thought of a 
ground…. All philosophizing must therefore end in an absolute 
ground. Now if this were not given, if this concept contained an 
impossibility – then the drive to philosophize would be an unending 
activity – and without end because there would be an eternal urge for 
an absolute ground that can be satisfied only relatively - and that 
would therefore never cease. Unending free activity in us arises 
through the free renunciation of the absolute – the only possible 
absolute that can be given us and that we only find through our 
inability to attain and know an absolute. This absolute that is given to 
us can only be known negatively, insofar as we act and find that we 
seek cannot be attained through action.… This could be called an 
absolute postulate. All searching for a single principle would be like 
the attempt to square the circle. (Kneller, 2003, pp. 167-168)  
 
Indeed, according to Novalis, we are only given certain signs, feelings, and 
intuitions about the Absolute through its mismatch with our own interpretations of 
it. Nature is very much an active part of humanity’s everyday, seemingly banal 
activities. It does not just come into play within ceremonial or religious discourse 
– if it did, it would be a ‘nonself’, a Fichtean postulation that, it will be recalled, 
Novalis resists (Becker & Manstetten, 2004) - but instead bears down on us 
through its arising within every aspect of life.  
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The exclusion of things in the world  
The self-conscious process of teaching and learning is an incomplete depiction of 
this ongoing activity. The complexity of ‘ako’, similar to ‘whakapapa’, has shown 
itself to be susceptible to its placement amongst colonising influences (mainly 
amongst a geheimnislose orientation of terms). This is part of the hegemonic 
attraction of colonising language, which appears to bring the underlying 
primordial nature of a word in line with its own. In some cases a vast amount of 
literature may be generated in respect of a ‘value’ that is deemed to be a 
traditional one, but in the course of its overuse the traditional term is made 
thoroughly knowable. The term ‘ako’, I argue, has been rendered an activity that 
almost exclusively involves human beings and fits our description of certainty. In 
‘ako’ the problem of Māori underachievement is deemed to be reparable through 
the reciprocity of teaching and learning (Bishop & Glynn, 1999). In essence, the 
dominant interpretation of ‘ako’ does not question the origin of knowledge or 
contemplate the presence of the environment in bringing to light both people and 
their relationships with the world. It does, to a certain extent, bring into question 
the established dichotomy of teacher/learner roles, but the presence of people in 
the learning process is what is seen to be most important. 
 
Poetically, Novalis reflected on the intimate interplay of nature and humanity. In 
Die Lehrlinge zu Sais he recounts the conversation of ‘the thousandfold natures’: 
 
O! daß der Mensch ... die innre Musik der Natur verstände und einen 
Sinn für äußere Harmonie hätte. Aber er weiß ja kaum, daß wir 
zusammen gehören, und keins ohne das andere bestehen kann.... Wie 
glücklich könnte er sein, wenn er mit uns freundlich umginge, und 
auch in unsern großen Bund träte, wie ehemals in der goldnen Zeit, 
wie er sie mit Recht nennt. In jener Zeit verstand er uns, wie wir ihn 
verstanden. Seine Begierde, Gott zu werden, hat ihn von uns getrennt, 
er sucht, was wir nicht wissen und ahnden können, und seitdem ist er 
keine begleitende Stimme.  (1960e, p. 95)  
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O, if only man … could understand the inner music of nature, if only 
he had a sense for outward harmonies. But he scarcely knows that we 
belong together and that none of us can exist without the others…. 
How happy he could be if he treated us amiably and entered into our 
great covenant, as he did in the good old days, rightly so named. In 
those days he understood us, as we understand him. His desire to 
become God has separated him from us, he seeks what he cannot 
know or divine, and since then he has ceased to be a harmonizing 
voice. (2005, pp. 69-70)   
 
In this quote we see that there is a nostalgia or longing on the part of nature to be 
treated properly by humanity. There is a suggestion that this former relationship 
merged throughout all the practices of humanity and that this included the 
perceivable (‘outward harmonies’), the cognitive (‘understood us’), and the 
imperceptible (‘what he cannot know or divine’). Colonisation for the Māori self 
and their communities, I have argued, has resulted in a rupture between that 
similarly holistic relationship with the environment, showing itself in the 
anthropocentricism of ‘ako’, to the extent that what has gained a foothold to the 
detriment of the others is the cognitive. Formerly, however, Māori believed that 
the self was part of the environment, and hence the self’s uptake of anything – 
emotion, feeling, cognition, even physical attribute – was dependent on the 
interplay of whakapapa with the natural world, leading to what Royal (2008) 
notes is “aroha”/love (p. 122). The deep links that Māori have with the natural 
world – seen and unseen – permeate outwards to include those who are deceased 
and those who are yet to come, as well as past and future impacts on the 
environment. Even thoughts and intentions could come to bear on the natural 
world and would dictate the reciprocity back from the natural world to the self. 
This suggests that there is very little room for subjectivity; however, humanity has 
always been able to affect the natural world individually and collectively through 
personality and uniqueness of whakapapa. We will recall from chapter three that 
the idea of Being was a constant activity that humanity could not fully conceive of 
mentally but that nevertheless always held sway, as ‘Te Ao Tua-Atea’, behind 
(‘tua’) all relationships. However, in dominant views of ‘ako’ the self is thought 
of as a constant, enduring presence. This is fortified in the belief that the human 
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faculty of knowledge is the sole domain of humanity; hence the overriding focus 
on people. 
 
There are problems innate to casting people as enduring presences for a Māori 
consideration of the ontological realm. To begin with, it facilitates the idea that 
people are knowable things. As Heidegger (1993) asserts, the body is approached 
in advance as bodily. As exercises involving evident bodies, learning/teaching is 
thus conceived in terms of what validly comprises teaching and learning. 
Curricula are devised, even if in the Māori language, which fit with the necessary 
components of learner and teacher as those present and evident bodies. Past 
examples heralding the body as beyond an exercise in learning and teaching are 
forgotten: The lessons of ancestors in shape-changing, for instance, are more 
easily relegated to myth with the practice of viewing the body as an unchanging 
entity involved in the exercise of learning or teaching. While it is tempting to add 
to the debate by taking the consequences down a sociological path – the person is 
more easily stereotyped through being posited as an object; the person’s learning 
needs might change; and not all knowledge can be measured, and so on – in fact a 
far more fundamental impact is possible in respect of the spiritual integrity of the 
body. With their contemplation of Being, Māori knew the importance of a 
tentative approach towards any perceived presence of things, even though those 
things were greatly valued. With ‘ako’, though, there remains the likelihood that 
the self becomes frozen through being approached as identifiable. Although that 
process does not necessarily affect the existence, as such, of Te Ao Tua-Atea, that 
same phenomenon’s ability to maintain movement in respect of the self is 
compromised. 
 
Participants in ‘ako’ are subjected to the idea that the knowledge that they are 
given is an explanation about particular things. The explanation is likely to be 
based on the belief that a certainty in respect of objects in the world is desirable, 
and that such certainty can be grasped by using reliable tools. The ability to intuit, 
which Māori particularly value, is indistinguishable in its translation ‘rongo’ from 
other senses (Raerino, 1999); yet, although it may be valued as an important tool 
in initially identifying a feeling about the world, its importance as a Gefühl/feeling 
for the Absolute is likely to comprise, at best, a step towards knowing the thing 
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with certainty. In its self-consciousness, besides its reciprocal focus, ‘ako’ really 
entails little more than Western conceptions of teaching and learning. This 
following description is quite representative of common descriptions of the term: 
 
The concept of ako describes a teaching and learning relationship, 
where the educator is also learning from the student and where 
educators’ practices are informed by the latest research and are both 
deliberate and reflective. Ako is grounded in the principle of 
reciprocity and also recognises that the learner and whānau cannot be 
separated. (Ministry of Education, 2009, p. 20)  
 
In its focus on learning and teaching (and hence its adherence to an approach that 
centres on things that go to make up learning and teaching), a clarity results which 
suggests that the term ‘ako’ need never be thought of in any other way. In other 
words, the apparent suitability of its translation as ‘learn/teach’ is unquestioned, 
although creative interpretations within the permissible field of its denotative 
clarity may occasionally happen. The term is thus made static. Moreover, its 
complicity with knowledge – the teaching and the uptake of it – means that 
knowledge is now on the side, a thing ready to be consumed, and is made 
transferrable between human beings.  
 
4. A solid portrayal of phenomena through 
‘whenua’ 
I argue that what the eye discloses, as with science, is only the physical world and 
can in fact cause some vexation, as the self can detect other phenomena behind 
that evident one and will always feel compelled – at a very deep, instinctual level 
– to mythologise that evident object. This is the transfiguration or Romantisieren 
that Wordsworth, Coleridge and Novalis advocate. Language that is used to point 
to the precise event before the person, however, has a tendency to deflate the 
romanticised thing, as Novalis broadly highlights in his belief that “das reine 
trennende Urtheil” (1960f, p. 653)/[the pure original division] can be 
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“tödtlich”/[fatal], and as Friedrich Schlegel (1964b), in respect of a precise word, 
laments: 
 
Ein einziges analytisches Wort, auch zum Lobe, kann den 
vortrefflichsten witzigen Einfall, dessen Flamme nun erst wärmen 
sollte, nachdem sie geglänzt hat, unmittelbar löschen. (p. 7) 
 
[A single analytical word, even directed as praise, can immediately 
quench the unusually convivial moment – a moment which should be 
warmed with its flames, having sparkled.]93  
 
Following Schlegel the analytical word could, in the context of a geheimnislose 
view of ‘whenua’, refer to the mapping of land, title registering, or earth sciences 
that deal with the flat surface of the land in a technical way, as some examples. 
Even seductive descriptions of land used in tourist literature, possibly construed to 
be ‘directed as praise’, quench the real essence, as land is talked about as isolated 
and reified event. Both Novalis and Schlegel here resist the fundamental belief 
that the thing before the self is all that there is to that thing, with land posing one 
example. In Māori language, even terms that point to apparently banal objects 
open up onto other objects and hence lose their solidity. In sites where there was 
an overwhelmingly focus on the evident, however, there appears to be a concerted 
effort to prevent their continued state of flux. I noted this happening in Waitangi 
Tribunal hearings and was particularly frustrated at the sterilisation of Māori 
terms, so that they threatened to mean no more than their Western, legal 
counterparts. The Waitangi Tribunal, dealing largely with land issues, first piqued 
my concern with its epistemologically certain tone of ‘land’. While by no means 
the only entity to sterilise Māori terms, because it frequently concerns itself with 
the term it is a significant contributor to the idea that ‘whenua’ and ‘land’ are 
direct equivalences of each other (Mika, 2007). 
 
Geoff Park (2006) has alluded to the disparity in meaning between ‘whenua’ and 
‘land’, noting that “the grievous losses that Māori have suffered since the treaty, 
                                                
93 ‘Witz’ for Schlegel is “unbedingt geselliger Geist, oder fragmentarische Genialität” 
(1964b, p. 6)/[unreified sociable spirit, or fragmentary geniality]. 
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while sited in the solid surface of the Earth that we call ‘land’, have been much 
more than the loss of ground” (p. 242). He indicates the spiritual connection that 
Māori have to that which is called ‘whenua’, asserting that it means something 
quite different from ‘land’, which has “connotations of the solid ground of earth” 
(Park, 2001, p. 12). He refers to David Abrams (1996) who is himself an advocate 
of a view of language such that it does not just refer to a package of meaning but 
that it opens up the life that transcends human experience and control. Correctly 
citing the other meaning of whenua – placenta – he then draws a relationship 
between nourishment and whenua. This reading of ‘whenua’ would have it that 
there is automatically an inherent inclusion of an acknowledgement of the 
Absolute and other emerging elements to the very word. This may be to do with 
its immediate reciprocity with the other meaning of whenua. However, that 
‘whenua’ has come to illuminate no more in the world than its chosen counterpart 
‘land’ means that it is self-evident in its solidness. This is entirely possible, given 
the “power of law to organize our awareness of phenomena before they reach the 
level of consciousness” (Banner, 1999, p. 807). 
 
Perhaps all that may be said is that the word ‘whenua’ in its broad sense should 
refer to all these elements activating against each other as an expression of the 
Absolute. ‘Land’ may have similar activities taking place behind it, yet in certain 
forums the lack of acknowledgement of this interplay means that the Absolute is 
probably constrained to fit with a dominant skewing of enframing. ‘Whenua’ is 
not automatically exempt from a similar limitation because, as ‘land’, it is the 
object that is disclosed to our eye: visible, measurable and able to be isolated as 
Zahlen and Figuren. When both terms are used to refer to no more than the flat 
surface of the earth, though, then they are both being touted as meaning nothing 
more than those in the forum of law. ‘Whenua’ may then be used as if it holds 
some innate spiritual reference, but in that forum it is suborned to meet the certain 
utterance that is expected with its equivalence, ‘land’.  
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Summary 
Novalis was concerned with bringing to awareness the intricacies of the 
relationships that underpin things in the world and making them mysterious so 
that they were not merely the domain of humanity. Words could therefore not be 
certain, as their references – things in the world – were in a constant state of flux. 
This changeable nature of things was brought about by the Absolute, which 
resides behind the horizons of human consciousness. In this chapter I have carried 
on “Wenn nicht mehr” as a Stoßsatz, as well as the broader philosophies that I 
arrived at through “Wenn nicht mehr” in chapter four, from which to discuss 
germane issues for the Māori self that arise in a colonised use of terms in respect 
of things in the world. I drew also on other fragments of Novalis’ and other early 
Romantics to sustain this process of Nachdenken. The issues that arose may be 
briefly summarised. Firstly, language as a means of talking about an isolated 
thing with precision is a delusion for Novalis. Coinciding with that delusion is a 
belief that things to which language points are static, arising because there is no 
relationship between the thing being discussed and other things.  The constantly 
moving relationship between things, for Novalis and for Māori, means that the 
thing being discussed is also shifting and hence is never isolated.  
 
One of the most striking aspects of Novalis’ philosophies is that he advocates a 
process of thinking about things in the world so that they retain their mystery. He 
calls this process ‘Romantisieren’. I now come to the final part of my thesis, 
which delves into this innovation of his, and use it to reinvigorate those terms I 
have outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter Seven: The Geheimnis of Māori 
terms in light of Novalis’ Romantisieren 
Preliminary remarks 
In the previous chapters, the main points of which I now briefly summarise, I 
have drawn on Novalis’ fragments to both provoke me into Nachdenken about a 
notion of Being and Geheimnis that may be of interest to Māori and also to bring 
to my awareness the overall nature of Geheimnislosigkeit for the Māori self, with 
particular reference to terms for things in the world. Those previous chapters now 
inform this one, in which I now refer to Novalis’ fragments to specifically 
romanticise those terms that, I identified in chapter six, have been used in a 
geheimnislose fashion. Chapter two, my method chapter, has some substantive 
impact on this chapter. Importantly, chapter two emphasised the enduring nature 
of Novalis’ fragments, but I also raise here that the outcomes I reached as a Māori 
writer continue too. The various aspects of the discussion in chapter two manifest 
in the following ways: The self is not really an isolated ‘self’ but is constantly 
impacted on by elements of the Absolute; Nachdenken occurs as a result of that 
essentially unknowable interaction; and one operates as much as an outcome of 
one’s history in Nachdenken (what is thought of as ‘historical’ is in fact always 
present in the location of the Nachdenker). Colonisation is hence an important 
factor for Māori writers to always keep at the forefront of their assertions about 
the nature of things in the world, as it must always be accounted for in these 
assertions.  
 
Chapter three set the context for further discussions about Geheimnislosigkeit and 
also expanded on the notion of the Absolute/Being in a Māori sense. Novalis 
believed that, in order to make affirmations about Being, one should reflect its 
nature by engaging in a dialectic, oppositional critique. I chose a text written by a 
Māori author with which I strongly disagreed and I engaged in a critique with it, 
using Novalis’ own method and substantive affirmations together with 
philosophies that certain Māori discussed as a form of Symphilosophie. That 
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dialectical exercise reflects a central element of the Absolute. In his own 
dialectical process with Fichte’s works, Novalis notes that Being contains 
oppositional forces, a surmise that I had earlier brought to light in chapter two. 
Being is also in a constant state of activity and arranges things in the world on that 
basis.  
 
Things in the world have their Geheimnis because of the Absolute. Chapter four 
provided a subtle provocation in the form of Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” to bring 
to our awareness the deeper layers of Geheimnislosigkeit and to stimulate a 
discussion about the forgetting of Being and resulting Geheimnislosigkeit for the 
Māori self, especially as the self engages with dominant institutions. This analysis 
was then extended to a speculation on how overriding uses of Māori terms reflect 
the Geheimnislosigkeit of the colonial project. Chapters four, five and six set the 
opposition from which to work for the current chapter, which makes some 
affirmations relating to the terms ‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’, and ‘whenua’. In chapter 
six of the thesis I noted the Geheimnislosigkeit of those terms is really just a 
continuation of a problem of the forgetting of Being and of the relationship 
provided by the Absolute between the self and things in the world generally. This 
latter and quite fundamental problem I had considered in chapter five.  
 
The term ‘mātauranga’ encourages the self to be central in its very construction 
and meaning. I romanticise the centrality of the self that the term urges, by 
romanticising the other terms I have mentioned and by discussing some aspects of 
the self that ‘mātauranga’, dominantly equated with ‘knowledge’, neglects. I note 
soon in this chapter in footnote form that one may indeed directly romanticise the 
term ‘mātauranga’; however, I wish to show that another way to romanticise the 
knowing self is to engage with Novalis’ Stoßsätzen both in discussions about the 
self directly and about the things in the world that ‘whenua’, ‘whakapapa’, and 
‘ako’ can refer to. 
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Reclaiming the spontaneity of terms 
Novalis engaged in romanticising at many steps of his works. In Die Lehrlinge zu 
Sais he gives nature itself a voice. In turn, nature in its many forms notes the need 
for humanity to romanticise: 
 
Der Zauber des Goldes, die Geheimnisse der Farben, die Freuden des 
Wassers sind ihm nicht fremd, in den Antiken ahndet er die 
Wunderbarkeit der Steine, und dennoch fehlt ihm noch die süße 
Leidenschaft für das Weben der Natur, das Auge für unsre 
entzückenden Mysterien. Lernt er nun einmal fühlen? Diesen 
himmlischen, diesen natürlichsten aller Sinne kennt er noch wenig: 
durch das Gefühl würde die alte, ersehnte Zeit zurückkommen; das 
Element des Gefühls ist ein inneres Licht, was sich in schönern, 
kräftigern Farben bricht. Dann gingen die Gestirne in ihm auf, er 
lernte die ganze Welt fühlen, klärer und mannigfaltiger, als ihm das 
Auge jetzt Grenzen und Flächen zeigt. (1960e, p. 96)  
 
The magic of gold, the secrets of colors, the joys of water are not alien 
to him, he surmises the wonder of ancient stones, and yet he lacks the 
sweet passion for nature’s weavings, the eye for our [nature’s] 
entrancing mysteries. Will he ever learn to feel? This divine, this most 
natural of all senses is little known to him: feeling would bring back 
the old time, the time we yearn for; the element of feeling is an inward 
light that breaks into stronger, more beautiful colors. Then the stars 
would rise within him, he would learn to feel the whole world, and his 
feeling would be richer and clearer than the limits and surfaces that 
his eye now discloses. (2005, pp. 71, 73) 
 
Clearly nature laments the lack of drive of humanity to romanticise, but it also 
promises – in typical Romantic form – that there is a means of finally 
acknowledging the Geheimnis of things in the world. Alongside the obvious need 
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to problematise, I contend that it is necessary to think along proactive lines, 
beginning for my thesis at the theoretical level.  
 
Emphasis on the active imagination  
One way of going back to a state of Geheimnis – a philosophical approach that 
respects the unknown of seemingly familiar concepts and ideas - is, I maintain, to 
revisit those core terms that are taken to be traditional because they originate from 
a Māori world and then to make them active. Novalis suggests in a Fichte-Studien 
fragment that the deeper, proper meaning of a word could often be grasped in its 
etymology. It is in both its etymology and its grouping with other words that the 
silent sense of the word is revealed, because the tendency to rely on accepted 
meaning assigned to that word is avoided: 
 
Eigenschaft bedeutet das Gesetz einer ursprünglichen Thatsache – 
eine Selbstthätigkeit –  
Eine Erscheinung, Offenbarung des Wesens.  
/Weisen - wissen - weis - Beweiß - zeigen - Zeugen - zeichen – 
zogen./ (1960j, p. 237) 
 
Property means the law of an original fact – a kind of spontaneity –  
An appearance, revelation of essence. 
/indicate – to know – show – proof – to show [zeigen] – witness – to 
signify [zeichen] – inferred [zogen]./ (Kneller, 2003, p. 136) 
 
Two aspects relating to Novalis’ wider exposition in the sphere of the Absolute are 
apparent here. First, Novalis does not undertake an etymological analysis of these 
terms as such: He notes that there is a property, which is hidden but active, 
inherent to a group of terms that he then lists. Nevertheless, an etymological 
breakdown is necessary in order to fully understand the sense that Novalis wishes 
to convey. He starts with an epistemological context – “Eigenschaften” – which 
indicates the visible traits or properties of a person or thing in the world. They 
belong (‘Eigen’) to the thing and are not incidental to the thing itself: Novalis 
wants us to remember that, in accordance with the word itself, properties are one’s 
 255 
‘own’ and are embedded in the thing. Moreover, these properties are contingent on 
an original “fact” (“Thatsache”), which can be broken down into two components 
– That/activity and Sache/thing. The combination of these two components 
suggests that things are active and that there is an original affinity with fact here. 
As a “kind of spontaneity”, again drawing on the word That, the properties of a 
thing are active and are self-arranged. As “an appearance” the essence of a thing 
reveals itself in its own way. This is its own activity. In this first component, 
Novalis encourages the reader to explore the intrinsic character to things in the 
world through what they reveal to the perceiver, even though that essence that 
those things reveal may not proclaim itself loudly. This may be best achieved by 
moving beyond the referential nature of terms to their ontological senses that they 
carry with them - that appear to be hidden but are still able to reveal themselves. 
Through his use of the terms ‘Eigenschaft’ and ‘Thatsache’ his encouragement 
encompasses an etymological dimension.  
 
The showing of the thing in the world that occurs demonstrates the activity of 
intuition (‘Anschauung’) and thereafter the representation (‘Vorstellung’) of that 
thing. Novalis calls the intuitive consciousness of objects ‘matter’ because it is not 
the solid component of awareness that is supposed by cognition. In its lack of 
solidity it “cannot conceive pure form … [but it] can grasp determinate form – 
some unity of form and content” (Beiser, 2002, p. 416)94. The ‘hovering’ that 
occurs is an indication that one never alights fully on the thing, because in striving 
for cognition one is simultaneously connected with things in the world through 
intuition – indeed, one’s intuition is the showing of those things - and removed 
from them by imagination (Rommel, 1996). Through the imagination and the 
imaginative association of signs assigned to the thing in the world - signs which in 
relation to language Novalis thinks of as “conceptual image[s]” (Rommel, 1996, p. 
101) - Romantisieren takes place. At each level or stage, the self reflects the 
showing of the thing, with Buber identifying that this continuous reflection 
through the imagination, from apparent start to finish, is the essence of freedom: 
 
                                                
94 By this, Beiser means that there is form there, but that it is accompanied by other 
elements aside from the matter that appears to make it up. 
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Er lauscht dem aus sich Werdenden, dem Weg des Wesens in der 
Welt; nicht um von ihm getragen zu werden: um es selber so zu 
verwirklichen, wie es von ihm, dessen es bedarf, verwirklicht werden 
will, mit Menschengeist und Menschentat, mit Menschenleben und 
Menschentod. (1997, pp. 72-73)    
 
He listens to that which grows, to the way of Being in the world, not 
in order to be carried along by it but rather in order to actualize it in 
the manner in which it, needing him, wants to be actualized by him – 
with human spirit and human deed, with human life and human death. 
(1996, p. 109) 
 
The active theme of Novalis’ continues in the list of words that are apparently 
independent, discrete activities, but which for him show the uncertainty of the 
imaginative process. This list of words is important for two reasons: Firstly, it 
demonstrates the showing of the thing in all its guises – starting with 
“Wesen”/essence, and then moving through a number of seemingly self-agentic 
processes. The showing of the thing in the world is processed through all those 
activities listed, but the listing of the terms shows the interdependency and, in the 
end, obscurity of each ostensibly discrete activity. The beginning ‘essence’, 
therefore, is never fully revealed to the self. The inference that occurs is as a result 
of a number of imaginative processes that draw on each other and that then 
arguably lead the perceiver back to the essence of the thing being perceived. 
Recalling chapter two: The object being regarded, and the imaginative response to 
it, are still contained in the representation. 
 
For this chapter, the above discussion adds a fuller explanation to my method. In 
the disclosure of things in the world, Being reveals aspects of itself in the 
subsequent imaginative process of the self, and in that disclosure Being indicates 
its interrelatedness with the properties of a thing. Here, Novalis draws to our 
attention that true ‘knowing’ comes about through this genuine self-showing of the 
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thing and its properties95. Knowing is a form of revealing which is proof of the 
thing’s contingency on Being. One may see this and make inferences from the 
process, but the close connection with all those other terms shows that Novalis 
prefers that, in ‘witnessing’, ‘signifying’, or ‘inferring’, one is also indicating and 
showing their own interdependency with Being. We can see through this activity 
that Being reveals itself but is being revealed also: This is the nature of the double 
genitive that Novalis uses in “Offenbarung des Wesens”/[disclosure by/of Being].  
 
I shall show in this chapter that a similar ‘self-revealing’ of things in the world 
through Māori terminology is made possible by interpreting the terms in their 
active senses96. The rendering active of things in the world is not an uncommon 
exercise of those in the creative arts, as I noted briefly in chapter two, but it is not 
a usual one in an academic setting. For the most part, Māori terms are protected as 
having specific (denotative) meanings that are already established and used in a 
collectively understood sense. This chapter again looks at things in the world 
through the lens of terminology, as chapter six did, but now I romanticise those 
terms. The reader should note that the terms interweave more strongly in this 
chapter, and so I shall not provide merely one space to discuss each term but 
                                                
95 Thus, alongside what Novalis asserts in that fragment, one could romanticise the term 
‘mātauranga’ by regarding its etymology. ‘Mā’ refers to ‘clear, transparent’, and 
‘tauranga’ is a form of settling, physical, emotional or mental. The transparency or clarity 
that is being discussed here, within the context of inaccessibility to “true assertions of the 
kind which apply to the object-world” (Bowie, 1997, p. 82) that characterises the beliefs 
of the Romantics, is one that depicts a lack of substance. The settling that occurs here is 
characterised by a lack of perfect or precise showing of the thing’s essence to the self. 
The settling, moreover, is shown to the self as an overall disturbing activity because the 
self becomes aware that he/she cannot perfectly posit the thing settled on for 
contemplation. 
This impossibility of the precise representation of the thing is also incidentally reflected 
in the romanticising of the other Māori terms through Novalis’ Stoßsätze. 
 
96 This exercise does not, however, deal with assertions that posit one thing’s equivalence 
with something else. That is, even romanticising terms may not diminish the tendency to 
say that a thing ‘is’ another. I noted in chapter six that the term ‘mātauranga’ may 
constrain how Māori writers describe the relationship of the self to things in the world, 
and now broaden a discussion of this unfortunate tendency to the outcome of academic 
writing where, particularly in Indo-European languages, one is forced to determine the 
equivalence of even geheimnisvollen terms. Novalis was to some extent resigned to 
humanity’s tendency to find an ultimate ground that would explain a thing. On that basis, 
I attempt not to avoid what is an inevitable consequence of academic writing but instead 
deliberately equate a term with a continuous, changing, and ultimately unknowable 
movement. Additionally, in offering a critique of the terms earlier on, I have opened them 
up to be potentially thought of as fluid things in the world. 
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engage with them so that they relate to each other. Both Novalis’ philosophies and 
Māori ideas of Being and Geheimnis, I have shown, require that things in the 
world be autonomous in their workings and yet actively interrelated: This chapter 
recognises that necessity and draws firstly on some basic, active definitions of 
each word to begin imaginative Romantisieren in a unifying way. 
 
Some contemplative fragments for the reader of the early 
German Romantics 
The activity of Romantisieren is ongoing, and with that in mind I have provided a 
further step, with the Romantisieren of terms found commonly in the German 
Romantic tradition, this time using Māori terms as Stoßsätze. I had already 
romanticised these Māori terms, and they in turn provide sentences that push for 
the revitalisation or rethinking of those German Romantic terms. Although the 
overall aim of this thesis is to use Novalis’ philosophies and fragments as 
Stoßsätze to revisit Māori terms, and to infuse them again with Geheimnis, that 
aim is an incomplete one in the grander scheme of Romantisieren. This last step 
of Nachdenken is offered in the hope that it will be particularly interesting to the 
reader of German Romantic philosophy. The tables that they are incorporated into 
the text with are not meant to ‘border off’ this discussion from the overall aim of 
the thesis but to show that there is a further step in what to me has become 
obvious as an ongoing aspect of Stoßsätze. 
 
The benefits of romanticising terms: Wellbeing 
Recall my observation that while present in the Waitangi Tribunal I had 
suspected a complete disparity between the terms land and whenua. In these 
forums, which talked in an overriding way not about whenua (even though the 
word might have been commonly used) but land, I started to theorise about what 
happens in the judicial process, even in the Waitangi Tribunal, which is 
inquisitorial but not adversarial. In even participating in these processes, the 
claimant threatened to be distanced from whenua in its fullest sense. The 
participant is encouraged to think of themselves as separate from all other things 
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in the world and to discuss them. Whenua as one example is expunged to the 
world of the outer and, even if not named such, becomes ‘land’. Fragmenting 
things in the world, the body is constrained, corresponding with the view of 
Māori writers on the theme that words have important repercussions for the 
metaphysical and physical self. This constraint can also occur in dealings with the 
dead body, even in the absence of words, as they may isolate the body from 
whenua. Māori typically have various ways of managing this, but many of these 
expressions appear to resist the casting of the self as a highly visible, certain 
object, devoid of any interplay with Being.  
 
I speculate that the primary concern here is the view of the self as a totally evident 
entity, able to be retained, moved around, and split off from all other elements 
(whakapapa, whenua and so on) that make it whole. The self then becomes pure 
abstract body, disembodied rational agent, or self. Those things in the world, 
whakapapa and whenua for instance, are equated with ‘land’ and ‘genealogy’ so 
that they are separate, physically discernible and geheimnislos. Royal (2008) 
resists that fragmentation and proactively points to the relationships that the self 
has with everything else, so that what he terms ‘knowledge’ arises: 
 
E pā ana ngā taonga o te mātauranga Māori –pēnei me te whakapapa, i 
te kōrero, i te mōteatea, i te haka, aha atu – ki a rātou anō. (p. 10) 
 
[These treasured elements of Maori knowledge – such as genealogy, 
speech, ancient verse, dance - whatever the element – relate to each 
other.] 
 
Those offshoots of knowledge are in fact themselves linked. This belief has 
practical consequences: 
 
Ehara i te mea, me ako i te mātauranga mō te mātauranga te take, 
engari, kia puta he māramatanga, he aroha ki te ao. (p. 12) 
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[It should not be that one learns knowledge for the sake of knowledge; 
instead, there should be understanding, and compassion for the world, 
stemming from that process.] 
 
Royal indicates here the need to acknowledge the full interplay of elements within 
the realm of Being. From a process arises a feeling, corresponding with Novalis’ 
(1960b) seemingly scientific but metaphorical assertion that “[b]ey allem 
Verdichten erfolgt Abstoßung von Wärme – Wärme wird fühlbar - Bey allem 
Verdünnen wird Wärme angezogen – es ensteht das Gefühl v[on] Kälte” (p. 
468)/“[e]very solidification produces an expulsion of heat – heat becomes 
perceptible – All rarefaction attracts heat – engendering the feeling of coldness” 
(Wood, 2007, p. 182). In that fragment, Novalis points out that what appears to be 
a solid object is actually emanating another form of energy that at first is not 
perceptible but becomes so. This energy moves back towards another process, 
resulting in an opposite energy. Casting the self as something inert and solid, then, 
has consequences for what occurs with the self afterwards. 
 
In chapter three I recounted Novalis’ language to do with the relationship between 
a technical view of nature and an approach to nature’s sick-room, or charnel house. 
Illness results from that relationship, primarily because “[j]etzt sehn wir nichts, als 
todte Wiederholung, die wir nicht verstehn” (1960o, p. 545)/[now we see nothing 
other than dead repetition, which we do not understand]. Nassar (2006) suggests 
that because of this change in attitude towards the mysterious (the Absolute) we 
are left with limited capacities for feeling the presence of spirit, and 
correspondingly with an ‘inadequate’ physical form. While an ability to be open to 
the miraculous in the visible object must be an aspect of what Novalis’ ‘Magical 
Idealism’ wants to achieve, the converse must presumably be true: that a lack of 
that ability leaves humanity with a sort of illness, leading Novalis (1960b) to note 
in fragment form: 
 
Lehre v[on] d[en] Kr[anckheiten] überhaupt im allgemeinsten Sinn. 
Diaetetische Beschäftig[ung] d[es] Geistes mit Best[immtem] und 
Unbest[immtem] zugl[eich]. (p. 381)  
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Theory of diseases on the whole in the most general sense. Dietetic 
occupation of the spirit with both what is definite and indefinite. 
(Wood, 2007, p. 114) 
 
Whether what I have suspected is enough of an impact to render the Māori self ‘ill’ 
in the allopathic sense is up for some speculation, but certainly if we take Novalis’ 
lead on the weakness of the organs because of the rendering of things in the world 
as certain it becomes clearer that there are effects on the self in such situations that 
are not immediately (or, in fact, ever) discernible. Novalis (1960b) also notes that 
“[d]ie Körper sind in dem Raum precipitirte und angeschoßne Gedanken.... Der 
Mensch ist ein Focus des Aethers” (p. 449)/“[b]odies are precipitated and 
crystallized thoughts in space…. Man is a focus of the ether” (Wood, 2007, p. 
167), and further in his Hymnen an die Nacht juxtaposes light, darkness, colour, 
light beams and waves, stars, stone and plant, alongside eyes, gait and lips of 
humanity. We can see here that all manner of things are physically and spiritually 
connected. Even stones may be sentient. Moreover, the ways in which the forces 
of nature come to affect these things are through their organs and organisation; the 
‘widespread space’ is the ‘most inner soul’ of life and thus moves in a non-linear 
fashion around and through these entities. The gentleness of the light plays across 
them, and animals ‘burn’, metabolise, or move, meaning here that they are the 
results of unseen processes – chemical and otherworldly – that interact with these 
dancing forces. The complexity of the Absolute is seen in the interdependence of 
these things that find them moving and disclosing themselves throughout it. Here 
Novalis incorporates the body with poetry; not only is the substance of what he 
says important but also the form he chooses to convey it. In this he presages the 
contemporary Harmut Böhme, who analyses the Romantic idea of the ‘analogia 
entis’ with a view to reclaiming aspects of poetic holism. In his chapter “Der 
sprechende Leib: Die Semioteken des Körpers am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts und 
ihre hermetische Tradition”, Böhme argues that discourses that look at the 
relatedness of body, nature and language are well worth considering: 
 
Körper ist Sprache und Sprache ist Körper: in den ver-rückten 
Diskursen sprachtheologischer Mystik und paracelsischer 
Signaturenlehre spricht sich ein Begehren aus, das die bürgerliche 
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Gesellschaft fortan begleitet. Das Begehren, von dem seit dem ‘Sturm 
und Drang’ die Poesie lebt: das absolute Wort und den absoluten Leib 
zu finden, goldenes Zeitalter der Menschen, die - im Dreiklang von 
Natur, Körper und Sprache - die Wahrheit des nackten Wortes und des 
sprechenden Leibes träumend leben. (Böhme, 1988 n.p.) 
  
[Body is language and language is body: in the non-rationalist 
discourse of theological mysticism and the Paracelsian teachings 
about signature, a desire, which goes with society, gives itself a voice. 
This desire thrives from the time of the Storm and Stress Movement, 
and it comprises finding the absolute word and the absolute body of 
the golden age of people who – in threefold of nature, body and 
language – wistfully live the truth of the naked word and the speaking 
body.] 
 
Both Novalis and Böhme argue for an expansive approach and recognition of 
things in the world on the body itself. As I have argued, conceiving of whenua and 
whakapapa as static entities has consequences for the body. The positing of things 
in advance has an effect on the self because the self is an intrinsic part of the 
activity that whenua and whakapapa anticipate. It is known amongst Māori that a 
‘makutu’/curse may be uttered against another, and so the negative intentions of 
humanity are acknowledged. I argue the effectiveness of this sort of activity is 
contingent on operating against the Other as if they are a separate, isolated event in 
the world. Browne’s (2005) observations that words operate in conjunction with 
environment and body are important because they herald a new approach to the 
wellbeing of Māori. If there are utterances with intentions behind them that can 
heal, however, then the converse must be true. In this latter situation the 
involvement of the body in seemingly neutral situations may have insidious effects 
on the self, as the self is effectively cut off from its ability, through the greater 
activity of ako, to acknowledge the effect of whakapapa and whenua on the self at 
a very deep and personal level. Of course this effect moves outwards as well, so 
that whenua and whakapapa, cut off from the self, are also negatively impacted. 
These are some of the far-reaching but theoretically possible effects of conceiving 
of things in the world through narrow terminology. 
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Challenging the geheimnislose self: ‘Dasein’/‘ira’:  
Reviewing Novalis’ interpretation of the ‘self’  
We will recall that Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” reveals both a corporeal and 
esoteric meaning to the existence of the self, not solely a corporeal, visible, 
physical and precise one that tends to dominate. The lines “Wenn die so singen 
oder küssen/Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen” expose that physical activity is 
involved as much as the hidden feeling of an activity. Novalis advocates that the 
world be viewed as a merging of feeling and expression. As “[e]in volkommner 
Trope des Geistes” (1960o, p. 564)/[a perfect trope of the spirit] he extends the 
physical self outwards into the ether, returning as we have seen in “Die Natur” to 
the self. In this movement, which is constant, the All is involved. As one 
expression of Being, the self encounters and incorporates other things in the world 
in both so-called97 physical and spiritual ways together98. 
                                                
97 I describe ‘physical’ and ‘spiritual’ as ‘so-called’ because for Māori writers such as  
Pere (1982), Durie (1994), Marsden (2003) they are artificial constructs, particularly in 
respect of the effects that one facet has on the other. Pere in particular notes the complete 
unity of the notions of ‘physical’ and ‘spiritual’ such that they are indivisible. 
 
98 This constant activity of coming into contact and relating to things in the world in both 
spiritual and physical ways makes perfect sense from traditional Māori discourses. It 
exemplifies that an outcome is no more important than the process because both are 
important physically and spiritually. The ascent of Tāne to retrieve the three baskets of 
knowledge may be read in light of Novalis’ idea, illustrated in his “Die Natur”, that 
Romantisieren includes moving to a different way of perceiving the world and is hence 
dependent on activity and process. In “Die Natur”, Rosenblüte was compelled onward into 
an animate nature towards the Jungfrau (Isis); similarly, Tāne was encouraged to leave the 
ordinary realm in order to obtain knowledge for mankind. Indeed, the ascent aspect of 
accounts to do with the baskets of knowledge appear to be of high importance: the 
relationships between the characters involved; the ways in which Tāne was assisted to 
ascend; the reasons that he was permitted to ascend to begin with are all important 
preliminary concerns central to the accounts. 
There are contextual considerations to be had in respect of the Tāne stories. First, Tāne 
was opposed by Whiro, who sought to reach the baskets of knowledge before Tāne. 
Tāne’s heroic deeds were thus emphasised by the undermining efforts of Whiro, who, it 
could be argued, is equally involved in the spiritual and physical encounter of the baskets - 
in opposing Tāne, Whiro distinguished himself as one who highlighted Tāne’s efforts and 
eventual success and provided the proceedings with a form of discomfort. Often Whiro is 
described generally as the nemesis of the ‘good’ gods (Hongi, 1911; Jordan, 2005); 
however, his association with Tāne as Tāne aimed for the baskets brings to mind Novalis’ 
endorsement of elements working separately but in conjunction.  
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In his summary of the Early Romantics, Berlin (1999) observes that the self is 
something we cannot be readily aware of. It is interesting that he hints at the 
changeable self towards the end of a passage on the general fluidity of the world: 
 
One is reminded of the famous cynical story about someone who said 
to Dante Gabriel Rossetti when he was writing about the Holy Grail, 
‘But Mr Rossetti, when you have found the Grail, what will you do 
with it?’ This is precisely the typical question which the romantics 
knew very well how to answer. In their case the Grail was in principle 
both undiscoverable and such that one’s whole life could not be 
prevented from being a perpetual search for it, and that is because of 
the nature of the universe…. The brute fact about the universe is that 
it is not fully expressible … it is not at rest, it is in motion … and this 
is what we discover when we discover that the self is something of 
which we are aware only in effort. Effort is action, action is 
movement, movement is unfinishable – perpetual movement. (p. 106)  
 
Thus nature is not a static non-self that Fichte argued it was but was to be reflected 
in the self’s striving for awareness. The movement of the self is one characterised 
by a turn towards becoming “half conscious” (Berlin, 1999, p. 98) as the self acts 
in a fluid relationship with the Absolute. But in the self-awareness that the self 
strives for, the self also becomes highly aware that the Absolute may not be 
represented fully. In this, the self has a will of its own, but just as Schelling had 
theorised that nature strives after a thing (Berlin, 1999), so the self strives also, but 
                                                                                                                                 
In a similar way, in Novalis’ poetic treatment of the acquisition of knowledge and 
wisdom, Roseblüte und Hyazinth bring to our attention that nature had as much to do with 
Rosenblüte’s movement to another realm as Rosenblüte did himself. For instance, the 
garrulous aspects of nature – both cruel and kind – provided a context within which 
Rosenblüte was immersed and without which he may not have proceeded. Both Tāne and 
Rosenblüte, then, endure moments of discomfort that is holistic in nature. Tāne appears to 
be more certain of his aim and outcome although, again, Whiro’s actions provide 
uncertainty. Rosenblüte encounters Sais in the Jungfrau but Novalis explains quite 
explicitly that the end of Rosenblüte’s journey results in the self-realisation that what he is 
encountering is contained within; the Tāne accounts, on the other hand, do not go this far, 
although the reader may interpret that the relationship that exists between Tāne and those 
elements around him lead to the conclusion that Tāne is not entirely disconnected from the 
baskets of knowledge either. 
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in a state of consciousness. It would be this moderated form of striving – itself 
only possible because of things in the world and their mystery – that would bring 
the body and other things in the world into relationship with each other. 
 
The relationship of the self to things in the world 
Advocating for a ‘metaphysical’ respect for the process of learning, Browne 
(2005) notes a similarly agentic yet externally related phenomenon occurring 
between body, environment and language for Māori: 
 
Languages that have a kinaesthetic feeling base, ‘deal with rhythms, 
and vibrations of process’…. ‘Listening’ to vibrations within objects 
emitting sounds outside of the human hearing range yet felt by the 
body kinaesthetically, could enable one to attune to the environment 
more completely. (p. 12) 
 
For her, terminology is important in ensuring that one is attuned to whenua. Māori 
terms for what we nowadays call ‘illness’ likewise foreshadow vital approaches to 
the body. Here, whenua as a sustaining force draws into the individual as 
emanating from the combination of elements; as I have maintained it must be 
acknowledged as an holistic agency if it is to have a positive impact on the body 
and spirit. Terms are therefore vital in how they preconceive the relationship of the 
body to the effective and interdependent character of whenua. With Novalis’ 
assertion that the body is reflective of the social “fort bis zur Sonne und ihrem 
System” (1960b, p. 370)/“up until the sun and its system” (Wood, 2007, p. 104), 
one sees the uncertainty of the body, which also recurs in different language in 
Pere’s (1997) and Durie’s (1994) writings at times. Novalis illustrates a holistic 
sketch of the body and personhood and even covertly attacks the practice of 
assigning language to the body that is specific to the body. He believes instead that 
“[d]as Äußre ist ein in Geheimnißzustand erhobnes Innre” (1960b, p. 293)/“[t]he 
exterior is an interior that has been raised to a mysterious state” (Wood, 2007, p. 
144) – that the link between the self and the world is implicit. 
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Instead, terms reflect the greater-than-physical character of the self: In that sense 
there is an ebb and flow between what is real and what is ideal, revealing the 
intent behind Novalis’ (1960b) rhetorical question: “Sollten die Körper und 
Figuren die Substantiva – die Kräfte die Verba – und die Naturl[ehre] – 
Dechiffrirkunst seyn” (p. 443)/“Should bodies and figures be nouns - forces, verbs 
- and the theory of Nature - the art of deciphering?” (Wood, 2007, p. 163). The 
link between the spiritual and the physical is evident here, and the terms merely 
disclose the changing interplay of the environment, the body and language. The 
‘hiddenness’ or opacity innate to the Māori terms shows a broader description of 
Māori language as one reflecting Being. Novalis believed that, due to the 
instantaneous change of the individual moment, definite knowledge about nature 
is also quite labile. Certain knowledge, or even a confident impression of nature, 
is useful, however, in that it brings humanity to a point of uncertainty. An 
uncomfortable process, the confusion of knowledge results from nature’s 
tendency to provide the genuine seeker with only a “dunkles Gefühl” (Novalis, 
1960b, p. 256)/[dim feeling]. Humanity consequently can obtain vague guidance 
from nature, and may even “mit desto größerer Genauigkeit das versteckte 
entscheidende Phaenomèn finden und bestimmen [lassen]” (1960b, p. 
256)/“discover and determine with much greater precision, the hidden and 
decisive phenomenon” (Wood, 2007, p. 14). Nature is thus never to be viewed as 
an immediate satisfier of mankind’s thirst for certainty; it might provide a voice 
which guides humanity to a method of discovery, but it will never yield precise 
answers. Additionally, merely discovering with precision the “decisive 
phenomenon” does not unearth the phenomenon; indeed, the essence of nature 
that, according to Novalis (1960e), complains about the “entsetzliche Qualen und 
Schmerzen” (p. 95)/[hideous anguish and pain] stemming from the process of 
objectification would prefer to keep the phenomenon within its own, embedded 
context. 
 
We can see that whenua, in combination with a number of other entities such as 
mauri and whakapapa, confuses the idea that there is certainty to be had about the 
body. This comes forth in Māori terms to do with a disorder. Whenua and 
whakapapa have hence come to bear on the body in both dramatic and subtle ways. 
Our proper acknowledgement of whenua and whakapapa as things in the world 
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that are guided by all other things is imperative to an awareness that the body is 
concomitant in the activity that whenua and whakapapa imply. For the Māori self, 
the ability to talk about wellbeing in a holistic way is predicated on this awareness, 
because terms either act in synchronisation with Being by opening up onto an 
unpredictable, unknowable world, or they distance humanity from an awareness of 
Being by seeking to narrow the scope of the body through terms that objectify.     
 
Dasein 
For the self, this interplay takes form in a number of ways that can be explained by 
referring again to Novalis. We have already seen that poetry for Novalis has the 
capacity to articulate an emotional, bodily response; it lacks the meticulous 
systematising approach of philosophy but it may “einen allegorischen Sinn im 
Großen haben und eine indirecte Wirckung wie Musik etc. thun” (1960f, p. 
572)/“have an allegorical meaning on the whole and, like music, exert … an 
indirect effect” (Behler, 1993, p. 206). The self as ‘Dasein’/existence99 is occupied 
with the act of poetry, not just the ability to intellectualise. As for the notion of 
‘Dasein’, the existential state of the self, Novalis notes that “[d]er reine Stoff d[es] 
reinen Geistes ist - Seyn – der empirische Stoff - bezogenseyn (Daseyn) – oder 
mannichfaltiges Seyn” (1960j, p. 174)/“t]he pure material of pure spirit is – being 
– the empirical material [of pure spirit] is – relational being (presence [Dasein]) – 
or manifold being” (Kneller, 2003, p. 72). Dasein is hence involved with feeling, 
even though Being may not be felt in its pure sense but as an mediated relationship 
to the self. 
 
Dasein in its authentic sense is poetic, bringing together different realms of 
existence to make something new of the seemingly banal. In this the poet is 
uniquely self-contained but only within the context and workings of the Absolute: 
                                                
99 Dasein is a particularly German philosophical concept that is commonly translated as 
‘existence’. Literally it means there-being. Other writers besides Novalis used the term, 
including Hegel, for whom Dasein is something because of its contrast and relationship 
with other, different things (Inwood, 1992). Notably, Heidegger referred to Dasein in 
place of the usual term ‘human’ to denote the historical and temporal self. Dasein for him 
raises Being as an issue or a problem. 
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Der Dichter ist wahrhaft sinnberaubt – dafür kommt alles in ihm vor. 
Er stellt im eigentlichsten Sinn Subj[ect] Ob[ject] vor – Gemüth und 
Welt. (1960f, p. 686) 
 
[To be sure, the poet is deprived of his senses – because of that, 
everything takes place within him. He imagines subject and object in 
the most authentic sense – soul and world.]  
 
The introspection that Novalis prefers here is not an independent one, however. 
He makes this point clear in “Blüthenstaub” when he discusses the self as a part of 
what he calls the universe, but, peculiarly, with the universe residing within at the 
same time: 
 
Wir träumen von Reisen durch das Weltall – Ist denn das Weltall 
nicht in uns? Die Tiefen unsers Geistes kennen wir nicht – Nach Innen 
geht der geheimnißvolle Weg. In uns, oder nirgends ist die Ewigkeit 
mit ihren Welten – die Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Die Außenwelt ist 
die Schattenwelt – Sie wirft ihren Schatten in das Lichtreich. Jezt 
scheint uns freylich innerlich so dunkel, einsam, gestaltlos – Aber wie 
ganz anders wird es uns dünken – wenn diese Verfinsterung vorbey, 
und der Schattenkörper hinweggerückt ist – Wir werden mehr 
genießen als je, denn unser Geist hat entbehrt. (1960m, pp. 416,418)   
 
We dream of traveling through the universe – but is not the universe 
within ourselves? The depths of our spirit are unknown to us - the 
mysterious way leads inwards. Eternity with its worlds – the past and 
future – is in ourselves or nowhere. The external world is the world of 
shadows – it throws its shadow into the realm of light. At present this 
realm certainly seems to us so dark inside, lonely, shapeless. But how 
entirely different it will seem to us – when this gloom is past, and the 
body of shadows has moved away. We will experience greater 
enjoyment than ever, for our spirit has been deprived. (1997, p. 25) 
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The self as Dasein experiences both its own limitations as well as its potential 
within the Absolute. In Heinrich von Ofterdingen Novalis assumes that this 
Dasein is the poetic existence of the self. In “Blüthenstaub” he had already 
accused the philistines of living a banal life that might, to them, delude them into 
thinking that they had achieved the full intellectual potential of the self. ‘Dasein’ 
is used in Heinrich von Ofterdingen as existence that experiences the mysterious 
relation of things in the world, which can, however, lead to some deep 
consternation: 
 
Es läßt sich auch diese volle Befriedigung eines angebornen 
Wunsches, diese wundersame Freude an Dingen, die ein näheres 
Verhältnis zu unserm geheimen Dasein haben mögen, zu 
Beschäftigungen, für die man von der Wiege an bestimmt und 
ausgerüstet ist, nicht erklären und beschreiben. (1960h, p. 242)  
 
Nor is it possible to describe or explain this complete satisfaction of 
an inborn desire, this wondrous joy in things, which may have a close 
relation to our mysterious existence, to activities one is prepared and 
predestined for from the cradle. (1990, p. 67)  
 
Thus the feeling of one’s own limitations is implicit to the self. Later in the novel 
Heinrich is afforded a view of the relations between things in the world, affecting 
his “Daseins” (1960h, p. 252)/“very existence” (1990, p. 77) due to the poetic and 
perceptive words of the figure of the old miner. Occasionally, Being will provide 
glimpses of its workings to the poetic and existential self, which is made aware of 
its own limitations in that very revelation. The self as an entity amongst the 
workings of the Absolute, and within the impression of all things in the world, is 
Dasein, which Novalis directly equates with “unserm irrdischen Daseyn 
überhaupt – das aus mannichfaltigen Arten zu existiren, gemischt ist” (1960m, p. 
446)/“our whole earthly being – which is a mixture of diverse ways of existing” 
(1997, p. 37). These various ways of being in the world are impacted on by things 
near and far, so that in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais the impact of things in the world is 
emphasised in Novalis’ mention of Dasein: 
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Der denkende Mensch kehrt zur ursprünglichen Funktion seines 
Daseins, zur schaffenden Betrachtung, zu jenem Punkte zurück, wo 
Hervorbringen und Wissen in der wundervollsten Wechselverbindung 
standen, zu jenem schöpferischen Moment des eigentlichen Genusses, 
des innern Selbstempfängnisses. Wenn er nur ganz in die Beschauung 
dieser Urerscheinung versinkt, ein unermeßliches Schauspiel, die 
Erzeugungsgeschichte der Natur, und jeder feste Punkt, der sich in der 
unendlichen Flüssigkeit ansetzt, wird ihm eine neue Offenbarung des 
Genius der Liebe, ein neues Band des Du und des Ich. (1960e, p. 101)  
 
The thinking man returns to the original function of his existence, to 
creative contemplation, to the point, where knowledge and creation 
were united in a wondrous mutual tie, to that creative moment of true 
enjoyment, of inward self-conception. If he immerses himself entirely 
in the contemplation of this primaeval phenomenon, the history of the 
creation of the nature unfolds before him in newly emerging times and 
spaces like a tale that never ends, and the fixed point that crystallizes 
in the infinite fluid becomes for him a new revelation of the genius of 
love, a new bond between the Thou and the I. (2005, p. 93)  
 
It is in Dasein that one finds the holistic existence of the self for Novalis, and it is 
characterised by feeling and inward concern. The Absolute creates other realms 
for Dasein, and other beings poeticise this wondrous, earthly Dasein but do not 
have to be immediately present to have an effect on the poet, with the nature of 
that remove not the same as the objective position of the scientist. We will 
remember Novalis indicated the sense-deprived nature of the poet, with the poet 
containing the whole world within: The poet is therefore not focused on one 
object, although he or she may conclude by finding the external object to be a 
reflection of what is within, as occurred with Rosenblüte in his Jungfrau-Sais 
encounter. It is clear that the world is within the poet as a whole, not just a 
resident of the poet’s mind, bringing Novalis to observe that poetry is the 
“willkührlicher, thätiger, produktiver Gebrauch unsrer Organe” (1960f, p. 
563)/“intentional, active, productive employment of our organs” (Behler, 1993, p. 
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203), with various influences coming to bear on the poetic activity100. The 
experience of the poetic self is therefore bodily but only because it has been 
moved by the overall impact of things in the world. 
                                                
100 The activity behind poeticising is important for the poetic self to allow a phenomenon 
to emerge. Exactly what the nature of that process is deserves some exploration. In the 
case of Tāne, we have seen that there was movement upwards, towards the baskets of 
knowledge. Again, there are echoes of Novalis here with the concept that moving the 
banal upwards or the unworkably mysterious downwards is fundamental to ira as it seeks 
to transform a thing in the world. Movement or glance upwards is also seen in the Māui 
stories. Māui, - a “very tricky demi-god, creating much mischief” (Robinson, 2005, p. 
267) - was responsible for not only reaching upwards to slow the sun, but also descending 
into the underworld to obtain fire from his grandmother. The separation of Rangi and Papa 
demonstrates the use of force upward to allow light to start to emerge. Hinetitama, the 
Dawn Maiden, moved into the underworld and became the Goddess of Death; and in order 
to acquire a moko from Uetonga (and then bring that art to the human world) Mataora had 
to descend into the underworld, thereafter returning to humanity (Adsett, Whiting, Karetu, 
& Lardelli, 1996). The characters are important to the activity, and their movement is 
metaphorically important because it depicts activity from one sphere to another.  
In karakia and other verse it is not uncommon to see the differing states of emergence 
being acknowledged. The following is a reminder of Tāne’s ascent: 
 
Tēnei au te hōkai nei o taku tapuwae 
Ko te hōkai nuku ko te hōkai rangi 
Ko te hōkai a tō tupuna a Tānenui-a-rangi 
Ka pikitia ai ki te rangi tūhāhā ki te Tihi-o-Manono 
Ka rokohina atu rā ko Te Matua-kore anake 
Ka tīkina mai ngā kete o te wānanga 
Ko te kete-tuauri 
Ko te kete-tuatea 
Ko te kete-aronui 
Ka tiritiria ka poupoua 
Ka puta mai iho ko te ira tangata 
Ki te wheiao ki te ao mārama 
Tihei-mauri ora!  
 
This is the journey of sacred footsteps 
Journeyed about the earth journeyed about the heavens 
The journey of the ancestral god Tānenuiarangi 
Who ascended into the heavens to Te Tihi-o-Manono 
Where he found the parentless source 
From there he retrieved the baskets of knowledge 
Te kete-tuauri 
Te kete-tuatea 
Te kete-aronui 
These were distributed and implanted about the earth 
From which came human life 
Growing from dim light to full light 
There was life. (Taonui, 2009 n.p.) 
 
This karakia points directly to the manifestation of different states, dependent on the 
ascension of Tāne. Tāne’s journey opened the way for the acquisition of the baskets, 
which then allowed for the emergence of full light. Those elements – the baskets and the 
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As with the collective or nation, the self needs to be aware of including otherness 
in their usual way of relating and communicating. This view comes to the fore in a 
fragment of Novalis’ that states: 
 
Jedes Individuum hat sein bestimmtes Maas – oder 
Gesundheitsverhältniß – Unter oder über diesen Maaß sind seine 
Krankheiten. Das wäre das vollk[ommen] gesunde Individuum, 
dessen Gesundheitssfäre auch die Sfären der Kr[ankheit] mit 
inbegriffe, so wie dasjenige Volk am Gebildetsten seyn würde, dessen 
Prosa – Rede[-]Gespräch – die ganze Sfäre der Poësie und des 
Gesanges mit einschlösse – wo kein Unterschied zwischen Poësie und 
Prosa wäre. (1960b, pp. 307-308)  
 
Every individual has its distinct measure – or relation of health - His 
illnesses lie above or below this measure. Thus the most perfectly 
healthy individual would be one whose sphere of health also included 
the spheres of illness, just as the most developed nation would be one 
whose prose-speech [-] conversations - also embraced the entire 
sphere of poesy and song - where no distinction existed between 
poesy and prose. (Wood, 2007, p. 56)  
 
Novalis’ message here is twofold. First and most obviously he is referring to a 
non-standardised formula of health for the individual, by which the self has his or 
her own thresholds for health and illness. Just as importantly, he notes the need for 
the individual to be seen as part of a collective or nation. Both must embrace the 
undesirable other if they are to be whole. Thus the individual must be cognisant of, 
and make room for, their own limitations (illnesses); moreover, though, he or she 
must be ready to accept those limitations wholeheartedly. By analogy, the nation, 
preferring prose as a means of communication, must allow and integrate what it 
                                                                                                                                 
light – already existed, but the self’s involvement with them in a poetic sense allowed 
them to emerge. Thus the self does not have to bring elements into existence; it can simply 
clear the way for their appearance. When journeying to the underworld to find Niwareka, 
for instance, Mataora acquired the moko from Uetonga. As with Tāne, the concrete entity 
already existed, and he was really just provided with the conditions to allow the entity to 
emerge, albeit in innovative ways. 
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considers undesirable - poetry - so that there is thereafter no distinction between 
the two. Again, as with Novalis’ equation of the individual’s talents with those of 
the nation, the individual should be reflected nationally. 
 
Not only is the self involved in poetry, however; it is also the product of poetry. 
While one may start with the anatomical and physiological features of the body, 
those only contribute in the first instance to a more mystical explanation. Novalis 
ties the physical attributes of the body with the emotions and thence with the 
spiritual aspects of the world. Alluding to the traditional theories of humoralism, 
or humoral pathology, he notes in one fragment that the soul has a manifest impact 
on the bodily organs. He continues that the soul appears to be the seat of emotions. 
The interaction of the organs and the emotions forms a “Licht” (1960b, p. 
351)/[illumination] that then works on the “einfachen Operationen[,] Formen und 
Stoffen des menschl[ichen] Geistes” (1960b, pp. 351-352)/“simple operations, 
forms, and substances of the human spirit” (Wood, 2007, p. 90). The self works 
from the inner to the outer, which is nevertheless always connected; this is a form 
of the “Verbindung der innern und äußern Poësie – des Allg[emeinen] und 
Speciellen”/“inner and outer poesy – of the universal and the specialized”. Poetry, 
then, ensures a link between those three supposedly distinct aspects of the self – 
physical, emotional and spiritual – particularly when the body is also thought of as 
a relational entity.  
 
The starting points of physicality or sensibility remain even into the mystical 
realms, and it is here that Novalis refers to the traces of usefulness in these first 
principles. His emphasis on the continued presence of life in explanations of life 
suggests that a living explanation, even when rendered mystical through poetry, 
remains tinged by a continual presence of the process of experienced living. The 
poetic self is likewise borne of the body, despite the self apparently having 
“certain zones” which match location – firstly, the physical body, secondly, the 
individual’s town or whenua, thirdly, the province, continuing through to the 
“Sonne und ihrem System” (1960b, p. 370)/[sun and its system]. 
Acknowledgement must then be given to those base factors; indeed, to forget their 
presence would be to imitate the proponents of the Enlightenment, who seized on a 
new way of explaining nature without any acknowledgment of the limitations of 
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aspects of their approach, such as the inquiry into a thing with a view to explaining 
it completely101. An “ununterbrochner Strom” (1960o, p. 575)/[unbroken stream] 
that he ascribes to all life holds true for other phenomena also. His observation 
“daß das Höchste … vor dem Niedrigeren etc. kommt” (1960b, p. 415)/[that the 
highest … comes before the lowest etc] suggests that, in any event, the lowest 
exists (and may precede the highest at this stage in modernist thinking). Taken 
together with his indication that there is a remnant of the first and lowest physical 
element, we can extend that latter fragment so that the lowest is in fact extant but 
not necessarily higher in the sense of more desirable. 
 
The Māori self: A general introduction 
Novalis’ assertions about the self as a poetic and creative expression of Dasein 
provide Stoßsätze which prompt a similar Māori idea of the self. Importantly, the 
Māori self as a holistic entity has already been written about by a number of Māori 
writers. That the Māori individual is reliant on the acknowledgement of Being, not 
only for his or her own state of wellbeing but also for that of the world in which 
they reside, is at the forefront of these writers’ minds. Recall Durie (1994), for 
instance, who argues that the whare tapa wha/four walls of health, comprising the 
‘taha wairua’/spiritual side, ‘taha tinana’/physical side, ‘taha whānau’/the family, 
and ‘taha hinengaro’/emotional and mental sides, are all to be taken into account 
when thinking about the Māori self in the first instance and thereafter when 
discussing the wellbeing of Māori. Hoskins (2010), recounting Heidegger’s 
theories about being-in-the-world, argues that Māori are wholly within their 
environment in a holistic and total sense. Royal generally notes the sourcing of the 
self within the location and natural features about the self.  
 
                                                
101 Novalis posits that “[d]ie Philosophie ist … die Substanz der Wissenschaft – die 
überall gesucht wird – überall vorhanden ist, und nie dem Sucher erscheint” (1960b, p. 
302)/“[p]hilosophy is the substance of science as it were - that is sought everywhere - 
present everywhere, and yet never appears to the seeker” (Wood, 2007, p. 52). It would 
be a mistake, then, to assume that it were not present merely because it could not be 
perceived. 
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Two points are worth noting here, however. First, as I have argued elsewhere, 
those sorts of philosophical discussions are useful only if they are melded with the 
use of common terms. Those terms would then express those philosophical 
assertions in everyday life, and would not be caught by the Geheimnislosigkeit that 
tends to entrap things in the modern Western world. Novalis’ positioning of the 
self is firmly political as much as spiritual or bodily, and as an experienced, living 
existence in the world, Dasein in particular reflects the inability of the self to fully 
apprehend the workings of the Absolute. The self is therefore, from Novalis’ 
promptings, less likely to be interpreted as a certain, self-assured entity as it 
regards things in the world. In this chapter I expand on the workings of things in 
the world behind those common terms as they are experienced by the uncertain 
self.  
 
Romanticising the epistemic self: Ira and its 
geheimnisvolle nature 
Secondly, and related to the first point, this task can only be undertaken with a 
transformation of the term ‘self’. There are problems in labelling the Māori self as 
‘self’ – in much the same way as ‘mātauranga’ is an inappropriate term to use for a 
Māori cognitive orientation towards things in the world – because of its historical 
and political involvement with the primary and autonomous subject. Novalis’ 
affirmations about the self, within the greater holistic dimension of Dasein, to 
some extent mitigate these problems. We have seen that Novalis prefers the idea 
that the self is at once spiritual, political and poetic/poeticised. A compelling 
possibility for Māori lies in considering the self as one uncertain, dynamic entity 
of many, with decidedly creative powers informed by the Absolute. A potential 
Māori term here is ‘ira’ that, when its meanings are taken together, includes all 
aspects of the social, physical and mysterious. Ira means simultaneously ‘gene’ 
and ‘life-force’, corporeal and mysterious. Edwards (2009) highlights the necessity 
of ira in the interrelationship of things:  
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A discussion I had with Ngati Rereahu kaumatua Piripi Crown 
explained how we are continually reminded of the relationship and 
interconnectedness between entities. Piripi recounted one explanation 
of the beginnings of whakapapa that he was once given by a kuia 
(female elder) that he didn’t name and at a time he did not give. He 
recalled that the kuia explained that uira, lightning, rekindles and 
connects our human whakapapa. Every living thing is part spirit and 
part animate in the Maori world and in relation to humans this is 
referred to as ira atua and ira tangata. Uira refers to the presence of 
being, the presence of ira, what Mead calls genes. Lightning connects 
both the spiritual and human elements connecting the genes of the 
spirit world to that of the living so that the connection is maintained. 
This would possibly also explain why many Maori view the signs of 
lightning over hills as a sign that death has come to someone or group. 
Crown explained it to me like this: 
 
Ka u te ira atua me te ira tangata i te uira, ara te timatanga o te 
whakapapa. 
 
Spiritual and human essences are recalled in lightning, that is the 
beginning of whakapapa. (p. 253)  
 
There is innate to the word ‘ira’ a sense of inheritance, but that is dependent on 
one’s ongoing interactions with Being. Ira ensures that the “limitless power of the 
divine” (Reinfeld & Pihama, n.d., p. 24) finds expression in both the body and the 
‘divine’. These descriptions have importance in an everyday sense, in that they 
demand that every interaction with things in the world – including language for 
those things – be based on a notion of mystery for the world. We may again take 
our cue from Novalis when he discusses how the human body is at every stage 
impacted by Being and hence itself is geheimnisvoll. ‘U’ of ‘uira’ suggests a 
gathering to oneself of things in the world within the movement of those things in 
the world; it also recognises the self in whatever is unfamiliar in the sense that 
‘lightning’ is a foreign, even overpowering entity that nevertheless is a potent 
force in the gathering that ‘ira’ involves. 
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Also similar to the term ‘Dasein’ in the sense of ‘there-being’, or ‘being there’, the 
term ‘ira’ carries with it an element of wonder. A dictionary search of the term will 
yield that it is an exclamatory expression to bring the attention of a person to a 
phenomenon – an event or a thing. In being caught up with the mystery of the 
appearance of the thing, the Māori self is also made mysterious. As with Dasein, 
‘ira’ is a reference to a constant geheimnisvolle presence that imbues throughout 
things in the world and shows itself in a lack of groundedness and certainty to the 
self’s comportment towards those things. With an emphasis on the appearance of a 
thing, ‘ira’ is undoubtedly related to self-hood but it relates just as much outwards 
from the self. As a term denoting ‘essence’, the existence that it denotes is 
dependent on how it involves itself with the Geheimnis of things in the world.  
 
‘Whaiaro’ as a Māori term for the self is preceded by the activity of ira. In that 
term as well one may gain insight into this activity, although the immediate self is 
more strongly emphasised. ‘Whaiaro’ comprises two terms – ‘whai’ and ‘aro’. The 
self, when recognised as constituents of these terms, constantly pursues or has 
(‘whai’) a regard or concern (‘aro’). I return to the term ‘aro’ later in this chapter 
in the context of ‘whakaaro’/to think, but note at this stage that it is linked to the 
front sensory field of the person (Royal, 2005) which allows the self to have 
concern for a thing in the world. The immediate self is the whaiaro that possesses 
this trait, but in a much greater way ira emphasises the historical, social and 
spiritual existence that whaiaro undertakes102. With this introduction to the Māori 
self in mind, let us now turn to examine how the self as ira103 can interact with the 
                                                
102 Novalis did not use ‘Dasein’ as a common noun, as Heidegger would later, but 
Novalis nevertheless indicated the need to supersede the solipsistic Fichtean term ‘Ich’ 
and create a sense of its totality. In the ‘Exkurs’ sections of this chapter, the reader will 
note that I have referred to the European self as ‘the self’, and the Maori self as ‘ira’, to 
distinguish between the two. My usage here preserves Novalis’ own view of the self as a 
potential confluence of historical and future events, unseen and seen things in the world 
and, ultimately, the Absolute. To that extent, my use of ‘self’ in the Exkurs fragments 
refers to the potential of the individual to romanticise, and also to be transformed in that 
process. 
 
103 My reference to ‘ira’ as a term for the self comes about because of my impression that 
‘self-hood’ needs some reference in this thesis, but the ‘self’ must automatically convey 
with it everything in relation to the self, not just the individual object. Yet the issue of 
‘self-hood’ cannot be avoided in a romanticised context that deals with terms such as 
‘whakapapa’, although as I have shown it can be resolved by allowing it its mysterious 
orientation towards things in the world. 
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historical and material presences that lie behind the terms ‘whakapapa’, ‘whenua’, 
‘ako’ and ‘whakaaro’. In my romanticised use of the term ira, I expand on the 
linguistic and phenomenological features of ira in the context of those terms 
discussed in chapter six. 
 
Exkurs: A Māori romanticisation of the Dasein of the Ich  
Ira is strongly connected to its specific location of belonging. The “spiritual and human 
elements” that Edwards recounts can be interpreted as borne of the stories and accounts 
of specific, exclusive locations. As utterances they are not just about those places but are 
also intrinsically, ontologically oriented towards those places. The ability for ira to 
poeticise in respect of elements outside of its ‘rohe’/area or ‘tūrangawaewae’/place of 
standing, is somewhat more limited. 
 
If the self, as a European rendition of poetic selfhood through the term Dasein, were 
similarly understood as the confluence of exclusive events and locations, then the self is 
challenged to contemplate its place of standing as both coloniser and colonised. We have 
seen that Novalis’ Die Christenheit oder Europa addresses to a large extent the problems 
of philosophical colonisation in an historic context, but the poeticising that the self 
undertakes is broadened, when thought of alongside the Māori notion of ira, to include 
the acknowledgement that self-colonisation has taken place and that Geheimnis may best 
be reclaimed for the self when this contemplation has occurred. As Die Lehrlinge zu Sais 
indicates, the self must bring to the forefront of its poeticising the discussion amongst the 
community of its individual and collective colonisation. With a greater emphasis on the 
collective history of colonisation that the self has experienced, the Geheimnis of the self 
in its dealings with things in the world becomes more marked. The self’s poeticising 
involves a degree of political and theoretical resistance here, with an uncertain outcome.  
 
Being a product of spiritual and human elements, there is a responsibility for the self, as 
an outcome of Dasein, to protect those elements. For ira, this is understood as a form of 
being-over-there that is inseparable from the Absolute. Again a political as much as a 
theoretical or literary exercise, Dasein as ‘being-there’ is ‘there’ amongst things in the 
world that appear to be separated from the self. Ira is active as in the verb ‘akiaki’/urge 
on, which forms the particle of the verb ‘tiaki’/to look after. The Dasein of the self, read 
in the context of ira, is hence ‘being there’ as an active form of movement or concern 
towards something. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
I note here that ‘ira’ would not normally be used to denote the noun ‘self’ in normal 
speech, but I have romanticised it to take on aspects of selfhood in relation to those 
Stoßsätze of Novalis’ that I have referred to. It is therefore a possible term to be used in 
an abstract manner that reflects on the notion of selfhood. 
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The groundlessness of the apparent ground  
Ira’s judgement of its fragility: Whakawā 
The indirect nature of poesy is discussed by Novalis in relation to the quality of 
distance. His belief is that distance provides the Romantic clarity that is needed to 
heed the poetic call. Even that most personal of individual characteristics, the ego, 
is susceptible to the distance of time: 
 
Im ächten S[elbst]B[ewußt]S[eyn] … sind alle Zustände und 
Veränderungen unsers empirischen Ich simultan - Wir sind so gut, in 
demselben Momente, wir vor 2 Jahren, als wir in diesem Augenblicke 
– wir sind nicht Ich durch Schlüsse und indirect – sondern 
unmittelbar. (1960b, p. 431)  
 
In genuine self-consciousness … all the states and variations of our 
empirical ego are simultaneous – We are as much in a moment that 
occurred two years ago as we are in the present moment – We are not 
an ego indirectly or by means of inferences – but rather directly. 
(Wood, 2007, p. 153)  
 
Novalis raises a number of possibilities within this fragment. When he speaks of 
indirectness and directness, he is adamant that one is as much in a moment that 
occurred two years ago as in the present. Pihama (2001; 2004), O’Connor (2007), 
and Whitt et al (2001) reflect that possibility in their belief that present generations 
in one way or other manifest their ancestors. Ira is thus never definite, particularly 
in modernist times, and ira can be certain that it is as involved in the past as the 
present, even though the past might be quite distant. There are two implications 
here: First, and more concretely, that ira is the result of a confluence of events; and 
secondly, and more mystically, that ira might be currently embroiled in a past that 
was never directly experienced. In the light of Novalis’ overarching Romantic 
philosophical approach, both are equally likely interpretations. The first, social 
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explanation proposes that one is collectively influenced by the whole. It remains in 
keeping with his aphorism of cooperative progress: 
 
Dieses und jenes Volk hat, wie dies und jenes Kind, ein vorzügliches 
Talent – die Andern müssen nicht über dies Eine auszubilden 
vergessen werden…. [Die] Nahrung können ihm nur die übrigen 
Talente gewähren. Die sämmtlichen Talente machen gleichsam Einen 
Körper aus. (1960b, pp. 294-295)  
 
And just like each individual child, each particular nation possesses a 
special talent. - However, the other talents must not be neglected 
while developing it … nourishment can only be provided by the other 
talents. The collective talents constitute one body as it were. (Wood, 
2007, p. 45)  
 
Just as the nation needs all talents to be fostered, so the individual is envisaged as 
having holistically accrued a number of experiences from past to present. Ira here 
is not involved in one-dimensional time; instead, it is part of a temporality that 
involves place also. The word ‘wā’ in Māori expresses both time and place, 
leading Takirirangi Smith (2000) to state that: 
 
Within the discourse of whakapapa korero, the notions of time and 
space are linked together. Time cannot exist without space, and space 
cannot exist without time. There are no singular terms in the language 
which describe time or space independently. Seasons (Nga tau o te 
Rangi) and days (Rangi) are seen as relationships of space; for 
example the position of the sky (Rangi) in relation to the earth 
(Papatuanuku). In the expression tona wa, its time and place, there is 
no singular distinction to mean either time by itself, or position by 
itself, but a singular union of the spatial and temporal context. (p. 56)  
 
Things in the world are constantly influencing ira, whether or not there is 
awareness of that fact. Things in the world, such as trees, rocks, whenua and so on, 
rise up to engage in a horizon of time that is non-linear, and carry with them the 
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current and past. The mauri of those objects forms complex relationships with ira 
in all settings – rural, urban, traditional or postcolonial – reflecting what Murton 
(2012) calls a “cosmic generative power” (p. 93). 
 
The horizon of judgement, time and place 
The “original phenomenon” (Baker, 2002, p. 65) occurs when we reflect on our 
inability to be Being. At this point we experience temporality. Novalis had noted 
here that “[d][ie] Gegenwart läßt sich nicht fixiren. Das vor und nach bestimmt 
oder bezieht den gegenwärtigen Augenblick” (1960j, p. 187)/[the present does not 
let itself be fixed. The before and after determine or occupy the present moment]. 
It is hence the ‘moment’ that is important to Novalis (Baker, 2002). I argue that ira 
is reflectively but primordially aware of time and place as one horizon. This is 
innate to the word ‘whakawā’. Conventionally, ‘whakawā’ is given to ira to mean 
‘judgement’ as a discriminatory ability. This latter sense of ‘whakawā’ is a 
colonised one because it prefers the self as ultimate ground; here, ira decides the 
apparently proper mode within which time and place may reveal themselves, and 
is hence self-assuredly restrictive on time and place as separate entities104. Yet 
‘whakawā’ in its more authentic sense points to the one horizon of time and place, 
and it involves an awareness that one may not be the ground of experience, despite 
what the orthodox, fixed rendition of ‘whakawā’ would have ira believe. In that 
                                                
104 This is probably because of one reading of the etymology of the world ‘whaka’ (to 
cause) and ‘wā’ (specific time or place). This etymology suggests that the self is solely 
involved in the specifying of which time or place it will involve itself with. 
A useful Stoßsatz in thinking about the simultaneity of time and place is Novalis’ 
assertion that “[v]om Unendlichen ist jedes bestimmende Urtheil ein Unendliches, in dem 
Sinn, wie man jede Negation eines Besondern am Besondern unendliche Urtheile nennt” 
(1960j, p. 166)/“[f]rom the unending, every determining judgment is an unending one, in 
the sense in which every negation of a particular in the particular [thing] is called an 
infinite judgment” (Kneller, 2003, p. 64). Novalis draws together a number of elements 
here necessary for judgement which draw judgement out of its neatly rational faculty and 
into one involving Being. These elements are: determining, negation of the particular, the 
infinite, and of course judgement itself. I surmise here that Novalis lists the apparently 
final decision on a thing as in fact a continual (temporal) exercise that deals with the 
seemingly solid entity (which takes up space, even if it is just an idea). Hence he brings 
together the ideas of space, time, and human agency in one assertion. 
Donehower (2007) indicates the Romantics’ tendency to return to the etymology of 
‘Urteil’, which unearths time as an issue in the sense of ‘original’.  For the Romantics, 
including Novalis, the original act of judgment “separates thinking from its ground” (p. 
12) – a ground which through whakawā would be the unity of time and space. 
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initial stage of ‘whakawā’ time and place as one horizon are felt as the coming to 
bear (‘whaka’) of time and place (‘wā’) on ira105. Hence ira is aware of its own 
finitude because it feels itself as one convergent point of time and place. In that 
moment, ira posits Being as ‘there’, with its sense of calling attention to something 
yonder. In the moment that ira judges itself not to be Being, as with Novalis’ 
‘Dasein’ it allows Being to be ‘there’ without truly representing it. Ira is then in a 
state of wonderment at the ‘over-there-ness!’ of the Absolute. 
 
Thus, as Novalis proposed, ira is engaged with ‘moment’. I add, however, that the 
nature of the ‘moment’ is a vexed issue in a colonised setting. Whether it has 
always been a wonder for ira to realise that it is not itself Being is uncertain; we 
can only be sure that since colonisation, as ira has been encouraged to think of 
itself as ground, the moment is maybe more poignant than it was. This moment, as 
a static notion of ‘whakawā’ encourages, is dealt with by proposing the self as 
agent in a determination of how time and place should be located. It makes a 
definite ruling on the nature of where and when something should occur, or 
whether it should occur/have occurred at all. This idea of judgement, as we have 
seen, is subsequent to the more original one. It is thus incomplete. The ‘over-there-
ness’ of Being – and indeed of ira itself - is denied with that incomplete positing of 
whakawā. 
 
 
 
                                                
105 This realisation may be emotional for ira. The turn of emotion that comes about is a 
form of movement that reflects the Absolute. Novalis’ Hymnen an die Nacht displays the 
relationship of an emotional feeling to the understanding that one is not the ground of 
one’s awareness. Emotion is associated with a lack of certainty, or the introduction of the 
night, which is outside of one’s control. 
Novalis’ own immersion within the night becomes more obvious as the hymns progress, 
and the night itself becomes increasingly mythical. A spiritual element also evolves, with 
“[h]immlischer, als jene blitzenden Sterne, dünken uns die unendlichen Augen, die die 
Nacht in uns geöffnet” (1960i, p. 133)/“[m]ore heavenly than those flashing stars the 
endless eyes seem, which Night opens up in us” (1988, p. 13), moving toward a more 
direct reference to the burial site of Novalis’ dead lover, Sophie von Kühn, in the third 
hymn, where he addresses the night directly as taking him over and releasing him in spirit 
form.  
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Exkurs: ‘Urteil’, romanticised by ‘whakawā’ ‘Urteil’  
Geheimnislosigkeit is a necessary issue of consideration for ira, and ira therefore 
has to act on its constant presence. This also holds true for the self within its own 
cultural context. ‘Whakawā’ for ira romanticises ‘Urteil’ for the self because a 
sense of activity emerges much more strongly in ‘whakawā’. The prefix ‘whaka’ 
shows that there is less of an emphasis on a base foundation – or primordiality, as 
‘Ur’ would have it – and far more a state of becoming. ‘Ur’ does indeed have to it 
this sense also, but taken together with ‘whaka’ the original act as a ‘constant but 
necessarily continual primordial presence’ is stressed. ‘Urtheil’, in relation with 
‘Ursprung’/origin, is therefore also concerned with a state of becoming but with 
more of an emphasis on an original point. 
 
Moving from an interpretation in ‘Urtheil’ as a decisive judgement, towards its 
explanation as an ongoing discriminatory ability that involved an initial decision 
to begin with, means that the self retains some sense of Geheimnis. Firstly, 
‘Urtheil’ as a constant process of change and tentativeness means that the 
approach to things in the world is less concerned with making assured divisions 
between those things in the world, even if one is making a discerning judgement. 
‘Urtheil’ romanticised with ‘whakawā’ is an example of humility towards things 
in the world that nevertheless involves human agency. Thus the verb ‘urteilen’, 
read with ‘whakawā’ as a romanticising Stoßsatz, emphasises that the division 
(‘Teil’) being made both originates from some time prior to the self’s awareness, 
as it is ‘Ur’, and that the division actively changes from that original point 
onwards. Thus the ‘urteilen’ is related to ‘mitteilen’ (communicate) and is 
predicated on another meaning of ‘teilen’ – that is, to share. 
 
This romanticising of Urtheil with whakawā suggests that the self should retain 
some tentativeness towards things in the world, even when a self-assured 
judgement is being made.  Dealing with things in the world involves awareness 
that the things have an autonomous but independent relationship with the self. 
Things may be divided so that the self can focus on them but there is a 
simultaneous acknowledgement that the thing is submerged within a 
fundamentally unknowable environment. 
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Being’s geheimnisvolle arrangement of things and 
ira 
The Absolute’s active layering and accrual: Whakapapa 
This sense of incompleteness, or of lack, that reveals itself in ‘whakawā’ also 
shows up in the word ‘whakapapa’. It is here that one of the lesser-known 
meanings of ‘whakapapa’ takes on an importance that transcends the usual 
translation of ‘genealogy’. Another meaning of the word is ‘to layer’. Whakapapa 
points to the special place of absence: ‘Papa’, an abbreviation of Papatūānuku, 
exceeds ira’s sensory sphere, meaning that the layering that is taking place is both 
from local and distant realms. In direct opposition to Geheimnislosigkeit, which is 
necessarily concerned with what is immediately perceptible, Novalis notes that: 
 
So wird alles in der Entfernung Poësie – Poem. Actio in distans. Ferne 
Berge, ferne Menschen, ferne Begebenheiten etc. alles wird 
romantisch, quod idem est - daher ergiebt unsre Urpoëtische Natur. 
(1960b, p. 302)  
 
Thus in the distance, everything becomes poesy-poem. Actio in 
distans. Distant mountains, distant human beings, distant events etc. 
all become romantic, quod idem est – hence our archetypal poetic 
nature is a result of this. (Wood, 2007, pp. 51-52) 
  
Evident here is the interplay of all elements that nevertheless retain their own 
character. Similarly, whakapapa can be understood as the activity that the Absolute 
undertakes in order to arrange things in the world, which Novalis describes, but it 
is also dependent on the activity between all elements in order to take place. While 
it may be tempting to think of ‘whakapapa’ as the first grounding principle due to 
its common association with ancestry, instead it is interdependent with any other 
element that we name for our own reference. Whakapapa accrues to all objects in 
the world, including ira, the various effects of other objects according to the 
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organising principles of Being. As to this effect of things in the world, Novalis 
refers back to older texts: “In manchen ältern Schriften klopft ein geheimnißvoller 
Pulsschlag und bezeichnet eine Berührungsstelle mit der unsichtbaren Welt – ein 
Lebendigwerden” (1960a, p. 276)/[In some older texts a pulsing beat reverberates 
and indicates a point of contact with the unseen world – a coming-into-being of 
life]. What is not necessary here is the physical presence of a thing; thus one does 
not need to have occupied one’s whenua in order to relate to it with as much 
significance106, as whenua as an active but distant phenomenon will rise up within 
ira nonetheless107.  
 
Ngata (1972) noted that “[w]hakapapa is the process of layering one thing upon 
another” (p. 6). According to Royal this process does not just involve materiality: 
 
‘Whakapapa’ describes the actions of creating a foundation, and 
layering and adding to that foundation. This is done by reciting 
genealogies (tātai) and stories, and through ritual. Whakapapa allows 
people to locate themselves in the world, both figuratively and in 
relation to their human ancestors. It links them to ancestors whose 
dramas played out on the land and invested it with meaning. By 
recalling these events, people layer meaning and experience onto the 
land. (2009c, p. 8) 
 
This account is useful for indicating the experiential as well as the material aspect 
of whakapapa. However, if viewed as if final, the account is also quite 
anthropocentric. To begin with, whakapapa does not just involve the recital of 
genealogies and stories, but it is additionally an unspoken movement that involves 
the active participation of Being, nature (finite objects in the world) and ira. All 
things are involved in an ongoing evolution of change and fluidity. As far as ira is 
concerned, change occurs due to this process of layering, from objects in the world 
                                                
106 At the time of writing, the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 intends 
as a test for customary marine title that Māori applicants have “exclusively used and 
occupied [the area] from 1840 to the present day without substantial interruption” 
(s.58(1)(a)). The Act is one example of how Māori are currently being forced to measure 
the worth of an entity in terms of its visibility. 
 
107 I discuss this emerging effect of whenua later in this chapter. 
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that are both near and distant108. Sometimes imperceptible in the effects this has, 
‘whakapapa’ itself reveals linguistically that it is without final foundation: 
 
Perhaps the greatest clue to its profound sense lies in its etymological 
meaning which, according to Hudson et al (2007), relates to the word 
‘papa,’ a word for ground or solid foundation and ‘whaka,’ referring 
to the transitional process of ‘becoming’’ (p.44). What is revealed in 
the use of that word is a view of the world as inhabiting a state of 
becoming; the ground, an embodiment of certainty, itself is then in a 
state of becoming and so it moves through different forms of solidity. 
Certainty is never solidified, is never finalised; this view of the term 
‘whakapapa’ seems to fit with the overall belief that even identity is in 
a state of flux (Webber 2009), and also that apparently ‘concrete’ 
institutions, such as whanau, are in a constant act of transformation 
(Durie 2005). There is a certain degree of emotional turmoil inherent 
to that reading of ‘whakapapa’: that there is no certainty to it forces 
humanity to a position of parallel relationship with it. Shifts in its 
stability likewise produce changes in the human form, including the 
body’s emotional form. 
 
Aspects of certainty remain in that continuous transforming state of 
being, however. To begin with, we can be certain that the term is 
never completely knowable – we can be certain that there will be 
nothing but change, and even with its genealogical portrait 
‘whakapapa’ throws us into doubt at times. Thus completely confident 
knowledge is evaded. Even within the genealogical names themselves, 
upon which a contemporary rendition of whakapapa is founded, there 
                                                
108 Thus there is an aspect to ‘whakapapa’ of the recital of genealogy, but this only 
happens because of the fact that ira is part of this overall activity of the Absolute. Ira may 
‘layer’ or “order” (Royal, 2009a, p. 70) ancestors’ names in sequence and recite the 
outcome. Each name, however, is historically and socially enmeshed within the Absolute, 
as is the reciter. Thus the Geheimnis of this aspect of whakapapa is preserved, but I 
suggest it is important that one be aware of one’s own enmeshment within this process of 
layering even when reciting. This continuous awareness or frame of mind when carrying 
out a poetic exercise is what Novalis endorses when he encourages the poet to work 
within a colonised context. 
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exists uncertainty; a person could be possessed of several, additional 
names, and they could be transmutable, to begin with, and even the 
name, when recited, could inhabit a different ontological ‘field’ when 
uttered by various individuals. (Mika, 2011b, pp. 106-107)  
 
The Geheimnis innate to the process of whakapapa lies in the fact that it is 
unpredictable and often – although not always – imperceptible109. Yet even if 
                                                
109 In his discussion about the baskets of knowledge, Marsden (2003) allows for the 
existence of things in the world that are not perceptible. The concrete world is not 
separate from the abstract one, but their separation out from each other is apparent in 
Geheimnislosigkeit. An artificial delineation is one that Novalis alludes to when he 
discusses the earlier view that poet and priest were one, but currently the poet, according 
to Novalis, was robbed of their knowledge of nature, despite the fact that he or she 
traditionally “versteht die Natur besser, wie der wissenschaftliche Kopf” (1960b, p. 
468)/“understands Nature better than the scientific mind” (Wood, 2007, p. 182) to the 
extent that he or she was also a priest. Here Novalis accords with Goethe’s belief (Nadler, 
1996) that the mind that is open to nature is more finely tuned than a scientific instrument. 
Novalis is convinced that, although recently separated, both priest and poet will become 
one again, but he draws attention to the latter distinction between poet and priest to 
emphasise the now seemingly unspiritual quality of the poet. Geheimnislosigkeit, 
particularly the qualitative approach to nature, has reduced the poet’s role to literal verse. 
Formerly, however, the poet undertook a responsibility to hint at what cannot be directly 
portrayed. Another similar distinction is revealed in his aphorism that “[d]ie Trennung 
von Poët und Denker ist nur scheinbar – und zum Nachtheil beyder – Es ist ein Zeichen 
einer Kranckheit – und kranckh[aften] Constitution” (1960b, p. 406)/“The separation into 
poet and thinker is only apparent - and to the disadvantage of both - It is a sign of 
sickness - and of a sickly constitution” (Wood, 2007, p. 132). This alludes again to the 
sudden importance of the rational thinker. 
Ira is often acutely aware of the artificial delineation that Novalis describes, and tends to 
be motivated by an unseen dimension as much as a physical one. This impetus may be 
sourced in ‘taha wairua’/[spiritual side]. It can be clearly seen in resistance measures. 
Traditional figures such as Rua Kenana (Derby, 2009) and Ratana (Ministry for Culture 
and Heritage, 2011) feature prominently here, with their frequent references to a spiritual 
world, alongside political motives, as an impetus for their movements. Te Puea had 
expressed her desire to reacquire 10 acres of land “sacred to all Waikato, because it 
contained a spring at which her grandfather, King Tawhiao, once drank” (Ramsden, 1953, 
p. 7). More recently, Eva Rickard had carried through her protest at the fact that Raglan 
Golf Course had not been returned to the traditional owners and descendants, and 
particularly because it had been a burial ground (Margolis, 2002). Placards in the march 
protesting at the Foreshore and Seabed Bill often referred to the Foreshore and Seabed as 
a spiritual phenomenon, and the ‘Taniwha Claim’ of Ngati Naho was premised on the 
existence of a local taniwha, which would be disturbed if Transit New Zealand continued 
with its plans of building an expressway (Durie, 2005). 
 
Indeed, in Māori resistance strategies it is unusual not to see evidence of spiritual belief. 
The challenge for the Māori poet is to hold the realm of rationality while recognising the 
spiritual realm. The WAI 262 claim, registered by two elderly Māori women who noticed 
that a number of native types kumara were being deposited in a research institute in Japan 
("The WAI 262 claim by six Maori tribes: Flora and fauna and cultural and intellectual 
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perceptible, the layers that accrue to ira emanate from objects in the world, the 
existence of which is underpinned by Being, with the result that the ability to 
perceive the process does not result in knowing with certainty the objects 
concerned (O'Brien, 1995). Trying to explain the ground of whakapapa is a futile 
exercise; as Novalis (1960b) noted, such an exercise leads only to “Heimweh” (p. 
434)/[homesickness] because ira longs to encompass all of the ontological and 
physical attributes of ‘Papa’ at once. More dramatically than Novalis, Goethe 
believed that to try and know every phenomenon would be an impossible exercise 
(Nadler, 1996). As the groundless nature of ‘whakapapa’ indicates, attempts at 
getting to know every phenomenon would prove impossible, as they would require 
each individual knowing every aspect of ‘Papa’. 
 
‘Whakapapa’ is hence the term given to the process of arrangement that Being 
undertakes. The ways in which those things in the world emerge will impact on ira 
in frequently imperceptible ways; however, at times ira becomes conscious of 
those influences of whakapapa. Through this process of the self-organisation of 
Being, though, sometimes objects come into our view of ‘aroaro’/concern. This 
first ground is ‘kaupapa’. ‘Kau’ suggests that there is an initial disclosure of 
“papa” (Marsden, 2003, p. 66)/[ground or foundation] that is our first impulse of 
                                                                                                                                 
heritage rights: Interview with Maui Solomon," 2001), as Maui Solomon remarks, was not 
just an exercise in preventing the loss of the physical kumara; it also sought to protect its 
spiritual attributes (and would be extended to cover all forms of mātauranga Māori, taonga 
and so on). Resistance to the taking of Māori DNA would be premised on similar, 
unequivocal arguments – that it is not so much the physical expropriation of the gene that 
is at issue as the effect that this could have on one’s (and hence future generations’) 
whakapapa (Hutchings & Reynolds, n.d). Interestingly, these spiritual arguments, 
advanced by various Māori poets or proponents of taha wairua, may be common sense to 
many Māori, but they are more often than not greeted with disbelief by mainstream 
institutions. Thus particular arms of Western society endorse the banality that these poets 
try to escape. When attempting to put forward Māori definitions for disease, for instance, 
including such terms as mate Māori, health professionals will still default to “hold[ing] 
unfounded beliefs that Māori are genetically more prone to psychosis and other serious 
mental illnesses” ("Māori mental health: "The greatest threat to Māori health is poor 
mental health"," 2008, p. 32). The law is particularly opposed to entertaining other 
explanations for the physical phenomenon at issue: In Ngāti Wairere’s opposition to 
AgResearch’s plans to field test a genetically modified cow which would produce milk 
with a human protein, for instance, the High Court, on appeal, stated that ERMA had 
indeed taken into account the spiritual relationship of Māori to their taonga (Adhar, 2003). 
Other historical cases, too numerous to mention, follow similarly dismissive lines of 
reasoning. 
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concern, caused by the ‘aroaro’ (coming into our view) of those objects. ‘Kau’ also 
means the absence of something; thus the ground that depicts our first impulse of 
concern is not actually a ground at all (although it appears so to ira) but is a 
disclosure of ‘whakapapa’110. Although it appears that we are building on our 
concern because of the solidity of that first concern, in fact that concern is not a 
ground but is merely the revelation of a move towards a ground. That ira misreads 
a concern as a fully formed, final yet initial ground is part of ira’s pursuit of 
finding the ‘thing in itself’ or Being. ‘Kaupapa’, then, is not so much about a self-
assured identification of principles upon which one may proceed but an awareness 
brought about by the appearance of an object that is indeed uncertain. 
 
Saying/speaking things through whakapapa 
Yet notwithstanding ira’s depiction of ‘kaupapa’ as a solid ground for concern, the 
thing that moves into ira’s aroaro, or realm of concern, is apparently congealed, or 
managed, by ira’s saying of that thing111. In saying (‘mea’) a thing (‘mea’) ira sets 
those things in motion (‘ranga’) or calls (‘ka ranga’) them so that those things are 
brought closer into our field of immediate concern (‘whakaaro’)112. Here ira is 
                                                
110 This realisation that one has not reached the ground is a form of ‘slippage’, which 
allows the expression of Being according to Novalis (Donehower, 2007). But this 
division of the ground of Being through thought does not actually allow for the precise 
representation of the ground of Being. 
 
111 A ‘thing’ may be either concrete or abstract, but is not entirely knowable. In all uses of 
the word ‘mea’ there is a sense of the unknown or unidentifiable. Coming to bear on ira, 
the thing appears to be certain but is another object of Being. It is therefore characterised 
by Geheimnis.  
For Heidegger, ‘saying’ the thing emphasises laying Being forth, and allowing the thing 
to “shine forth as what it is” (Richardson, 2003, p. 496). Novalis’ preference is for a type 
of speech that poetically also allows the thing to move forward in its own way, evident in 
his discussion in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais of the various ways in which nature may manifest 
(and in which the self may interpret those manifestations). 
 
112 I argue that the creative arts are another form of ‘mea’ even though there may be no 
verbal utterance involved. ‘Mea’ in this vein would be more aligned to ‘comportment’. 
One’s ontological inclination towards a thing in the world is as a result of the ‘showing’ 
that the thing in the world invokes, and one responds according to that showing, verbally 
or through other means. This comportment is not a solid, unchanging one, and can show 
itself in the mixture of traditional and contemporary art. Jahnke and Ihimaera (1996a), for 
instance, see the continuing presence of traditional work in contemporary art: “For him 
[Pakariki Harrison], the work of contemporary artists is founded in tradition. ‘But you 
must understand,’ he says, ‘that our carving is not static and never has been. People say, 
‘Why don’t you do it traditionally?’ and they are having a sly dig at contemporary 
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engaging with a language that is tied to the thing but originates from a primordial 
arrangement of Being, for it means that language is also given to ira. As I noted 
previously, this account of language – which has largely been fixed to the term 
‘reo’ – runs counter to a common notion of self-constructed language. Whakapapa 
moves ira to talk in different ways at different times, despite the dominant belief 
that ira has complete control over its language. Ira will discern signs (‘tohu’) at the 
time of saying them, thereby pointing to the object through language, suggesting 
that there is a certain agency involved in how ira sets about saying those things; 
however, the ontological given of what Novalis has termed ‘Sprachlehre’ and what 
I would call ‘whakapapa’, through the Absolute, has already moved ira to speak in 
particular ways113. The physical signs act as an affirmation to that primordial 
inclination of ira to the impact of those particular things in the world, and their 
relationship with other things that may not even be of concern to, or perceived by, 
ira114. 
                                                                                                                                 
carvers. But contemporary artists also flourished in traditional times. You only have to 
look at Hone Ngatoto – some of the things he did were ‘way out’ at the time. It’s the 
same with Te Kooti. People say he was a revolutionary – he wasn’t. His work was 
steeped in tradition – he extended tradition. So it is with Arnold Wilson, Para [Matchitt] 
and Cliff [Whiting]” (p. 32). 
Several Māori groups – not just those with aesthetic concerns – aim to directly transport 
traditional discourse into the contemporary realm. Te Whānau o Waipareira, for instance, 
sought to represent non-traditional urban iwi in legal proceedings to acquire a share of the 
allocation assets. In their argument they noted that ‘iwi’ was not a prescribed structure 
and that, moreover, tradition has shown “many instances where iwi had formed around a 
cause, rather than an ancestor” (Durie, 2005, p. 121). The overall impression of the 
Absolute is to create an ontological concern of ira in contemporary times towards things 
in the world, including those things that are allegedly meant to belong either solely to 
traditional times or contemporary. 
 
113 Royal (2008) gives an example of a ‘rākau’/tree. He states that the word ‘rākau’ comes 
to mind, not the actual rākau, and that this is a form of, as he calls it, ‘mātauranga’. 
Whilst I agree that of course a specific rākau itself is not present in all its physicality in 
the mind of the subject, I argue that the complex interaction of things in the world 
produces, or brings the self’s attention to, the word ‘rākau’. It is not just brought about by 
the self. Important for the manifestation is our concern for an aspect of a thing in the 
world – which may or may not involve either a specific ‘rākau’ or the general abstract 
notion of ‘rākau’. Royal notes this weddedness to the world as a whole in his book. 
It is possible, though, that the occurrence of ‘rākau’ to ira indicates that ‘rākau’ in all its 
forms has impacted on ira, not just as an idea but as an evolving, layering process that 
‘whakapapa’ envisages. This may be likened to the thinking of one’s tribal saying, where 
the natural phenomena spoken of are not just ideas but are actively coming to bear on the 
thinker. Similarly, the thinking of these phenomena itself has an impact on them. 
 
114 This ‘incline’ towards things that is brought about by those things is important for ira. 
Like Goethe (1964), who had stated that “[d]as Gebildete wird sogleich wieder 
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Ira’s discussion after the comportment of things 
However, ira does have some agency in the language given but only because of the 
power of that thing and in turn its association with other things to begin with. 
While I have drawn on the links between language and thing here, we can gain 
support from Novalis in this interpretation of language: 
 
Die Bezeichnung durch Töne und striche ist eine bewundernswürdige 
Abstraction. Vier Buchstaben bezeichnen mir Gott – Einige Striche 
eine Million Dinge. Wie leicht wird hier die Handhabung des 
Universi! wie anschaulich die Concentricitaet der Geisterwelt! die 
Sprachlehre ist die Dynamik des Geisterreichs! Eine Commandowort 
bewegt Armeen – das Wort Freyheit – Nationen. (1960m, p. 412)  
 
Signification by means of sounds and strokes is an amazing 
abstraction. Three letters signify God to me – a few strokes a million 
                                                                                                                                 
umgebildet, und wir haben uns, wenn wir einigermaßen zum lebendigen Anschaun der 
Natur gelangen wollen, selbst so beweglich und bildsam zu erhalten, nach dem Beispiel 
mit dem sie uns vorgeht” (p. 56)/[the intellectual is yet again, and simultaneously, 
uneducated, and if we in some measure want to aspire to the living regard of nature, we 
ourselves must preserve our fluidity and educability, after the example that nature has set 
us], Novalis advocated that nature be related to as a constantly changing, fundamentally 
unknowable entity: the master in “Die Natur”, for instance, is mysterious, but his mystery 
merely helps Rosenblüte interpret the signs of nature. This role of the poet is clearly seen 
in the Māori equivalent. Robinson (2005) gives an illustration of how the Absolute 
reveals tohu/signs to the onlooker: “The signs are all seen through the weather patterns, in 
the clouds, the waves of the ocean, in the winds and especially when the weather changes. 
One only need look around one’s surroundings to let the atua speak to you. Tawhiri 
speaks in the winds, Ruaimoko in clouds and lightning, Tangaroa or Takaroa in the 
rolling waves of the ocean, Tane through the birds and in the forest. Sometimes you 
might see a bush shake wildly when you pass it by and this is a wairua or spirit speaking. 
Every time you see a landslide it is Ruaimoko, the god of mana, calling out to you. Even 
in the little signs of nature as when you see the mist, the snow, a flood, or a leaf dancing 
along in the wind, the atua are calling out, giving you a tohu or sign for some reason” (p. 
142). Clearly these signs are perceivable by the conventional senses, making them less 
mystical than they might have been despite their origins in the various gods. The Māori 
poet, however, leaves room open for the existence of those phenomena that do not impact 
on humanity through the empirical senses, and is hence not bound by the rules of the 
senses. Closely related to this is the place of critique, based in unidentifiable prompts. In 
our article titled “Kia Hiwa Ra”, we (Aranga et al., 2008) consider the critical role of the 
injunction or phrase ‘kia hiwa ra’, which holds in it the necessary conditions for critical 
engagement with the world. With this pre-existing element in what is essentially taken to 
be a traditional phrase, we identify that one must be open to various signs, physical, 
emotional and spiritual, when involved in critique. 
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things. How easy it is to handle the universe in this way! How 
perceptible the concentricity of the spiritual world! Grammar is the 
dynamic of the spiritual empire! A single word of command moves 
armies – the word freedom – nations. (O'Brien, 1995, p. 146)  
 
O’Brien (1995) argues that, for Novalis, language is how we “affect ‘things’” (p. 
146). Recall that, to that extent, ira wishes (‘mea’), as a form of language (‘mea’), 
to deal with (‘mea’) the thing (‘mea’)115. Language thus allows ira to momentarily 
solidify the concern for discussion. What I maintain here is that ira is within a 
realm of language that, due to its link with things, primarily involves an awareness 
of things and a desire to move those things through the activity that underpins 
‘whakapapa’. This moving-to-the-front (aroaro) involves facing those things, still 
with that initial moment of desire manifesting itself. Discussing a word, Novalis 
(1960b) continues: 
 
Jedes Wort sollte eine acustische Formel seiner Construction, seiner 
Aussprache seyn – die Aussprache selbst ist ein Höheres, mimisches 
Zeichen einer höhern Aussprache – Sinnconstruction des Worts. Alles 
dies hängt an den Gesetzen der Association. Die sog[enannten] 
willkührlichen Zeichen dürften am Ende nicht so willk[ührlich] seyn, 
als sie scheinen – sondern dennoch in einem gewissen Realnexus mit 
dem Bezeichneten stehn. (p. 305)  
                                                
115 These dictionary definitions of the word ‘mea’ all indicate simultaneous activities. 
They appear to allow for a speaker to have some agency in dealing with the thing to be 
spoken of. Because of the prior ontological engagement that I highlight, however, ira’s 
dealings with the thing are premised on referring to it so that it can maintain its 
relationship with other things and with the Absolute. 
I argue that, generally, the depth and breadth of Being, as it comes to bear on ira and thus 
allows the spoken (or written) word to manifest, is largely ignored in most text. This 
regrettable omission comes about because of an overly great emphasis on the self in the 
role of language as socially constructed. One learns language, acquires it, and may 
dispense with it as one sees fit, according to that explanation. While there is an element of 
language being constructed by the self, as I have noted, the fact that the Absolute figures 
very rarely in discussions is concerning. Language is dependent on the movement of 
things in the world in relation to ira (and to other things in the world), together with the 
desire of ira to utter aspects of those things. One writer who does illustrate this prior 
agency to language is Browne (2005) who argues strenuously and convincingly for the 
active influence of wairua/spirit in language (mainly in its teaching and learning). She 
points to the tendency of mainstream education to oust these sorts of philosophies around 
not only language but relationship with the world generally. 
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Every word should be an acoustic formula for its construction and 
pronunciation - the pronunciation itself is a higher, imitative sign of a 
higher pronunciation – construction of the meaning of a word. All of 
these are ultimately dependent on the laws of association. So-called 
arbitrary signs mightn’t be as arbitrary as they appear - but stand in a 
certain real nexus with what is signified. (Wood, 2007, p. 54)  
 
The saying of a word is the pronouncing of a thing for Novalis; words are to 
become audible and visible, so that “[das seltsame Verhältnißspiel der Dinge] 
spiegelt sich in ihnen [den Worten]” (1960c, p. 672)/[the peculiar relational play of 
things mirrors itself in them [words]]. In saying a word, its sound, or pronunciation 
(as an active movement of ira) takes on special importance. Novalis appears to 
envisage that the pronunciation of a word is merely a step in the direction of 
another, perhaps more mystical, pronunciation, coming to bear on the thing 
bringing about the saying of it. However, none of these elements – thing, 
pronunciation – work independently of each other. I surmise that Novalis 
advocated a view that the word is involved in a deeper mystery with the speaker of 
it and the object to which it relates. The pronouncing of a word – in effect, saying 
it – gives it some sort of force. This is his ‘acoustic formula’: a relational structure 
between sound, thing being spoken of, and ira. Again, by coming into ira’s sphere 
of consciousness, the thing is said. 
 
Desire is a keen participant in these activities that word and language indulge in. 
As we have seen, there is a realm of concern for ira that permits ira to engage with 
things in the world to begin with and to say them116. According to Novalis it is the 
                                                
116 Ira’s desire to say something is important for the word and may result in the extension 
or romanticising of a traditional term in order to explain a phenomenon. If romanticised it 
will not necessarily bear strict resemblance to its traditional meaning. I note here 
Holman’s (2007) analysis that “presentist arguments” (p. 372) are undesirable because 
they “ascribe contemporary meanings to the past” resulting in  “anachronistic 
etymologies” that result from “unexamined revisionism”. Holman takes to task 
Marsden’s apparently unbounded and liberal application of the traditional term ‘mauri’, 
stating that “[m]auri meanwhile continues to mutate into an available vessel that may 
contain whatever the writer requires of it” (p. 372). This is admittedly true if one is 
anxious at the potential for the terms to be rendered static in the contemporary 
environment, but I argue that Marsden is more intent on highlighting a philosophical 
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soul that, when confronted with a thing, seeks out  “genetischintuitiven Worte” 
(1960b, p. 431)/[genetic-intuitive words]. The formula is one that allows the soul 
to apprehend and ‘complete’ a concept by making it into both spirit and matter. 
Here, as in other fragments of his Das Allgemeine Brouillon, Novalis is eager to 
synthesise the empirical with the unknown. In this fragment, the soul is given the 
task of instinctively grasping a thing by orienting it towards ira. He suggests that: 
 
Unsre Sprache – sie war zu Anfang viel musicalischer und hat sich 
nur nach gerade so prosaisirt – so enttönt. Es ist jetzt mehr Schallen 
geworden – Laut, wenn man dieses schöne Wort so erniedrigen will. 
Sie muß wieder Gesang werden. Die Consonanten verwandeln den 
Ton in Schall. (1960b, pp. 283-284)  
 
Our language - was much more musical to begin with, and has 
gradually become so prosaic - so unmusical. It has become more like 
noise - sound, if one thus wishes to degrade this beautiful word. It 
must become song once again. The consonants transform tones into 
noise. (Wood, 2007, p. 37)  
 
He shows that language has been narrowed in scope considerably by reason but 
that the musical nature of things in the world means that their saying should 
likewise be musical. 
 
When ira desires (‘mea’), says, deals, manages a thing that is shown to it, ira also 
pronounces (‘whakahua’) or brings to fruition (‘whakahua’) that thing in turn. 
Thus there is an impact back on that thing that has come into the view of ira by the 
activity of whakapapa. Both word and thing remain mysterious to ira because of 
the process of whakapapa as a self-organising, layering movement of Being. But 
ira can point out (‘tohu’) a thing and lay it by or preserve it (‘tohu’) as a means of 
carrying on in relation to and on the instruction (‘tohu’) of that thing. The original 
                                                                                                                                 
phenomenon than the linguistic purity of a term. Marsden wishes to envisage the term 
‘mauri’ as an activity, not as a static event. Moreover, the phenomenon that he wants to 
refer to is an enduring one for him, and he therefore finds a contemporary manifestation 
different from the traditional one. 
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desire that the thing arouses in ira should be retained in ira’s dealings with that 
thing. There are consequences for ira in misconstruing that original ‘tohu’ of the 
thing, and here we are again reminded of the lament of the thousand-fold voices of 
nature in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais. For ira, even supposedly banal words – ones that 
are not reserved for ceremony – move into ira’s inclination in the first instance 
because of Being. The moment of desire that ira feels for the thing to be said is 
important here, because it is what initially inclined ira to the thing and it ensures 
that ira reflects the unknowable nature of the thing. Ira is involved with the ‘huna’ 
(mystery) of language and saying that word necessitates at the same time acting in 
accordance with the sensuous nature of that word. 
 
Where words, such as those outlined in chapter six, have lost their ontological 
sense, ira may help reenergise them by uttering them in accordance with the 
original Being of their orientation towards the speaker. With ira being particularly 
aware, in a traditional way, of the power of words, then the saying of those words 
may be constantly allowed to emerge from that initial point of desire. This poses 
challenges for the push to have one meaning for a word. Yet as Novalis indicated, 
the initial interference of Geheimnislosigkeit can form a pathway towards 
Romantisieren. In the case of ‘whakapapa’, for instance, I have outlined that there 
is a problem for the wellbeing of the person in strictly scribing its parameters. The 
point of desire may be unidentifiable (which itself is another construal of ‘mea’) 
but is innate to the saying process; thus, allowing for the possibility that the word 
emanates from that point of desire, which is in itself not sayable, is important. 
Romantisieren is an acting out of that point of desire – it is carrying out the innate 
instruction of that word as a Being-oriented object. One may start with the 
geheimnislose rendition of that word and use that first principle, which is self-
assured and certain, to lift the word up to a more poetic realm. 
  
Social outcome of accrual for ira 
Recall that Novalis wishes things to be viewed as working in conjunction with 
each other. The thing and ira are physically distinct from each other yet inform 
each other in totally intimate ways at the same time. Pihama (2001) discusses the 
inextricable link between te reo and ‘ōnā tīkanga’/[its customs] that does not 
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nevertheless override the significance of those two elements. She notes that the 
two can be discussed separately and yet viewed as linked; in a similar way, we 
may talk about speech, nature, the Absolute and ira as occupying separate spaces 
but as constantly interacting with each other117. Such a description, as Novalis 
would have it, results in a far more effective way of talking about the whole 
subject of layering and the self. Even in relation to ira’s association with 
whakapapa, Pihama (2001) recognises that: 
 
Within whakapapa we are a part of a complex set of 
interrelationships. We are a part of whānau, hapū and iwi. Yet 
contrary to dominant belief, this does not deny our own person as 
individuals, rather what it contends is the prioritising of cultural 
relationships over a notion of privileging the individual. Rangimarie 
Rose Pere writes that each individual has their own absolute 
uniqueness and that we need to keep a balance between individual and 
group pursuits. (p. 130) 
 
There is a dilemma that collectivist discourse poses for the Māori self when the 
activity of ‘whakapapa’ is considered. It assumes that everyone will be affected by 
their surroundings in exactly the same way; namely, everyone accrues exactly the 
same experience, feeling and mysterious qualities of objects (which are henceforth 
not mysterious as the experience is now general). Certainly, collectivity is 
important insofar as it recognises the impact of others on the self and vice versa. 
To that extent Māori are collective – and that form of collectivity is responded to 
by the idea of whakapapa, because it immediately demonstrates the influence of 
others on ira – but this does not stand in for the effect that that layering process has 
                                                
117 Mildon (2011), recalling Delamere’s words, identifies the interrelatedness of nature 
and reo in a more primordial sense than human speech: “In the grander scheme of things, 
traditional Te Reo are the voices of nature; the jolt of an earthquake, the song of a bird, 
the rustling of leaves, the rumbling of thunder before a storm, the piercing bolt of 
lightning in the night sky, the rushing waves of a tsunami, the cry of a whale, the fresh 
smell of rain on the earth” (p. 10). I suggest that these reo may not even be heard or 
sensed by ira but will nevertheless have an effect on ira, as they appear to be more 
aligned to the arrangement of things in the world than just pure sound.  
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on ira118. Novalis’ emphasis on the individual working in conjunction with other 
elements supports the idea that there are a number of aspects to whakapapa that tie 
in with each other but have their own separate aspect: Thus Pihama (2001) 
continues that “[w]hakapapa is not only about identity and knowing who we are 
as Māori, but is surrounded by discussions of the whenua, of inter-relationships, 
of past experiences and key events in whānau, hapū and iwi history” (p. 149). 
 
Exkurs: Actio in distans – whakapapa 
For ira, whakapapa has as part of its meaning the connection of things in the world 
(through the activity that whakapapa denotes). Novalis’ phrase ‘actio in distans’ allows 
for the distant activity of things in the world that cannot be seen, but with ‘whakapapa’ 
those things take on a greater intimacy for the self. Those things that are to be poeticised 
are hence not detached objects for the self but are, in a sense, only affective because they 
are linked with the self. Speech, as one mode of expression, affirms that distant action for 
the self, and is one example of comportment towards things in the world, when thought 
about alongside the various meanings of ‘mea’. The distance that is inherent to the notion 
of ‘Dasein’ is especially evident here because the comportment that is involved for the 
self is oriented towards those things that are ‘there’ or are not immediate. 
 
‘Actio in distans’ may refer to events in the past and to the people associated with those 
events, when romanticised by ‘whakapapa’. Novalis indicates this in his assertion, quoted 
above, that “[u]nsre Sprache – sie war zu Angang viel musicalischer” (own 
emphasis)/“[o]ur language – was much more musical to begin with”, hinting at the 
utterances of ancestors. ‘Sprache’, then, has the potential for the self to be a constant 
reaffirmation of those ancestors, when it is spoken poetically. As I have noted above, 
though, ‘Sprache’, when romanticised with ‘mea’, is not simply speech; it is also a mode 
of orientation towards things. Novalis’ poem “Astralis” contains some important stanzas 
in relation to this, for instance: “Noch war ich blind, doch schwankten lichte 
Sterne/Durch meines Wesens wunderbare Ferne,/Nichts war noch nah, ich fand mich nur 
von weiten,/Ein Anklang alter, so wie künftger Zeiten” (1960h, p. 318)/“I still was blind, 
yet twinkling stars was seeing/Through distant, wondrous reaches of my being;/Nothing 
yet was near; I found at distant stages/Myself a hint of old and coming ages” (1990, p. 
151). The emphasis on distance demands that attention be paid to the influence of what 
cannot be perceived, and simultaneously to the impact of what is to come. In a moral 
sense, the self is reminded of its inability to take control over those things in the world 
that are activated by Being and which remain at a distance from the self. ‘Whakapapa’ 
and ‘mea’, taken together with ‘actio in distans’, argue that the self is morally responsible 
for remembering the mystery of the activity of those things. 
                                                
118 Indeed this process of layering is individual but not in the sense of the individual 
unrelated to other things in the world.  
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The concerning comportment of things for ira: Whakaaro 
The ‘over-there-ness’ of Being does not in any way mean that ira is unrelated to 
Being, but merely that one may not find an identity with Being. We should be able 
to see here that there is a distance, yet intimacy, in the dealings of Being. Here, 
finite manifestations of Being – objects in the world – do not have to be 
immediately present to affect ira. In current colonised settings, as I noted 
particularly in chapter five, Māori are encouraged to pursue things in the world as 
if those things’ importance is in their visibility. Yet things in the world have an 
effect on ira even when not present, through the ultimately unfathomable nature of 
‘whakapapa’. Novalis (1960b) declares that “[a]lle körperliche Operationen sind 
ein entgegengesetzes Denken. Drüben ist Brennen, gähren, stoßen etc. – was hier 
Denken, Empfinden etc. ist” (p. 268)/“[a]ll bodily operations are an inverse 
thinking. What is thinking sensing etc. here – is burning, fermenting, thrusting etc. 
yonder” (Wood, 2007, p. 24), showing that the body makes visible its activities at 
a distance (although the body might not perceive what is occurring in those distant 
places). The effect that distant entities may have on ira is also demonstrated in his 
statement that: 
 
Alle Wirckungen sind nichts, als Wirckungen Einer Kraft – der 
Weltseele – die sich nur unter verschiednen Bedingungen, 
Verhältnissen und Umständen offenbart – die überall und nirgends ist. 
(1960b, p. 423)  
 
All effects are nothing else than the effects of one single force – of the 
World-Soul – which only manifests itself under certain conditions, 
relations and circumstances – it is everywhere and nowhere. (Wood, 
2007, p. 146)  
 
Novalis’ description of thinking as a distant activity has application for the Māori 
self too. Unnerved by the ‘over-there-ness’ of Being, ira is therefore influenced by 
Being. Being arranges things in the world according to its own autonomy and at 
times these things are perceptible. Whakaaro, although quickly rendered as 
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think/thought, means more fundamentally to cause something to come to the front 
or comport towards one. Takirirangi Smith (2000) argues that whakaaro means “to 
cast attention to” (p. 58), which he places as an “activity of the stomach and the 
entrails”. He continues “the stomach is associated with the ira tangata aspect or 
earthly component of that which forms the basis of action”. It is not, however, “the 
actual process of rational thought” (p. 58), which he believes is closer to “Te 
Whanau a Rua”. Te Whanau a Rua, involving as it does a connection with 
meetinghouse, earth mother, and sky father, still attracts the interaction of 
Geheimnis of things in the world with rational thought so that ira is still in a state 
of wonderment at those things, even though rational thought may be an outcome.  
The awareness that ira is involved in here is located in the realm of desire or 
inclination, not just in cognitive reflection that ‘thinking’ expects. Royal’s (2005) 
reference to ‘aroaro’, which is that area directly in front of the person, emphasises 
balancing the senses in that exercise. I agree with Royal that this process of 
harmonisation is important: It contributes to the wellbeing of ira, in much the same 
way as Novalis believes it does. In an important reminder of the need for revisiting 
the long-held belief of thinking, Royal (2005) states that: 
 
[T]exts – and latterly screens – serve to narrow the aroaro. Consider 
what happens to our bodies when we spend some time either reading 
texts or sitting in front of a screen. This experience, the physical 
position, narrows and sharpens the aroaro. The more time and the 
more often we do this, the more the aroaro becomes fixed in a certain 
shape and the less ‘omni-directional’ we become. (p. 16) 
 
I argue that the ‘becoming’ aspect of the prefix ‘whaka’ needs more recognition 
generally in Māori scholarship, alongside the ‘to cause’ interpretation that is 
commonly attributed to it. It is possible that, within the activity of ‘causing to 
consider’ that whakaaro denotes, both causative and gradual elements are possible. 
However, the ‘cause to consider’ is not one that originates from ira but instead 
from without. Yet we must make room for the necessity of ira’s recognition of the 
thing to be considered, and it is here that the ‘desire’ facet of aro becomes 
especially important. Novalis (1960m) asked: 
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Wie kann ein Mensch Sinn für etwas haben, wenn er nicht den Keim 
davon in sich hat? Was ich verstehn soll, muß sich in mir organisch 
entwickeln. (p. 419)    
 
[How can a person have a sense for something if he does not have the 
seed of it within himself. What I am meant to understand must 
develop organically within me.]  
 
To become considered, a thing must first have some emotional quality for ira. Here 
the “sense for something” occurs at a very subjective level, with the consequence 
that ira can then start to consider it. The desiring in respect of the object occurs at 
the point that it is made conscious, even if not identifiable, for ira.   
 
In becoming inclined towards the object that has come into ira’s view of concern, 
there occurs a reciprocal activity between them, one that carries on the movement 
of Being through the dynamism of whakapapa. Thus the object has an ongoing 
effect on ira even when ira believes itself to have ceased thinking about the object. 
To this extent, Māori were traditionally careful about the nature of their 
relationship with objects; for instance, they would not blithely overturn a rock 
(Smith, 2007) or fell a tree - not simply for environmental reasons but also, I 
argue, because they are responding to the constantly impinging activity of Being 
through whakapapa. Whakaaro, then, concurs with whakapapa because it 
continues long after ira’s awareness of it has ceased. Hence as aro, one is in the 
presence of (‘aroaro’) Being because one remains inclined towards the object, 
even when that relationship appears to ira to have ended. 
 
Wonderment through the groundlessness of Being: Ako 
There is a learning process here for ira in the sense that the initial orientation 
towards the thing is what causes it to become focused on. Novalis discusses this in 
terms of poesy. Novalis’ love of poesy is key to his surmise that nature and 
humanity are interdependent. Poesy is not merely an exercise in aesthetics but is 
 301 
more importantly a way of clearing the path for things to reveal themselves in their 
proper surroundings. Poesy is aware of the shortcomings of logocentric ways of 
speaking that adhere to rules and appear certain at that level but that cannot 
acknowledge a prior mysteriousness offered by nature. Things may show 
themselves in their inherent character through poesy. What is learnt through this 
way of revealing is that one carries vestiges of things in the world throughout 
one’s certainty towards things and is hence forced to engage with those things with 
a sense of Geheimnis. Novalis advocates permanent wonderment in learning; thus 
learning does not just relate to the capture and uptake of factual data but to the 
Geheimnis that whakapapa as a layering process provides. He proposed that 
education is cyclic with one always returning to a child-like state (Schrock, 2006). 
In Die Lehrlinge zu Sais the students are constantly aware of the revealing that is 
allowed through statements of Geheimnis and through the mysterious disclosure of 
nature. What is more important to Novalis is this constant marvel at things in the 
world. 
 
In Die Lehrlinge zu Sais the young messianic boy who enters the students’ 
demesne is seen as inspiring wonderment among the students, as well as being in a 
state of quiet wonderment himself. His wonderment, however, is not only self-
created; it also arises from the world around him. For ira, ‘ako’ as I outlined in 
chapter six is currently restricted to knowable bodies involved in a tightly 
constrained exercise of learning and teaching (even if the learner and teacher 
exchange roles). I argue, however, that the wonderment that should be felt by ira in 
any conscious process should also be part of that activity of ‘ako’. To be sure, 
there are two additional meanings for the word ‘ako’: to split, have a tendency to 
split; and to move, stir (Williams, 1921). In thinking about the role of things in the 
world with language, Raerino (2000) stated that: 
 
Kai roto i ngā kupu me ngā momo kōrero, waiata, haka me ngā 
karakia a te Māori ngā oro o te taiao. Ko ngā oro nei hai tūhono i te ao 
tangata, ki te ao o te wao. Ko ngā momo oro hai tūhono i te ao 
kikokiko ki te ao wairua, te ira tangata ki te ira atua. (p. 1)  
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[Within words and the diversity of talk, songs, performance and 
prayers of the Māori, resides the sounds of the world around us. These 
sounds link man to the world of the environment. These sorts of 
sounds connect the bodily realm to the spiritual realm, the intrinsic 
humanness to the intrinsic godliness.]  
 
The sounds that Raerino refers to are manifestations of the Sprachlehre giving rise 
to the tones of words that Novalis mentioned. Taken together with Novalis’ overall 
impression of the mysterious, however, Sprachlehre is not entirely perceptible. 
There is a prior orientation of nature that allows signs in nature to manifest to 
begin with119; this prior ontology is something that depends to a large extent on the 
interplay of person, nature and object. The impressions that the person gleans may 
differ according to that ontological movement underpinning those sound 
manifestations. This may impart a sense of moving or stirring for ira. Moreover, 
there is a need to incorporate to ako the idea of ‘a tendency to split’. Addressing 
this unorthodox attempt at bringing together the various meanings of ‘ako’ into 
one activity, Thrupp and I (2012) noted the following: 
 
At first glance these meanings are all irresolvable to the mind which 
endorses commonsense. However, how this word might move 
together with the weight of all its meanings represented together is a 
fascinating idea. In other words, how would it have been for the 
reader to see ako defined as: learning, teaching, while having a 
tendency to split and being in a state of moving and stirring? (Thrupp 
& Mika, 2012, p. 209)   
 
                                                
119 Royal (2008) refers humanity’s concern with two types of knowledge in relation to 
“Te Ao”/the world, which may be distilled to rationalism: “[T]e mātauranga e hāngaia 
ana e te tangata hei whakamārama mō te Ao” (p. 26)/[Knowledge that is constructed by 
the person to explain the world], or empiricism: “[T]e mātauranga … e homaingia e te Ao 
anō hei kōrero mōna”/[Knowledge given by the world so that it may be discussed]. Royal 
rightly complicates the strict delineations between these two traditionally Western forms 
of knowledge. In both cases Novalis would have it that they are actually processes of 
being in the world. ‘Knowledge’ may be an outcome, but it is constantly affected by 
Being and is hence not free from continual Geheimnis. It is therefore still located within 
the interplay of things in the world that he indicates; as knowledge it is still active and 
mysterious. 
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The danger of common sense is that it tends to cast things in the world as evident 
to the self. With the more romanticised approach to words that Thrupp and I 
envisaged, however, we attempted to depict the activity of the word ‘ako’ as 
involving all meanings at once 120 . We had therefore drawn on the banal 
definitions offered in the dictionary to begin the process of Romantisieren. In 
respect of the ‘split’ element of ako: 
 
It would be tempting to suggest that the process of learning or 
teaching stirs one to split what is being learnt from its context. 
However it could also refer to that which is fragile and which is 
deserved of respect; in the sentence kei te ako au one could be in a 
state of fragility while moving or stirring in the process of learning or 
teaching. In the sentence kei te ako au i te reo - and although there is 
only one transitive verb – to learn, teach, instruct – one could be 
learning the language and at the same time be stirring or moving, 
whilst in a fragile state, even because of the reo. Thus language in this 
light is something that affects the person, rather than just being an 
object of creation by the person. (p. 209)  
 
Again the issue of the effect of the external on ira arises; this is a major theme in 
Novalis’ works. We indicated that stirring and moving occurs because of the 
impact of the thing on ira: 
 
Stirring and moving does not take an object; hence it seems that the 
activity takes place with a sense of independence and autonomy. The 
action occurs within, although the self-involvement envisaged here 
                                                
120 Whilst Andreotti, Ahenakew & Cooper (2011) do not address the Māori term ‘ako’, 
they do argue for a constantly mysterious interpretation of learning. They state that 
“engaging with complexity, diversity and uncertainty would be translated into equipping 
students to respond and adapt to a sacred realm (of both visible and invisible realities) 
that is both elusive and tangible and where multiplicity and uncertainty are natural 
givens” (p. 46).  This leads to “intellectual freedom”, with an “ontological responsibility”. 
I add that if ‘ako’ is viewed within a much wider framework of ontology then it is less 
concerned with a self-conscious situation of learning and teaching and simply (yet 
sophisticatedly) is oriented more towards an everyday activity of comporting oneself 
towards things in the world. The activity that I anticipate here is an ontological one that 
may or may not be realised by ira, and may involve learning or teaching as an outcome, 
but is not dependent on these exercises. 
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does not preclude a collective movement; it may be an activity which 
engages the individual but can be reflected in the wider group. Care 
has to be taken here, though, to ensure that the individual is not 
immediately and urgently submerged within a collectivist discourse, 
especially when it is indeed just the individual that is moving and 
stirring within. It is sufficient to recognise that one moves or stirs 
singly or as part of a group. 
 
So what exactly is this moving and stirring? Does it necessarily have 
to involve the person? If we were to state the phrase kei te ako au 
(commonly accepted as I am learning) but wanted to acknowledge 
that one is inextricably part of a landscape that encompasses whenua, 
whakapapa and so on, is it possible that the moving and stirring occurs 
outside of a person and also they are moved to a different state of 
being? We are reminded again of Heidegger, who conceived of 
language, for instance, as that which speaks (Heidegger, 2001). With 
Beings constantly being summoned into presence by language, and 
language as something which we hear and then speak, we then 
become dependent on the movement of entities outside of our realm of 
control which then nevertheless become meaningful to us. Here, ako 
is the action of the external which always at the same time concerns us 
and involves us because of our link to the external. In other words, our 
movement and even agitation are entirely dependent on how the 
environment itself moves toward us.  
  
Stirring and moving can also take the ki participle which suggests a 
sort of behaviour toward a thing, rather than a concerted action 
exerted directly on the thing as a direct object. At this point a fragile 
approach is appreciable; the acknowledgment of one’s own frailties 
and mortality while moving toward a thing ensures a sort of respect 
not too different to that envisaged by Levinas (1969) who asserted that 
the beholding of the Other did not involve knowing the Other but 
rather treating the Other as different and unknowable; thus the Other 
was not reduced to something less. The individual or group may reach 
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out toward another or a thing in a fashion which carries a feeling or 
sense of fragility, not the bold sense of confidence that is 
conventionally supposed to attend the acquisition of knowledge. (p. 
210)  
 
As with Rigby (2004), Schrock (2006) refers to Novalis’ assertion that we are to 
teach nature. Yet the coming into view of things in the world before the Lehrling 
should be remembered here. Ira is engaged in saying things in the world and this 
will impact on these things but ira still acts as a vulnerable entity in this way 
because of the moving, stirring process of those things. Cherryl Smith (2000) 
states that “within whakapapa there are origins and explanations for trees, birds, 
parts of the human body, words and speaking, the cosmos, the gods, karakia, the 
moon, the wind and stones” (p. 45), allowing “the speaker and listeners to 
negotiate the terrain of both seen and unseen existence”. Such involvement with 
“seen and unseen existence”, of course, does not mean that one set out to acquire 
complete knowledge about those existences but that one should acknowledge the 
impact of their co-existence on the self, amongst other things in the world.  Ako 
may hence be thought of as another active layering: 
 
When we do consider the learning, the uptake, or the teaching of a 
segment of knowledge, we are now involved with an objectifying 
process – or, at least, we would be if we were not cautioned by the 
other states of being inherent to the word ako that we have outlined. 
The stirring and fragility are states of being, but they temper the 
tendency of the learner and teacher to objectify through any 
supposedly pure act of learning. With our movement toward the thing 
that is to be related to in a careful fashion while learning and teaching, 
we are not just seeing the thing being learnt or taught as something 
distant. Knowledge itself is imparted from the natural world and thus 
the interaction of the self with that knowledge is consonant with a 
traditional Maori worldview that endorses a holistic relationship. 
(Thrupp & Mika, 2012, p. 210) 
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‘Ako’ as the impact of the unknown 
Novalis’ works are replete with references to the mystery of the felt world. In his 
Hymnen an die Nacht he reflects on the emotional state of darkness: 
 
Doch was quillt 
So kühl und erquicklich 
So andungsvoll 
Unterm Herzen 
Und verschluckt 
Der Wehmuth weiche Luft, 
Hast auch du 
Ein menschliches Herz  
Dunkle Macht - 
Was hältst du 
Unter deinem Mantel 
Das mir unsichtbar kräftig  
An die Seele geht? 
Du scheinst nur furchtbar – 
Köstlicher Balsam 
Träuft aus deiner Hand 
Aus dem Bündel Mohn 
Weiter sehn sie 
Als die blässesten 
Jener zahllosen Heere 
Unbedürftig des Lichts 
Durchschaun sie die Tiefen 
Eines liebenden Gemüths,  
Was einen höhern Raum 
Mit unsäglicher Wollust füllt. (1960i, pp. 130, 132)  
 
But what wells up? 
So cool and refreshing 
So forebodingly 
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Under the heart 
And swallows up 
The soft air’s sadness? 
Have you also 
A human heart, 
Dark night? 
What are you holding 
Under your cloak, 
That grabs so unseen, strongly 
At my soul? 
You seem only fearful.- 
Costly balm  
Drips from your hand 
From a bundle of poppies. 
In sweet drunkenness 
You unfold the heavy wings of the soul, 
And give us joys 
Dark and unspeakable, 
Secretly, as you are yourself, 
Joys which let us 
Sense a heaven. (1988, p. 51)  
 
Darkness is unseen Being for Novalis that involves an influence on the body. 
Darkness ‘grabs so unseen’ but ‘strongly’ at the body, resulting in emotional 
turmoil. Evident in the poem is the sense of the not – uncertainty as to whether a 
characteristic exists in relation to the night. Novalis identifies there is secrecy to 
the night that is not evident in the day. Robinson (2005) indicates of the ‘Te Kore’ 
traditions that only nothingness may be spoken of; he states that ‘Korekore’, 
meaning “not nothing” (p. 298), confronts us with negation that can only itself be 
referred to negatively. Yet even in speaking about it we can be assured that there 
has been a movement of the element of korekore towards ira as a manifestation of 
concern. As with Novalis’ Hymnen an die Nacht ira is able to respond to korekore 
as a thing to be considered in subjective ways because ira carries within it the seed 
of korekore itself. Just as night never ceases to exist for Novalis, so korekore 
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thrives within ira despite the various stages of creation.  It will be recalled that, as 
whakapapa would have it, the presence of Being occurs at all times and 
everywhere. For ira there are effects of whakapapa that are not immediately, or 
indeed ever, discernible, yet their impact will involve a kind of learning. Novalis’ 
actio in distans, while intended to refer to art and aesthetics, concisely represents 
also his views about the presence of things in the world in relation to the self. He 
identifies various things in the world that are distant but are nevertheless 
influential for the poet. They may all influence, but are not perceivable by, ira. 
What happens at a distance happens for the conscious mind, as we have seen; yet 
how things in the world influence us without our awareness is also a matter of 
concern for Novalis. In other words, we may be aware of a thing coming into our 
sensory realm but we can never be aware of all of them at once. Things in the 
world, vast in number, are constantly participating with each other, leading 
Novalis to speculate that:  
 
Je mannichfacher Etwas individualisirt ist – desto mannichfacher ist 
seine Berührung mit andern Individuen – desto verändlicher seine 
Grenze – und Nachbarschaft.  
Ein unendlich caracterisirtes Individuum ist Glied eines 
Infinitinomiu[m]s – So unsre Welt – Sie gränzt an unendliche Welten 
– und doch vielleicht nur an Eine. (1960b, p. 261)   
 
The more diversely individualized something is – the more diverse its 
contact with other individuals – the more variable its boundaries – 
and neighborhood.  
An infinitely characterized individual is a member of an 
infinitinomium – Thus our world – borders on infinite worlds – and 
yet perhaps only One. (Wood, 2007, pp. 18-19)  
 
Royal (2005) similarly notes in relation to Māori that “[t]he land and the person 
becomes one as in the well known term, ‘tangata whenua’. The person is the earth, 
the earth is the person” (p. 18). Although he was stating this to highlight how 
Māori come by knowledge, I argue that it could equally apply to the unknowability 
of the impact that all things in their entirety have on ira. As to the vastness of this 
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impact, expressed through the presence of whakapapa, Tomas (1994) argues that 
there is a bond that is beyond the experience of humans, as it branches out to the 
“rest of the physical world” (p. 40). In this activity, ira seeks to go “immer nach 
hause” (Novalis, 1960h, p. 325)/[always towards home], which is in fact always 
back to the point at which one recognises the vastness, and simultaneously the 
homeliness, of the relationship between things in the world. Pihama (2001) noted 
about whakapapa that it “exists irrespective of our specific knowledge of its 
complexities, and for many Māori the search towards knowing those specificities 
can be fraught with complications” (p. 129). As the indiscernibility of whakapapa 
will affect ira to the same extent as its perceivable elements, there will be a greater 
impact on the ontological aspects of ira than the dominant interpretation of ‘ako’ 
as ‘teaching and learning’ would allow. 
 
Disclosure and concealment for ira: Whenua 
Whenua appears to ‘rise up’ to ira because it is a constant disclosing to ira of a 
number of elements. These include: emergence, Papatūānuku/Earth Mother, 
Ranginui/Sky Father, tīpuna, forthcoming generations, history, and concealment. 
The simultaneous nature of these things in the world means that whenua both 
reflects and impacts on humanity’s emotional and physical state and therefore acts 
as a constant, active influence on ira. Ira is the object of special forces, according 
to Novalis when he states that “[u]nser Geist ist eine Associationssubstanz – Aus 
Harmonie – Simultanëitaet d[es] Mannichfachen geht er hervor und erhält sich 
durch sie” (1960b, p. 456)/“[o]ur spirit is a substance of association – It results 
from harmony – from the simultaneity of the diverse, which also preserves it” 
(Wood, 2007, p. 172). 
 
At all times, whenua contains ira, so that emergence and concealment for instance 
are inevitable activities confronting ira. Emergence constantly concerns ira, not 
just through the physical birth of another human (and hence it is not just an event) 
but also because of ongoing concerns that ira has in respect of their history. What 
has gone before for ira is reflected in whenua and all its disclosing elements. In a 
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sense, emergence is a confronting issue for ira because it is an ongoing process of 
strange elements as well as familiar. Things in the world are present for ira but in 
an unobtainable way; their ongoing existence, whether physically or 
imperceptibly, is confronting because they continue to exist without confirmation 
by ira. Emergence, or ‘whānautanga’, represents the constant membership of 
things in the world that will have an impact on ira. Indeed, I speculate that the 
word ‘whānau’, which is commonly termed ‘family’, may initially have its 
etymological origins in the idea of ‘causing something to come or go’, in the 
sense of ‘whā’ and ‘nau’121. ‘Whānau’, dominantly constructed as ‘family’, 
clearly prefers the emergence of things (in that case, people) in a community. 
Taken together, the idea of ‘whānau’ is the ongoing emergence and concealment 
of things in the world. Their emergence and concealment will come to bear on 
other things in the world, including ira. 
 
Ongoing emergence and concealment are attributes of the Absolute that also take 
place through whenua. In Heinrich von Ofterdingen, whilst talking about poetry, 
the merchants stated that: 
 
Wie aus tiefen Höhlen steigen alte und künftige Zeiten, unzählige 
Menschen, wunderbare Gegenden, und die seltsamsten Begebenheiten 
in uns herauf, und entreißen uns der bekannten Gegenwart. (Novalis, 
1960h, p. 201) 
                                                
121 If I am to discuss the family members that are normally concretely discussed in much 
governmental literature, then I do so here within the context of ‘whānau’ as I have 
rendered it in the text. My rendition of ‘whānau’ prefers the notion that those finite 
members of a family unit emerge and depart actively within the similar process of 
emergence and concealment that occurs in the wider world, which may also be described 
as ‘whānau’. ‘Whānau’ thus depicts the fragility of human presence (or the presence of 
any entity) and highlights the tendency of things in the world – including family members 
– to either suddenly come forth or draw back. ‘Families’ are hence phenomena that are 
reflected in the wider world, and as a verb the term becomes ‘to move towards’ or ‘move 
away from’. Novalis also noted the “Anlage”/[potential predisposition] of every family 
“zu einer unendlichen individuellen Menschheit” (1960o, p. 540)/[to an infinite 
individual personhood]. As Stoßsatz this assertion of his is incredibly useful, because it 
acknowledges the birthright of the individual but within simultaneous infinitude. 
As ‘birth’ (which is the other meaning of ‘whānau’), what comes forth is finitude, and the 
Absolute remains concealed in its totality. One may then be aware of finitude but is also 
reminded of the immersion of that finitude within the infinite. Novalis’ “Astralis” may be 
recalled here, with its emphasis on concealing and revealing occurring during birth, 
which is the birth not only of a child but also of infinitude. 
 311 
Within us as out of deep caverns there rise ancient and future times, 
countless people, marvelous regions, and the strangest occurrences, 
snatching us away from the familiar present. (Novalis, 1990, pp. 31-
32)  
 
The hard surface of land is thus imbued with other qualities that immediately 
engage with the self. Amongst these entities that arise are time (ancient and 
future) and countless people. These entities all match the solid, physical notion of 
‘tūpuna’ that is often given to mean ‘ancestors’. ‘Tūpuna’ is another form of 
emergence to the extent that there is a welling-forth (‘puna’) of something, often 
attributed to one’s ancestors but, I argue, also referring to the non-human act of 
manifestation. Again, the history of the individual is one aspect of this welling-
forth, so that it remains in front of ira as much as an historical precedent. That the 
welling-forth is a confronting activity shows itself in the way that it stands as an 
emerging thing in the world. There is an attribute of what has happened in the past 
here – evident in the equivalence of ‘tūpuna’ and ‘ancestor’ – but simultaneously 
there is a manifestation of what springs up towards ira. What is important here is 
that whenua becomes an active entity through its membership with other elements 
which are often taken to be just nouns but which are, in fact, constantly revealing 
(and concealing) things122. Ira becomes aware of this activity through the solid 
manifestation of Papatūānuku (land) and the aforementioned process of layering 
(whakapapa) as well as the occasional glimpses of what has taken place in the 
past, and what may occur in the future.  
 
Novalis noted that “[j]edes Ding ist positive und negative Größe; denn es ist ja 
nicht das nicht, was es ist – Was es nicht ist, ist es nicht – i.e. es wird von Seyn 
                                                
122 For Novalis, a romantic land is active. Linguistically it may be a noun, but Novalis 
highlights the active nature of the land: “Das Land der Poesie, das romantische 
Morgenland, hat Euch mit seiner süßen Wehmut begrüßt” (1960h, p. 283)/[The land of 
poesy, the romantic Orient, greeted you with its sweet sadness]  (1990, p. 111). Similarly, 
while strictly a noun, ‘whenua’ is also active. Browne (2005) notes that Māori thinking 
prefers the verb, but does not venture outside of the orthodoxy that treats nouns as such. 
An attempt to turn ‘whenua’ into a verb, taking account of its nounal aspects of 
‘ground/land/afterbirth’, might give it a sense of ‘to give rise to’, with land or afterbirth 
allowing a thing to come forth, but also as a phenomenon that rises around a thing, at 
times concealing it. What may also be given rise to is the act of concealment, both of 
which are possible in the nounal versions of ‘land’ and ‘afterbirth’. 
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und Nichtseyn, von Setzen und Nichtsetzen, bestimmt und nicht 
bestimmt/bestimmbart und nicht bestimmbart” (1960j, p. 180)/[every thing is 
positive and negative size, because it is not not what it is – What it isn’t, is that it 
is not – that is, it is made up of Being and Not-Being, place and Not-place, 
definite and not-definite, determinable and not-determinable]. Concealment and 
not-concealment can be added here, so that the concealment of a thing in the 
world through whenua is also its emergence. Māori traditionally say of death “ka 
hinga he tetekura, ka ara ano he tetekura” – “as the fronds of the fern wither, new 
shoots replace” – which comes close to the simultaneous concealment/revealing 
of, in this case, humanity. Although the activities I have outlined – tūpuna, 
Papatūānuku, whānau – appear to be instances of disclosure through whenua, they 
also actively indicate withdrawal. ‘Whānau’, as I have already suggested, implies 
causing to move away as much as move towards. Whenua is therefore evidence of 
mortality but is actively the presence of life as well.  
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Exkurs: Tupuna/‘Vorfahr’ romanticised 
The reaffirmation of the ancestors of the self becomes more marked in a 
romanticising of ‘Vorfahr’/ancestor with ‘tupuna’/ancestor. ‘Tupuna’, as we have 
seen, also means to well forth with both human and non-human elements. In that 
light, ‘Vorfahr’ suggests that the self encounters both what has gone before and 
that which currently ‘goes before’ the self. Thus things also manifest before 
Dasein that are simultaneously connected to the past. As we have seen, Novalis 
notes that one’s land is more than just the inert object that it is often taken to be. 
‘Vorfahr’, as both land and people that well forth before the self, provides the self 
with both physical and spiritual sustenance in the present, even if ‘Vorfahr’ 
intends to deal with past and future but not the immediate present. The self, as 
with ira, is a thing in the world that draws to it that which has gone before and 
continues to go before and so provides that current continuity for ‘Vorfahr’. 
 
As constantly emerging ancestor, land for self, as for ira, is evidence of the 
Absolute. “[A]lte und künftige Zeiten”, as Novalis has noted, “steigen … aus 
tiefen Höhlen”, and emerge before the self as expressions of the Absolute. This 
manifestation shares some similarities with the verb form of ‘ao’/[to world]. Here, 
past and future times come into the vision of the self, or dawn toward the self. 
Alongside these ‘Zeiten’ are “unzählige Menschen” that, along with ‘Zeiten’, are 
those things that materialise before the self. Tūpuna dawn constantly for ira, and, 
romanticised in a similar way, Vorfahr also move towards, before and prior to the 
self. 
 
This linguistic Romantisierung suggests that the self is responsible for viewing the 
earth as an unknowable but intimate entity that manifests mystery from a distance 
as well as proximately. One’s ancestors are in fact these manifestations that are 
not only human but also entities from one’s local and distant space. 
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Summary 
In this chapter I have romanticised the terms ‘whakapapa’, ‘whenua’, and ‘ako’ so 
that some essence of Geheimnis is reclaimed for them. Romanticising the self so 
that it is a participant with things in the world was also an aim of this thesis; thus 
the idea behind ‘mātauranga’ was romanticised to the extent that the complexity 
of the other terms stepped in to explain the highly complex movements that the 
Absolute undertakes and that ‘mātauranga’ threatens to overlook. The terms 
‘whakaaro’, ‘whakawā’, ‘mea’, ‘tohu’, ‘whakapapa’, and ‘whenua’ ascribe an 
interrelationship to the self as it is placed within things in the world.   
 
Novalis was an architect of highly novel ideas around the relationship between the 
self and things in the world, alongside that of the interface of Being, those things, 
and the self. His works reveal some fascinating glimpses into the possibilities for 
an interpretation of things in the world, together with an incorporation of an 
empirical, scientific approach to both words and nature. We have seen that the 
poetic and fragmentary nature of his philosophies, quite apart from posing 
difficulties, allows us to achieve the impetus to start to critique geheimnislose 
beliefs. However, Novalis enables us to start a far more vital and exciting process 
than that: his fragments contribute to the foundations of a more organic, unfolding 
way of looking at things in the world and the self. This endeavour is exciting 
because it is dependent on the deviser’s ability to hold the different fragments of a 
holistic worldview, which is, I argue, the only way to do justice to Novalis’ 
works. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
The Absolute, not able to be perfectly represented by human language and 
science, may nevertheless be glimpsed in writing as well as the process of 
thinking. As a ubiquitous phenomenon it may dwell distinctly in spaces where 
disciplines meet, because it allows those disciplines to work and activate 
themselves to begin with. It underpins divergent fields of knowledge and acts as a 
unifier as it resides under and within those fields. In this thesis I have established 
a dialogue between Early German Romantic and Novalis’ philosophies, Māori 
Studies, the social mechanisms of powerful colonising institutions, and 
epistemology, in a novel way and with a fresh outcome. I have addressed the 
Geheimnis that accompanies this interdisciplinary method and retained it 
throughout my substantive discussion as well, so that a presence of Being is 
always remembered. The special place of interdisciplinary work in allowing 
mystery to yet again be part of things in the world has been a focus of this thesis. 
 
I have highlighted aspects of epistemology and language philosophy in this work, 
and have also touched on areas that are not accounted for in dominant 
philosophical disciplines. Novalis has been of particular assistance here, because 
he emphasises the precarious but necessary role of the philosophising writer in 
taking account of the ontological and spiritual realms so that they are, indeed, no 
longer ‘realms’ but are infused with those objects that are normally held with 
epistemic certainty. This for him, and for me, has been the nature of Geheimnis: 
the recognition and acknowledgement of Being as one engages with a thing in the 
world. I have revisited ontological elements that move throughout all things in the 
world so that one may not discuss them without involving oneself within those 
elements.  
Uniqueness of the thesis 
Because of these unusual groupings of cultural thought, I can confidently assert 
that my thesis is unique. For scholars of Early German Romantic thought it brings 
to the fore some of Novalis’ philosophies and interprets them through an 
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indigenous lens. For the Māori reader it similarly highlights certain philosophies 
and starts to discuss them within their fuller implications for language, but with 
Novalis constantly in the background. It hence brings to the fore a Novalis-
inspired Māori critique of Being and Geheimnis with relevance to epistemology, 
ontology, metaphysics, and postcolonial studies. 
 
To some extent, my overall method of placing a Western philosopher alongside 
aspects of Māori thought and scholarship is a risky one. There is not a big body of 
scholarly work on this sort of method – particularly to discuss what I have 
proposed is a Māori metaphysical problem - so I had no precedent to work from. I 
could not use established empirical methods and bring those to bear on these 
particular philosophical questions, because I actually challenge those methods. 
This has made the work both demanding and exciting, because if we are to give 
Novalis full room for movement, the ‘method’ should be one that is quite similar 
to the actual substance of the work – not viewed so much as a distinct mechanism 
by which one has a desired outcome. Even though through my 
Erkenntnisinteresse I did have a prospective outcome in mind as I worked through 
the thesis, the method forms part of that outcome as folded into the overall 
discussion as well as the mechanism to arrive there. 
Specific arguments 
In chapter two I described my method, which drew on Novalis’ broad project of 
Romantisieren in specific detail, and pointed out that I would refer to Novalis’ 
writings as Stoßsätze to write from, to propose Māori notions of Being, 
Geheimnis and Geheimnislosigkeit. I began that chapter with a quote from 
Novalis about the oppositional nature of Being, and this would provide a push to 
describe Being, the Absolute, and the unreified. However, this description 
occurred due in no small part to Marsden’s metaphysical theories of korekore as 
well. To that extent, I placed Novalis and Marsden in a discussion with each other 
to compel me to think about the significance of those terms.  My responses, which 
were spurred on from variously provocative, illustrative, and romanticising 
Stoßsätze, were brought about also by the impact of things in the world, including 
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past experiences and tribal affiliations. I argued that this method/methodology 
chapter was additionally substantive because it set the scene for the development 
of the colonised self generally as a geheimnislose entity. What became clear, as 
the thesis developed, was that a dialogue was developing between my thinking 
and Novalis’. Combined, these dual discussions would then act as a collaborative 
Stoßsatz for the discussion at the time. The Stoßsatz method was therefore not as 
one-directional as I had imagined it would be. ‘Dialogue’ may not be an entirely 
sufficient term to use here, as I maintain that any term used to describe this 
exercise should emphasise the ‘push’ that was nevertheless still evident in the 
progress of my discussions. ‘Symphilosophische Stoßsätze’/[philosophically 
collaborative sentences that push] could be an appropriate phrase to use here. 
Despite what turned out to be a unified discussion of the 
Geheimnis/Geheimnislosigkeit of things in the world, however, I still assert that 
the general emphasis was on Novalis’ beginning sentences to provide a 
subsequent discussion that included Māori scholarship and thought. The 
cumulative effect of these sentences that push, I argue, added to the depth of the 
work, because their culturally disparate character provided a greater impetus for 
that push. In association with each other, they gathered momentum to encourage 
discussion about things in the world with an unusual and distinctive twist. 
 
In order to discuss Geheimnis I had to raise Being as an issue, and then posit some 
theories of what Being would be from a Māori worldview, through my own 
thinking and that of other Māori writers. This was the focus of chapter three. 
Novalis assisted me with this because he provided a means of critique that I could 
imitate. Although Fichte’s theories of the absolute self grated against Novalis in 
no small measure, we have seen that Novalis also admired Fichte for positioning 
the self to be the central figure of all things in the world. This admiration was 
based not only on the fact that there were several appealing aspects to that 
positioning, as it amplified the fraught place of the self; it additionally turned on 
the nature of Fichte’s instigation of Novalis’ interest in the self and Being, which 
then enabled Novalis to philosophise on the theme. Despite disagreeing in marked 
fashion with Fichte, Novalis was appreciative of that assistance from Fichte. This 
means of critique formed an impetus for me to then undertake a similar discussion 
against a Māori writer, Te Maire Tau, whom I also admire for his courageous and 
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innovative analysis of the self and knowledge. This chapter was intended to show 
that one could and indeed should make assertions about Being through the 
practice of critique, as Novalis had with Fichte. I also wanted to lay the ground for 
a discussion about Geheimnis and its relationship with the Absolute, to 
demonstrate that both Being and Geheimnis were meant to be acknowledged as 
everyday phenomena and not to be relegated to any specific part of human life or 
purely to esoteric thinking. Novalis, along with some reflections on my 
upbringing with my aunt, assisted me in some assertions about how the Absolute 
works, and the implications of this for Geheimnis (which, because of the 
Absolute, should be retained for every thing in the world). 
 
The problem of Geheimnislosigkeit in Western modernity as well as colonial 
discourses then formed the focus for the next three chapters. Chapter four 
described Novalis’ views on the Enlightenment, which impinged on his society in 
a number of ways. The problem for him was not science as such, but the much 
more fundamental rise of a static view of things in the world, together with the 
self as the absolute central figure in that view. Although the Enlightenment had 
not taken hold in Germany to the same extent as it had in France and England, 
Novalis and the other Early German Romantics witnessed its progress with some 
trepidation, because its tenets of rationalism threatened certain traditional 
worldviews; namely, the belief that things in the world were suffused with the 
Absolute and were therefore not knowable with any determinacy, and that the self 
was one of many things in the world. Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” gave us the 
problem in poetic form. I analysed the poem and supported it with various 
historical and poetic discourses. What emerges is that Geheimnislosigkeit is often 
hard to identify, because it lies deeply beneath some very entrenched philosophies 
and practices. Its submerged character allows it to manifest as diverse, everyday 
social problems and yet remain protected from being recognised. Thus, Novalis 
identified that what are taken to be common problems have their roots in 
philosophies that sought to divest the world of Geheimnis and make it thoroughly 
knowable and clear to the objectifier. 
 
That chapter acted as an overall Stoßsatz for my Nachdenken about a similar 
problem in the Māori world, in chapter five. In modern times, we see that Māori 
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are encouraged through various institutional mechanisms to view both the self and 
other things in the world as geheimnislos. Commonly, Māori have observed and 
experienced the excluding practices and philosophies, in their various guises, of 
the institutions of law, health and education. Occasionally, the philosophical 
impetus for this exclusion is acknowledged but rarely has the theme been 
sustained for a complete discussion, as if it is the underlying problem. I carried 
out this chapter on the basis of “Wenn nicht mehr” on the basis that it is the 
constant but invisible problem for the Māori self. I pointed out that the exclusion 
by institutions is in fact an exclusion of Geheimnis, not just of the self (although 
this is a substantial portion of its working mode) but, importantly, of other things 
in the world too. There are potential implications in those procedures for the 
ontological and metaphysical balances of things in the world, including the self. 
Some of these consequences relate to preventing the thing in the world from 
manifesting according to its own agency through the language that is directed at 
it. In turn, the self is isolated and ontologically affected. The nature of the critique 
here is that things in the world come to be discussed on the basis of those very 
primordial, initial orientations of the self towards those things. Language comes to 
be framed according to that inclination, and it is my discussion of that regard that 
allows me to then turn to chapter six, which addresses how certain common Māori 
terms have either been banalised over time because of Geheimnislosigkeit or have 
been introduced to justify the staticising of the self and other things in the world. 
 
Chapter six therefore considers Māori terms as they have become commonly 
used, also on the basis of the critique that “Wenn nicht mehr” provided. Those 
terms are ‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’, and ‘whenua’. The term ‘mātauranga’ I discussed 
as an introduced one; I argued that it coincides with a tendency of 
Geheimnislosigkeit to place the self as an entity that is capable of getting to know 
things in the world thoroughly. Because it conjoins so readily with ‘knowledge’ in 
its overly rationalistic form, it has become particularly predominant since 
knowledge of a thing in the world gained in importance. The first three terms have 
been interpreted in line with the philosophy that things in the world are solid, self-
evident phenomena that promise to be fully knowable by the self. Thus these 
entities either assist the self in gleaning knowledge or else provide it outright. 
Novalis’ “Wenn nicht mehr” helped me to disturb that idea, also with a focus on 
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the subterranean problem that lies underneath those terms. My discussion in 
chapter five had outlined that problem, and the terms that I raised in chapter six 
showed a definite lack of Geheimnis, as if the terms were not connected to the 
Absolute. 
 
Chapter seven was an important one for this thesis, for two reasons: It 
demonstrates more explicitly than the others the nature of the romanticising 
Stoßsatz, and it additionally used those sentences of Novalis’ to romanticise the 
terms that I noted had become geheimnislos in their use. It is the most vivid 
example of the cumulative Stoßsatz. Chapter two had introduced in some depth 
the idea that one is constantly affected by things in the world, and chapter three 
added to this by a discussion of how one’s selfhood relies on the movement of the 
Absolute, and is hence largely mysterious. Chapter four then emphasised more 
explicitly the importance of critique and showed the general problem of the self as 
central entity; adding to that discussion, chapters five and six showed that the 
ontological problem of Geheimnislosigkeit affected Māori on an everyday, 
terminological level. For chapter seven, all these chapters revealed both problem 
and possible resolution. In combination they provided a fertile ground for 
romanticising the terms ‘whakapapa’, ‘ako’ and ‘whenua’, and, by romanticising 
the self, the idea behind ‘mātauranga’ was also romanticised, even though it had 
ceased to figure as an outright term to be romanticised in that chapter. What came 
clearly to the fore was that, if romanticised along the lines of Novalis’ writings, 
the Māori terms’ activity is highlighted, and they lose their self-evidence. Things 
in the world, distant as well as near, emerge and conceal through a romanticised 
view of those terms. Because of that constant autonomous activity, the Absolute, 
providing Geheimnis, is recognised as a romanticising and infusing phenomenon. 
 
I also directly romanticised some German Romantic terms through my own 
Nachdenken and by drawing on relevant Māori scholaraship. These forms of 
Nachdenken are an important facet of Romantisieren, as they acknowledge the 
ongoing character of that project. The aim of those Nachdenken is to alert the 
German Romantic scholar that there are possible extensions to be made to those 
terms, and to highlight the vitality of collaborative work in that regard. Despite 
these visible additions, though, I speculate that I have romanticised aspects of 
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Novalis’ thinking by bringing it into an engagement with Māori indigenous ways 
of thinking. 
 
Philosophical and cultural implications of the thesis 
as it relates to postcolonialism 
Arising from the philosophical focus and implications of my thesis, there are 
specific postcolonial ones that are important. I believe that my thesis could 
contribute to what already exists in terms of Māori research about colonisation. 
My critique has been both general, starting with the metaphysical, and has moved 
towards the specific in my discussions about particular discourses that refer to 
things in the world with Geheimnislosigkeit. Where writers such as Pihama and 
Linda Smith have started these discussions, I have gone in a different direction, 
tending to look at the fundamental assumptions that predicate a colonised placing 
of the self in relation to Being. This has underpinned my discussions even when 
talking about specific instances of colonisation. I attempted to sustain the 
phenomenon of Being in those discussions so that it would become apparent that 
Being was not simply a thing that could be relegated to another (usually mystical) 
space. 
 
This thesis may assist those Māori readers who are seeking other ways of thinking 
about things in the world. At a time in which I believe we are being encouraged to 
think of our things in the world as highly evident, it becomes necessary to think of 
these things in totally different ways. Perhaps the greatest help that Novalis has 
been here is in his identification of how Being is a current (yet historical and 
future) phenomenon that is not consigned to the realm of ceremony or to certain 
geographical spaces. He has been helpful in bringing me to discover that Being is 
a dominant force in our lives that impacts on everyday activities. This is largely 
forgotten in New Zealand and threatens to become lost in writing about Māori 
issues. There is also a logical tendency to forget that, if Being is no longer 
acknowledged as a primordial activity, our regard for things in the world is 
affected. I have identified in this thesis – in particular in chapter five – how it has 
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been a colonial project, intentional or otherwise, to encourage the Māori self to 
forget this fact. 
Everyday nature of ontological metaphysics 
Geheimnis, as I have emphasised throughout, is given by the Absolute. Thus the 
metaphysical realm encroaches and moves throughout the common, everyday 
realm. Geheimnislosigkeit is a forgetting of the Absolute, but despite the fact that 
one of the causes of this forgetfulness is that the Absolute is consigned to either 
the past or to particular sites, it is nevertheless a problem occurring here and now. 
My thesis has opened spaces that are generally discussed as socially oriented and 
given them a metaphysical focus, and I have reflected the everyday relationship of 
the Absolute with things in the world by offering both a critique and a resolution 
of common terms. My aim here has been to question the commonly held belief, or 
the drive to adhere to the belief, that the Absolute somehow ceases its influence at 
a particular point, either in time or in practice. This has been an ambitious aim 
because at most junctures we are urged to think of Being as somehow rarefied or 
bygone. In that sense I have tried to show that one should attend to the tension 
between critique and affirmation and construct them so that are both part of one’s 
normal affirmations. The affirmation part places a resolution to a problem as a 
possibility for the thinker, and to critique forces the thinker to engage with a 
current problem, and thus places the issue of philosophy as a problematic, 
contemporary theme. I argue that this critique needs to be a sustained one, and is 
even itself a resolution simply because it aims to place the thinker, and other 
things in the world, in the present. 
 
I have not yet come across much indigenous writing that so sustainedly focuses on 
philosophical colonisation as Novalis does. To be sure, there are various 
interpretations of ‘philosophy’. What I mean by the term here is the metaphysical 
place of self and things in the world in combination with Being, then in relation to 
current colonised existence. When it does crop up in indigenous writing it is 
superseded by, or is folded within, what Royal (2007) terms a “sociological” (p. 
11) discussion. He maintains that this approach to explorations of ‘knowledge’ 
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form the greater part of Māori research. The colonisation that I am referring to in 
my thesis is more fundamental than an epistemological one: It is ontological and 
occurs at quite a primordial level. Novalis has enabled me to access this level.  
Challenges arising during thinking and writing 
In chapter seven I discussed the fact that language is given to one to speak, 
evident in both Novalis’ theories and certain Māori terms. The Absolute, or 
Being, governs this provision through the active nature of whakapapa. One may 
therefore encounter another’s thoughts and then incorporate them with his or her 
own, with the aim of romanticising normal thinking and in tandem with ethical 
Nachdenken. 
 
An interesting challenge was that of maintaining my cultural voice while 
responding to Novalis. Some readers may find that one of the limitations of the 
method might be that the outcome has remnants of Novalis’ own cultural 
background within it. Indeed, in chapter two I argued that these traces would be 
evident, and I maintain that argument at this stage also. Novalis certainly wanted 
various aspects of his argument accounted for in one’s Nachdenken: notably, the 
place of the individual self in relation to things in the world, the mediation of the 
self as it responds to a colonised notion of those things, and the ability of the self 
to transform the world even as the self acts within Being. These are not common 
considerations in Māori scholarship, and Māori readers in particular will find 
these desiderata either refreshing or problematic. I have found them to be 
inspirational and worthwhile, but acknowledge that limitations may arise. 
Retaining a Māori ‘voice’ 
Due directly to Novalis, terms such as ‘Being’, ‘the Absolute, and ‘self’ have 
been mentioned much more frequently than one normally encounters in Māori 
scholarship. A sustained focus on them in this thesis could be critiqued on the 
grounds that the terminology is not of the Māori world. When I began this thesis I 
was worried about the possibility that I would somehow introduce foreign 
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theoretical matter into Māori experience. Novalis’ Stoßsätze placate this concern 
to some extent because in their ideology they have some similarities to Māori 
belief. Thus ‘Being’ and ‘the Absolute’ are markedly similar to ‘korekore’. 
Having taken aim at the equivalences of terms between cultures, I realised that I 
had also talked about a key term within my own cultural context. This term, 
Being, is historically fraught for the West and so, as Novalis would have it, may 
convey with it similar discursive problems to words such as ‘knowledge’. Yet 
writers such as the German Romantics have attempted to talk about Being while 
retaining some uncertainty. Being is not a self-generated phenomenon with them, 
and so as a term it does not demarcate out a specific thing. Instead, for them 
Being underpins all things in the world. I feel protected to a certain extent in my 
use of it because of the fact that they describe it in such opaque ways to begin 
with. The problem, if there is one here, would be that I am talking about it in the 
language that directly colonised us – English.  
 
The problem may more appropriately be traced back to written academic 
language. One major challenge in tackling the questions I have lies in sequentially 
laying out an argument that requires clear terms. Novalis himself was unclear 
when talking about Being, and would not say that it shared an exact identity with 
this or that. He would, however, describe that it exists, and at best he said that it 
was ‘freedom’, which is hardly a precise definition. One has to name it in order 
for it to be valid in research, however, and a term had to be given to this 
unknowable activity that underlies everything. This is a major challenge for Māori 
writers who talk about a significant term at a time and it prohibits a discussion of 
Being that reflects Being’s integrity. In my research I have found this a difficult 
problem, because, as we have seen, Māori terms, if approached from a position of 
Being, each revolve naturally around each other.  
 
“Self” as a dominant figure in research discussions is potentially much more 
challenging. My response to the difficulty that reifying “self” poses is twofold: 
Firstly, there is a tendency to discuss Māori constantly as a collective group and 
not to discuss the ontological characteristics of the individual (if I were to offer a 
phrase to describe this tendency, it would be “the enforced collectivisation of 
Māori”); and, secondly, colonisation largely provokes individual responses at a 
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number of levels, and so “selfhood” must be catered for in discussions about 
Geheimnislosigkeit. Geheimnislosigkeit as Novalis would have it challenges 
Being in favour of the primacy of the self. The introduction of Geheimnislosigkeit 
to Māori thus requires that the place of the self is addressed and hence that ‘self’ 
is mentioned. My rendition of ira, though, aims to thwart the normal expectations 
that come with “self” by making the self less certain through the term. 
 
I identified in chapter two that sentences that push stay with the outcome and are 
embedded in them. Because Novalis has played an indispensable role in the 
outcome of this thesis, it follows that his influence will be all the more palpable, 
and that the outcome will have vestiges of his thought in it. Discussions about a 
‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ voice are not his primary concern, and are not mine either, 
but the fact that he has been drawn on to such an extent will mean that he will 
appear from time to time in the thinking and writing of this thesis. As a Māori 
writer who writes in the field of cultural philosophy, I welcome the turn from a 
discussion of the pure voice to one that engages with the voices of many in text 
and speech. 
Complicating what is actually quite simple 
The reader may have gathered that I think of the influence of the Absolute as far 
from straightforward. Novalis certainly gives the impression that the idea of the 
Absolute is difficult enough, to say nothing of the nature of its role in everyday 
things in the world. My thesis has deliberately engaged with the notion that those 
terms needed complicating, if complicating is indeed the appropriate word here. 
Tied in with this is the possibility that I have overly spiritualised certain terms that 
were actually quite pragmatic and that have served both the German and Māori 
audiences quite well for a long time. Chapters two, three and seven, where I make 
affirmations about certain terms, reveal what is my deliberate transformation of 
those terms so that they no longer particularly show what they used to. The Māori 
terms figure much more here than the German ones do, but placing the German 
Romantic terms alongside Māori interpretations does alter them, or at least it does 
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give them a different slant. I suspect that, if anything, rather than spiritualise those 
terms, I have made them more attuned to things in the world, and more concrete.  
 
Perhaps I can theorise with more authority about the Māori terms. I have heard 
various knowledgeable people assert that terms such as whakapapa are actually 
straightforward. My response is that, beneath and within that transparent level of 
the terms, lies Being, which allows things in the world to manifest at all. The 
appearance of the thing that whakapapa refers to might appear obvious, and it may 
be used in that vein, but there are other senses to the word that are silenced but 
nevertheless persist in that silence. So, whakapapa might be used as genealogy, 
but even in that expression the ‘quietly clamorous’ voices of those other senses 
echo too. This is not necessarily a ‘spiritual’ phenomenon, either – although I 
argue that Māori have been encouraged to redefine matters that are not immediate 
as spiritual – but one that is part of a quite concrete, yet still unknowable, activity 
that underpins all things in the world. 
Potential for future research 
My recommendations are not aimed at government departments and the like: That 
is, I have nothing to say on the matter of how either my method or the discussion 
about colonisation and solutions could be incorporated as a ‘framework’ into 
conventional government policy or law. Instead, I would like to think that my 
thesis was accessible for a Māori audience, in particular a Māori academic 
audience. To this end, as my thesis indicates I would like to highlight that as 
Māori we need to constantly address colonisation (and its remedies) in innovative 
and fresh ways. The method I have drawn on here has given me the freedom to 
explore theoretical considerations, and it has not involved community research. 
The beauty of this sort of method is that it allows a certain degree of creativity 
and it focuses almost solely on the critique of assumptions, rather than gaining 
data as a first method. It is a given premise of this sort of research that one is 
setting out to critique and, if necessary, resolve, and one can start this process 
from the outset. I do not maintain that community research does not critique, but 
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the method I have used is intent on questioning first assumptions rather than 
adding to knowledge based on those assumptions as a central method. 
 
I have referred to various other philosophers – notably Friedrich Schlegel and 
Heidegger – to support my approach to Novalis. In their own right, these 
philosophers could form the basis for an interesting Stoßsatz project that would 
yield different philosophies from that of this thesis. There are other additional 
theorists, too, who could give that impetus to the Nachdenker. Work into 
romanticising common Western philosophical terms would be desirable, 
preferably with the assistance of literature that is not sourced in dominant 
philosophy. Novalis had attempted it in his Das Allgemeine Brouillon, and a 
similar project could be attempted in a current context. Also, working with a 
philosophical source that is at least partially inimical could be a worthwhile 
project, as it would involve delving into the sort of Stoßsatz that Fichte’s theories 
represented for Novalis as a focus. A different style of writing is envisaged from 
that sort of project: one that is reactive yet highly energetic. 
 
Summary: Reference back to “Tērā te Auahi” 
The lament “Tērā te Auahi” that I started with in the introduction is a way of 
referring to the continued reflection that Novalis’ and my Romantisieren project 
represents. It refers to the survival of certain elements, including people from that 
iwi, as well as a way of thinking. In the introduction I referred to it as a means of 
gathering disciplines to discuss the notion of Geheimnis and Being. For me, the 
importance of the lament is that it heralds continued thought in foreign terrain – 
thought that continues to ‘gather’ that terrain to it - but always with the elements 
that it mentions within my writing. What the potential of this lament points to is 
the ability to refer to everyday activity and think about it in terms of its 
Geheimnis. 
 
Just as there are numerous combinations of things in the world in the lament, so 
there is undoubtedly the potential for several collaborations of thinking in 
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philosophy. One of the enchantments of bringing seemingly unrelated cultural 
groupings together is that they immediately engage with the uncertain, and retain 
enough Geheimnis so that things in the world keep their inherent mystery. For the 
Māori self, I have argued this is a positive approach, so that things in the world 
that are normally framed in an everyday manner can retain their self-governing 
but interrelating integrity. I speculate that Novalis, were he living today, would 
have sympathised with that contemporary application of theories, and may have 
understood “Tērā te Auahi”, assisting the disciplines as it does, as a decidedly 
romanticising influence.  
 
  
 329 
Glossary 
This glossary is an aid for readers unfamiliar with German and Māori terms. I 
include the common, well-known meanings of those terms. I also include my 
romanticised interpretations of those terms, noted with ‘Romanticised’. Some of 
the common translations are delved into in more depth, and the romanticised 
interpretations are more fully described, in the text. 
 
The reader should note that both common translations and my romanticised 
interpretations are just meant to help the reader and are not meant to provide pure, 
definitive explanations for them. My proviso here reflects my overall thesis 
argument; that pure definitions may deprive things in the world of their 
Geheimnis and sever those things from their connection with the Absolute. I do 
not aim to offer any finality to the terms – inherent to the etymology of ‘de-fine’ 
(to end, terminate, limit) - but to just provide a first glance for the reader. 
 
German terms 
German term 
  
English translation 
das Absolute the Absolute 
 
der Anstoß  Shock/impetus 
 
aufheben to sublate 
 
der Buchstabe letter 
 
das Dasein/Daseyn Existence (at present); there-being; 
actuality 
Romanticised: agent of thought about 
colonisation; agent that moves towards 
 330 
things with concern 
 
einst once (past and future adverb) 
 
der Exkurs digression 
 
Frühromantiker Early German Romantics 
 
das Geheimnis mystery 
 
geheimnislos lacking in mystery 
 
die Geheimnislosigkeit  lack of mystery 
 
geheimnisvoll replete with mystery 
 
das Geheimnisvolle  the state of being replete with mystery 
 
das Gerede  idle chatter; the gathering together of 
words of a certain kind 
 
das Geviert the Fourfold; Quadrate 
 
die Heimat homeland; dwelling 
 
das Heimweh homesickness 
 
(das) Ich  I; self 
 
die Kreaturen (pl) creatures 
  
der Lehrer teacher 
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die Lehrlinge (pl) students; apprentices 
 
das Nachdenken  reflection; contemplation; (lit.) after-
thinking; meditative thinking 
 
der Nachdenker meditative thinker 
 
die Natur nature 
 
das Nichts the nothing; ontological void 
 
das Romantisieren/ 
romantisieren 
 
romanticising/ to romanticise 
 
der Schlüssel key 
 
(das) Selbst self 
 
(das) Sein/Seyn Being 
 
das Spiel  play 
 
die Sprache  language; 
Romanticised: expression or mode of 
orientation towards things 
 
die Sprachlehre Linguistics; language theory; (natural) 
grammar 
 
der Stoß  push 
 
Der Stoßsatz;  
die Stoßsätze (pl) 
sentence(s) that push and challenge 
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die Symphilosophie  collaborative philosophy 
 
die Systemphilosophie  rational philosophical system; 
foundationalist philosophy 
 
die Tiefgelehrten (pl) erudite person or scholar; deeply 
learned 
 
unbedingt unreified; absolute 
 
das Unbedingte the unreified; the Absolute 
 
die Unbegrifflichkeit  non-conceptual representation; 
incomprehensibility 
 
das Urteil/Urtheil judgement; original division; 
Romanticised: state of becoming, with 
an evident original emphasis; original, 
changing division occurring prior to 
Dasein’s awareness 
 
versteinert petrified; hardened 
 
das Vordenken thinking in advance of/on behalf of; 
exploration on behalf of/in anticipation 
of 
 
der Vorfahr ancestor;  
Romanticised: that which ‘goes before’ 
or ‘has gone before’; that which moves 
towards, before, and prior to Dasein 
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die Weltgeschichte 
 
story of the world; world history 
wenn when; if 
 
die Wunden (pl) wounds 
 
die Zahl/die Zahlen (pl) number/s 
 
 
Māori terms 
Māori term/phrase English translation 
 
akiaki to urge on 
 
ako to teach/learn; to stir; fragile; to split; 
Romanticised: the movement of the 
natural world towards the self so that 
wonder takes place; impact of the 
unknown 
 
ao world; to dawn;  
Romanticised: to world 
 
te Ao Tua Atea Being 
 
aro to have regard for; presence; regard or 
concern; a linguistic component of 
aroaro; 
Romanticised: initial point or regard or 
concern, coming about through desire 
 
 334 
aroaro view of concern; sensory field; coming 
into self’s view or awareness; moving 
to the front; area directly in front of the 
self 
 
awa river 
 
ētahi some 
 
hā/haa breath 
 
hapū subtribe; pregnant 
  
hinengaro intellect; mind; emotion 
 
huna mystery 
 
ia he/she 
 
ira gene; life-force; derived from uira; 
Romanticised: self (ira); Dasein; a 
concurrent exclamation to denote the 
‘over there’ aspect of Being in relation 
to the self 
 
iwi tribe; bone(s) 
 
kaitiaki guardian; steward 
 
kaitiakitanga guardianship; stewardship 
 
karakia prayer 
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kau initial disclosure; absence of a thing 
 
kaupapa theme of discussion;  
Romanticised: Disclosure of ground, 
but revelation to the self that the ground 
is absent; awareness brought about by 
the appearance of a thing in the world 
that is uncertain 
 
kōaro regard of a thing so that it is inverted 
 
kore void; Being; negativity;  
Romanticised: to noth; nihilation; 
sheltering  
 
korekore Being; thorough-going negativity; 
negativity to the point of positivity. 
Romanticised: a thing in the world as 
well as sheer activity; finite thing and 
infinite phenomenon; the metaphysical 
underpinning of critique and 
affirmation/Māori dialectic 
 
kuia older woman 
 
kupu word(s); speech 
 
kupu ohorere immediate provocative response that 
the words arouse in the reader or 
listener 
 
kupu whakakōaro the regard to respond to the word with 
the result that a conventional approach 
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is overturned 
 
kupu whakakōkiri the challenge that a word or set of 
words invokes 
 
mana prestige; power; authority 
 
manaakitanga urging on with care in mind 
 
Māori/Maori indigenous people of Aotearoa/New 
Zealand 
 
Māoritanga Māori cultural way of living 
 
mātauranga knowledge;  
Romanticised: the lack of disclosure of 
a thing’s essence as the thing is settled 
on/contemplated 
 
mate illness; death 
 
maunga mountain 
 
mauri life-force 
 
mea say, thing, deal, wish;  
Romanticised: ultimately inexplicable 
comportment or ontological inclination 
towards things in the world as a result 
of the showing of those things; the 
self’s speech after the autonomous 
showing of things in the world; a desire 
to deal with/congeal the thing by 
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speaking it after the thing has shown 
itself through the Absolute/Being 
 
Pākehā/Pakeha 
 
of European descent (mainly used in 
relation to New Zealand Europeans) 
 
papa rock; earth; derivative of Papatūānuku; 
Romanticised: ground of concern 
 
Papatūānuku/papa-tua-nuku rock foundation beyond expanse; the 
infinite; Earth Mother; Being/the 
Absolute 
 
te pō/po dark; night; derivative of pō-uri 
 
pō tangotango/po tangotango darkness 
 
pō-uri/pōuri distress; 
Romanticised: jarring emotion 
stemming from realisation that a thing 
in the world is also infinite in nature 
 
rākau tree 
 
ranga set in motion 
 
rangahau research 
 
Ranginui  Sky Father 
 
reo language; voice; 
Romanticised: natural expression of 
things through their arrangement 
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te reo Māori Māori language 
 
rohe area 
 
roto inside; lake 
 
taha side; aspect 
 
taonga treasure; prized possession 
 
tangata human; person 
 
tangata whenua people of the land; indigenous people 
 
tētahi one; a 
 
tiaki the active urge towards a thing that 
results in care 
 
tīkanga custom 
 
tinana body;  
Romanticised: the self that comes about 
as physical body within the interplay of 
things in the world and within Being 
 
tino rangatiratanga intrinsic chieftainship/autonomy 
 
tohu sign; represent; point out; lay by or 
preserve; instruction; 
Romanticised: the agency of the self in 
representing things in the world as 
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those things instruct and relate to the 
self 
 
tohunga/tōhunga specialist(s) 
 
tupuna/tūpuna/tipuna/tīpuna ancestor.  
Romanticised: an active welling-forth 
with both human and non-human 
elements; a confrontation of the self 
through a welling forth of whenua 
 
tūrangawaewae place of standing 
 
uira lightning; origin of ira; presence of 
Being; presence of genes. 
Romanticised: a momentous gathering 
to oneself of things in the world 
through those same things; a 
recognition of the self in the unfamiliar 
 
wā time; space;  
 
wairua spiritual; spirit; lit. two waters 
 
whai to have, possess 
 
whaiaro self; that which has a regard or concern 
 
whaka to cause; to become; coming to bear 
 
whakaaro to think; to cause to have regard for; to 
apprehend through the use of the 
senses; to cast attention to; 
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Romanticised: becoming a concern; the 
bringing closer of things in the world 
towards the self’s field of concern 
through the autonomous activity of 
Being; the orientation of things in the 
world; the continuous impact of things 
in the world after their orientation to, 
and impact on, the self through the 
Absolute 
 
whakahua bring to fruition; pronounce 
 
whakapapa genealogy; gene; pedigree; connections 
between things in the world; analytical 
tool to order things in the world; recital 
of genealogy; methodical kinship; 
taxonomy; to layer. 
Romanticised: the movement of finite 
things in the world into new terrains but 
within the influence of Being; 
groundless layering and accrual; the 
ontological accrual to things in the 
world of the effect of things in the 
world, resulting in state of fluidity ; the 
activity that the Absolute carries out to 
arrange things in the world, with an 
emphasis on the interplay of those 
things in the world; constant movement 
towards a ground (such as a definitive 
proposition); the identification of a 
lack, through never arriving at the 
ground 
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whakarehurehu fade from sight; premonition 
 
whakataukī a saying; proverb 
whakawā judgement; to judge; 
Romanticised: primordial awareness of 
time and place as one horizon; 
realisation that the self may not be the 
ground of experience; coming to bear 
of time and place on the self; 
incomplete judgement through positing 
the self as ground of experience 
 
whānau family; birth; 
Romanticised: the tendency of things in 
the world to reveal and conceal through 
the activity of the Absolute; the 
tendency of things in the world to 
suddenly come forth or draw back; the 
emergence of finitude with the 
concealment of Being 
 
whanaungatanga family bondedness 
 
whānautanga birth; 
Romanticised: emergence and 
concealment 
 
wharenui meeting house 
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whare tangata womb 
 
whenua land; placenta; 
Romanticised: that which prompts; to 
give rise to, in the sense of rising 
around things in the world, occasionally 
concealing those things; that which 
rises up; that which actively contains 
the self; that which evidences mortality 
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